Fortieth session
Item 65 (h) of the provisional agenda*

REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION

Prevention of nuclear war

Report of the Secretary-General

CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART ONE</th>
<th>Paragraphs</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1 - 7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS</td>
<td>8 - 78</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. CONCLUSION</td>
<td>79 - 88</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PART TWO

REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

Argentina .................................................. 26
Australia .................................................. 27
Brunei Darussalam ................................. 31
Bulgaria .................................................. 31

* A/40/150.

85-22451 1510-11n (E)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Federal Republic of</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART ONE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By its resolution 39/148 P of 17 December 1984, the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report on suitable steps to expedite effective action for the prevention of nuclear war, to be transmitted to the Conference on Disarmament and submitted to the Assembly at its fortieth session, and invited Governments to submit to the Secretary-General, not later than 1 February 1985, their views on such steps so that they might be taken into account in the preparation of that report. The present report was prepared in accordance with the request of the Assembly.*

2. In the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, contained in its resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, adopted by consensus, the Assembly, "alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race", declared in paragraph 18 that "removing the threat of a world war—a nuclear war—is the most acute and urgent task of the present day", and, in paragraph 47, declared that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization, that it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons and that the ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. And, in paragraph 58 of the Final Document, it stated that "all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement, and thereby ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered" and that "all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons."

3. At the outset, it should be noted that, while it is generally agreed that the prevention of nuclear war is of overriding importance, the question has been approached from different perspectives and differing ideas and proposals have therefore been advanced. These are presented in summary form below (see paras. 4-7). The views of Governments submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 39/148 P are reproduced in full in part two of the present report.

4. Non-aligned and neutral countries stress that the greatest peril facing mankind is the threat of destruction from a nuclear war, which would have devastating effects on belligerents and non-belligerents alike. They also stress

* Previously circulated as document CD/603 and Add.1.
that the most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war lies in the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and that, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited. In their view, nuclear weapons are more than weapons of war; they are instruments of mass annihilation and thus the consequences of their use would inevitably extend far beyond the target and the purpose of their use. Therefore, they find it unacceptable that the security of all States and the very survival of mankind should be held hostage to the security policies and interests of nuclear-weapon States. In the face of the enormity of the global devastation that may be wrought by nuclear weapons, they consider legal justifications for the use of nuclear weapons without foundation, noting that such weapons were unknown when the Charter of the United Nations was drafted. They recognize that it is primarily the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to prevent a nuclear war but consider that the problem cannot be left to those States alone. They have repeatedly called for the initiation of multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. They believe that such measures must take into account the security interests of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States alike and must ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered. In that context, they reject all doctrines and concepts justifying the possession of nuclear weapons and their use in any circumstances. Apart from the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, non-aligned countries have advocated various measures for the prevention of nuclear war, such as the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and a freeze on nuclear arsenals. They have also stressed the importance of the prevention of an arms race in outer space (see CD/341, CD/513 and CD/515).

5. Socialist countries have also underlined the priority of the prevention of nuclear war and the consequent urgency of concrete steps towards that end. They have denounced strategic concepts or doctrines based on the assumption that it is possible to attain victory in a nuclear war and have emphasized that such doctrines also implied the first use of nuclear weapons. In that respect, they have stressed the importance of commitments by nuclear-weapon States on the non-first use of nuclear weapons. They also consider that it is of special significance for solving the problem of the prevention of nuclear war that relations between nuclear-weapon States be regulated by certain norms of a mandatory character and have supported a number of specific proposals to that effect (see CD/444). Apart from calling for undertakings by all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, socialist countries have supported the elaboration of a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons and have also proposed the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. In addition, they attach importance to such measures as the freezing, under appropriate verification, of nuclear weapons in both quantitative and qualitative terms; the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and, pending the conclusion of such a treaty, a moratorium by all nuclear-weapon States on all nuclear explosions; the prevention of the spread of the nuclear-arms race to other spheres, in particular outer space; the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form and, in that connection, universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (see General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII)). They have also stated their readiness to consider other appropriate measures, such as the prevention of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and the avoidance of the possibility of surprise attacks (see CD/406).
6. Western countries, in attaching utmost importance to the question, emphasize that the formulation of the relevant item in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament clearly indicated that the prevention of nuclear war could not be dealt with separately from the prevention of war in general. In their view, the pursuit of security and stability at the lowest possible levels of armaments requires a comprehensive strategy, the key concepts of which are the renunciation of force, restraint, balanced and verifiable disarmament measures and confidence-building. Western countries stress the importance of strict compliance by all States with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force and to settle all political disputes by peaceful means. While they have stated on many occasions that nuclear war cannot be won and should not be fought, they believe that, in the present circumstances, the nuclear factor continues to be a basic element in the balance needed for maintaining peace and security. In rejecting the idea of declarations on the prohibition of use or first use limited to nuclear weapons, which, in their view, would be unverifiable and would fail to prevent armed conflict, they have repeatedly affirmed that none of their weapons would ever be used except in response to armed attack and that their nuclear arsenals had a single function, namely, to prevent war. They consider that deep and verifiable reductions in nuclear arsenals are a key element in reducing the risk of nuclear war. However, in their opinion, a nuclear freeze would consolidate existing imbalances and reduce the incentive to undertake balanced and verifiable reductions. Western countries also believe that an effective policy to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons plays a key role in the prevention of nuclear war and, in that connection, have called for universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. They have also stressed the value of confidence-building measures to improve the international political climate and thereby diminish the danger of war, including nuclear war, and the utility of measures against surprise attack and measures to reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons (see CD/357, CD/380 and CD/411). Western countries have favoured a comprehensive and structured discussion of all views and proposals on the subject.

7. China is of the view that the fundamental way to prevent nuclear war lies in the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. It has consistently stressed that, pending the realization of that goal, the non-use of nuclear weapons would be a measure conducive to reducing the danger of nuclear war. China has also emphasized the relevance to the prevention of nuclear war of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and singled out the following as having special importance: (a) refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State; (b) non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; (c) peaceful settlement of international disputes; (d) sovereign equality of States and self-determination for peoples; and (e) co-operation among States for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55 of the Charter. It has also stressed that in considering how to prevent nuclear war effectively it was necessary not to lose sight of the importance of conventional disarmament.
II. SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS

8. Over the years, efforts to avert or reduce the danger of nuclear war have been pursued at various levels.

9. The first specific resolution of the United Nations on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons was General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI), adopted in 1961, at the initiative of a group of non-aligned countries, by 55 votes to 20, with 26 abstentions. In paragraph 1 of that resolution, the Assembly declared that the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would be a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations and that any State using such weapons would be acting contrary to the laws of humanity and committing a crime against mankind and civilization, and, in paragraph 2, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to consult Governments to ascertain their views on the possibility of convening a conference for signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons for war purposes. Sixty-two Governments replied to the Secretary-General's inquiry. While a majority, including the Eastern European States, viewed favourably the possibility of convening such a conference for signing the proposed convention, the large number of negative views and doubts expressed by Western and some other States was also significant.

10. In subsequent years, a number of countries continued to stress the importance of a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. In 1967, for instance, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics requested that an item on the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly and it accompanied its request with the text of a draft convention. The outcome of that initiative was General Assembly resolution 2289 (XXII), adopted on 8 December 1967, in which the Assembly expressed its conviction that it was essential to continue urgently the examination of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and of the conclusion of an appropriate international convention.

11. At about the same time, the negotiations on the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, were concluded, representing an important regional contribution to the prevention of nuclear war. That regional accord among States of Latin America was signed at Tlatelolco, Mexico, in 1967, creating a Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone. It has received repeated support from the General Assembly. By signing and ratifying Protocol II of the Treaty, all five nuclear-weapon Powers - China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America - have undertaken to respect the denuclearized status of the zone and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties to the Treaty.

12. An important development took place in 1968. On 12 June, the General Assembly commended the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for early signature and ratification by States. In this connection, on 19 June, the Security Council adopted resolution 255 (1968) containing so-called "positive" security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against aggression with nuclear weapons, or threat of such aggression.
13. Since then, the non-nuclear-weapon States have sought to have those assurances strengthened so that their renunciation of nuclear weapons would not place them at a permanent military disadvantage and make them vulnerable to nuclear threat or use. These efforts have not so far been successful. Significant differences in approach between non-nuclear-weapon States and certain nuclear-weapon States have prevented agreement on a common formula for a legally-binding instrument. While there is a continuing recognition that the non-nuclear-weapon States should effectively be assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, divergences in security perceptions of nuclear and non-nuclear States, and among the nuclear-weapon States themselves, pose significant difficulties to efforts at the realization of an early agreement on the question.

14. In the early 1970s, the Soviet Union initiated an approach to the question of the non-use of nuclear weapons by linking such a prohibition to a general non-use of force in international relations. Upon that initiative, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2936 (XXVII) on 29 November 1972, in paragraph 1 of which it solemnly declared, on behalf of the States Members of the Organization, "their renunciation of the use or threat of force in all its forms and manifestations in international relations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons". The resolution was adopted by 73 votes to 4, with 46 abstentions.

15. Since becoming a nuclear Power in 1967, China, for its part, has repeatedly affirmed that at no time and in no circumstances would it be the first to use nuclear weapons and that, as an initial step towards the complete prohibition and destruction of such weapons, all nuclear-weapon States, especially the Soviet Union and the United States, should undertake the obligation not to be the first to use such weapons and particularly not to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

16. The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978, marked the beginning of a new phase in the continuing search for ways to eliminate the growing danger of nuclear war. The Final Document adopted at that session made the halting and reversing of the arms race the key to the solution of the problem, which would lead to nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The arms race, the Final Document recognized, reflects deep international tensions and conflicts, and the endless build-up of arms and forces only aggravates world problems. It exacerbates the differences between opposing military alliances. It heightens the sense of insecurity among all States and increases the threat of nuclear war.

17. At that special session, India submitted a draft resolution on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons but, as all decisions were meant to be taken by consensus, India did not press it to a vote. The draft was submitted again to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session in 1978 and was co-sponsored by 34 countries, mostly non-aligned.

18. In introducing the draft resolution, India noted that there was no indication of an early halt to the nuclear arms race and, therefore, saw no reason why mankind should not be given credible and binding assurances against the use of nuclear
weapons. The draft resolution called upon all States, particularly those with nuclear weapons, to submit proposals on arrangements for the conclusion of a convention or any other agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons so that the subject could be further studied in the light of those proposals. The General Assembly adopted the draft as its resolution 33/71 B on 14 December 1978, by 103 votes to 18 (including France, the United Kingdom, the United States and other Western countries), with 18 abstentions (including the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries).

19. The issue was pursued, again at the initiative of India, at the thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth sessions of the General Assembly. By its resolution 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, the Assembly decided to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament the views of States concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons, avoidance of nuclear war and related matters, and requested that Committee to take those views into appropriate consideration. By its resolution 35/152 D of 12 December 1980, the Assembly declared once again that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity and that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited, pending nuclear disarmament; that resolution was adopted by 112 votes to 19, with 14 abstentions. Of the nuclear-weapon States, China voted in favour; France, the United Kingdom and the United States voted against; and the Soviet Union abstained.

20. At its thirty-sixth session, in 1981, the General Assembly adopted three resolutions on the issue, entitled (a) Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe (resolution 36/100 of 9 December 1981); (b) non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war (resolution 36/92 I of 9 December 1981); and (c) prevention of nuclear war (resolution 36/81 B of 9 December 1981).

21. The Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe was adopted as the result of an initiative of the Soviet Union. In submitting the proposal, the Soviet Union stressed that the task of preventing a nuclear catastrophe was one that should be given the highest priority in international relations. The problem, the Soviet Union added, had become particularly relevant in the light of attempts on the part of some countries to advance the doctrine of a limited nuclear war, a doctrine which was, in the opinion of the Soviet Union, meant to legalize the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union stated that the United Nations would be taking a timely and correct action if it issued, as proposed in the draft resolution, a warning that there could never be any justification or pardon for those who took a decision to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and that any doctrine endorsing the first use of nuclear weapons would be incompatible with the principles of human morality and the ideals of the United Nations.

22. Several States, including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Mongolia, expressed strong support for the Soviet initiative. Bulgaria stressed the danger of the emergence in certain Western circles of doctrines such as that of a limited nuclear war and pointed out that the text of the Soviet proposal first and foremost was aimed at ensuring survival and preserving civilization. The provision stating that it was the supreme duty and direct obligation of leaders of nuclear-weapon States to act so as to eliminate the risk of the outbreak of nuclear conflict was also particularly important. Czechoslovakia also emphasized those points and, noting
that eliminating the scourge of war was the very cornerstone of the work of the United Nations, stated that the proposed declaration would be an important political instrument to promote the preservation of peace and save mankind from nuclear catastrophe. Mongolia similarly referred to the fact that new and dangerous ideas were being put forward, thus making preventing efforts urgently essential. It added that the nuclear arms race should be halted and reversed by joint efforts of all countries through honest and equitable negotiations.

23. Some Western States questioned the usefulness of the proposal. For instance, the Federal Republic of Germany, while asserting that no Member of the United Nations wanted to dissociate itself from the objective of making nuclear war impossible, criticized what it considered to be an ambiguous relationship between the new initiative and earlier Soviet proposals, incompatibilities between the draft resolution and various statements of Soviet military doctrine, and certain contradictions and lack of clarity in the non-first-use idea. The Federal Republic of Germany also pointed out that, in its opinion, there were inconsistencies between the Soviet draft resolution and agreed principles of disarmament and between the non-first-use proposal and certain provisions of the Charter, in particular Article 51, which, the Federal Republic of Germany noted, drew no distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. It further stated that, in its opinion, the adoption of the non-first-use obligation would eliminate the deterrent effect of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defence system in Central Europe and that the vast conventional superiority of the Warsaw Treaty countries would come into play, resulting in an unequal security situation in Western Europe.

24. The United Kingdom, speaking on behalf of the Ten member States of the European Community, stressed that the declarations favoured by some States could do little to enhance international security if they were not accompanied by realistic, balanced and verifiable arms control agreements. For that reason, the members of the European Community were unable to give their support to proposals such as those for non-first-use of nuclear weapons, which in their view were unrealistic, unenforceable and declaratory. The Ten believed that disarmament would come about only through serious and painstaking negotiations, resulting in concrete agreements on the limitation and reduction of armaments, and taking into account the principles of parity and equality.

25. Responding to these and other views, the Soviet Union stated that all its proposals, submitted over the years, on the prevention of nuclear war had the same goal, namely, the outlawing of nuclear war and the eventual elimination of all nuclear stockpiles. Secondly, as the threat of nuclear war had increased and various doctrines had been adopted which regarded nuclear war as permissible or possible, the United Nations should condemn the first use of nuclear weapons as a most grievous crime against humanity. A condemnation by the General Assembly of the use of nuclear weapons would improve the situation for the subsequent elaboration of specific concrete agreements. The Soviet Union stated that its proposal obviously confirmed that it would not use nuclear weapons first, and if that example was followed by the other nuclear Powers there would be no nuclear war. The Soviet Union also confirmed that it would never use its nuclear weapons against those States which had forgone the acquisition and production of nuclear
weapons and did not have such weapons on their territory. But if a non-nuclear-weapon State made its territory available for the deployment of nuclear weapons by another State it should not expect to have guarantees against a retaliatory nuclear strike.

26. Later in the session, the representative of the United States noted that a number of delegations, in particular those of France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, had exposed inconsistencies between the draft resolution and other statements of the Soviet Union on the issue of the use of its nuclear weapons. The United States also referred to other disarmament initiatives of the Soviet Union over the years, citing several cases to question the aim and reliability of Soviet proposals and pledges. In addition, the United States emphasized that the maintenance of national security is the most important duty of any Government to its people and that, therefore, meaningful arms control becomes prudent only when all States Members of the United Nations strictly adhere to their solemn obligation to abide by Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.

27. At its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly adopted as its resolution 36/100, the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union, by a recorded vote of 82 to 19 (including, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and other Western countries), with 41 abstentions. China did not take part in the vote.

28. At its thirty-sixth regular session, the General Assembly adopted two further resolutions on the subject.

29. General Assembly resolution 36/92 I, initiated by India and sponsored by 30 non-aligned countries, was adopted by 121 votes to 19 (including, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and other Western countries), with 6 abstentions. In that resolution, the Assembly declared once again that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity and that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited, pending nuclear disarmament, and urged the consideration, at the forthcoming second special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament, of the question of an international convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war or some other agreement on the subject.

30. In its resolution 36/81 B, adopted without a vote, the General Assembly, inter alia, urged all nuclear-weapon States and other Member States that so desired to submit to the Secretary-General by 30 April 1982, for consideration at its second special session devoted to disarmament, their views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war, and requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Assembly, at its second special session devoted to disarmament, a report containing those views. The resolution was introduced by Argentina and co-sponsored by 16 other, mainly non-aligned, countries.

31. At the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, held from 7 June to 10 July 1982, many delegations referred to the danger and likely effects of nuclear war and the consequent need to avoid the outbreak of a nuclear exchange.
32. In the course of the session, many speakers called for the early removal of the threat of nuclear war and put forward various suggestions and proposals. Thus, for instance, on 15 June, in a message read to the General Assembly, the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declared that, with immediate effect, the Soviet Union assumed an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. In taking that decision, the message continued, the Soviet Union proceeded from the indisputable fact that should a nuclear war start, it could mean the destruction of human civilization and perhaps the end of life itself on Earth. The peoples of the world had a right to expect that that decision would be followed by reciprocal steps on the part of the other nuclear States, which, if taken, would be tantamount to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons altogether. The Soviet Union also noted that, in the conduct of its policy, it would continue to take into account how the other nuclear Powers acted.

33. China reaffirmed its commitment that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons and would not use them against non-nuclear-weapon States in any circumstances. It also stressed that any combination of measures for both nuclear and conventional disarmament could help reduce the danger of war. A conflict with conventional weapons might very well escalate into a nuclear war, China warned.

34. In the opinion of Western States, the primary need was not pledges of non-first-use of nuclear weapons, but the renunciation of force in international relations in general, and the ban on the use of force should be applicable comprehensively as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations; that is, it should cover both conventional and nuclear weapons. For instance, the United Kingdom stated that it did not believe that there was a greater danger of the outbreak of war than there had been in the past. It again drew attention to the solemn undertaking of States in the North Atlantic Alliance that none of their weapons would ever be used except in response to attack. The United States expressed the view that the NATO policy went far beyond the pledge of non-first-use of nuclear weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany viewed the prevention of war as the most fundamental objective of disarmament and arms control and added that Governments must dedicate themselves to the prevention of war in all its aspects, conventional and nuclear.

35. In the course of the session, several draft resolutions were submitted on the subject. India and Mexico jointly sponsored a draft resolution which called for the appointment of eminent persons to advise on measures and procedures relating to the question of prevention of nuclear war. Another draft resolution was submitted by India, containing the text of a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Subsequently, India submitted a third draft resolution calling upon States to undertake certain urgent measures for the prevention of nuclear war; a convention on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons; and a freeze on the development, production and deployment of nuclear weapons.

36. None of the draft resolutions on that subject was, however, put to a vote at the special session, because it was felt that the rule of consensus should be maintained for decision-making at the session on such important issues.
37. The question of prevention of nuclear war was also discussed extensively in
the appropriate working group of the Ad Hoc Committee at the Twelfth Special
Session. During that consideration, two specific draft resolutions were put
forward: one by Bulgaria entitled "Prevention of nuclear war" and the other by the
Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and the Netherlands entitled "Prevention of war,
in particular nuclear war". The discussion also included a proposal by India. The
Ad Hoc Committee established a drafting group to continue consideration of the
proposals, but it was unable to reach agreement on a text on the subject.

38. On the final day, India, considering that for the success of the special
session the minimum would have been the adoption by consensus of at least some
urgent measures for the prevention of nuclear war and for nuclear disarmament,
expressed its deep concern and noted that not one single, concrete measure, however
modest, had been taken to avert the danger of nuclear war.

39. In the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General
Assembly, 1/ the Assembly expressed its profound preoccupation over the danger of
war, in particular nuclear war, the prevention of which remained the most acute and
urgent task of the day. The Assembly urged all Member States to consider as soon
as possible relevant proposals designed to secure the avoidance of war, in
particular nuclear war, thus ensuring that the survival of mankind was not
endangered.

40. The Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly was addressed by a number
of representatives of organizations and bodies, including 53 non-governmental
organizations and 22 peace and disarmament research institutions, many of which
made reference to the threat and effects of nuclear war and the urgent need to
prevent such a disaster.

41. At its thirty-seventh session, in 1982, the General Assembly adopted three
resolutions on the subject. In its resolution 37/100 C of 13 December 1982,
titled "Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons", initiated
by India and co-sponsored by several other non-aligned countries, the Assembly
reaffirmed that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of
the United Nations and a crime against humanity, and requested the Committee on
Disarmament to undertake "on a priority basis" negotiations with a view to
achieving agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the text of a
draft convention which was annexed to the resolution. The vote on the resolution
was 117 (including China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) to 17
(including France, the United Kingdom and the United States and other Western
countries), with 8 abstentions.

42. In General Assembly resolution 37/78 I of 9 December 1982, sponsored by
non-aligned and some other States and introduced by Argentina, the Committee on
Disarmament was requested to undertake "as a matter of highest priority"
negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical
measures for the prevention of nuclear war. In the fourth preambular paragraph of
that resolution, the Assembly recalled that in the provisions of the Final Document
of its tenth special session it had been agreed by consensus that all States should

/...
actively participate in efforts to bring about agreement on a code of peaceful
conduct of nations in international affairs, which would preclude the use or threat
of use of nuclear weapons. The vote on the resolution was 130 to none, with
17 abstentions (Western States).

43. In General Assembly resolution 37/78 J of the same date, entitled "Non-use of
nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war", which was sponsored by Cuba, the
German Democratic Republic, Romania and Viet Nam, the Assembly considered that "the
solemn declarations by two nuclear-weapon States (China and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics) made or reiterated at the Twelfth Special Session of the
General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, concerning
their respective obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons"
represented an important approach to decrease the danger of nuclear war, and
expressed the hope that other nuclear-weapon States would consider making similar
declarations with respect to not being the first to use such weapons. That
resolution was adopted by 112 votes (including the Soviet Union) to 19 (including
France, the United Kingdom, the United States and other Western States), with
15 abstentions (including China).

44. In the debate on the question, the Western countries continued to stress that
peace and freedom and the prevention of all war remained their objective. They
repeatedly called attention to the fact that the Charter of the United Nations,
while prohibiting any military aggression, fully recognized the right of
self-defence. In particular, the United States asserted that, in an environment of
persistent violations of the Charter and confronted with large and growing forces,
the Western countries had no choice but to insist that the right of self-defence
could not be fettered. The Federal Republic of Germany stated that, in its
opinion, any State which undertook not to make first use of a specific type of
weapon obviously intended to reserve the right to use other weapons in which it was
superior. Secondly, the Federal Republic of Germany held that a self-imposed but
unverifiable obligation not to resort to the first use of certain weapons was not
sufficient to meet its professed purpose as long as those weapons remained ready
for use. Whether such an obligation was really being honoured would become clear
only in the event of a confrontation, at which point it might be too late for the
international community to react. The Federal Republic of Germany remained
prepared to identify, within a multilateral framework, practical measures for the
prevention of nuclear war, within the context of the prevention of war in general.

45. The Soviet Union re-emphasized the significance of the unilateral obligation
it had assumed not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It also stressed its
willingness to conclude a treaty on the non-use of force in international
relations, whether that force be nuclear or conventional, and recalled that the
opposition of some Western States had prevented the conclusion of such a treaty in
the 1970s.

46. China considered that the Soviet Union's commitment not to be the first to use
nuclear weapons represented a significant change, but noted that it had done so
only after building up a vast nuclear arsenal and gaining a preponderance in
conventional arms. Furthermore, China added, the Soviet statement did not contain
an undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

/...
47. Sweden believed that every effort must be made to reduce the role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent. In its view, it should be possible, as a part of a realistic disarmament policy, to achieve a mutual obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Such a restriction would help avert further speculation on limited nuclear war, which had recently poisoned the political climate. An enhanced reliance on conventional forces should therefore be pursued. It was its view that a rough conventional balance at a lower level could and should be achieved.

48. When the Committee on Disarmament reconvened at Geneva in February 1983 it decided, after intensive negotiations, to include on its agenda an item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

49. Mexico reiterated the need for appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war commensurate with the gravity and imminence of the dangers that are to be averted. It also called on the Committee on Disarmament to make an effective contribution to the solution of what the General Assembly described as "the most acute and urgent task of the present day" through the negotiation of appropriate and practical measures.

50. By the time the Committee concluded its 1983 session, during which the item was extensively debated, six working papers had been submitted on the item by Committee members.

51. A paper of the Group of 21, the non-aligned and neutral members of the Committee, called for the setting up of an ad hoc working group to undertake negotiations on practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war.

52. In another working paper, the socialist States also called for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to negotiate concrete steps on the question, including the renunciation by all nuclear-weapon States of the first use of nuclear weapons and the conclusion of a world-wide treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. Subsequently, the German Democratic Republic put forward a paper containing a list of items which could be dealt with in the course of informal meetings of the Committee on the subject.

53. The Federal Republic of Germany submitted a working paper that sought the objective of preventing all armed conflict, beginning with the prohibition of the threat or use of force as stipulated in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. Belgium submitted a working paper on confidence-building measures within the framework of the prevention of nuclear war. Finally, Australia, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands tentatively outlined in a joint document how the subject "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters" could be explored in the course of a series of informal meetings.

54. Many members considered, however, that there was need for urgent negotiations on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war and that informal meetings would not be the appropriate answer. Under no circumstances, it was stressed, would they be a substitute for the consideration of the question in a
working group. In practice, substantive matters were discussed at plenary meetings of the Committee. Proposals for the establishment of an ad hoc working group were also considered in the Committee, but there was no consensus on them.

55. At its thirty-eighth session, in 1983, the General Assembly took up once again the question of prevention of nuclear war. At that session, the Soviet Union, together with other Eastern European States and Viet Nam, submitted a draft resolution by which the Assembly would express alarm at the growing threat of nuclear war, which could lead to the destruction of civilization on Earth, and unconditionally and for all time condemn nuclear war as being contrary to human conscience and reason, as the worst crime against peoples and as a violation of the foremost human right - the right to life. The Assembly would also condemn the formulation, propounding, dissemination and propaganda of political and military doctrines and concepts intended to provide "legitimacy" for the first use of nuclear weapons and in general to justify the "admissibility" of unleashing nuclear war. In submitting the draft resolution, the Soviet Union stated that, by adopting it, the United Nations would make a major contribution to the creation of an international moral and political climate likely to reduce substantially the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war and open up more favourable prospects for the solution of far-reaching tasks, such as the conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States, as called for by many non-aligned countries.

56. The draft resolution was adopted on 15 December 1983, by 95 votes to 19 (Western States), with 30 abstentions (including China), as General Assembly resolution 38/75. For the Western countries, condemning nuclear war alone was unacceptable. In their view, States should, as requested by the Charter of the United Nations, condemn and ban all uses of force. In particular, the United States, which considered the resolution to be impractical, rhetorical and unenforceable, stated that for its part it would propose only concrete and verifiable measures which would effectively reduce the risk of any war, nuclear or otherwise. The United States also criticized the resolution for advocating the control of a free flow of information. This view was also shared by other countries.

57. According to the Federal Republic of Germany, it was so self-evident that nuclear war must be condemned that no special resolution was needed to confirm that shared belief. The prevention of nuclear war, however, could not be accompanied by individual, arbitrarily selected and ill-balanced measures, the Federal Republic of Germany stressed. A comprehensive strategy was needed, which must have its basis in the Charter of the United Nations and its prohibition of the threat and use of force - a strategy that was aimed at the reduction of crises and tension, compliance with the rules of international law, restraint on the part of all countries, including the nuclear-weapon States, enhancement of available procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes, an expansion of international co-operation, wider use of regional security arrangements, an improved régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other appropriate measures. With regard to security and disarmament proper, the Federal Republic of Germany held that the key concept for the prevention of nuclear war and all armed conflict was a balance of forces at the lowest possible level.
58. A second resolution was initiated by Cuba and the German Democratic Republic and also sponsored by Mongolia and Romania. It was adopted as General Assembly resolution 38/183 B of 20 December 1983, by a vote of 110 to 19 (Western countries), with 15 abstentions (including China). Substantially, it reiterated the contents of resolution 37/78 J adopted by the Assembly at its thirty-seventh session (see para. 43 above).

59. A third resolution, sponsored by a representative group of non-aligned countries, as well as the German Democratic Republic and Romania, had its counterpart in General Assembly resolution 37/78 I of 1982. However, the new resolution (General Assembly resolution 38/183 G of 20 December 1983), in addition to requesting again the Conference on Disarmament* to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations on measures for the prevention of nuclear war, further requested it to establish for that purpose an ad hoc working group on the subject at the beginning of its 1984 session. In that connection, Argentina, in introducing the draft resolution in the First Committee of the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, expressed concern for the lack of specific achievement by the Committee on Disarmament on that vital issue in the course of 1983 and made clear that the resolution was designed to ensure that the negotiating body would complete its task as a matter of urgency and priority. General Assembly resolution 38/183 G was adopted by 128 votes to none, with 20 abstentions (mostly Western States).

60. Reference has also been made to General Assembly resolution 37/100 C of 1982 (see para. 41 above), initiated by India, in which the Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to undertake, on a priority basis, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the text of a draft convention which was annexed to the resolution. As a follow-up to that resolution, the Assembly, in 1983, noting with regret that the Committee on Disarmament had not yet been able to undertake negotiations on the convention, reiterated its request in its resolution 38/73 G, which was adopted on 15 December 1983 by 126 votes to 17 (Western countries), with 6 abstentions.

61. General Assembly resolution 38/183 M of 20 December 1983, co-sponsored by several non-aligned countries and one neutral country, was adopted by 133 votes to 1 (the United States), with 14 abstentions (Western countries and China). In that resolution, the Assembly, inter alia, recalled the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, and solemnly reaffirmed: (a) the special responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States for nuclear disarmament and for undertaking measures to prevent nuclear war and to halt the nuclear-arms race in

* From 7 February 1984, the date of commencement of its annual session, the Committee on Disarmament is to be known as the "Conference on Disarmament" (see Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27), para. 21).
all its aspects; (b) the vital interest of all peoples of the world in the success of disarmament negotiations and the consequent duty of all States to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament; (c) the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament. The Assembly also requested the nuclear-weapon States to submit annual reports to it on the measures and steps taken by them, jointly or individually, in the discharge of the special responsibilities incumbent upon them for the prevention of nuclear war and for halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race.

62. At the 1984 session of the Conference on Disarmament, the question of "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters" was included in the Conference's agenda as a separate item (item 3). A group of socialist countries circulated a working paper on the prevention of nuclear war (CD/484). Proposals for the establishment of an ad hoc committee were submitted by the Group of 21 and by a group of socialist countries. China also supported the establishment of an ad hoc committee. Consultations were held concerning the question of establishing an ad hoc committee. Towards the end of the session, the Group of 21 made a formal proposal (CD/515), which was meant to represent the lowest common denominator of the positions held by various delegations in the Conference concerning item 3. The proposal called for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to consider all proposals relevant to the agenda item, including appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. The proposal was put before the Conference for decision. It was supported by the group of socialist countries, although they regarded it as a minimum mandate for an ad hoc committee to deal with the problem. China also supported the proposal. However, Western delegations could not support it.

63. Argentina stressed that there is no political issue that could justify the use of nuclear weapons, since such weapons are qualitatively different from other type of weapons. The prevention of nuclear war is therefore a question requiring urgent treatment, and the dilemma that confronts humanity is indeed to eliminate nuclear weapons or perish.

64. India considered that a substantive consideration of the item by the Conference on Disarmament with a view to reaching agreement or agreements was essential. Measures to prevent nuclear war must be achieved even before the equally urgent task of nuclear disarmament. India reiterated the need for a separate set of measures of immediate and practical nature to cope with and contain the menace of nuclear weapons pending their complete elimination.

65. At its thirty-ninth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 39/148 D on 17 December 1984, by 101 votes to 19, with 17 abstentions. In that resolution, the Assembly, in addition to reiterating the terms of the operative part of its resolution 38/183 B, requested the Conference on Disarmament to consider under its relevant agenda item, inter alia, the elaboration of an international instrument of a legally binding character laying down the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The resolution was co-sponsored by Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Romania.
66. The General Assembly also adopted by 128 votes to 6, with 12 abstentions, resolution 39/148 P, in which it, inter alia, noted with regret that despite the fact that the Conference on Disarmament had discussed the question of the prevention of nuclear war for two years, it had been unable even to establish a subsidiary body to consider appropriate and practical measures to prevent it; again requested the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on the subject at the beginning of its 1985 session; expressed its conviction that in view of the urgency of this matter and the inadequacy or insufficiency of existing measures, it was necessary to devise suitable steps to expedite effective action for the prevention of nuclear war; requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report on steps to that effect which should be completed in time to be transmitted to the Conference on Disarmament in April 1985 and submitted to the Assembly at its fortieth session; and invited all Governments to submit to the Secretary-General, not later than 1 February 1985, their views on steps to expedite action on the question of the prevention of nuclear war so that they might be taken into account in the preparation of the above-mentioned report. The resolution was initiated by Argentina and co-sponsored by a number of other countries.

67. It should be noted that, at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Australia, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan and Norway submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/39/L.40), bearing a double title "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters: prevention of war in the nuclear age". The draft resolution was introduced by the Federal Republic of Germany, which noted that the first title was in line with the formulation of the agenda items agreed upon in the Conference on Disarmament and that the second title was designed to reflect the draft resolution's comprehensive nature. In the view of the sponsors, the latter formulation provided an excellent description of the overriding task at hand and they recommended its wider use. The draft resolution was subsequently revised and also sponsored by Denmark, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The following views were stressed among others in the draft resolution:

(a) That the elimination of the threat of all armed conflict remains the ultimate goal of disarmament;

(b) That all States should refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, and thus never should use any of their weapons, except in the exercise of their inherent right of individual or collective self-defence;

(c) That all States should maintain, as a priority objective of their policies, the removal of the danger of war at any level of hostility, thereby precluding the use of nuclear weapons;

(d) That all States should exercise restraint in their relations with others, should act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations which could cause dangerous exacerbation of their relations, should avoid military confrontations and should prevent the outbreak of war;
(e) That the importance of concluding agreements on militarily significant and verifiable reductions of armaments and forces, including nuclear armaments should be stressed;

(f) That all States should promote, to the best of their ability, the objective of the prevention of war, through, inter alia, more openness and an enhancement of mutual knowledge about military activities, an expanded exchange of information and views on military matters and other confidence-building measures, with a view to enhancing both confidence and stability, particularly in regional contexts, and taking into account regional security needs;

(g) That the conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and that a conventional war may involve the risk of escalation to nuclear war should be stressed.

68. Argentina, India, Mexico and Yugoslavia submitted various amendments to the revised draft resolution (A/C.1/39/L.80) which reiterated the positions of the Group of 21 on the subject. A draft resolution on the prevention of nuclear war introduced by Nigeria but not put to a vote, in emphasizing some of the positions of the Group of 21 on the issue, proposed to convene a plenipotentiary conference to adopt a legal instrument prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in connection with the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations.

69. Subsequently, the sponsors requested that no action be taken on the draft resolution.

70. During the first part of its session, in 1985, the Conference on Disarmament continued the consideration of its agenda item 3: "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". A working paper on the subject was submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (CD/578).

71. The United Nations has also undertaken studies related to the subject matter of this report. In 1967, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2162 A (XXI) of 5 December 1966, the Secretary-General prepared, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, a report entitled "Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons" (A/6858). 2/ By General Assembly resolution 33/91 D of 16 December 1978, the Secretary-General was requested to carry out, with the assistance of qualified experts, a comprehensive study providing factual information on present nuclear arsenals, trends in the development of nuclear-weapon systems, the effects of their use and the implications for international security as well as for negotiations on disarmament of: (a) the doctrines of deterrence and other questions concerning nuclear weapons; (b) the continued quantitative increase and qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems. That study, entitled "Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons" (A/35/392) 3/ was completed in 1980. At its thirty-ninth session, the General Assembly adopted, on 17 December 1984, decision 39/423 by which it requested the Secretary-General to prepare a study under the title: "Deterrence: its implications for disarmament and the arms race, negotiated arms reductions and international security and other related matters", as recommended by

/...
the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies in paragraph 6 of the report of the Secretary-General (A/39/549), to carry out the study in accordance with the recommendations of the Advisory Board in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the same document, and to submit the final report to the Assembly at its forty-first session. The Assembly requested those Member States that wished to submit their views on the subject to communicate them to the Secretary-General not later than 1 April 1985.

72. Efforts for the prevention of nuclear war have also been pursued at the bilateral level and have resulted in the conclusion of agreements on this subject. Thus, in 1963, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to establish, for use in time of emergency, a direct communication link, and a Memorandum of Understanding to this effect was signed at Geneva by the American and Soviet representatives of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. A few years later, within the framework of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), a special working group was established to consider ways to improve the direct communication link. The advance in technology that had occurred since 1963 offered the possibility of greater reliability than the arrangements originally agreed upon. The understanding reached by this group was reported to the SALT delegations in the summer of 1971 and became a formal agreement to improve the "hot-line". Also in 1971, during the course of the SALT negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union entered into the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War. The Agreement covers a pledge by both sides to take measures that each considers necessary to maintain and improve its organizational and technical safeguards against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; arrangements for immediate notification should a risk of nuclear war arise from such incidents, from detection of unidentified objects on early warning systems, or from any accidental, unauthorized, or other unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon; and advance notification of any planned missile launches beyond the territory of the launching party and in the direction of the other party. The Agreement also provides that for urgent communications in situations requiring prompt clarification the "hot-line" will be used.

73. In 1972, the first round of negotiations on strategic arms limitation was concluded by the SALT I agreements, which include the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. In 1973, the Soviet Union and the United States entered into the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War and committed themselves to make the removal of the danger of nuclear war an objective of their policies. Towards that end, they agreed that they would act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, to avoid military confrontations, and to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them and between either of them and other countries. They further agreed that each would refrain from the threat or use of force against each other, against the allies of the other Party and against other countries, in circumstances which might endanger international peace and security and that they would be guided by those considerations in the formulation of their foreign policies and in their actions in the field of international relations. If at any time there should arise the risk of a nuclear conflict, urgent consultations should be held immediately and every effort should be made to avert the risk. The agreement further stipulates that nothing in it shall affect formal alliance obligations or the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as envisaged by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
74. Subsequently, the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes between the United States and the Soviet Union were signed in 1974 and in 1976, respectively. Neither of these Treaties has yet been ratified, though the parties have repeatedly declared that they will abide by their provisions. The 1974 threshold test-ban Treaty prohibits all underground tests with a yield of more than 150 kilotons. Testing is limited to certain sites, and the Treaty provides for the exchange of technical data to facilitate mutual seismic verification. The Treaty also commits the parties to continue negotiations for a comprehensive test ban. The 1976 Treaty prohibits individual nuclear explosions of more than 150 kilotons or a series of explosions totalling more than 1,500 kilotons. In 1979, the Soviet Union and the United States signed at Vienna the Treaty on the Limitation of Offensive Arms (SALT II). Although the Treaty has not been ratified, the parties have unilaterally stated that they would abide by its provisions so long as the other did.

75. "Hot-line" agreements and agreements on the prevention of the outbreak of accidental nuclear war were concluded between France and the Soviet Union in 1976 and between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in 1977.

76. The Soviet Union and the United States began a new round of talks on intermediate/medium-range nuclear forces in November 1981 and on strategic nuclear-weapon systems in June 1982. Such negotiations, also known as INF and START talks, were suspended late in 1983. Subsequently, in March 1985, bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States began at Geneva on nuclear and space arms. As reflected in the joint communiqué agreed upon early in 1985 following a meeting at Geneva between the Secretary of State of the United States, G. Shultz, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, A. Gromyko, the subject of the negotiations is a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms - both strategic and intermediate-range - with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The objective of the negotiations is to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability.

77. Efforts for the prevention of nuclear war have also been pursued at the regional level. Thus, initiatives have been taken for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world. The 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, establishes the only existing nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated area (see para. 11 above). The 1959 Antarctic Treaty 4/ provides for the demilitarization and denuclearization of the Antarctic continent and the area south of 60° S latitude, as well as for the prohibition of any nuclear tests there. The 1966 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (see General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI) of 16 December 1966 prohibits the stationing or orbiting of nuclear weapons in outer space, and the 1979 Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (see Assembly resolution 34/68 of 5 December 1979) further specifies prohibitions concerning those areas. The 1970 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (see Assembly resolution 2660 (XXV) of 7 December 1970) also prohibits the emplacement of facilities designed for storing, testing or using such weapons.

78. The Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa 5/ was adopted by the Organization of African Unity in 1964. In this connection, the General Assembly has repeatedly called upon all States to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and has condemned the pursuit of a nuclear capability by South Africa. Nuclear-weapon-free zones have also been proposed for the Balkans, central Europe, northern Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, South Asia and the South Pacific. With regard to the Middle East, there has been consensus support for Assembly resolutions urging the parties directly concerned to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.

III. CONCLUSION

79. All States Members of the United Nations have agreed on the need to prevent a nuclear war. The 1978 Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, which was adopted by consensus, states that "nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization", and "effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority".

80. There is today an international consensus that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Indeed, the effects of a nuclear confrontation could be so far-reaching as to threaten the very existence and the conditions for survival of life on our planet. While the international community as a whole is deeply concerned with this paramount problem and is actively involved in the negotiating process on various measures to prevent nuclear war, the primary responsibility for effective and speedy solutions to the problem rests with the major nuclear-weapon States. It is thus a significant development that the two major Powers have found it possible to begin bilateral negotiations at Geneva with the objective of working out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth.

81. The principal goals of disarmament are to ensure the survival of mankind and to eliminate the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, to ensure that war is no longer an instrument for settling international disputes and that the use and the threat of force are eliminated from international life as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. The most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament which would eventually lead to agreements for the elimination of nuclear weapons under an effective system of international control. In this context, bilateral, regional, multilateral and other approaches are all complementary and serve to reinforce each other in the final achievement of that goal.

82. Various measures leading towards general and complete disarmament, particularly those that would halt and reverse the arms race as a whole, should be negotiated and agreed upon at an early date. The cessation of nuclear weapon
testing by all States would make a significant contribution to ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that context, full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation would represent an important measure.

83. The United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. Indeed, genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system envisaged in the Charter. In the realization of the objective of disarmament, through the conclusion and implementation of agreements on genuine measures of disarmament, full account must be taken of the legitimate needs of States to protect their own national security. The further strengthening of the system of security provided for in the Charter of the United Nations, including the prevention of the conditions and the containment of situations of tensions, confrontation and conflict that might otherwise be conducive to war, is, therefore, an integral part of the process of disarmament.

84. While the United Nations provides the forum in which to consider the issue of the prevention of nuclear war in its global perspective, very important steps could be and have been envisaged also in a regional context. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) is such an example. The issue of establishing such zones in different parts of the world is being discussed in various forums and, where freely agreed upon, could contribute meaningfully to the strengthening of international peace and security. In this connection, the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa is an important example of such efforts. Measures and policies to build confidence among States, both regionally and world wide, could also greatly contribute to progress in disarmament. The international community should intensify its efforts to promote dialogue and negotiations in a broad context and to reduce the barriers to understanding between nations.

85. The Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, has a unique role to play. This body is already dealing with the issue of "Prevention of a nuclear war, including all related matters". Intensified efforts by all its members with a view to starting negotiations on all the relevant issues on its agenda would be a significant step forward in the overall process of disarmament.

86. With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the problems created by the arms race, the United Nations launched in 1982 the World Disarmament Campaign, which constitutes a means through which world-wide public opinion could be constructively and realistically involved in the discussions about the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, as well as other relevant disarmament issues in a balanced, objective and factual manner.

87. The replies of Governments in part two of this report contain a number of measures, views and proposals with a view to contributing to the solution of the question of the prevention of nuclear war. They should all be taken into careful account by the Conference on Disarmament. Although there still exists a variety of
approaches and security policies concerning the issue of prevention of nuclear war, every effort should be made to find mutually acceptable solutions to this vital problem.

88. The United Nations was established 40 years ago to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. Today there is no task more imperative before the international community than to remove the threat of nuclear war. It is a transcendent interest of the peoples of the world that geographical, ideological or political differences, national boundaries or regional alliances not be allowed to jeopardize the future of mankind. The prevention of nuclear war is not an issue among many; it is the *conditio sine qua non* of all our endeavours.

**Notes**


2/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.68.IX.1.


PART TWO

REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

ARGENTINA

[Original: Spanish]

[7 February 1985]

1. As recently brought out in the Delhi Declaration of 28 January 1985 by the Heads of State or Government of Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, the United Republic of Tanzania and my own country (see A/40/114-S/16921, annex), the Argentine Government wishes to reiterate its serious concern over the dangers inherent in the existence of more than 5,000 nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States. The threat of a nuclear holocaust is with us permanently and seems to increase as time passes. The great majority of the international community are constantly appealing for efforts to avert this threat, but what has been done so far is not sufficient.

2. In our view, as stated in the Political Declaration adopted by the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, at New Delhi in March 1983, "the renewed escalation in the nuclear arms race, both in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, as well as reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence, has heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Nuclear weapons are more than weapons of war. They are instruments of mass annihilation. The Heads of State or Government therefore find it unacceptable that the security of all States and the very survival of mankind should be held hostage to the security interests of a handful of nuclear-weapon States. Measures for the prevention of nuclear war and of nuclear disarmament must take into account the security interests of non-nuclear-weapon States alike and ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered. They rejected all theories and concepts pertaining to the possession of nuclear weapons and their use under any circumstances" (A/38/132-S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, annex, sect. I, para. 28).

3. The report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1984 session (A/39/27) submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, brings out clearly the reasons why the sole multilateral negotiating body in the disarmament field was unable to begin consideration of the item on the prevention of nuclear war. In the circumstances, the Argentine Government welcomed General Assembly resolution 39/148 P of 17 December 1984, which, recognizing the insufficiency of existing measures, requested the preparation of a report on possible steps to expedite effective action for the prevention of nuclear war.

4. It is our hope that the report will provide an overview of the question of the prevention of nuclear war and that it will contain the views you have reached on an issue of such overriding importance and universal concern.
5. Given the danger posed by nuclear weapons to the survival of mankind, all States have the obligation to make individual and collective efforts to avert the threat of a nuclear holocaust. As long as nuclear weapons exist and they continue to increase in number and in sophistication, it would be highly advisable to set up a body responsible for studying the matter on a continuing basis and submitting specific suggestions to the Conference on Disarmament so that the latter, as the sole multilateral negotiating body in the disarmament field, can negotiate the adoption of appropriate and practical measures in keeping with the magnitude of the threat we seek to prevent. Such a body, which could be called the Ad Hoc Committee to Prevent Nuclear War, could act as a deliberative organ of the General Assembly. In our opinion, such an ad hoc committee would facilitate sustained consideration of this issue, permit the adoption of appropriate courses of action, expedite the negotiation of pertinent measures and, basically, contribute to reducing the serious danger of nuclear war.

AUSTRALIA

[Original: English]

[8 March 1985]

1. The existence of 50,000 nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapons States makes the prevention of nuclear war imperative. It is Australia's view, however, that the prevention of nuclear war is inextricably linked with the problem of preventing all war. Indeed the evidence suggests that nuclear war is just as likely to begin as an escalation of conventional conflict as it is from a premeditated, pre-emptive first strike. To prevent all war is therefore to prevent nuclear war.

2. Australia holds that it is the collective responsibility of all States to work towards these ends. We note that paragraph 32 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, stated that: "All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war" (see General Assembly resolution S-10/2). We take this to mean that while it is imperative that there be direct negotiations between those States most responsible for the prevention of nuclear war - namely the nuclear-weapon States - it is also the responsibility of all States to avoid all armed conflict in order to preclude the possibility of triggering a nuclear war. Responsibilities can therefore be divided as between: nuclear-weapon States and all States.

Responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States

3. In view of their special responsibilities, it is incumbent on the nuclear-weapon States to pursue policies directed at the avoidance of conflicts and of escalation to the nuclear level of conflicts which do occur.

4. Direct negotiations should be conducted between the nuclear-weapon States in pursuit of the following measures.

/...
Nuclear disarmament

5. As the ultimate achievement of nuclear disarmament will render nuclear war impossible, this is one of the most important measures to be taken by the nuclear-weapon States. In this respect Australia fully supports the resumption of bilateral talks between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on a range of nuclear and outer space issues.

Nuclear confidence-building measures

6. Such measures are again for the nuclear-weapon States to devise, but they could include a whole range of initiatives from, for example, regular consultations about projected military developments, to notification of all seismic events, including nuclear tests, to the International Seismic Centre in the United Kingdom. The Conference on Disarmament's ad hoc committee on prevention of nuclear war and all related matters could discuss and propose to the nuclear-weapon States particular measures in this vein.

Specific prevention of nuclear war measures

7. Past examples of these include the 1973 United States/Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War and the "hot-line" arrangements between the two super-Powers. There is presumably scope for further measures including "hot-line" arrangements between the other nuclear-weapon States. The Conference on Disarmament's ad hoc committee could also have a role in discussing and proposing measures under this category.

Negative security assurances

8. Nuclear-weapon States can enhance the prospects of avoiding nuclear war by strengthening their guarantees not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. This issue should be addressed by the Conference on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances.

Responsibilities of all States

Adherence to the Charter of the United Nations

9. The Charter of the United Nations already provides the international legal framework for the prevention of all wars, including nuclear war. In particular, Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter states that all United Nations Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Universal respect for this Article is the most important single requisite to prevent nuclear war. Universal membership of the United Nations, and consequent achievement of universal commitment to Article 2, paragraph 4, would also be valuable.
Strengthening of peace-making and peace-keeping capability of the United Nations

10. Further discussion and analysis could lead to the enhancement of existing mechanisms – particularly the system of collective security under the Charter of the United Nations. Australia, which began its two year term on the Security Council on 1 January 1985, will pursue initiatives aimed at making the Security Council itself more effective in containing and preventing international conflict. These initiatives include measures for strengthening the role of the Secretary-General in his actions to settle disputes, pressing the Security Council for realistic actions designed to implement in some form the collective security provisions of the Charter and supporting proposals to change the way the Security Council is conducted in order to create a more conducive climate for effective negotiation of disputes. In this regard, Australia supports the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the implementation of the collective security provisions of the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security (the Koroma Committee). Australia has also supported the Cypriot initiative for a special session of the Security Council to discuss disarmament and international security. Australia has also taken an active interest in the work of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization.

Nuclear non-proliferation

11. Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would enhance the possibility of preventing nuclear war by helping preclude the spread of nuclear weapons to current non-nuclear weapon States. The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to be held in September 1985 will provide an opportunity to review the achievements of the Treaty and enhance its effectiveness.

Regional security arrangements and regional disarmament

12. The international community should be encouraged to negotiate geographically limited disarmament and arms control measures, zones of peace (in accordance with paragraph 64 of the Final Document) and nuclear-weapon-free zones (in accordance with paragraph 60 of the Final Document). Australia is, in this respect, participating in consideration by the South Pacific Forum of the establishment of a South Pacific nuclear-free zone.

Adherence to multilateral disarmament and arms control agreements

13. As a contribution to the prevention of war, including nuclear war, all States should adhere to existing multilateral disarmament and arms control agreements. Special attention should be given to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.

Confidence-building measures

14. The United Nations Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures should be followed up and consideration given to the following measures:
(a) Preparedness on the part of States, especially nuclear-weapon States, to practise more openness and transparency, including in the field of military budgets and force planning;

(b) Increase in the exchange of information on military strategies, especially as regards the function of nuclear weapons within such strategies;

(c) Possibilities for the limitation of military options of all States in order to ensure that existing capabilities cannot be used for aggressive purposes;

(d) Facilitation of international measures for the verification of compliance with agreements in the field of disarmament and arms limitation;

(e) Steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot-lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict;

(f) Advance notification of military exercises;

(g) Expanded exchange of military force data.

**Multilateral disarmament negotiations**

15. The Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the responsibility for negotiating those agreements most amenable to multilateral consideration. For Australia, the most urgent of these are a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and a chemical weapons convention. Both of these measures would have an indirect, but lasting effect on efforts to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. The prevention of nuclear war itself is an agenda item of the Conference on Disarmament. Australia believes that the Conference should develop a work programme that would enable it to address the full range of issues relevant to the prevention of nuclear war with a view to identifying measures and initiatives that the Conference might consider.

16. The Conference on Disarmament should examine all of the foregoing possibilities in its ad hoc committee on prevention of nuclear war and all related matters.

**Specific prevention of war measures and agreements**

The Conference on Disarmament could in its ad hoc committee also consider specific measures and agreements for the prevention of war. The Conference could:

(a) Assess those factors which need to be negotiated by the international community with a view to reducing the risk of an outbreak of armed conflict in general and nuclear conflict in particular;

(b) Look at measures to prevent, in the first instance, conventional war;

(c) Look at measures to prevent the escalation of armed conflict, including:
(i) Restriction of arms supplies to areas of conflict;
(ii) The arms trade in general (both overt and covert).

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

[Original: English]
[12 March 1985]

At this juncture the Government of Brunei Darussalam has no further views regarding this matter but fully supports every effort of the Conference on Disarmament which will prevent the occurrence of nuclear war.

BULGARIA

[Original: Russian]
[8 February 1985]

1. The People's Republic of Bulgaria, like the overwhelming majority of States, is firmly convinced that removing the threat of nuclear war is the most important and urgent task of today. This threat is not only real but has also grown considerably in recent years. Nuclear war would result in catastrophe for all countries and peoples of the world. Therefore, the preservation and strengthening of peace and the prevention of nuclear war are a vital necessity for mankind and the common responsibility of all working people.

2. The threat of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons can be reduced and removed completely. The most effective guarantee in this respect would be the complete destruction of all types of nuclear weapons. However, before this ultimate objective can be achieved, there is an urgent need to take specific, practical steps that would contribute effectively to lessening and removing the threat of nuclear war. These steps may be of a material, moral and political, or international legal character. They could be adopted on a unilateral, bilateral or multilateral basis.

3. Bulgaria has repeatedly expressed its views on steps to expedite effective action on the question of the prevention of nuclear war in the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament and other international forums. In particular, Bulgaria fully supports the positions and concrete proposals of the socialist countries on this question, as contained in the relevant documents submitted by them to the Conference on Disarmament (CD/484 and CD/406).

4. Bulgaria attaches the greatest importance to such measures as:

(a) The regulation of relations among the nuclear States by means of certain norms of a mandatory nature which could be recognized by mutual agreement among these States;
(b) The creation of a moral and political atmosphere in relations among States which would help to ensure that:

(i) All States, and primarily the nuclear-weapon States, regard the prevention of nuclear war as the main objective of their policy, avert situations fraught with nuclear conflict and, in the event of such danger, hold urgent consultations to prevent a nuclear conflagration from breaking out;

(ii) All States, and primarily the nuclear-weapon States, renounce propaganda for nuclear war in any form, either global or limited, and refrain from the formulation, propounding, dissemination and propagation of political and military doctrines and concepts intended to provide "legitimacy" for the first use of nuclear weapons and in general to justify the "admissibility" of unleashing nuclear war;

(iii) All nuclear States undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons;

(iv) All nuclear-weapon States undertake not to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances against non-nuclear countries in whose territory there are no such weapons, respect the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone already created and encourage the creation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world;

(c) Bulgaria supports the proposal for the conclusion among all nuclear States of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. With a view to the general exclusion of the use of force, both nuclear and non-nuclear, from international relations, it is essential to conclude a world treaty, as has been proposed for many years by the socialist countries. A particularly important step in this direction would be to implement the proposal for the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of force and on the maintenance of peaceful relations between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO);

(d) Implementation of measures of a material nature aimed at preventing the development and deployment of constantly newer weapons systems, such as:

(i) The freezing, under appropriate verification, of nuclear weapons in quantitative and qualitative terms. This step should be taken by all nuclear States or at least, in the first instance, by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, on the understanding that the other nuclear States would follow their example;

(ii) The cessation of the qualitative refinement of nuclear weapons and the development of new models and types of such weapons;

(iii) The earliest conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and, until the conclusion of such a treaty, the declaration by all nuclear States of a moratorium on all nuclear tests;
(iv) Prevention by the nuclear States of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form, the transfer of these weapons or control over them to anybody, the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of countries where there are none, and the spread of the arms race to new spheres;

(v) The step-by-step reduction, on the basis of the principle of equal security of nuclear weapons until they have been completely eliminated in all their forms;

(vi) Prevention of the arms race from proceeding in other dangerous directions, especially in outer space since, if permitted, this would sharply increase the risk of nuclear war;

(e) Bulgaria attaches exceptional importance to the understanding reached between the Soviet Union and the United States with regard to fresh negotiations on a whole range of issues relating to nuclear and space weapons. The negotiations should lead to the elaboration of a mutually acceptable agreement based on the principle of equality and equal security, simultaneously and in an interrelated manner covering the three aspects of the negotiations. The aim of the negotiations should be the limitation and reduction of strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons, with a view to the ultimate destruction of nuclear weapons, and likewise the complete elimination of the danger of extending the arms race into outer space;

(f) Bulgaria stresses the great responsibility of the Conference on Disarmament, namely, that it should contribute to the prevention of nuclear war. It is time for the Conference to proceed, as a matter of priority, to constructive negotiations on the elaboration of urgent practical steps and the conclusion of relevant international agreements aimed at averting nuclear war. The concrete proposals of the socialist countries are a good basis for this. The most suitable forum for conducting such negotiations would be an ad hoc committee with an appropriate mandate, and such a body should therefore be established;

(g) Bulgaria reaffirms its readiness to consider any other steps, of either a substantive or a procedural nature, with a view to expediting the effective solution of the problem of preventing nuclear war.

BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

[Original: Russian]

[13 March 1985]

1. It is the position of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic that under current circumstances there is no task more important than that of preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. The acute aggravation of the international situation and the increased threat of a nuclear catastrophe have been caused by the policy of the United States of America and its closest allies designed to acquire military superiority, undermine military strategic stability in the world and achieve global dominance. The intensification of the programme to develop strategic and other
nuclear weapons, the desire to transfer the arms race to outer space and the deployment of the new American nuclear missiles in Western Europe are the material manifestation of this irresponsible policy. The plans to acquire, in addition to new nuclear missiles, offensive space weapons, including anti-missile and anti-satellite weapons, can be viewed only as attempts to gain a first-strike capability while remaining safely protected by a space "shield" in the hope of escaping a second strike. All this, together with the doctrines and concepts which permit first use of nuclear weapons, demonstrates the refusal of these States to consider the prevention of nuclear war as the main task of international politics and to take appropriate effective measures.

2. The Byelorussian SSR shares the alarm at the increased nuclear threat which was expressed by the majority of States in the world at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly and which was reflected in a number of resolutions adopted at that and previous Assembly sessions. Among them, the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe, the Declaration on the Condemnation of Nuclear War, and the resolutions on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the non-first use of nuclear weapons, a nuclear-weapon freeze, and the start of nuclear disarmament negotiations are particularly important. The Byelorussian SSR supported all these resolutions and was a sponsor of a number of them.

3. The prevention of an arms race in outer space and simultaneous progress in bringing about radical reductions in nuclear weapons until their complete elimination would mark the beginning of the successful solution of the problem of preventing nuclear war. In this regard, a significant contribution could be made by the Soviet-American negotiations on space weapons and nuclear weapons which have begun and which became possible, as is well known, through the initiative of the Soviet Union, which declared its readiness to conduct them in a business-like and constructive manner, on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. The United States too, must demonstrate the same honest and responsible approach and must strictly adhere to the understanding reached concerning the subject and objectives of the negotiations in all their parts.

4. Any attempts to undermine current military strategic parity, which promotes stability in the world, will have dangerous consequences. The goal of States must be to reduce as far as possible, the level of this balance, rather than to upset it.

5. Decisive action on the part of all States without exception is required in order to prevent a nuclear catastrophe and, ultimately, to bring about the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

6. The Byelorussian SSR is convinced that the problem of eliminating the threat of nuclear war must be the focal point of the work of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission and, of course, the multilateral negotiating body - the Conference on Disarmament. On this basis, the Byelorussian SSR actively supported the adoption of Assembly resolution 39/148 P on prevention of nuclear war and, in particular, its provision concerning the need to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on the subject at the beginning of its 1985 session. This provision should be implemented without delay.

/...
7. The policy of the nuclear-weapon Powers is of particular importance in our time. The vital interests of all mankind require that relations between these Powers must be subject to specific rules which are designed to achieve the goal of peace. The achievement of an understanding on this would be in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

8. The prevention of nuclear war must become the main goal and binding rule of conduct for all nuclear Powers, regardless of the size of their nuclear arsenals. Situations which might lead to a nuclear conflict should not be permitted and, if such a danger should arise, urgent consultations must be undertaken in order to avert the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.

9. It would be appropriate, in developing the General Assembly Declaration on the Condemnation of Nuclear War, for all States to include provisions condemning nuclear war in unilateral and joint statements or declarations of a political nature.

10. It is necessary to renounce nuclear war propaganda in all its forms and to reject doctrines and concepts designed to justify the "legitimacy" of first use of nuclear weapons and the "admissibility" of nuclear war in general.

11. All nuclear-weapon Powers must renounce first use of nuclear weapons. Obligations to this effect could be undertaken unilaterally by each nuclear-weapon State that has not yet done so. As is well known, the Soviet Union has already undertaken such an obligation. Similar obligations could also be laid down in a single international instrument of a legally binding character as provided for in General Assembly resolution 39/148 D of 17 December 1984, which was supported by the Byelorussian SSR. This would be equivalent to a complete international legal prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The Byelorussian SSR also supports the proposal to conclude a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons with the participation of all nuclear Powers.

12. The use of force in general, whether it involves nuclear or conventional weapons, must also be excluded from international relations. This goal can be achieved through the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. The proposal concerning the mutual non-use of armed force and support for peaceful relations, which was put forward by the Soviet Union at the 1984 Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, also relates to the solution of this problem. It would be based on the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear or conventional weapons against one another.

13. The nuclear Powers must pledge not to use nuclear weapons against those States in whose territory such weapons do not exist and must also respect the status of the existing denuclearized zones and promote the establishment of further denuclearized zones in different areas of the world.

14. Other measures, such as prevention of the accidental or unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons, exclusion of the possibility of surprise attack and so forth, can
also be considered. In this regard, the Byelorussian SSR considers that confidence-building measures can contribute to solving the problem of preventing nuclear war only in conjunction with large-scale political and international legal measures designed to achieve this goal.

15. In order to eliminate the nuclear threat, it is also necessary to adopt a series of concrete measures of a practical nature. A freeze by the nuclear Powers of all their existing nuclear weapons in qualitative and quantitative terms under appropriate supervision could be one such measure. An understanding on this question would signify the mutual cessation of the build-up of all components of existing nuclear arsenals, including delivery vehicles and nuclear stockpiles. The arms race would thus be halted which would decisively facilitate the achievement of subsequent understandings on reducing the number of such weapons until their complete elimination. As a first step, the Soviet Union and the United States could agree to freeze their nuclear weapons as an example to the other nuclear States. General Assembly resolution 39/151 D of 17 December 1984 on a nuclear-weapon freeze, of which the Byelorussian SSR was a sponsor, is in keeping with these goals. Certain other resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session are also consistent with them.

16. The elaboration of the agreement on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests must be brought to a conclusion. Agreement should also be reached on a moratorium on all nuclear explosions by all nuclear States pending the conclusion of such an agreement. The ratification of the Soviet-American 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes should constitute an important step in this direction.

17. Within the context of efforts aimed at preventing nuclear war, the importance of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot be exaggerated. Such weapons must not be permitted to spread in any manner; nuclear weapons or control over them must not be transferred to anyone whatsoever; they must not be deployed in the territory of countries where they do not exist, and the nuclear arms race must not be transferred to new areas.

18. The Byelorussian SSR is convinced that the strongest guarantee against the possibility of nuclear war is nuclear disarmament. The immediate development and execution of a phased nuclear-disarmament programme leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security are necessary in order to achieve these goals. General Assembly resolution 39/148 C of 17 December 1984, of which the Byelorussian SSR was a sponsor, deals with such a programme.

19. The prevention of an arms race in outer space is of exceptional importance. The militarization of outer space will jeopardize everything that has been achieved with regard to limiting the arms race. Moreover, it will be an incentive to further spurts in the arms race in all directions; a sharp increase in the threat of nuclear war will be a direct result of this. The policy of militarizing outer space, regardless of the pretexts which were used to justify it, will undermine the strategic stability and security interests of all States without exception. The
attempt to extend the arms race to outer space must be blocked in an effective manner. In this regard, the elaboration at the Conference on Disarmament of an agreement in accordance with General Assembly resolution 39/59 of 12 December 1984 is extremely necessary.

20. The prohibition, halting and limitation of the arms race and achievement of disarmament in other areas, particularly in the field of weapons of mass destruction, would be a truly positive factor in the task of eliminating the nuclear threat. It is important, in particular, to prohibit the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and, ultimately, to ensure the use of scientific and technological achievements exclusively for peaceful purposes.

21. Other measures leading to the reduction and elimination of the nuclear threat can also be considered. It is important that these measures make a concrete, truly tangible contribution to the vitally important task of preventing nuclear war.

22. It is also necessary to strive consistently to eliminate conflict and crisis situations and to eradicate colonial and racist régimes. Expenditure of the material and intellectual resources of mankind on preparations for its violent destruction, must be precluded. These resources must be redirected towards the solution of the global problems confronting mankind in order to ensure its steady socio-economic development.

23. The forthcoming fortieth anniversary of the victory of the peoples in the Second World War, which in accordance with General Assembly resolution 39/119 of 14 December 1984 will be observed on 8 and 9 May 1985, is a further reminder that joint, united action is required to eliminate the danger threatening mankind.

24. The efforts of all States, regardless of their social, political and military status, must now focus on halting the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, directing its course into a downward spiral and delivering mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

CANADA

[Original: English]

[9 April 1985]

1. Canada could not support General Assembly resolution 39/148 P which, among other things, attempted to isolate artificially the dangers of nuclear war from the very real dangers which all armed conflict poses to the world today. These dangers were underscored by the Economic and Social Council 1985 Report on the World Social Situation (E/CN.5/1985/2), which stated that 16 million and perhaps as many as 20 million people have died in some 150 conventional armed conflicts since the end of the Second World War. This report helped to underline the immensely destructive nature of conventional war. The use of chemical weapons was also noted in the report.
2. This report serves to reinforce the Canadian view that, while the prevention of nuclear war must be the underlying tenet of all practical arms control and disarmament proposals and security policies, it cannot and should not be considered in isolation. That is why Canada supported a broader, more balanced approach to the prevention of all war in the nuclear age by co-sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.40/Rev.1 entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". Canada continues to subscribe totally to the views found in this draft resolution. The task of preventing nuclear war, indeed all war, requires all States to do their utmost to ensure that force is no longer viewed as an appropriate instrument for settling international disputes and that both its use and the threat of its use are eliminated from international relations as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

3. The Charter of the United Nations also enshrines the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack should occur. In this context, and in the absence of a more sure and practical method for the prevention of war, Canada continues to subscribe to the concept of collective defence and deterrence against conventional and nuclear aggression. We realize, however, that our security cannot rest upon deterrence alone and therefore Canada's goal remains the control and major reduction of armaments, both nuclear and conventional, to their minimum levels consistent with the legitimate security needs of States. To this end, Canada is determined to pursue balanced and verifiable arms control and disarmament measures as a central objective of its foreign policy.

4. Canada hopes that due consideration will be given to the points outlined in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.40/Rev.1 in the continuing discussion of this subject, since they provide a practical and concrete approach to the prevention of all war in the nuclear age.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

[Original: English]  
[21 February 1985]

1. Czechoslovakia regards the prevention of nuclear war as a priority issue of the present times. It is this issue that constitutes the central motto of its foreign policy, guiding its activities in all international negotiations, primarily in the United Nations, at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and also in bilateral talks. The development and the outcome of the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly testify to the fact that the prevention of nuclear war is regarded as an imperative of our time, as the key to the solution of other global problems by an overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations. The session confirmed that the utmost attention should be devoted to the efforts aimed at halting the nuclear arms race and proceeding to nuclear disarmament, namely, to the adoption of effective measures of moral-political, contractual as well as a material nature designed to limit and reduce nuclear arms up to their complete liquidation. This is an approach which Czechoslovakia fully approves and actively promotes.
2. There are a number of measures which may contribute to the realization of this goal. However, none of them would have the appropriate weight without the participation of the major nuclear Powers. Czechoslovakia welcomes therefore the agreement on opening bilateral Soviet-United States talks on the entire complex of the interrelated questions concerning space and nuclear weapons. Success and concrete results at these negotiations would undoubtedly contribute to a decisive extent to the averting of a nuclear apocalypse. Czechoslovakia regards as particularly topical, not only in respect of these negotiations, but above all in the context of General Assembly resolution 39/148 P, the question of the prohibition of the militarization of outer space and its use for exclusively peaceful purposes, for the benefit of mankind. That is why our Republic gave its unreserved support to the resolution on the prevention of the militarization of outer space adopted at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly (resolution 39/59 of 12 December 1984).

3. In accordance with the United Nations Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session in 1979 (resolution 34/88), as a result of a Czechoslovak initiative, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic considers that it is the political will of States and the principle of reciprocity, equality and equal security of all parties that remain the decisive factors for the achievement of concrete measures and steps also in the aforesaid negotiations.

4. In this connection, Czechoslovakia highly appreciates the importance in the current international situation of the Soviet proposal of 2 March 1984 for the adoption of certain norms of relations among States possessing nuclear weapons, which require, among other things, that the prevention of nuclear war be regarded as the main aim of the foreign policy of States and which contain a pledge not to make first use of nuclear weapons. Czechoslovakia is convinced that the adoption of such a code of conduct in the nuclear epoch would contribute to the preservation of peace, to the reduction of military confrontation and to the strengthening of security and stability in relations among States in general.

5. Czechoslovakia regards as a fundamental step of particular importance in the field of nuclear disarmament the demand for a freeze of nuclear weapons by States possessing them, both in quantitative and in qualitative terms. A solid basis for the solution of this question is provided in the Soviet proposal, which was adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session as resolution 38/76. In this context, Czechoslovakia also evaluates positively the Appeal of the Heads of State and Government of six countries made to the nuclear Powers on 22 May 1984.

6. A milestone would undoubtedly be achieved on the road of nuclear disarmament if a treaty were formulated and concluded on a general and complete nuclear-weapon test ban. Czechoslovakia also advocates therefore the resumption of talks on this question with the participation of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

7. Czechoslovakia is also in favour of the achievement of universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1970 and for the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime in general. Of great importance for
the creation of conditions leading to nuclear disarmament is also the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world.

8. An irreplaceable role in the solution of the problems of nuclear disarmament and thus also in the reduction of the risk of a war conflict involving the use of nuclear weapons is played by the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva. Czechoslovakia regards it therefore as essential that the Conference should establish in 1985 appropriate working bodies for all items on its agenda with clearly specified mandates, so that it might proceed to the formulation of concrete contractual documents. Incentives for such work have been provided in a number of initiative resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

9. Czechoslovakia will do its utmost to achieve these goals. To this end, it will actively co-operate with all States interested therein.

DENMARK

[Original: English]

[13 February 1985]

1. The Danish Government regrets that it was not possible at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly to reach agreement on a consensus resolution on the very important problem of the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.

2. Many of the elements in General Assembly resolution 39/148 P of 17 December 1984 are endorsed by the Danish Government. The overall balance of the resolution is, however, somewhat distorted by the exclusive emphasis on nuclear war. The important question of preventing war in all its forms is not taken into account. Considering the grave risk that a conventional war between the world's major power blocs might develop into a nuclear catastrophe, a very important element in the ongoing deliberations should be the question of how to prevent war as such.

3. The Danish Government has repeatedly emphasized the urgent need for the earliest possible conclusion of military significant and verifiable reductions of armaments. Such agreements should take into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned and of achieving stable military balance, globally and regionally, at the lowest possible levels. The conclusion of such agreements would be a very important contribution to the prevention of war.

4. The full and unreserved commitment by all Member States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations should form the basis for the efforts to prevent war and, in particular, nuclear war.
5. At the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly a draft resolution was introduced by Denmark together with eight other delegations entitled "Prevention of war in the nuclear age" (A/C.1/39/L.40). It will be recalled that the sponsors of this draft resolution decided not to put it to a vote in order to avoid controversial recommendations of the General Assembly on a question so much in need of consensus and concerted efforts. The viewpoints and proposals made in this draft resolution are fully endorsed by the Danish Government and should be taken into account in future deliberations concerning the question of the prevention of nuclear war.

EGYPT

[Original: Arabic]

[11 March 1985]

1. The Government of Egypt considers that one of the most acute dangers facing today's world is the threat presented to the survival of mankind by the outbreak of nuclear war and the fact that nuclear weapons are instruments of mass annihilation. Because of this, the prevention of nuclear war is regarded as a goal having urgent and absolute priority for all the peoples and Governments of the world. The primary responsibility lies with the nuclear States, whose arsenals continue to possess nuclear weapons constituting a threat to human security itself.

2. Egypt considers that there is an urgent need for the international community to arrive at an agreement or agreements on effective steps aimed at reducing the probability of the outbreak of nuclear war, as a step towards the achievement of general and complete nuclear disarmament. It also believes that agreement on such measures should be reached through serious negotiations, in addition to the initiatives that must be taken by the nuclear States for their part.

3. In calling upon the nuclear States to assume their primary responsibilities in this regard and to intensify their negotiations for the attainment of this objective, Egypt stresses the vital and important role of the United Nations in this area and supports the efforts made in the Conference on Disarmament for the prevention of nuclear war, the halting of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament.

4. We propose below some measures of particular importance with regard to the prevention of nuclear war:

   (a) Agreement by the nuclear States on measures to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war, including:

   (i) Arrival at a binding unified formula whereby all the nuclear States would undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, which would, in practice, ensure their commitment not to use nuclear weapons at all;

   (ii) Agreement on specific arrangements and measures to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war by error and others to support and develop existing systems for communications between the nuclear States;
(iii) Agreement on measures to build confidence between existing military alliances, such as the exchange among them of sufficient information about the current and future military capabilities and movements of other alliances.

(b) Prevention of the extension of the arms race to new areas, particularly outer space, restriction of the use of outer space to peaceful purposes, and the use of space technology to support and develop the international community's supervision of disarmament agreements, to limit armament and to monitor world crises and prevent their escalation.

(c) Expediting arrival at an agreement on a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests under effective international control, as a positive step towards halting the development of nuclear weapons and preventing the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. A start might be made with agreement on a halt to nuclear testing for a specific period, pending agreement on a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapons tests.

(d) Arrival by the nuclear States - as a first phase - at a limited agreement or agreements on nuclear disarmament eliminating nuclear weapons that increase the probability of the outbreak of a nuclear war, particularly as a result of error.

(e) In view of the fact that the increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States increases the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war, Egypt supports the strengthening of the system for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and stresses the importance of developing and enhancing the effectiveness of that system by the following means:

(i) Compliance of the nuclear States with their commitment to arrive at an agreement to halt the nuclear-arms race leading ultimately to nuclear disarmament;

(ii) Arrival at a binding unified formula whereby all the nuclear-weapon States would undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States;

(iii) Conclusion of a binding international agreement not to attack nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes, particularly in non-nuclear-weapon States;

(iv) An international commitment not to assist States whose nuclear programmes are agreed by the international community to constitute a threat to the security of neighbouring States and which refuse to subject those programmes to international supervision and safeguards;

(v) Encouraging the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; an undertaking on the part of the nuclear States to respect the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone; commitment on their part to encouraging States which express their desire to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones; and abstention from the adoption of any measures that might impede such action.
1. France voted against General Assembly resolution 39/148 P because, in its view, the resolution presents the problems of international security in the nuclear age in terms which do not correspond to reality.

2. Problems of international security cannot, in fact, be arbitrarily dissociated from one another, and the justifiable concern to avoid the outbreak of a nuclear war must not make us forget that other major priority, the prevention of any war of whatever kind.

3. We cannot turn back the clock on the invention of nuclear weapons. There is nothing we can say or do to alter this reality. Nuclear weapons will not become "obsolete" and "powerless". Nor will they be exorcized by means of unverifiable agreements which seek to regulate their use without in any way altering reality, namely, their continuing presence in countries' arsenals.

4. For nearly 40 years now, deterrence has contributed to stability and peace among the countries of the East and West. The European countries, situated on the continent with currently the largest accumulation of weapons of all kinds (nuclear, chemical and conventional), have been spared any major conflict on their own soil thanks to deterrence and the certainty that any aggressor would suffer tremendous losses on its own territory.

5. In these circumstances, the essential factor is not the "increased danger of nuclear war" described by the alarmist sponsors of the resolutions, but rather the maintenance or restoration of balances at the lowest possible level by means of verifiable agreements.

6. As was recognized in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the two most heavily armed Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, must first make the most substantial reductions.

7. France, for its part, has already stated the terms for any decision that it might possibly take to participate in nuclear disarmament, namely: reduction of the arsenals of the two super-Powers to levels such that one might consider the gap between potentialities to have changed in nature; quantitative and qualitative limitation of strategic defence systems; significant progress in reducing conventional imbalances in Europe; and disappearance of any threat of the use of chemical weapons.

8. It is France's view therefore that, in the region in which it is situated there is currently no credible alternative to nuclear deterrence for discouraging aggression and preserving the peace, a view already expressed in its previous reply to the Secretary-General on the same subject (see A/S-12/11/Add.2 of 9 June 1982) and which still holds good today.
1. Forty years after the smashing of fascism, peace is again in jeopardy. The German Democratic Republic shares the concern of States and peoples at the increased danger of nuclear war conjured up by the imperialist policy of all-out armament and confrontation and at the disastrous consequences that such a war would have for all mankind. It believes that especially the removal of the threat of a nuclear inferno and the prevention of the militarization of outer space, the cessation of the arms race, the limitation and reduction of armaments in accordance with the principle of equality and of equal security are literally of vital importance to all nations.

2. The German Democratic Republic is convinced that this objective can be achieved by the creation of a world-wide coalition of common sense and realism versus the policy of nuclear-arms build-up. This requires vigorous efforts and constructive political dialogue.

3. In this connection, the German Democratic Republic strongly welcomes the joint Soviet Union—United States declaration of 8 January 1985 on the beginning of new negotiations on a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear weapons, both strategic and intermediate range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. It is now essential to scrupulously implement the agreement reached and to strictly observe all its components in practice.

4. The German Democratic Republic shares the view of a large number of States that the prevention of an arms race in outer space is inseparably connected with steps for the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments and of intermediate-range nuclear forces. The point is not to allow arms competition in outer space before it begins and to put an end to it on the Earth.

5. Urgent measures of an international legal and material nature to reduce the danger of a nuclear catastrophe are necessary and feasible. They would, at the same time, pave the way for ending the nuclear-arms race and for nuclear disarmament.

6. Efforts for the solution of this overriding global problem rightly occupy a central place in the work of the United Nations and of the Conference on Disarmament. Never before has the General Assembly so unequivocally voted for the avoidance of nuclear war and the prevention of an arms race in outer space as it did at its thirty-ninth session.

7. The German Democratic Republic co-sponsored the relevant General Assembly resolution 39/148 P, in which the Conference on Disarmament is requested "to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on the subject at the beginning of its 1985 session".

/.../
The Soviet Union sponsored resolution 39/148 D on the non-use of
nuclear war. In this context, it reiterates its serious concern about plans for
the militarization of outer space and about the continued deployment of United
States first-strike weapons in Western Europe, which are contradictory to recently
declared intentions and constitute serious obstacles to purposeful negotiations.
At the same time, the German Democratic Republic recalls the need for renouncing
the elaboration and propagation of nuclear warfare doctrines, including those which
justify the first-use of nuclear weapons. Attempts to play down the real danger of
nuclear war and to have a first-use "option" approved by the United Nations by
invoking the need for avoiding any war, were rightly rejected by the overwhelming
majority of Member States at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

14. The German Democratic Republic points to the urgent necessity of implementing
the decisions adopted by the United Nations so that the role of the world
Organization in efforts for international peace and security, arms limitation and
disarmament will be decisively enhanced in the fortieth year after the victory of
the anti-Hitler coalition and the foundation of the United Nations Organization.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

[Original: English]

[11 February 1985]

1. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany avails itself of this
opportunity to respond to the invitation contained in paragraph 5 of General
Assembly resolution 39/148 P of 17 December 1984 in order to underline the
overriding importance it attaches to the problem of the prevention of war, in
particular nuclear war, and to clarify again its own views on the subject. In
doing so, it is recalled that the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany had
found it necessary to vote against resolution 39/148 P.

2. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany continues to regret that it
has proven impossible at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly to work
out a consensus resolution on the problem of the prevention of nuclear war,
including all related matters, in spite of the fact that members of the Group of
Western States had repeatedly stressed their willingness to join in efforts to
reach a common understanding on an issue that calls for concerted action by the
international community.

3. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany:

(a) Recalls document CD/357 and its proposal submitted during the Twelfth
Special Session of the General Assembly;

(b) Shares the conviction of the authors of General Assembly resolution
39/148 B that determined action is necessary and that suitable steps should be
expedited in order to reduce the possibility of a conflict involving nuclear
weapons;
(c) Joins in the expression of regret of the General Assembly that the Conference on Disarmament has not yet fully considered its agenda item on the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, and that, instead, it has been bogged down in unnecessary procedural debates.

4. However, the Government takes a critical view of several other parts of General Assembly resolution 39/148 P and, in particular:

(a) Rejects the hypothesis that the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war has recently increased;

(b) Perceives the description of the current situation as overly alarmist;

(c) Takes exception to the exclusive emphasis on nuclear war with the result that all related matters, including the importance of preventing war in all its forms, are neglected;

(d) Remains critical of attempts to regulate in detail by resolutions of the General Assembly matters regarding agenda items of the Conference on Disarmament, including procedural issues, which the Conference itself should take up in conformity with its own rules of procedure.

5. As will be recalled, the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, jointly with eight other delegations, introduced at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly a draft resolution under the same agenda item entitled "Prevention of war in the nuclear age" (A/C.1/39/L.40/Rev.1). Although the authors of this draft resolution did decide not to put it to a vote, since full discussion on the issues had not taken place and the potential for elaborating common positions taking full account of the security needs of all concerned had not been exhausted, this draft resolution continues to reflect the views of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, and is therefore reproduced below as an integral part of this reply.

"Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters: prevention of war in the nuclear age"

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling the determination of the peoples of the world to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and, for this end, to strengthen their resolve to maintain international peace and security,

"Noting with grave concern the implications of a continuing arms build-up, particularly in its nuclear aspect, and expressing its profound conviction that the prevention of nuclear war, indeed all war, remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day,

"Convinced that the successful fulfilment of this task requires all States to do their utmost to avoid conflict and to resolve disputes

/...
peacefully, so as to ensure that war is no longer viewed as an instrument for settling international disputes and that the use and the threat of force are eliminated from international life as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

"Further convinced that the prevention of war, and particularly nuclear war, requires that all States respect the sovereignty, equality, independence and territorial integrity of all other States, and recalling the commitment by all Member States under the Charter of the United Nations to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force,

"Recalling none the less the inherent right of States to take the measures necessary to defend themselves against attack, and recognizing the vital importance of deterring and preventing armed conflict in any form,

"Reiterating the vital interest of the peoples of the world in disarmament, but also recognizing the importance of confidence-building measures for the establishment of more co-operative relationships between States, the prevention of conflicts, in particular by lessening the possibility of surprise attack, and the facilitation of further disarmament measures, and noting in that regard the large number of proposals for additional confidence-building measures currently considered in a large number of multilateral forums,

"Stressing the necessity of building on the important steps that have already been taken to reduce the risk of war, most notably on the verifiable arms control agreements that have already been concluded,

"Recalling paragraphs 47 to 50 and 56 to 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session devoted to disarmament, regarding the necessity for, and the process of, nuclear disarmament,

"Underlining the primary responsibility of nuclear-weapon States, in particular those with the largest nuclear arsenals, for the prevention of a war involving the use of nuclear weapons and for nuclear disarmament, but also bearing in mind the collective responsibility of all States to work towards these ends,

"Believing that the critical goals of securing peace and preventing nuclear war and any armed conflict are best achieved by fully recognizing and respecting the dignity of man, basic freedoms and the right of national self-determination,

"Noting with deep concern that, in spite of their important contribution to the prevention of war, negotiations to reduce the current level of United States and Soviet nuclear weapons are suspended and other arms control negotiations proceed at a pace which is clearly inadequate to the seriousness of the threat and the urgency of the problem,"
"1. Reaffirms that reducing and removing the threat of nuclear war is the most acute and urgent task of the present day and that eliminating the threat of all armed conflict remains the ultimate goal of the international community;

"2. Urges all States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, and thus never to use any of their weapons, except in the exercise of their inherent right of individual or collective self-defence;

"3. Calls upon all States to maintain, as a priority objective of their policies, the removal of the danger of war at any level of hostility, thereby precluding the use of nuclear weapons;

"4. Urges all States to exercise restraint in their relations with others, to act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations which could cause dangerous exacerbation of their relations, to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of war;

"5. Emphasizes the importance of concluding agreements on militarily significant and verifiable reductions of armaments and forces, including nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned, and of achieving stable military balance, globally and regionally, at the lowest possible levels;

"6. Calls upon the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics especially to reach effective agreement to reduce to the lowest possible levels their strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons;

"7. Urges all States to work for concrete and verifiable results in arms control negotiations, especially those aimed at the elimination of whole categories of weapons and of weapons that have destabilizing effect, as well as those that enhance the prospects for the reduction of current armaments to lower levels consistent with strictly defensive needs;

"8. Urges all States to promote, to the best of their ability, the objective of the prevention of war, through, inter alia, more openness and an enhancement of mutual knowledge about military activities, an expanded exchange of information and views on military matters and other confidence-building measures, with a view to enhancing both confidence and stability, particularly in regional contexts, and taking into account regional security needs;

"9. Stresses the necessity of preventing military conflicts which may take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure, by taking steps to maintain, or where necessary improve, communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension;
"10. Calls upon all States to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons because such proliferation would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war;

"11. Rejects military doctrines and policies which explicitly or implicitly aim at the achievement of military superiority in the place of balance, stability and undiminished security for all States;

"12. Declares its view that a nuclear war cannot be won and that a conventional war may involve the risk of escalation to nuclear war;

"13. Takes note of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1984 session concerning the consideration of the agenda item entitled 'Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters', and requests the Conference to continue its substantive consideration of this issue;

"14. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fortieth session an item entitled 'Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters'."

GREECE

[Original: French]

[28 January 1985]

1. Greece supports every effort aimed at the prevention of nuclear war and regards this as a matter of high priority.

2. In this spirit, it voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 39/148 P in the hope that implementation of the operative part of that resolution would prove to be a positive factor for the prevention of nuclear war in particular and for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

3. In addition, the Government of Greece has on many occasions supported every initiative aimed at realizing this objective.

4. With that purpose in mind, the Prime Minister of the Hellenic Republic, Andreas Papandreou, together with the leaders of Argentina, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania, issued a Joint Declaration, which was circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council (see A/39/277-S/16527, annex, dated 25 May 1984), and which, inter alia, places emphasis on the prevention of nuclear war in the following terms:

"Agreements which merely regulate an arms build-up are clearly insufficient. The probability of nuclear holocaust increases as warning time decreases and the weapons become swifter, more accurate and more deadly. The rush towards global suicide must be stopped and then reversed. We urge, as a necessary first step, the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the United Kingdom, France and China, to halt all testing, production and
deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, to be immediately followed by substantial reductions in nuclear forces. We are convinced that it is possible to work out the details of an arrangement along these lines that takes into account the interests and concerns of all, and contains adequate measures for verification. This first step must be followed by a continuing programme of arms reductions leading to general and complete disarmament, accompanied by measures to strengthen the United Nations system and to ensure an urgently needed transfer of substantial resources from the arms race into social and economic development. The essential goal must be to reduce and then eliminate the risk of war between nations.

"We will do everything in our power to facilitate agreement among the nuclear weapons States. We will continue to keep in touch with one another about the best ways and means of achieving this objective. We will be consulting with the leaders of the nuclear-weapon States and with other world leaders as well as pursuing discussions through United Nations channels."

HUNGARY

[Original: English]

[12 February 1985]

1. There is no doubt that the most urgent task of the day is to promote nuclear disarmament and the effective measures for the prevention of nuclear war should be regarded as a matter of the highest priority. The Government of Hungary is firmly convinced that negotiations to elaborate concrete and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war should be started without delay.

2. The Government of Hungary devotes particular attention to such measures as they may directly contribute to the improvement of the international atmosphere, the strengthening of trust among States and of international security and, ultimately, the creation of a world free from nuclear weapons.

3. The Government of Hungary has welcomed the agreement reached by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Andrei Gromyko, and Secretary of State of the United States of America, George Shultz, during their talks at Geneva on 7 and 8 January 1985 to start substantive negotiations with a view to halting the arms race and reducing the threat of military confrontation. The agreement creates a possibility to elaborate mutually acceptable agreements by consistent adherence to the principles of equality and equal security.

4. The Government of Hungary considers that non-first use of nuclear weapons would be a major step towards the prevention of nuclear war. It would deem it useful for all nuclear Powers to undertake, following the example set by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The effectiveness of such unilateral commitments would be enhanced by their inclusion in an international legal instrument. Creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world, particularly in Europe, would also be a useful contribution to the prevention of nuclear war.
5. A commitment by the nuclear-weapon States not to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances against countries that possess no nuclear weapons and have no such weapons on their territories would contribute effectively to strengthening the security of States, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the non-proliferation régime.

6. Agreement by the nuclear-weapon States on a quantitative and qualitative freeze on their nuclear arsenals under an appropriate system of verification, would be a major step forward on the road to nuclear disarmament and would open up further possibilities for the reduction and complete elimination of nuclear arsenals, thereby definitively removing the threat of a nuclear war.

7. The Government of Hungary maintains its view that general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests as part of complex disarmament measures would represent definite progress towards ending the qualitative development and perfection of nuclear weapons.

8. The United Nations has, in a whole range of resolutions, urged effective action for the prevention of nuclear war. Of particular relevance are the measures to reject nuclear war and the first use of nuclear weapons and to freeze the nuclear buildup. The Government of Hungary believes that the question of the prevention of nuclear war should be a high priority item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva as well. In this regard, it expresses concern over the fact that the Conference on Disarmament, which has been seized of this issue for two years now, has so far been unable to start substantive negotiations to elaborate concrete practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. It deems it necessary for the Conference to set up a subsidiary body with a concrete mandate to discuss the question and to expedite tangible results in the elaboration of an appropriate agreement.

IRAQ

[Original: Arabic]

[6 February 1985]

1. An attack on nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes is regarded as equivalent to a nuclear armed attack, and the international community is therefore called upon to take effective steps to prevent such an occurrence or the threat of the use of force in this context.

2. A nuclear-weapon-free zone should be established in the Middle East. It should be borne in mind that the Zionist entity possesses an arsenal of weapons which is a major factor impeding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Furthermore, this entity should adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and place its nuclear installations under international supervision in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) of 19 June 1981.

/...
ITALY

[Original: English]

[28 February 1985]

1. The Government of Italy is deeply committed to the goal of preventing war, in particular a nuclear war or any kind of conflict which could escalate to the nuclear level. Italy has constantly followed a policy aimed at promoting, on the one hand, equitable and verifiable agreements on substantial reductions of nuclear weapons and at preventing on the other hand, the spread of such weapons and the destabilizing implications of such a development. The pursuit of these two goals has been a constant feature of the policies of successive Italian Governments. The negative vote cast by Italy on General Assembly resolution 39/148 P does not reflect a disagreement with the general purpose of preventing war, particularly nuclear war. On the contrary, that negative vote was intended to mark the disappointment of the Italian Government with the shortcomings of both the content of the said resolution and the approach followed by the Assembly in considering a problem of such a vital interest for the survival of mankind.

2. Italy is located in Europe, a continent in which there is the greatest concentration of conventional forces in the world and where the serious imbalance in those forces to the advantage of the Warsaw Pact that has existed for decades has not so far been corrected through disarmament negotiations. The Government of Italy has a vivid memory of the destruction brought about by the last conflict in all the continent and cannot therefore accept nor will it accept in the future the perspective of a new and even more destructive conventional war fought on European soil. The Government of Italy believes that its own security interests and the preservation of the national independence and territorial integrity of its country have been well served over the past decades by the strategy of deterrence and cannot see at this time a realistic alternative to it. Italy is therefore ready to discuss within the context of the United Nations the merits of the military doctrine it considers as the only one which currently responds to its own security interests, but cannot accept a discussion based on an aprioristic rejection of that doctrine and aimed at negotiating measures which are clearly incompatible with it and are in fact specifically designed to undermine it.

3. The Government of Italy believes that the problem of the prevention of nuclear war cannot be realistically considered, at least from the point of view of a European country, except in the wider context of the prevention of war as such. Nuclear weapons are a reality of today's world and as long as they exist, the risk of escalation of any major conflict to the nuclear level will also continue to exist whatever commitments are made as to the modalities of their use. The measures which are routinely considered by the General Assembly would only result in the illusion that conventional conflicts involving crucial security interests could be maintained at the conventional level, thus increasing rather than preventing the danger of nuclear war.

4. Therefore, the Government of Italy believes that any consideration of the problem of the prevention of war, including nuclear war, requires a preliminary review of the approach followed so far in United Nations resolutions. A strategic doctrine aimed at preventing war in a specific region of the world cannot be rejected outright by countries whose security interests are not involved in the
situation of that region, particularly when no viable alternative, in fact, no alternative at all is offered for the protection of the national independence and territorial integrity of the countries directly concerned. Problems concerning vital security interests of member countries cannot be discussed in abstract. Any debate of such issues must take into serious account not only those security interests and whether the solutions which are proposed can protect them, but also the nature and purposes of the military doctrines currently prevailing as well as the compatibility of the force levels and force structures which oppose one another with the defensive goals incorporated in those doctrines. Only a preliminary ample discussion of these issues can lead to a fruitful consideration of concrete means to prevent war, including nuclear war.

5. In this respect, the debate on the prevention of nuclear war which took place in the First Committee of the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session was particularly disappointing. The treatment accorded to draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.40 showed total disregard on the part of certain Member States for the security concerns expressed in that draft by other Member States. It clearly indicated the intention to ensure that any discussion of the problem of the prevention of war be conducted on a unilateral basis taking into account only some views of the issues involved to the exclusion of others. It is noticeable that some of the countries which took the lead in this direction have not renounced the nuclear option as Italy has done. The Government of Italy cannot but express its deep concern at this situation and stress the need for a more balanced approach to the question of the prevention of war. Its negative vote on Assembly resolution 39/148 P was an expression of this concern and of its conviction that close and serious consultations are urgently required if a constructive discussion of this crucially important question is to be conducted within the Conference on Disarmament.

JAPAN

[Original: English]

[29 March 1985]

1. Paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 39/148 P invites all Governments to submit their views on the question of the prevention of nuclear war. Although the Government of Japan abstained from voting on the draft resolution, it nevertheless considers it meaningful to submit the following view in response to the above-mentioned invitation based on the position it took in co-sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.40/Rev.1, introduced in the First Committee of the Assembly at its thirty-ninth session in 1984.

2. The Government of Japan shares the firm conviction that the prevention of war remains the most urgent task of the present day and that every opportunity and all possible measures should be fully exploited to prevent war from ever occurring. As nuclear wars are most likely to be preceded by various disputes leading to war in general, in which nuclear exchange is the most destructive and devastating of all, any realistic consideration of the issue of the prevention of nuclear war should be made in the wider context of peaceful settlement of disputes and prevention of war in general. Based on the unique experiences Japan has had, which led the people of
Japan to think very seriously about the effects of nuclear weapons, Japan is firmly convinced that no nuclear holocaust should be allowed to ever happen again. Japan, therefore, believes that any conflicts which may lead to the use of nuclear weapons, should most carefully be checked and placed under constraint through concerted efforts of all nations of the world. In this regard, the Government of Japan believes that every State is required to do its utmost to avoid war and to resolve disputes peacefully, so as to ensure that war is no longer viewed as an instrument for settling international disputes and that the use or threat of force is eliminated from international life as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

3. The Government of Japan considers it essential that all States, and especially the nuclear-weapon States which possess substantial nuclear and conventional forces in their arsenals, work to reduce progressively the level of their forces by implementing one by one the effective measures of disarmament, particularly of nuclear disarmament, thereby advancing towards the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament, and therefore, of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, under strict and effective international control.

4. The Government of Japan attaches great importance to such measures in the field of nuclear disarmament as promotion of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty and strengthening of the non-proliferation régime.

5. It must also be pointed out that the issue of nuclear disarmament should be considered in a broad context of disarmament, including disarmament in the field of conventional weapons, because the East-West imbalance in conventional forces is inseparably linked to the question of nuclear disarmament.

KENYA

[Original: English]

[19 March 1985]

1. The greatest peril facing the world today is the destruction from a nuclear war, a war which would have devastating results on belligerents and non-belligerents alike. The actions of the nuclear weapon States which are engaged in a new and frenzied round of the nuclear arms race, and the attempts by some nuclear weapon States to promote the highly dangerous concept of a limited nuclear war and to minimize the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons, have greatly increased the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. Doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being the cause of the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the continuing escalation in the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover, such doctrines which are predicated upon the willingness to use nuclear weapons cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. Concern for common security and global survival should be the basis of international peace rather than the concept of deterrence. International peace must be based on a commitment by all States to join in survival rather than in a threat of mutual annihilation.

/...
2. Kenya believes that international relations must be based on strict adherence to and respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States and on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States. Kenya believes that it is the shared responsibility of all States to save succeeding generations from the scourge of another world war — a nuclear war. Kenya cannot, therefore, accept that the security of the world and the survival of mankind should be in continual and increasing jeopardy as a result of the actions of a handful of nuclear weapons States. Since a nuclear war would have devastating consequences for the whole of mankind, all nations have a vital interest in the urgent negotiations of appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. It is for this reason that Kenya subscribes to the call for multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on this subject, just as we continue to emphasize the need for multilateral negotiations on item 2 of the Conference's agenda, entitled "The cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

3. During the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, which was held in June-July 1982, not a single concrete measure for the prevention of nuclear war was adopted despite the growing popular expression of profound disquiet and anxiety all over the world concerning the dangers of nuclear war. This was mainly due to the attitudes of nuclear weapon States which failed to acknowledge that the question of the prevention of nuclear war was not a matter only of their own security concerns but of the survival of mankind as a whole. While Kenya welcomes the adoption of any measures for the reduction of the risks of nuclear war which may be agreed upon by the nuclear weapon States themselves, it asserts that all nations have both the right as well as the obligation to work collectively to dispel the danger of a nuclear holocaust.

4. The Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament, has and should play its indispensable and unambiguous role in this regard.

5. Kenya feels strongly that the Conference on Disarmament can undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of a nuclear war. In undertaking such negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament could take into account the views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war which were submitted to the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, both by nuclear weapon States as well as other States, including deliberations on this item during the second special session devoted to disarmament. The Conference would also take into account other existing proposals and future initiatives.

LESOTHO

[Original: English]

[28 February 1985]

The Government of Lesotho has no comments or suggestions to make at this stage. /...
MEXICO

[Original: Spanish]
[19 June 1985]

In the view of the Government of Mexico, there are many measures for the prevention of nuclear war; they follow from the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament. However, the Government of Mexico has singled out five measures which necessarily have priority in order to avert the outbreak of a nuclear conflagration:

(1) The negotiation of a broad treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, in accordance with the undertaking given by the three nuclear Powers which act as depositaries of the 1963 Moscow Treaty, and also with the repeated appeals by the General Assembly for the Conference on Disarmament to begin the preparation of such a treaty.

(2) An immediate freeze of nuclear arms of the United States and of the Soviet Union, through the proclamation of two unilateral declarations or a joint declaration. This freeze, of course, would not be an end in itself. Nevertheless, it is felt that this is an effective means of curbing the growth of the two super-Powers' nuclear arsenals, as well as of encouraging dialogue and negotiation between the nuclear States. The structure and scope of a nuclear-arms freeze are described in General Assembly resolution 39/63 C, without prejudice to what might be agreed by the nuclear Powers in due course.

(3) An undertaking by all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use such weapons. This measure would unquestionably help to build confidence among the nuclear Powers, which would have the effect of strengthening international security.

(4) The scope of the bilateral disarmament negotiations conducted in Geneva by the United States and the Soviet Union should be broadened to include so-called theatre nuclear weapons, thousands of which are deployed in Europe in outstations, which are not currently the subject of any kind of negotiation.

(5) The initiation of multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. In this connection, it is essential for the Conference on Disarmament to set up an ad hoc committee which would be responsible for developing paragraph 50 of the 1978 Final Document, and for delimiting the following substantive issues:

(a) Elaboration and elucidation of the nuclear disarmament stages referred to in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, including the determination of the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the function of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to nuclear disarmament;

(b) Elucidation of issues relating to the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament, and with a view to the prevention of nuclear war;

/...
(c) Elucidation of questions concerning the elimination of recourse to doctrines of nuclear deterrence;

(d) Measures to enable the Conference on Disarmament effectively to carry out its proper function as the single multilateral negotiating body in the disarmament field, and, in this connection, the relationship between the Conference and bilateral, regional or other forums conducting nuclear disarmament negotiations.

NETHERLANDS

[Original: English]

[27 March 1985]

1. The Netherlands takes an active interest in the subject, as it has demonstrated by its contribution to the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament (see Concluding Document (A/S-12/32, annex III)) and its participation in compiling an indicative list of items to be explored by the Conference on Disarmament (CD/411).

2. While the scope of General Assembly resolution 39/148 P is directed primarily at removing the threat of nuclear war, in the view of the Netherlands, the removal of this threat cannot be considered in isolation from the threat of war with conventional means. This is the central thesis of draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.40/Rev.1 - the draft on this subject submitted by a number of Western States - which the Netherlands supports. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) made the fundamental pledge that none of its weapons will ever be used, except in response to attack. This pledge is in full conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, which allows for the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. This pledge does not in any way belittle the fundamental difference between nuclear and conventional weapons or diminish the importance of lessening the threat of nuclear war. On the contrary, it is based on the view that a likely cause of nuclear war is escalation of conventional conflict. Furthermore, the Netherlands points to the NATO-policy to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. More in particular it recalls the NATO-decisions to withdraw unilaterally some 2,400 nuclear weapons.

3. The Netherlands cannot subscribe to the notion that the danger of a nuclear war has increased in recent years, as implied in General Assembly resolution 39/148 P. There seems to be no evidence to substantiate this claim.

4. The Netherlands is of the opinion that the prevention of nuclear war is a matter of concern not only for the nuclear-weapon States and their allies but, in view of the potentially global consequences, for all other States as well. It agrees therefore with the consideration in General Assembly resolution 39/148 P that the prevention of a nuclear war is a problem that cannot be left to the nuclear-weapon States alone. At the same time however, it cannot be denied that nuclear-weapon States, in particular the ones with the largest nuclear arsenals, have a special responsibility and a primary role to play.
5. The Netherlands hopes therefore that it will prove possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to agree in their bilateral negotiations on significant and balanced reductions of their nuclear arsenals. A positive outcome of these negotiations will be conducive to the improvement of East-West relations and thereby to the goal of preventing nuclear war.

6. The Netherlands attaches great value to agreements of a practical nature, such as better communications to prevent the outbreak of accidental war. It points to the relevant agreements concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States, France and the United Kingdom.

7. The Conference on Disarmament should, in the view of the Netherlands, take advantage of the fact that all nuclear-weapon States are represented at Geneva. The role of the Conference should be complementary to bilateral efforts to cope with the problems of nuclear disarmament. During the 1984 session of the Conference, the Netherlands suggested a number of confidence-building measures that could be discussed, first between the nuclear-weapon States within the context of the Conference. These measures could cover the areas of communication, exchange of information on size and structure of nuclear forces, notification of missile tests, manoeuvres of strategic nuclear forces, etc. In addition, attention could be devoted to the question of avoiding such military postures, both nuclear and conventional, which cannot be justified for defensive purposes only and in times of tension or crisis might exacerbate the risk of war, in particular nuclear war.

8. These proposals could form a basis for participation of the Conference as a whole in a negotiating process. In the view of the Netherlands, the time is not yet ripe for the Conference to establish an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate as has been suggested in General Assembly resolution 39/148 P. It hopes, however, that agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee with a practical and concrete programme of work can be reached as soon as possible. It regrets that the Conference has been unable to establish such a subsidiary body during the last two years. Those States that participate in the Conference on Disarmament and voted in favour of Assembly resolution 39/148 P should indicate in which areas negotiations could be envisaged.

9. They should equally propose specific ideas for such negotiations with a potential for compromise. Suggestions by Western States for a programme of work may be recalled (CD/357, CD/411). These suggestions are still valid. They could form a useful basis for discussion in the Conference on Disarmament, a discussion the Netherlands considers both timely and urgent.

NIGERIA

[Original: English]

[6 February 1985]

1. The Government of Nigeria notes with great concern the escalating arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race which poses the most serious danger to the survival of mankind. The prevention of nuclear war as well as the reduction of the
risk of such a war cannot but be a matter of vital interest to peoples all over the world. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth; yet, the arms race continues, both qualitatively and quantitatively, unabated with unsettling consequences of new deployments of more offensive missiles by the two super-Powers.

2. The Government of Nigeria, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 39/148 P and in response to the United Nations Secretary-General's request for views of all Governments on steps to expedite effective action on the question of the prevention of nuclear war, wishes to state in the context of the foregoing, that the world community in general, and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States and the Conference on Disarmament should work assiduously in concert towards the realization of the following disarmament measures:

(a) A comprehensive nuclear-test ban represents the first and most urgent step towards a cessation of the nuclear-arms race. A comprehensive test ban is an indispensable nuclear disarmament measure to curb the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons as well as the development of new types and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Nigerian Government, while regretting the lack of progress by the Conference on Disarmament on the setting up of an ad hoc committee on the subject, urges it to exert the utmost effort to establish such a committee with full mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. All nuclear-weapon States should actively participate in the negotiation.

(b) The Conference on Disarmament should also set up a subsidiary body to undertake negotiations on such practical measures as a freeze on nuclear weapons including their means of delivery and fissionable materials for weapons purposes, as well as a moratorium on all nuclear testing pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

(c) Another committee of the Conference on Disarmament should be set up with full mandate to negotiate a reduction in nuclear weapons. The committee will be assisted by representatives of the two super-Powers through rendering of progress reports on the bilateral negotiations. In this respect, it is essential that the super-Powers should show maximum co-operation by recognizing the essential role of the United Nations in co-ordinating disarmament process aimed at preventing nuclear war which is central to peace and security for the world.

(d) A legally binding commitment on non-use of nuclear weapons represents an important step to reduce the danger of nuclear war. It was to this end that Nigeria proposed to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session to consider convening a plenipotentiary conference to elaborate a protocol for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. However, it did not press the proposal to a vote. Instead it decided to support the resolution requesting the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, as a matter of priority, in order to achieve agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The Conference on Disarmament should proceed without delay to establish an ad hoc committee with full mandate for this purpose.

/...
(e) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of each region should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons and to avert the threat of a nuclear war. The creation of such zones serves to reduce the area in the world where it is potentially possible for a nuclear war to occur. The Government of Nigeria, therefore, calls on all regions of the world to co-ordinate efforts towards the establishment of regional denuclearization in line with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco).

(f) It must be recognized that no negotiations on the prevention of nuclear war can succeed as long as the super-Powers do not wish or lack the will to disarm. Both should therefore exert the utmost effort to reduce the international tension to the lowest level as part of intrasuper-Power confidence-building measures. In this connection, the Government of Nigeria welcomes the recent agreement by the two super-Powers to resume disarmament talks to be conducted in three sets of negotiations simultaneously. Both sides should strive to harmonize their negotiating positions so that meaningful and concrete negotiations can be conducted on agreements relating to quantitative reductions and on restrictions of qualitative improvements of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons as well as a halt to the research in anti-satellite and "Star Wars" weapons.

(g) The Government of Nigeria is concerned over the lack of progress at the Conference on Disarmament. The often protracted debate on mandates and the rigid adherence to the consensus principle, even on procedural matters, should not be allowed to obstruct the substantive work of the Conference on Disarmament. The nuclear-weapon States and in particular the super-Powers should, therefore, endeavour to establish the necessary negotiating climate to enable the Conference on Disarmament to organize its work in such a way as to focus its attention and time on substantive negotiations aimed at preventing nuclear war.

NORWAY

[Original: English]

[5 March 1985]

1. Norway was not able to support General Assembly resolution 39/148 P. However, in consideration of the importance of the issue before us and of the fact that Norway co-sponsored another draft resolution dealing with prevention of nuclear war, the following views and comments are nevertheless submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 39/148 P.

2. Norway attaches the greatest importance to the question of prevention of nuclear war, but is of the opinion that this question should be viewed in the context of prevention of war in general. For this reason, concrete results are imperative in negotiations dealing with disarmament and arms control in both the nuclear and conventional fields as well as with confidence-building measures.
3. On this background, Norway was satisfied that the question of prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters was included as item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament in 1983 and as a separate item (No. 3) on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament in 1984.

4. As the prevention of nuclear war, indeed all war, is the most acute and urgent task of the present day, Norway co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.40/Rev.1, which was introduced by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany in the First Committee of the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

5. The draft resolution stresses the need for a balanced and comprehensive approach to peace and security issues. In accordance with paragraph 13 of this draft resolution, Norway hopes that the Conference on Disarmament will continue its substantive consideration of the issue, taking into account the approach outlined in the above-mentioned draft, and will agree on a substantive programme of work, enabling a thorough analysis of all the relevant matters. In this way, the Conference may promote efforts aiming at the reduction of nuclear arms and the role they play in defence planning.

POLAND

[Original: English]

[5 February 1985]

1. The position of the Polish People's Republic with respect to the question of prevention of nuclear war was expounded in detail in the statements of representatives of Poland in the Conference on Disarmament in 1984 at its 250th and 265th meetings and in the course of the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly in the First Committee, at its 4th and 23rd meetings.

2. Together with an overwhelming majority of the world community, Poland is deeply convinced that the prevention of nuclear war is the most urgent and important problem facing mankind at present. This conviction has found full confirmation in numerous resolutions of the General Assembly, adopted with the support of Poland, among them General Assembly resolution 39/148 P of 17 December 1984, which states inter alia that "removal of the threat of nuclear war is the most acute and urgent task of the present day".

3. In the opinion of the Government of Poland, the organ which should strive to take appropriate and tangible steps to reach an understanding on measures to prevent nuclear war is the Conference on Disarmament. Consequently, we have steadfastly supported the call on the Conference, contained, inter alia, in General Assembly resolutions 38/183 G and 39/148 P, to "undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on the subject".

/...
4. Such practical measures should include, in our view, in particular, the following:

(a) The commitment by all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. As it will be recalled, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have already made such a commitment. It is imperative for the remaining nuclear-weapon States to follow suit. Such a commitment by all nuclear-weapon Powers would be tantamount to a general renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons and consequently would be a major step towards the prevention of nuclear war;

(b) A freeze by all nuclear-weapon Powers - as a first step towards a general and complete elimination of nuclear weapons - on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and on the production of fissionable materials for military purposes;

(c) The declaration by all nuclear-weapon States of a moratorium on the explosions of all nuclear devices, pending the conclusions of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

(d) Concrete steps for the prevention of the militarization of outer space, including an immediate moratorium on anti-satellite weapons, followed by an agreement on a comprehensive prohibition of the use of force in, from and towards outer space and on the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind.

5. Those measures should be supplemented, to the extent possible on a parallel basis, by additional steps in a multilateral framework, inter alia, such as further consolidation and universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a binding commitment by all nuclear-weapon Powers not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States on whose territory such weapons are not deployed and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

6. The Government of Poland is also of the opinion that the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations between States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty and States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as proposed in the Prague Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty of January 1983 and subsequently reaffirmed in the Moscow Joint Statement of their leaders of June 1983, would also be conducive to preventing nuclear war. We hold the view, moreover, that this goal would be promoted by the implementation of the proposal of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Konstantin Chernenko, of March 1984, to work out binding norms regulating relations between nuclear Powers.

7. Poland deeply hopes that all those vitally important measures will be urgently considered in a constructive spirit, in particular, in the year of the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, born out of the common determination "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", and on the eve of the International Year of Peace.

/...
1. Romania considers that the cessation of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, and the transition to disarmament, the elimination of the danger of a new world war and the maintenance of world peace compromise the basic problem of the contemporary era.

2. The continuing acceleration of the arms race and the accumulation of vast quantities of nuclear weapons in different parts of the world have created a grave threat to peace and international security and have increased the danger of a world war which, in present circumstances, would inevitably lead to a nuclear catastrophe and to the destruction of the entire human race as well as of the conditions of life on earth. A particularly serious situation has been created in Europe following the deployment of United States medium-range nuclear missiles in certain States of Western Europe and the adoption of nuclear countermeasures by the Soviet Union and certain European socialist countries. Mankind has never before been threatened by such dangers. It is essential that everything possible should be done to halt the progress of humanity towards nuclear disaster.

3. It is for that reason that Romania was among the sponsors of General Assembly resolution 39/148 P, in the belief that resolute and responsible action must be taken to elaborate and adopt the measures recommended in that resolution. To that end, the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva should, in Romania's view, establish without delay a special committee to negotiate an agreement containing concrete measures which will make an effective contribution to the prevention of a nuclear war.

4. In the view of President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania, the current trend of international events can only be stopped, and nuclear war prevented by ending the arms race, primarily the nuclear-arms race, by ceasing the production of nuclear weapons and by the gradual reduction of existing stocks of such weapons up to their complete elimination. With that in mind, Romania, like other States in Europe and other regions of the world, welcomed the start of negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America regarding the problems of nuclear and space weapons. The very grave situation which has been created calls for these negotiations to be conducted constructively, with understanding and in a highly responsible manner, with a view to reaching appropriate agreements on halting the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, moving on to the reduction of nuclear weapons until they are completely eliminated, and stopping the militarization of outer space. In the view of Romania, the testing and production of new nuclear weapons, the deployment of new nuclear missiles in Europe and all activities in connection with the militarization of outer space must be halted during the Geneva talks.

5. The adoption of such measures would contribute to the establishment of a climate of confidence which would help to bring about a successful outcome of the negotiations. For that reasons, Romania welcomed the Soviet Union's initiative...
regarding the establishment of a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of its medium-range missiles, and its suspension of other countermeasures in Europe, as a positive contribution to the progress of the negotiations.

6. In view of the particularly grave situation in Europe, consequent upon the heavy concentration of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, priority should be given, during the negotiations, to the conclusion of agreements for the withdrawal of existing nuclear missiles on that continent and for the total liberation of Europe for nuclear weapons.

7. At the same time, since the problems of nuclear weapons and the militarization of space are of equal concern to all States, other States must also be able to participate more actively in the efforts to conclude agreements to end the nuclear threat on earth and in space. It is equally essential, in parallel with the Soviet-American negotiations, to intensify the negotiations which are taking place in international agencies and conferences on security and disarmament. In this connection, the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva, the work of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and arms in central Europe should be accelerated.

8. At the same time, efforts to conclude agreements for conventional disarmament must be intensified in parallel with the negotiations for the reduction of nuclear weapons.

9. The adoption of such radical measures with a view to eliminating the danger of nuclear war could also be helped by the conclusion of collateral agreements which, by their substance and results, would be such as to sustain the process of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States.

10. Such agreements should in particular aim at:

(a) The prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. The drawing up of a treaty on this problem would represent an expression of the political will of States possessing nuclear weapons to renounce the never-ending advance of these weapons and to embark upon the path to disarmament. Such a measure would fulfil, albeit after a substantial delay, the undertaking of the nuclear States parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, to continue negotiations with the view to putting an end to nuclear-weapon tests for all time. The prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests would undoubtedly have positive consequences for the creation of a climate of confidence, which is necessary if further progress is to be made on the path to nuclear disarmament and to the lessening of the risk of nuclear war. Bearing in mind the special responsibility of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva in connection with this major problem, it is essential to create a special negotiating committee and to proceed without delay to the preparation of a draft treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests.
(b) The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The starting point in promoting the goal of reducing the risk and preventing the occurrence of nuclear war must be to cease all actions likely to contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Under the terms of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, States possessing such weapons undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. In addition to the obligation to take action to end the production of new nuclear weapons and to reach an agreement on the reduction and elimination of existing nuclear weapons, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons provides for the renunciation of any action involving the horizontal proliferation of such weapons. It is for that reason that the deployment of new nuclear weapons beyond the frontiers of nuclear-weapon States contravenes the letter and spirit of that Treaty and must therefore be stopped. In the same way, the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from the territories of States not producers of such weapons would be a major contribution to the reduction and removal of the danger of a nuclear conflict. In this spirit, Romania considers that, at the Review Conference on the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to be held in 1985, the participating States, and the nuclear-weapon States, in particular, should orient their efforts towards the strict implementation of all provisions of the Treaty.

(c) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. One way of lessening the risk of nuclear war is to limit as much as possible the area of deployment of nuclear weapons. In this spirit, Romania is trying to create in the Balkans a zone of peace, co-operation and good neighbourliness, free of nuclear weapons and foreign military bases, and supports proposals for the establishment of similar zones in the north and centre of Europe, as well as in other regions of the world. In Romania's view, encouraging action by States to create nuclear-weapon-free zones should become a major concern of the United Nations in its efforts to prevent a nuclear conflict. At the same time, it is obvious that, no matter what the state of international relations, and despite the progress being made as a result of negotiations on disarmament problems, mankind will continue to be confronted with the spectre of nuclear conflict and total destruction as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world. That is why Romania believes that, along with efforts to negotiate and implement substantial nuclear disarmament agreements, practical and effective measures must also be adopted that can help reduce and avert the threat of a nuclear conflict. Chief among such measures could be the following:

(i) Non-first use of nuclear weapons. The unilateral declarations by China and the Soviet Union, in which they undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, have been welcomed as a significant contribution to efforts to reduce and ward off the threat of nuclear war. There can be no doubt that a similar undertaking on the part of the other nuclear-weapon States would have a positive effect on the international political climate and on disarmament negotiations. The Conference on Disarmament at Geneva, in which all nuclear-weapon States participate, has a particular role and responsibility in the attainment of this objective.
(ii) Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and of force in general, as a first step towards elimination of such weapons from State arsenals, would be of great importance in reducing the risk of nuclear conflict. A positive step in that direction would be the updating of the Declaration adopted by the General Assembly in 1961, which termed the use of nuclear weapons a crime against mankind, to reflect the clear and firm commitment of nuclear-weapon States not to resort under any circumstance to the use of nuclear weapons or to force in general. Such a step would demonstrate the resolve of States to co-operate effectively to promote the goal of disarmament in practice and thereby reduce and eliminate the threat of nuclear war.

(iii) The assurance of security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States. The conclusion of an international convention giving non-nuclear-weapon States assurances that they would not be the target of the use of nuclear weapons or of the threat of their use and the use of force in general would reinforce the confidence of States that nuclear weapons will not be used as a means of pressure or intimidation. That would be an act of equity and of justice towards the non-nuclear-weapon States which, having renounced the nuclear option, have every right to obtain firm security guarantees from the nuclear-weapon States. Such a step would at the same time be a major contribution to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the promotion of the goal of nuclear disarmament.

(iv) Measures to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear conflict inadvertently or as the result of an accident. The stockpiling of enormous quantities of nuclear weapons, their continual improvement and their deployment in more and more regions of the globe have brought about a real increase in the danger that a nuclear war could break out inadvertently or as the result of an accident. In order to reduce and eliminate this grave danger, agreement must be reached, particularly among the nuclear-weapon States, on new measures to improve communication and rapid consultation among States, particularly in emergencies. A general way of reducing the threat of a nuclear conflict would be to further within the United Nations the concept of confidence-building measures among States and also suitable mechanisms for promoting such measures internationally. The 1984 Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe has a special role to play in that connection. Attainment of the goal set for that Conference - the adoption of a set of confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe - would be an achievement of the first order in the campaign to prevent nuclear war, all the more so in that Europe is the region with the highest concentration of armed forces and armaments, where the two military blocs confront each other directly and where, consequently, the danger of a nuclear conflict is particularly acute.

/...
(v) Measures for the peaceful settlement of disputes between States. The threat of a nuclear war is aggravated by the existence in various parts of the globe of conflicts that can degenerate into a nuclear disaster. Resolute action is therefore required to reach a political settlement of all existing armed conflicts and to prevent new armed conflicts in the future. To that end, it is essential to strengthen the means and mechanisms available to the United Nations for the peaceful settlement of all disputes between States and the prevention of armed conflicts among nations. The establishment of a permanent United Nations commission on good offices, mediation and conciliation would be of great importance in this connection. Romania believes that an essential premise for prevention of nuclear war and all armed conflict is the total renunciation of a policy of force or the threat of force, together with a deep respect, in international relations, for the principles of full equality of rights, national independence and sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, mutual benefit and the right of all people to free and independent development without any foreign influence. Since deviations from these unanimously recognized principles of international relations are still continuing, the General Assembly must at its fortieth session address to all States an urgent appeal to conduct themselves in their international relations in strict accordance with the fundamental purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

SPAIN

[Original: Spanish]

[23 April 1985]

1. The Government of Spain wishes to take this opportunity to reply to the invitation contained in paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 39/148 P of 17 December 1984, in order to emphasize the crucial importance that it attaches to the objective of preventing all kinds of war, especially nuclear war. This position is justified by the possibility, which must not be forgotten, that nowadays a conventional war could turn into a nuclear conflict.

2. Bearing that prospect in mind, it is of vital importance to negotiate agreement on the progressive and balanced reduction of both nuclear and conventional weapons to the lowest possible level without prejudice to the security of the States concerned. Such agreements should also provide for adequate verification measures. States which possess nuclear weapons, particularly those with the largest nuclear arsenals, have a special responsibility for achieving such agreements.

3. It should be noted that confidence-building measures are an important contribution to the prevention of war, since they increase mutual trust and stability in international relations, thus facilitating the implementation of disarmament measures.
4. The Government of the Spain considers that the debate at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly on the item concerning prevention of nuclear war and all related matters allowed for an exchange of ideas that was most useful for a proper examination of the problem. Those ideas and the various proposals put forward in the First Committee, particularly those contained in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.40/Rev.1 submitted to the Federal Republic of Germany, should serve as the basis for the work of the Conference on Disarmament on this question.

SWEDEN

[Original: English]
[5 February 1985]

1. The Government of Sweden shares the conviction that, as expressed in paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 39/148 P, in view of the urgency of this matter and the inadequacy or insufficiency of existing measures, it is necessary to devise suitable steps to expedite effective action for the prevention of nuclear war.

2. The Government of Sweden, therefore, favours the establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee under its agenda item 3 entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", as defined in the draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 3 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament tabled by the group of 21 (see CD/515 of 11 July 1984).

THAILAND

[Original: English]
[28 March 1985]

1. Nuclear war will be the direct result of the nuclear-arms race among the super-Powers.

2. The super-Powers must cease using military force in other countries to advance their own interest.

3. It is a false assumption that having superior nuclear weapons can serve to deter a nuclear war. On the contrary, the arms race inspired by such an assumption has enhanced the risk of a major nuclear war.

4. The increasing development of more powerful and modern weapons may reach a point that would cause a breakdown in the talks for the reduction or ban on the production of nuclear weapons. When that point is reached, the world may not be able to avoid a nuclear war.

/...
5. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is discriminatory. It should be amended.

6. Factors that cause the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be eliminated, such as having tighter controls on the export of nuclear materials, the belief that nuclear weapons enhances a country's prestige, and the use of nuclear weapons as political and military leverage.

7. The United Nations should make greater efforts in disseminating information to the world concerning the catastrophe that would result from a nuclear war.

8. A communications hot-line network should be set up among the leaders of countries with nuclear weapons in order to prevent the start of a nuclear war through misunderstanding and/or accidental causes.

TURKEY

[Original: English]
[26 February 1985]

1. Turkey was unable to support General Assembly resolution 39/148 P because of the principles it was based on and because its main thrust and contents were not compatible with the main principles of our foreign and defence policies.

2. The views of the Government of Turkey were reflected in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.40/Rev.1 entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters" which it sponsored with a number of other countries. The said document was drafted with the aim of achieving balanced and verifiable measures of arms control and disarmament and of enabling parallel reductions in nuclear as well as conventional weapons and forces. The Government of Turkey is of the view that its aim of prevention of all wars, nuclear as well as conventional, can only be achieved through a practical and realistic approach as contained in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.40/Rev.1, which takes proper note of the critical interrelationship between imbalance in conventional weapons and nuclear disarmament.

UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

[Original: Russian]
[3 April 1985]

1. The position of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on the question of the prevention of nuclear war is well known. We feel that, in an international situation which has been deteriorating in recent years, the efforts of the United Nations and the entire international community must be concentrated primarily on solving the key tasks of the day, namely, the preventing of another world conflagration and the preservation of life on the planet. All other vital problems confronting the world today, and even the future of human civilization itself, depend on whether the world can avert a nuclear catastrophe. The Ukrainian SSR
therefore fully supports the view expressed in General Assembly resolution 39/148 P that the prevention of nuclear war and the reduction of the danger of its outbreak are matters of paramount importance and in the vital interest of all peoples.

2. At the same time, as the General Assembly noted, the danger of nuclear war is growing. It is our conviction that the source of this danger lies in the policy and practical deeds of certain States which refuse to face the realities of the world today and rely on force and on the achievement of military and strategic superiority in order to impose and force their will on others. Evidence of this policy is to be found in formulation of various kinds of aggressive doctrines and concepts based on the dangerous illusion that it is possible to win a nuclear war by being the first to use nuclear weapons.

3. The need to solve the problem of the non-militarization of outer space is now becoming of paramount importance. It is perfectly obvious that existing plans to extend the nuclear-arms race to outer space are nothing but an attempt to deliver a first nuclear strike while sheltered from retribution by a space "shield". Any efforts to camouflage the aggressive nature of such schemes and to depict them as a "defence initiative" should not deceive anyone.

4. The Ukrainian SSR shares the conviction that space must be an arena for fruitful peaceful co-operation and not for military confrontation. The militarization of circum-terrestrial space not only means the virtual end of the process of limiting and reducing nuclear weapons but will inevitably set off an uncontrolled arms race in every direction, and the danger of a thermonuclear war will grow by leaps and bounds.

5. There are real opportunities to normalize completely the international situation, to prevent the arms race in outer space and end it on earth and ultimately to save mankind from the nuclear danger. They are to be found in a series of peaceful initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, in the United Nations and elsewhere.

6. In the view of the Ukrainian SSR, the Soviet initiative which led to the agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to enter into new negotiations on the questions of space weapons and nuclear weapons, is of special importance under prevailing conditions. The fundamental point is that all matters must be considered and decided together, as an organic whole, as the absolute prerequisite for success. It is the only possible approach, under present circumstances, to the problem of the non-militarization of outer space and the problem of nuclear weapons, since it has now become perfectly obvious that any success in limiting and reducing strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons is unthinkable as long as there is an arms race in outer space.

7. This concept is clearly stated in a joint Soviet-United States document which stresses that the aim of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements designed to avert the arms race in outer space and end it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear weapons and to strengthen strategic stability.

/...
8. The Ukrainian SSR firmly believes that the final outcome of the Soviet-United States negotiations, and of all efforts to limit and reduce weapons, must be the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

9. A good basis for a radical solution to the question of removing the threat of nuclear war is available in the specific proposals which the Soviet Union and the other socialist States have submitted for consideration to the Conference on Disarmament. In this connection, we support the General Assembly's request that the Conference on Disarmament should undertake as a matter of priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war and should establish an ad hoc committee for that purpose.

10. Among the effective practical steps which would help the solution of the task of preventing nuclear war, the achievement of an agreement between the nuclear States on the mutual recognition of specific norms in their relations with each other would be especially significant. As everyone knows, the Soviet Union has made specific proposals regarding the content of such norms.

11. Of continually growing importance is the question of the renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons by all States possessing them. Such commitments could be undertaken unilaterally, as was done, for example, by the Soviet Union back in 1982. If the other nuclear Powers, which have not yet done so, agreed to that step, as they were called upon to do by the General Assembly, the world situation would be fundamentally different, and that would make it possible to strengthen confidence and lower the level of nuclear danger.

12. Together with political measures to remove the nuclear threat, specific steps are required to limit, reduce and ultimately destroy the material means of waging war.

13. In the view of the Ukrainian SSR, the primary tasks in achieving that end are:

(a) A nuclear-weapon freeze by all nuclear Powers, and primarily the Soviet Union and the United States;

(b) A complete and comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test ban, and until an agreement to that effect is concluded, the declaration by all the nuclear Powers of a moratorium on any nuclear explosions;

(c) Prohibition of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and comprehensive strengthening of the established non-proliferation system based on the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

14. While giving priority to the problems of curbing the arms race, primarily in the nuclear field an preventing the further destabilization of the strategic situation, the Ukrainian SSR at the same time favours the achievement of tangible results wherever they might be conducive to removing the threat of nuclear war. The present international situation requires the adoption of specific measures to strengthen international security, eliminate focal points of tension and military conflict, stop acts of aggression in various regions of the world and eradicate the
vestiges of colonialism, racism and apartheid. The task of concentrating the intellectual and material resources of States, not on preparing for war, but on solving the global economic and social problems facing mankind is urgent.

15. This year the international community will celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the victory of the peoples in the Second World War and the founding of the United Nations as a centre for the co-ordinated action of States to maintain peace and security; and today, in order to keep the peace which was won at the price of enormous losses, we must again combine the political will and the resources of all countries in order to achieve universal security, a return to détente, the affirmation in international relations of the principle of peaceful co-existence and ultimately the solution of the overriding problem of the decade, the prevention of nuclear war.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Original: Russian]

[12 February 1985]

1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics fully shares the conviction expressed in General Assembly resolution 39/148 P on prevention of nuclear war that the elimination of the danger of such a war is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Its solution not only determines mankind’s ability to deal with all the other problems facing it, but also affects its very existence. Surely now there can hardly be a single Government or responsible politician prepared to dispute openly this conclusion, which has been irrefutably proven by scientists and by civilian and military experts in many countries of the world.

2. However, as the General Assembly stated with deep concern, the danger of nuclear war is increasing. In order to counter this ominous trend successfully, its origin must be clearly understood. It lies in the stubborn reluctance of certain States to recognize the realities of the nuclear and space age, and in practice to regard the prevention of nuclear war as their principal goal in international relations. This is evidenced by the propounding of various doctrines and concepts based on the admissibility of the first use of nuclear weapons, which are now being supplemented by ideas of using outer space for this purpose. In other words, these States are thinking about how to prepare for and win a nuclear war and not about avoiding the very possibility of such a war being unleashed or about devising and taking steps to expedite effective action for its prevention, as called for in the above-mentioned general resolution.

3. Reckless militarist aims of this kind underly the policy — as futile as it is dangerous — of seeking military superiority and securing dominant positions on the international scene. For that purpose, these States would be prepared to extend the ruinous arms race into outer space while at the same time escalating it further on earth. Plans to create offensive space-based weapons, including anti-missile and anti-satellite systems, in addition to developing new nuclear-missile armaments, can only be seen as a desire to acquire the capability of delivering a first nuclear strike with the hope of using a space "shield" to withstand any response.

/...
4. If no effective barrier is established, the militarization of outer space will cancel out everything that has been achieved in the area of arms limitation, thrust the arms race into new directions and lead to a further and manifold increase in the threat of nuclear war. A policy for the militarization of outer space - no matter what excuse might be offered for it - is contrary to the interests of strengthening strategic stability and the security of any State.

5. The Soviet Union has repeatedly declared that it does not seek superiority, but will under no circumstances permit others to have superiority over it. Any attempts to undermine the prevailing military and strategic parity, which objectively serves to maintain international peace and strategic stability, are both unjustifiable and dangerous. Instead of trying to shift the military and strategic balance in the vain hope of achieving superiority, it is essential to direct efforts towards lowering as much as possible the level at which that balance is preserved.

6. The Soviet Union is sure that there is the possibility as well as the need to curb dangerous developments of the situation and to adopt effective measures to prevent a slide towards the nuclear abyss. To this end, it is essential first and foremost to avoid the militarization of outer space, halt the nuclear-arms race and make the policies of the nuclear Powers conform to the realities of the nuclear and space age. Although particular responsibility in this respect lies with the nuclear States, the struggle to prevent nuclear war and maintain strategic stability at steadily lower levels of nuclear armaments is a cause of common concern. Positive and purposeful action by all States without exception is needed to bring about a decisive change towards lessening the nuclear danger and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons completely.

7. The Soviet Union is doing everything in its power to achieve that goal. This is clearly evident from the initiative which it took in enabling agreement to be reached with the United States of America for the commencement of new Soviet-American negotiations on a range of issues relating to space-based and nuclear weapons, both strategic and medium-range; and all these issues, moreover, will be considered and dealt with in an interrelated manner. This takes account of the objective reality of the present-day world, namely, the fact that it is now impossible to limit or, indeed, reduce nuclear weapons without taking effective steps to prevent the militarization of outer space. This organic interrelationship is clearly reflected in the joint Soviet-American document, which indicates that the purpose of the negotiations will be to draw up effective agreements aimed at preventing the arms race in outer space and halting it on earth, at limiting and reducing clear armaments and at strengthening strategic stability.

8. The Soviet Union seeks a successful outcome of the new Soviet-American negotiations. That will be possible if both sides are guided by the principle of equality and equal security and adhere strictly to all parts of the agreement reached with regard to the subject and purpose of the negotiations; this would be an important contribution to the prevention of nuclear war.

9. Ultimately - and the Soviet Union firmly supports this view - the Soviet-American negotiations, like all efforts in the area of arms limitation and reduction, must lead to the complete and universal destruction of nuclear weapons.
10. For the purpose of preventing nuclear war, a number of other steps of a material nature must also be taken without delay:

(a) The freezing of nuclear weapons by all the nuclear Powers, primarily the Soviet Union and the United States;

(b) The complete and universal prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and, until an appropriate agreement is reached, the declaration by all nuclear-weapon States of a moratorium on any nuclear explosions;

(c) The prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the strengthening in every possible way of the existing non-proliferation régime based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

11. Eradication of the danger of nuclear war is the aim of the proposal concerning the elaboration of a nuclear disarmament programme which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries submitted for consideration to the Conference on Disarmament.

12. Together with steps to limit, reduce and eventually destroy the physical means of waging nuclear war, there is a need for effective measures of a political nature aimed at preventing such a war from being unleashed.

13. It is now more important than ever for all nuclear States which have not yet done so to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This would be a major step serving to build international confidence and having great practical importance for reducing the nuclear threat. It would, in essence, have the effect of a general renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons.

14. An undeniable positive impact would be made by the achievement of an agreement among all the nuclear Powers to recognize certain norms governing relations among them which are logical if the object is to avert nuclear war. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union aside has put forward specific proposals, regarding the content of such a code of conduct for the nuclear Powers.

15. The Soviet Union shares the desire of the majority of States Members of the United Nations that the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva should proceed without further delay to negotiations with a view to reaching an agreement on practical steps to avert nuclear war and that it should establish an ad hoc committee for that purpose.

16. While seeking the adoption of specific, tangible steps to avoid a further destabilization of the strategic situation and to preclude fresh rounds of the arms race and reverse its course, the Soviet Union also advocates action in all other directions that would lead to the removal of the threat of nuclear war. It consistently strives to eliminate conflict and crisis situations and to eradicate the vestiges of colonial and racist oppression. It is the Soviet Union's conviction that the intellectual and material resources of States should be directed not towards preparation for war, but towards a solution of the global problems facing mankind, the elimination of hunger and disease, the development of new sources of energy, environmental conservation, the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, and the opening up of secrets of the atomic nucleus and the ocean depths.
17. The need to unite the efforts of states for these purposes, and above all for
the preservation of peace, is forcefully brought to mind again with the fortieth
anniversary of the peoples' victory in the Second World War, which the United
Nations has decided to observe on 8 and 9 May 1985. It was precisely the concerted
action at such a time that made it possible to crush the forces of war and
barbarity. Combined efforts have been needed and are required today in order to
safeguard the post-war world and to remove the threat of nuclear war.

18. The Soviet Union is prepared to co-operate honestly and constructively with
all those who genuinely wish to ensure that the further evolution of world events
does not involve successive stages of nuclear competition but follows the path of
strengthening peace and security, détente and trust, and it will combine its
efforts with all those who contribute in practice to the prevention of nuclear war.

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

[Original: English]

[20 February 1985]

1. The United Kingdom was unable to support General Assembly resolution 39/148 P
because of its implication that the one-sided abandonment of nuclear weapons would
enhance peace. This is an illusion.

2. The United Kingdom's policy remains one of deterring aggression and preventing
all war. It also recognizes the vital importance of preventing nuclear war. As a
nuclear-weapon State, it acknowledges its responsibility to do everything in its
power to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used. It believes that this must
and can only be achieved through preserving its current policy of deterrence. At
the same time, it is determined to pursue balanced and verifiable measures of arms
control and disarmament; to these the United Kingdom, together with its allies, is
firmly committed. To remove the means of deterrence in advance of agreement on
such measures would be both foolhardy and dangerous.

3. The United Kingdom believes that in parallel with reductions in nuclear
weapons it is important to seek reductions in conventional weapons and forces.

4. Given our aim to prevent all war, and given the appalling damage done over the
past 40 years by so-called conventional conflicts, such reductions should not be
treated as a minor matter compared to nuclear arms control. This broad and
balanced approach was clearly reflected in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.40/Rev.1
titled: "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", sponsored by
the United Kingdom and others. Such an approach carries a much firmer promise of
achieving a lower level of nuclear and conventional armaments than any
concentrating solely upon the removal of the threat of use of nuclear weapons.

5. The United Kingdom hopes that the approach in draft resolution
A/C.1/39/L.40/Rev.1 will be given proper consideration at the Conference on
Disarmament and at the fortieth session of the General Assembly. This draft
resolution provides a sound basis for a practical and realistic approach to the
prevention of all war, including but not solely nuclear conflict.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[Original: English]

[18 March 1985]

1. The Government of the United States of America and the American people are committed to ensuring that the dreadful prospect of war, particularly nuclear war, never becomes a reality. As President Reagan has said many times, "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought".

2. The world-wide concern with nuclear war, while understandable, should not cause us to ignore the broader goal of seeking to prevent all wars, an approach reflected in draft resolution A/C.1/39/L.40/Rev.1, supported by the United States and others. The Charter of the United Nations laid down our mandate to strive towards the goal of preventing all war; its opening words declare the determination of the peoples of the United Nations "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war".

3. As we approach the fortieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War, we are reminded of the horrors of conventional war in the twentieth century. Today we must also face the fact that conventional war could trigger a nuclear war. Therefore, if we are sincerely committed to preventing a nuclear holocaust, we must dedicate ourselves to the task of preventing war of any kind.

4. The Charter of the United Nations directly addresses the issue of the prevention of war. Member States are obliged to abide by its provisions, and foremost among these are the principles set forth in Article 2, including in particular those calling for members to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The continued failure of some to abide by these injunctions is all too evident in the armed conflicts which today disturb international peace and security. It is a tragic commentary on the state of international relations that all States do not comply fully with the Charter and with other commitments they have undertaken, such as the Helsinki Final Act. For their part, the United States and its allies continue to affirm that they will not use nuclear weapons, nor indeed any weapons, other than in response to aggression.

5. For preventing nuclear war, preventing all war, in this imperfect and heavily armed world, nations cannot rely solely on agreements or similar undertakings not to use force. As long as the threat of aggression exists and international security is in doubt, nations need something more to protect them. For the United States, the purpose of military forces is to deter aggression or if that fails, to defeat it. As long as an imbalance of conventional forces remains and nuclear weapons exist, the United States and its allies will retain their conventional and nuclear forces and continue to rely on the strategy of nuclear deterrence which has helped to keep the peace for almost 40 years.

6. The United States believes that a key element in reducing the risk of nuclear war is to make deep and verifiable reductions in the quantities of nuclear weapons themselves. We have therefore advanced proposals for the complete elimination of
an entire class of intermediate-range nuclear forces and for substantial reductions to equal levels of strategic ballistic missile forces, so that there will be a nuclear balance at a significantly lower and verifiable level. Such a balance is essential for maintaining stability and security and minimizing the danger of war. Moreover, the United States believes that emerging defensive technologies, especially those of non-nuclear means of defense against attack by nuclear weapons, hold the promise of enhancing deterrence and moving us toward our goal of the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons.

7. The Government of the United States is therefore pleased that it has been possible to agree with the Soviet Union to begin negotiations on strategic offensive and defensive systems. The United States will exert every effort to make those negotiations successful.

8. The United States welcomes the interest of many nations in the problem of the prevention of war, particularly nuclear war, not least because we believe it constitutes a recognition by such nations that they share with the nuclear weapon States the responsibility for achieving that goal. They will, the United States hopes, increasingly concern themselves with such issues as compliance with arms control agreements - both the historical record and what it can teach us about the design of new treaties, so that they can avoid the weaknesses of the past.

9. War is also made more likely when military capabilities and activities are so clothed in secrecy that nations must prepare for the worst. For this reason, the United States believes that all States would be better off if those which cling to such secretiveness would recognize the extent to which their behaviour works against the interests of peace and the prospects of arms control.

10. In the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, held at Stockholm in 1984, the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies had proposed a package of measures designed to make the peoples of Europe more secure by promoting openness and predictability in military activities. We also proposed confidence-building measures in the START negotiations. Such measures, if accepted, would reduce the risk of war by miscalculation and decrease suspicions that make war more likely.

11. The United States will also spare no effort in search of measures to prevent any accidental outbreak of nuclear war. To this end, it concluded with the Soviet Union the 1971 agreement on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, as well as the "hot-line" agreement providing for rapid direct communication between the two Governments in times of emergency. The hot-line was recently upgraded to provide for improved capabilities.

12. The United States accepts its responsibilities in the effort to reduce the possibility of nuclear war. At the same time, it recognizes the vital contributions to international security and stability and the prevention of nuclear war made by those countries that have taken on the obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons or help others acquire them. There is no escape from the fact that the world would be much less secure if nuclear weapons were more widely distributed. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and other arrangements inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons have
served the nations of the world well. We are all vastly better off with these vital agreements than we would be without them. An important step all members of the United Nations could take to prevent nuclear war would be to rededicate themselves to maintaining, extending and improving the non-proliferation régime. The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to be held in 1985, offers such an opportunity.

13. There is no objective of greater importance than the prevention of nuclear war. As President Reagan said on 9 May 1982 the United States believes "that it will be possible to reduce the risks of war by removing the instabilities that now exist and by dismantling the nuclear menace". The first steps in this process are to seek effective and verifiable agreements for the control of nuclear arms at substantially reduced levels, and to reduce the possibilities of misinterpretation or misunderstanding between nuclear-armed adversaries. But, until these goals are reached, the United States must continue to rely on the strategy of nuclear deterrence.

VIET NAM

[Original: English]

[13 January 1985]

1. Nuclear weapons occupy a distinctive place among modern armaments and have an unprecedented destructive power. Diverse researches conducted in many countries have proved that the consequences of the use of the available nuclear arsenals would be immediate, total and global, leading to global annihilation. The recent findings on a "nuclear winter" further enforce the view that the disastrous effects brought about by a nuclear war are unforeseeable.

2. Therefore, shortly after the end of the Second World War the question concerning the prevention of a nuclear war was raised and has ever since become the paramount goal for forces of peace in their struggle for disarmament, peace and international security. The very first resolution adopted by the United Nations in 1946 (General Assembly resolution 1 (I)) called for "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons". Since then, the United Nations has also adopted a number of important documents, such as the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe (General Assembly resolution 36/100) and the Declaration on the Condemnation of Nuclear War. Paragraph 18 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, declared that "removing the threat of a world war - a nuclear war - is the most acute and urgent task of the present day" and paragraph 20 declared that "effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority" (General Assembly resolution S-10/2).

3. Since its inception, the Non-Aligned Movement has taken a definite stance on this matter. The Political Declaration adopted by the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in 1983, considered that "the greatest peril facing the world today is the threat to the survival of mankind from a nuclear war" (A/38/132-S/15575 and Corr.1 and 2, annex, sect. I, para. 28).

/...
4. However, over the past 40 years, far from decreasing, the nuclear danger has continued to grow. The most war-like imperialist forces must be held responsible for this situation and represent the greatest obstacle to the common efforts by the international community at averting a nuclear war and safeguarding peace and détente. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has always perceived nuclear weapons as the main instrument to ensure its policy of force in pursuit of world hegemony. And, since the late 1970s, motivated by its selfish interests, the United States has set off a new spiral of the arms race, disrupting the hard-won international détente. It has begun deploying new medium-range nuclear missiles on the territories of some Western European countries and is involved in plans for star wars in space. The international reaction, by conniving at and encouraging those cynical activities, should also take the blame.

5. Now, more than ever before, the international community should do everything in its power to reduce and then to eliminate the threat of nuclear war. This task urgently demands the creation of certain political and moral factors inhibiting the attempts to unleash a nuclear war and the destruction of all material bases for such attempts. The plans aimed at preventing a nuclear war should also foresee those factors that can cause destabilization in the future.

6. The most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and against the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of this goal, all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, should regard the prevention of nuclear war as the main objective of their policy and take every measure to create the conditions favourable for agreement on a code of peaceful conduct among nations in international affairs. In this regard, the agreement among the nuclear-weapon States on some norms regulating their relations is of special importance.

7. Viet Nam considers that the following measures are of an urgent and practical nature:

(a) Renunciation by all nuclear-weapon States of the first use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so should now unilaterally assume their obligations. This measure would increase confidence among States and lessen the nuclear danger. At the same time, the commitments by nuclear-weapon States can be codified in an instrument of international law, thereby amounting to legal prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We also advocate the conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons as reaffirmed in General Assembly resolution 39/63 H;

(b) Quantitative and qualitative freeze of the present nuclear arsenals. The freeze would cover all the components of nuclear arsenals, non-deployment of new nuclear weapons and cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. This process can be initiated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America with the other nuclear-weapon States following suit. In its recent resolutions, the United Nations has established that at present there exist propitious conditions for such a freeze, namely, the overall wrought parity between the United States and the Soviet Union in nuclear military power;
(c) Prevention of nuclear war cannot be divorced from non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, the non-proliferation régime established by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be strengthened. To this end, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free regions on the basis of the agreement and arrangements arrived at by the States concerned in the region are of significant contribution. It is now a pressing task to prevent the deployment of nuclear weapons abroad;

(d) All States, especially those having the major space capabilities, should make active contributions to the objective of using space exclusively for peaceful purposes and undertake prompt measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. The United States "star wars" plan is aimed at guaranteeing that Power the strategic superiority when it unleashes a nuclear war.

8. Prevention of nuclear war is organically linked with the principle of non-use of force in international relations. We deem it necessary in this respect to lay emphasis on measures assuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of force, nuclear or non-nuclear as a result of the hostile policies of certain nuclear-weapon States towards the former.

9. The task of preventing nuclear war demands all States, primarily the nuclear-weapon States, to exert the greatest efforts and to assume the most serious responsibilities towards the destiny of mankind. It can only be achieved through the tenacious and resolute struggle of all forces of peace throughout the world.

YUGOSLAVIA

[Original: English]

[3 April 1985]

1. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 39/148 P, the Government of Yugoslavia wishes to express its views on the question of preventing nuclear war.

2. Yugoslavia considers that in adopting a position towards an armed conflict, and nuclear war in particular, any member of the international community, any State or inter-State body, should be guided by the Charter of the United Nations, particularly Article 2 thereof stating the obligations binding for all Member States, according to which they should refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.

3. This is all the more important since the prevention of nuclear war is a key issue on which world peace and security and the survival of mankind depend.

4. The extent of danger arising from the outbreak of a nuclear war is directly related to and proportionate with the size and destructive power of nuclear arsenals. The continuation and intensification of the arms race between the great Powers increases manifold the possibility of an accidental or non-accidental nuclear conflict. The potential source of such a conflict is the policy of threat
or use of force and foreign intervention. Although a nuclear war would spare neither the parties in conflict nor other countries, the nuclear arms race is assuming ever larger proportions day after day.

5. The dynamics of vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons is not being reduced, despite the obligations undertaken by the nuclear Powers signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

6. New, more precise and lethal systems continue to be introduced and deployed in areas and territories where they did not exist before. Nuclear weapons are being introduced to ever lower levels of military units, thus lowering the "nuclear threshold" and increasing the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict.

7. The publicly known incidents with intermediate-range missiles which recently occurred in Europe, as well as the numerous false alarms of control systems on nuclear attacks, are sufficient examples of the extent of the real danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war by error. The international community expressed its awareness of the danger of the mere existence of nuclear weapons almost four decades ago, when the General Assembly, at its third session in 1948, adopted resolution 192/III on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and reduction by one third of the armaments and armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council.

8. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence is one of the most direct generators of qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear weapons. This concept is incompatible with the security interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear States, since it is based on the threat of mutual destruction of the parties in conflict by the use of nuclear weapons.

9. The use of the means upon which the doctrine of nuclear deterrence rests would have unforeseeable consequences for the entire world, which is clearly evident from the recent scientific analysis of "nuclear winter". Hence, the genuine and equal security for all countries cannot be achieved through senseless competition and stockpiling of weapons but, first and foremost, by the implementation of disarmament measures, nuclear ones in particular.

10. International security can be founded on sound bases only in conditions of consistent respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and particularly the principles of sovereignty and non-use of force or threat of use of force against territorial integrity and independence of countries, peaceful solution of disputes, non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs of countries and peaceful co-existence among States. These are the principles to which the policy of non-alignment and the movement of non-aligned countries are also committed.

11. Great Powers, particularly those possessing the largest nuclear arsenals, bear special responsibility for taking all necessary measures for preventing nuclear war, halting the nuclear arms race and launching the process of disarmament.

12. Steady negotiations, which must take account of the interests of the international community as a whole, may render an exceptional contribution to other efforts aimed at launching the process of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
13. Negotiations between the great Powers, however useful and indispensable, cannot replace the right and duty of all States to participate in and contribute to the disarmament process, nor can they serve as a pretext for impeding or obstructing the launching of substantial multilateral negotiations on specific measures for preventing nuclear war in the existing bodies, such as the Conference on Disarmament.

14. Non-aligned countries have always pointed out that international peace and security cannot be preserved and strengthened through the arms race. At their First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in 1961, the non-aligned countries called upon the great Powers to halt the nuclear arms race and launch negotiations, particularly on nuclear disarmament.

15. The first resolution of the General Assembly on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons was adopted in 1961 at the initiative of the non-aligned countries. It underlined, even then, that the use of nuclear weapons would constitute a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against mankind and civilization. In the present-day conditions, this position is becoming ever more important and topical.

16. In continuation of the non-aligned policy, the New Delhi Message given at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in 1983, urged "the nuclear weapon Powers to adopt urgent and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. They should agree on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances and stop further production and deployment of nuclear weapons. It is also essential that they observe existing arms limitation agreements while seeking to negotiate broader and more effective programmes leading to general and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, under international supervision" (A/38/132-S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, annex, sect. II, para. 4).

17. The extent to which the New Delhi Message expressed and still expresses the wishes and interests of the great majority of mankind has been demonstrated by an almost unanimous favourable reaction of the entire world to the agreement of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to resume the negotiations at Geneva on 12 March 1985, followed by the expectation that the two major nuclear Powers will, this time, be resolute in their quest for a mutually acceptable solution both for them and the international community as a whole.

18. At the same time, the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva should fulfil its mandate without delay and start negotiations with a view to adopting measures for the prevention of nuclear war. In this connection, emphasis should be laid on the increasing danger of the proliferation and development of other weapons for mass destruction whose destructive effects are nearing those of nuclear ones. The Government of Yugoslavia considers that greater attention should be devoted to the cessation of the arms race in these weapons.

19. Proposals submitted during the past discussions in the Conference on Disarmament can serve as a solid basis for meaningful work and, hopefully, a positive outcome on this issue. Therefore, we consider that it would be useful if the Conference established without further delay an ad hoc committee for...
negotiations on this issue, and member States of the Conference, especially the nuclear Powers, should contribute to achieving constructive results.

20. The Government of Yugoslavia, however, wishes to emphasize again that in order to prevent nuclear war it would be of great importance to reach an earliest possible agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which would be preceded by a moratorium conducive to the cessation of production, prohibition and final elimination of nuclear weapons which is the only way to prevent their use.

21. In view of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, these issues should be given the highest priority in the preparations of this session, so that substantial progress towards preventing nuclear war and prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons could be achieved at this session.