Fifteenth special session

COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FIRST MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 6 June 1988, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

INTRODUCTION OF THE SPECIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION TO THE THIRD SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

The Chairman: At this meeting the report of the Disarmament Commission to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is to be introduced by the Chairman of the Commission, Ambassador Hepburn of the Bahamas, and I now call upon him.

Mr. Hepburn (Bahamas), Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission: In my capacity as Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission for the current year I have the honour and pleasure to introduce the special report of the Commission to the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament, document A/S-15/3. The special report was prepared in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 42/42 G. It consists of three chapters and annexes, which constitute the factual description of the Commission's work on various disarmament subjects on its agenda since 1982. In particular Chapter III contains, *inter alia*, the present state of deliberations and recommendations on the respective items, which duly reflect the progress on disarmament issues that the Commission achieved in May this year.

The 1988 substantive session was organized in accordance with the mandate of the Disarmament Commission as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly - the first special session devoted to disarmament - as well as with the request contained in General Assembly resolution 42/42 G, in which the Commission was requested, *inter alia*, to submit a substantive special report, containing specific recommendations on the items included in its agenda, to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament. Bearing in mind the special task entrusted by the General
Assembly, as well as the sentiment that the 1988 session was, de facto, a "forerunner" of the work of the third special session, the Commission proceeded with its work in a spirit of co-operation and pragmatism. Such a co-operative atmosphere may also be attributed to the improved relationship between the two major Powers and their allies.
After three weeks of intensive deliberations, the Commission adopted a number of concrete recommendations made by its subsidiary bodies on various agenda items, as reflected in the relevant paragraphs of the special report. During its 1988 session the Commission dealt with an unprecedented number of eight vital disarmament issues. In this regard I am pleased to report that the Disarmament Commission was able to make specific recommendations by consensus on two of its eight substantive items, namely item 10, verification in all its aspects, and item 11, guidelines for confidence-building measures.

The report of the Working Group on the question of verification in all its aspects addressed three major aspects, namely 16 principles of verification, provisions and techniques of verification, and the role of the United Nations in the field of verification. With respect to the third, the Commission welcomed the view expressed by the Secretary-General in his 1987 report on the work of the Organization that the United Nations can make a significant contribution in the field of verification. A number of concrete proposals made by delegations regarding the nature and scope of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification were discussed, although no consensus on those proposals was possible. The success on this item may be attributed to a general willingness on the part of delegations to reach agreement on this subject, which they recognize as a matter of critical importance in the negotiation and implementation of arms limitation and disarmament.

The Consultation Group on guidelines for confidence-building measures was able at the 1988 session to finalize the three outstanding paragraphs, namely 2.3.3, 2.3.4 and 2.3.6, contained in the draft guidelines considered by the Commission in 1986. By adopting these three paragraphs the Commission completed its deliberations on the subject and fulfilled the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly.
The Commission also made some progress on item 8 regarding the question of naval armaments and disarmament. The meetings of the Consultation Group on that item resulted in a number of findings and recommendations on the subject.

On the other hand, however, I must point out that during this year the Commission was still not able to conclude successfully certain items on its agenda. Though the work of the Commission and its results accurately reflected the present state of multilateral relations and the positions of various countries on disarmament issues, as many delegations pointed out at this session, it could have done better.

Notably, the Commission made only nominal progress on item 4 regarding various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament as well as a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament; on item 5 regarding the reduction of military budgets, despite the fact that there was only one paragraph left outstanding; on item 6 regarding South Africa's nuclear capability; and on item 7 concerning the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, in which the political aspects of the United Nations role were untouched.

Regrettably, no progress was made on item 9 concerning conventional disarmament, an issue of universal concern. It is probably true, as many delegations pointed out, that this issue has a close relationship to the problem of nuclear weapons. It also involves complex aspects of concern for all countries, including the question of arms transfer. Indeed, it may have been too ambitious to try to conclude work on this complex subject within a period of two sessions. The Commission has endorsed the recommendation by the Working Group that deliberations on this item should be continued next year in the Commission.
Recently, many members of the Commission have suggested that the Commission should limit the number of items on its agenda and devote its maximum effort to a few items on which the chances for success seem better than on other items. No doubt, some of those questions under consideration have been maintained on the agenda of the Commission for too long with no conclusions, though it is duly acknowledged that the lack of favourable international conditions has contributed to this outcome. To achieve any modicum of success on those subjects, it is indispensable for all countries, particularly the major Powers, to devote efforts with sincerity of purpose and a spirit of co-operation and accommodation. The improvement of the relationship between the two major Powers and their allies, as currently demonstrated, could expedite the process.

With respect to the organization of work of the Commission in 1988, I am grateful to note that the Commission was free from procedural and organizational difficulties with respect to the equitable distribution of chairmanships of subsidiary bodies. This outcome should be attributed to the extensive pre-session consultations held both in Geneva and in New York. In particular, it should be noted that, despite the fact that the duration of the 1988 substantive session was shortened to a period of three weeks, the Commission was able to arrange the limited time available in a balanced manner for its various subsidiary bodies and to bring about a number of fruitful conclusions.

To conclude, I wish to echo the sentiment expressed by other members of the Commission that as part of the overall disarmament process the efforts undertaken during recent years to strengthen the role of the Commission and to improve its capacity to deal effectively with the questions within its purview must be further pursued so that the Commission may serve as an effective machinery for the promotion of and assistance in the negotiation process on urgent and vital disarmament issues.
I cannot fail to express my thanks to all delegations for their understanding and co-operation in their conduct of the work of the Commission with a view to fulfilling the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly. Special tribute should be paid to the officers of the Commission, in particular the Rapporteur of the Commission, Mr. Sipos of Hungary, and the Chairmen of the various working groups and consultation groups and the contact group - Mr. Martynov of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Mr. Melescanu of Romania, Ambassador Perera and Ambassador Jayasinghe of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Engo of Cameroon, Ambassador Butler of Australia, Ambassador Ekeus of Sweden, Ambassador Mellbin of Denmark and Ambassador Roche of Canada - for their arduous work in the subsidiary bodies and consultation groups of the Commission.

On behalf of the Commission I should also express my sincere gratitude to the Department for Disarmament Affairs for the assistance provided to the Commission, particularly by the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and the Secretary of the Disarmament Commission, Mr. Kuo-Chung Lin, as well as by their colleagues serving as secretaries of the subsidiary bodies of the Commission. To all other members of the Secretariat who assisted the Commission in the conduct of its work, on behalf of the Commission I extend my great appreciation.

With these words of introduction I present to the General Assembly the special report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE AGENCY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (OPANAL)

The CHAIRMAN: As decided by the General Assembly at its third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, at its 1st meeting, held on 31 May 1988, Secretary-General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), Mr. Antonio Stempel Paris, will now address the Committee of the Whole.
Mr. STEMPFEL PARIS (Secretary-General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL)) (interpretation from Spanish): At the time of the League of Nations, the problem of disarmament was approached with a view to finding suitable machinery to enable human beings to coexist in a framework of international peace. Yet the results were unsatisfactory. The Second World War intervened, with the consequent birth of the United Nations, which reiterated the wish to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The cold war and the advent of the nuclear-arms race further hampered the efforts of the international community. The economic crisis, the crisis of confidence and the crisis in multilateralism have all made it even more difficult to achieve the goal.

None the less, our many efforts in the form of meetings, conferences, assemblies and so forth, have led to studies and created situations in which we can better understand the complexity of the problem of disarmament. That problem has been divided into its vertical, horizontal, collateral, strategic and other aspects, which means that the arms race exists in a context that is not only military or political, but that has thrust its roots into the economic and social system of many communities. Moreover, science and technology have advanced faster than man's ability to understand them and apply them wisely.

In the 1963 symposium on "A world without war" - whose proceedings were published under the same title by the Johnson Foundation edited by Arthur Larson - the French diplomat Jules Moch stated his beliefs in this way:

"Supposing that the problem were solved and the world disarmed, the problem would be to prove that peoples were safer than they had been when the horizon was clouded with launching pads, batteries and arsenals and when youth spent its best years in barracks and training camps."
He said there were four pre-conditions for this, which I shall summarize as follows: first, that there be an international disarmament-control organization with extensive inspection powers; secondly, that the International Court of Justice have mandatory jurisdiction, that its decisions apply in all countries and that it be able to impose sanctions on States; thirdly, that, in cases where the above was inadequate, the Court be able directly or indirectly to set in motion through the Security Council's peace machinery an international police force to intervene in the territory that has violated international law, which requires that the Charter of the United Nations be amended to abolish the veto; and, fourthly, that this international police force be created before general and complete disarmament. In other words, what he had in mind in practice was the creation of a world Government.

Stating the problem in those terms it is easy to see the utter impossibility of achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament, as the British historian Arnold Toynbee said at the same symposium:

"We are aware at present of the difficulty of transferring sovereignty from States to a global authority. Once a nation has tasted sovereignty it clings to it at whatever cost to itself or to its neighbours."

In that framework, and taking as a basis the various proposals put forward to date in the international sphere - such as the Unden, Kekonnen, and Rapacki plans, among others - and given the problem posed by the possible emplacement of nuclear missile installations in Cuba in 1962, the idea was developed in Latin America to establish contractually the denuclearization of the Latin American region, including the Caribbean. Among the various purposes of the establishment of the zone, one was that, as a confidence-building measure for other States, vast geographical regions should share the same goals, with the members of the zone ceding some sovereignty in the sense that they would have to accept international
inspections in certain specific cases agreed in the signing of a Treaty affecting
the security of the parties. It was necessary to define the concept of a
nuclear-weapon-free zone and to specify the main obligations of nuclear-weapon
States vis-à-vis States members of the nuclear-weapon-free zone, thus establishing
the first international verification system not only for the States members of the
region but also for nuclear-weapon States themselves.

I should note that through the Rarotonga Treaty of August 1985 countries of
the South Pacific established another nuclear-weapon-free zone contiguous with
those established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Antarctic Treaty. This
encourages the establishment of other similar zones in the near future.

For various reasons, 21 years after the Treaty of Tlatelolco came into force
for 23 States of Latin America and the Caribbean, it is not yet in force for
another 10 States. In fact, Argentina and Brazil - the States of the region with
the most advanced nuclear technology and with vast territories - are not parties,
nor is Chile, which possesses research reactors; Cuba has not signed; Dominica,
Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have
recently acceded to independence and have been invited by the General Conference of
OPANAL to join the zone; finally, Belize and Guyana have been unable to join the
Treaty because of certain of its provisions, a situation we hope will soon be
resolved. With respect to the Treaty Protocols, the islands of Guadaloupe and
Martinique and a continental enclave, French Guyana, are not covered by the
Tlatelolco system because France has not ratified Protocol I.

It should be stated that the signatory and ratifying States must all refrain
from actions running counter to the purposes of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, in
accordance with the principle set out in article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, whose text is fully applicable to this case.
Apart from the work assigned to it under the Treaty, the Agency I head is responsible for the duties assigned to it by General Conference resolution CG/E/Res.5 (II-E) of 14 February 1977, which to its disarmament responsibilities adds the planning, organization and regional co-ordination of Latin American efforts with respect to the full and effective peaceful use of nuclear energy.

When the Treaty of Tlatelolco was written, nuclear technology was very limited in terms of peaceful uses in overall international terms and in the Latin American sphere in particular. Therefore, the authors of the Treaty included in articles 6 and 29 the provisions necessary both for joint consideration of questions that could effect the very essence of the Treaty - including its possible amendment - and for the form in which any such reforms could be considered at a special meeting of the General Conference.

It may be relevant to recall that the Ambassador Emeritus of Mexico and Chairman of all meetings of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, Mr. Alfonso García Robles, said the following at the closing meeting of that Commission, on 14 February 1967:

"Some may say that the new instrument suffers from certain deficiencies and could have been better. But I do not think this should be of concern to us, because the same applies to all the fruits of human endeavour, which can always be improved. It is my conviction that this Treaty is destined to have a very valuable moral influence despite its limitations".

Over the past 21 years doubts have been expressed with respect to the interpretation of various Treaty articles. One was raised by Jamaica on 11 February 1971 in connection with article 5, which defines a nuclear weapon.
Jamaica asked whether the Treaty of Tlatelolco prohibited all military uses of nuclear energy, "including military submarines with reactors for propulsion and non-lethal military uses". Our secretariat replied that

"With respect to the instrument that can be used to transport or propel a nuclear device, the article in question states that 'it is not covered in this definition', if it is separable from the device and not an indivisible part of it".

Subsequently that response was expanded upon when a similar doubt was expressed with respect to the Malvinas conflict. I shall quote the relevant portion of an OPANAL memorandum dated 21 April 1982:

"A nuclear-powered submarine is not a 'device capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled fashion'; as it is a 'device' for the transport or propulsion of a nuclear device for use in war, it is divisible and separable from that device. Therefore, it is not a nuclear weapon, and it does not carry such weapons on board it is merely a nuclear-powered vessel armed with conventional weapons."

That statement was not the subject of debate either in the Council or in the General Conference of OPANAL.
Another of the comments made in this case by the Observer Delegation of Brazil, with the support of other delegations, was that there is no exhaustive mechanism for verifying compliance with contractual obligations in the region for the nuclear-weapon Powers as exists for the States Parties, and the argument was made that only the adoption of such procedures, which do not exist at present, could fully ensure a balance between the responsibilities and obligations of the two groups of interested States.

I should like here to endorse the comments made by the representative of Venezuela at the last General Conference, held at Montevideo, in which he noted that, while the Treaty of Tlatelolco does have some omissions and shortcomings, those cannot be blamed on the drafters or negotiators of that Treaty, much less on the political will evidenced to implement it. The effectiveness that was clearly demonstrated during the course of the war in the South Atlantic in 1982 must lead to considerations of the extent to which the nuclear Powers are prepared to accept obligations or give verifiable guarantees with regard to regional nuclear demilitarization agreements like that of Tlatelolco.

Another doubt, which was raised by Argentina and Brazil in connection with the inspections referred to in article 16 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, had to do with the possible threat to the indispensable confidentiality of certain industrial processes in connection with nuclear energy, which might represent unwarranted harm for the States involved, and with the fact that such inspections are not restricted to specifically nuclear industrial and technological activities but extended, presumably, to many other sectors.

The control system set up under the Treaty of Tlatelolco was approved after a lengthy and exhaustive study of the Treaty by the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, and thus far it is the only control system that has been approved not only by the States in the geographical region itself but also
by the five nuclear-weapon States as well. Nonetheless, the Agency would like to receive suggestions from both Argentina and Brazil in order to refine that article and give it the attention it deserves. The secretariat of OPANAL would like to hear not only objections but also proposals for overcoming them.

Article 18 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which states that the Contracting Parties may carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes, including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons, or collaborate with third parties for the same purpose, provided that they do so in accordance with the provisions of article 18 and the other articles of the Treaty, particularly articles 1 and 5, has also been the subject of considerable thought. First, it must be made clear that we now know with certainty that such explosions, regardless of their objective, are the cause of radioactive contamination of the environment and that they can therefore harm human health.

On the occasion of the signing of the Treaty on 27 September 1967, Argentina declared its satisfaction at the inclusion in the instrument of clauses that preserve the peaceful development of nuclear energy, including article 18, and added:

"Those provisions ensure the use of nuclear energy as an essential auxiliary in the Latin American development process and thus represent the basic prerequisite to laying the foundations of an acceptable balance of joint responsibilities and obligations for the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers with regard to non-proliferation."

Upon signing the Treaty on 9 May 1967 Brazil stated that article 18 gave the signatory States the right to conduct, on their own or in collaboration with third parties, nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons. That statement was repeated on 19 January 1968, when Brazil unreservedly ratified the Treaty.
When Nicaragua signed the Treaty on 12 February 1967 it stated that it did so "reserving its sovereign right to employ, at its own discretion, nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to use its territory for the construction of interoceanic or any other type of canal, for irrigation works, for electric plants, and so on, as well as to allow the transit of nuclear materials across its territory."

Upon signing Additional Protocol II on 1 April 1968, the United States of America stated that:

"the technology for making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology for making nuclear weapons, and that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy generated instantaneously from a compact source."

The United States Government added that it understood

"that articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the activities of the contracting parties under paragraph 1 of article 18."

Nonetheless, the United States later added:

"The United States Government understands that paragraph 4 of article 18 of the Treaty permits, and the United States adherence to Additional Protocol II will not prevent, collaboration by the United States with contracting parties for the purpose of carrying out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with our policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this respect the United States reaffirms its willingness to provide services for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis, in keeping
with the appropriate international agreements, and to join other nuclear-weapon States in a commitment to that end."

That statement was reiterated when the United States ratified Protocol II, adding:

"In this connection the United States Government notes article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, under which it joined in an undertaking to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be made available to non-nuclear-weapons States parties to that Treaty and reaffirms its willingness to extend such undertaking, on the same basis, to States precluded by the present Treaty from manufacturing or acquiring any nuclear explosive device."

In signing Additional Protocols I and II on 20 December 1967, the Government of Great Britain stated:

"Article 18 of the Treaty, when read in conjunction with articles 1 and 5 thereof, would not permit the Contracting Parties to the Treaty to carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes unless and until advances in technology have made possible the development of devices for such explosions which are not capable of being used for weapons purposes."

That statement was reiterated on 11 December 1969, the date of the ratification of those Protocols.

On 15 March 1968, upon ratifying the Treaty, the Netherlands declared:

"No provision of the Protocol will be interpreted as implying that norms other than those set for Contracting Parties to the Treaty are applicable with regard to the conducting of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in the Territory of Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles."
At its tenth regular session the General Conference approved resolution 239 (X), the operative section of which reaffirms the spirit and letter of the provisions of article 18 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, on the understanding that in the exercise of that right the existing levels of security in the region will not be called into question. The Secretary-General of OPAFAL was entrusted with the preparation of a draft additional protocol in which it would be stipulated that peaceful explosions of nuclear devices can be conducted following the norms of radiological protection accepted by the international community.
The prospect that the new technology would make it possible to reduce the costs of major excavation projects, such as canal construction or exploration for oil, led to the development, in the 1960s, of programmes to develop nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in the United States and in the Soviet Union.

All of this is of great importance to the role being played by the Treaty of Tlatelolco in connection with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is clear that if the States possessing nuclear weapons can conduct experiments with nuclear explosives it is difficult to limit that right in a contractual instrument. None the less we do believe that the United Nations and the Organization of American States should conduct a symposium to study the effects of such nuclear explosions on the environment and to establish means of control to guarantee that they will not be used for military purposes. They should also establish norms to protect the environment internationally that can serve as a basis for a binding general agreement that would cover nuclear Powers. We must also take it into account that the denuclearized zone of the South Pacific created by the Treaty of Rarotonga established factors not covered in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, such as the total prohibition of nuclear explosions and contamination by waste disposal.

This new contribution to disarmament has met with difficulties. Some of the nuclear-weapon States have been reluctant to sign its Protocols. It is necessary to emphasize that the efforts of non-nuclear countries must be respected by the nuclear-weapon States and that no geopolitical or strategic considerations should prevent the development of those regions, which would facilitate the goal of disarmament and peace. As has been shown by the study of the United Nations group of experts on denuclearized zones, a number of regions would like to be declared nuclear-weapon free zones, but they have still to be defined legally to establish their link with disarmament. It is, as I have said, none the less essential that
the nuclear-weapon countries listen to the non-nuclear-weapon States in regard to that goal.

The undertaking begun by the Latin American Republics at the beginning of 1963, which culminated in the drafting of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was opened for signature on 14 February 1967, has not yet been completed. The present goal is to achieve the complete integration of the region in accordance with article 4 of the Treaty. I am firmly convinced that no obstacle is insurmountable, given good faith. The Treaty was not intended to make more difficult the work of the members of the region as far as benefiting from technological progress is concerned. Quite the contrary: as the preamble to the Treaty itself indicates, it is its aim not only to put an end to the arms race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, as a contribution to international peace and security, but also to enable the Latin American countries to exercise their right to the broadest and most equitable possible access to this new source of energy in order to accelerate the economic and social development of their peoples.

The potential danger of nuclear proliferation for military purposes led the nuclear-weapon States to try to preserve the status quo so that they could control the nuclear-arms race. History has often shown us that knowledge cannot be withheld. The number of countries that are in a position to produce nuclear weapons is growing, and that means it is necessary to find a legal mechanism to prevent that form of energy being used in a manner detrimental to the well being of peoples.

I have given a list of problems confronting the Latin American region, which is not exhaustive, to make it very clear that the countries of the region are contributing to the struggle for general and complete disarmament and that we are pleased by the talks being held between the United States and the Soviet Union in order steadily to reduce the number of missiles in their possession and their destructive capacity. Those States have the greatest responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, but it is not they alone that need
to make efforts to achieve peace and disarmament; efforts need to be made through
the United Nations, through mechanisms that are acceptable to the international
community.

While the talks between the States having the greatest capacity to arm
themselves are a major step towards the relaxing of world tension, peace is not the
prerogative of the powerful. The right to education, to health and well being must
form the basis of change for the benefit of coming generations.

**ORGANIZATION OF WORK**

*The CHAIRMAN:* At our first meeting, on Friday last, I informed the
Committee that it would be my intention to consult with the Chairmen of the Working
Groups and with Ambassador Garcia Robles with respect to the organization of work
this week. The schedule of meetings that has just been circulated to members is
the result of our consultations and reflects the plans of the Chairmen concerning
the organization and conduct of the work of their respective Working Groups.

As I noted at our previous meeting, the question of the allocation of time
next week will be considered at the meeting the Committee is to hold on Monday
next, 13 June, at which the Committee will receive progress reports from the
Chairmen of the Working Groups. I hope that in the light of the evolution and
requirements of work we shall be able to schedule the meetings for that particular
week.

There is just one minor change in the time-table that delegations may wish to
note. The meeting of Working Group III scheduled for today, immediately following
this meeting, will not now take place. The Chairman of that Working Group,
Ambassador Engo, has indicated to me that he wishes to use the time for informal
consultations. Immediately following this meeting there will be a meeting of Working Group I.

If there are no comments I shall adjourn this meeting. As agreed, the Committee of the Whole will meet on Wednesday, 8 June, and Thursday, 9 June, to hear statements by non-governmental organizations and peace and disarmament research institutes.

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.