Thirty-eighth session
Agenda item 50, 53, 59, 59c.

REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION

Note by the Secretary-General

CONTENTS

| I. INTRODUCTION | .......................................................... | 2 |
| II. INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS | ......................................... | 2 |
| UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS | ........................................... | 2 |
I. INTRODUCTION

In connection with paragraph 9 of General Assembly resolution 37/78 F of 9 December 1982, the Secretary-General has received a communication from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, dated 26 October 1983, the text of which is reproduced below.

II. INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Original: Russian]

[26 October 1983]

1. With reference to General Assembly resolution 37/78, "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session", of 9 December 1982, which includes a request for information concerning disarmament and arms limitation negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations system, the Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations wishes to communicate the following.

2. In view of the current dangerous developments in international relations and the growing threat of nuclear war, the Soviet Union attaches great importance to concluding agreements on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament within the framework of appropriate international negotiations.

3. The USSR considers that the conclusion of specific agreements directed towards the effective reduction and eventually the elimination of the material instruments of war would genuinely reduce the threat of war and would promote détente, the improvement of international relations and the strengthening of peace and security.

4. Fortunately, in international negotiations on disarmament, including negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations, the Soviet Union acts in a highly responsible manner and makes every necessary effort it can with a view to reaching mutually acceptable solutions as rapidly as possible on these issues which are so vital to peace.

5. The USSR sits down at the negotiating table not for the sake of the negotiations themselves nor to engage in propagandistic rhetoric but in order to achieve concrete results promoting real arms reductions and genuine disarmament measures. The main condition set by the USSR is that negotiations should be conducted in good faith. This is the criterion the Soviet side follows, and it is entitled to expect the same thing from other parties in negotiations.

6. However, in response to the constructive position of the USSR at ongoing negotiations on disarmament, a position designed to ensure rapid and practical results, and in response to the Soviet proposal to re-open negotiations interrupted through no fault of the Soviet Union and to begin new ones, the States members of
NATO, and above all the United States of America, are demonstrating a clear reluctance to engage in honest and equitable co-operation or to seek ways of reducing the military threat. The United States refuses to re-open the tripartite negotiations - involving the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom - on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, as well as bilateral Soviet-American negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the limitation of sales and deliveries of conventional weapons to other States, the limitation of military activity in the Indian Ocean, etc. The United States has in fact blocked all ongoing negotiations on the curbing of the arms race.

7. In the Soviet-American negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons that have been going on since June 1982, the United States has been concentrating solely on obtaining not an honest agreement but one-sided military advantages. While insisting that the Soviet Union should cut back on its latest types of weapons, and moreover to a much greater extent than the United States, the United States has made no secret of its intention to make virtually no change to the basis of its nuclear arsenal or to its extensive programmes for the deployment of new strategic weapons, including air-based, land-based and sea-based cruise missiles. Washington recently announced "new" United States proposals at the negotiations on strategic arms limitation and reduction. The essence of these proposals consists in channeling the strategic arms race towards the further qualitative improvement of missiles and bombers.

8. The Soviet Union has consistently demonstrated its constructive approach to the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union is in favour of deep, across-the-board cuts in the numbers of such weapons with a view to increasing general military and strategic stability while at the same time strictly observing the principle of equality and equal security.

9. The far-reaching proposals advanced by the Soviet Union concerning mutual reductions in strategic delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads provide a good basis for achieving this goal. Specifically, the USSR is proposing that the total number of ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers should be progressively reduced to 1,800 on each side by 1990; this would represent a 25 per cent reduction from the initial ceiling on these weapons established under SALT II. The number of nuclear warheads on these delivery vehicles would also be reduced to equal agreed levels. At all stages during these reductions, the USSR and the United States would be on an equal footing in terms of their security, and the strategic parity that existed between them would be maintained.

10. In advancing these proposals, the USSR has taken account of the fact that the United States has forward-based nuclear weapons situated in the immediate vicinity of the borders of the Soviet Union and its allies. As far as the USSR is concerned, these weapons are strategic in nature. Since the USSR has no similar weapons in the vicinity of the territory of the United States, during the reductions in the numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, the relative importance of United States forward-based nuclear weapons in the strategic balance between the two sides would steadily increase. The Soviet proposals therefore provide that, during the mutual reductions in strategic nuclear forces, the United States should at least refrain from increasing its arsenal of other nuclear weapons capable of reaching targets...
within Soviet territory. This is the sole basis on which an equitable and mutually acceptable agreement can be reached.

11. The Soviet proposals are aimed at further limitations in the qualitative improvement of strategic weapons. In this connection, the Soviet Union is in favour of prohibiting and restricting certain new types of strategic weapons, in particular cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 km, and of restricting the modernization of existing weapons with agreed parameters. The USSR has also advanced a series of proposals aimed at strengthening strategic stability and increasing confidence between the USSR and the United States.

12. Action to give effect to the Soviet initiative designed to "freeze" the strategic arsenals of the USSR and the United States could also play an important role at these negotiations. The Soviet Union is proposing not only that the number of existing missiles should not be increased but that the two sides should refrain from developing and testing new types and categories of strategic weapons and should limit the modernization of existing weapons to a minimum. The USSR would also agree to a broader variant of the proposal whereby all components of the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States would be frozen.

13. One question that is of particular importance at present is how to avoid a new round of the nuclear arms race in Europe. At the Soviet-American negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe that have been proceeding in Geneva since 30 November 1981, no progress has as yet been made, and there can be no hope of progress as long as the United States maintains its present position.

14. From the very outset of the negotiations, the United States has adopted a negative and unacceptable stance, a stance actually designed to bring the negotiations to a halt.

15. Initially, the United States put forward the so-called "zero option" providing for the destruction of all land-based medium-range missiles deployed in the European and Asian parts of the USSR in exchange for the non-deployment of new United States missiles in Western Europe. At the same time, the United States, completely ignored the existence in Europe within NATO of the nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom and France, as well as forward-based American nuclear weapons. The implementation of this totally unacceptable proposal would mean zero missiles for the USSR and zero reductions for NATO.

16. The United States next proposed its "interim option", under which the USSR would have to make considerable reductions in its nuclear arsenal of medium-range missiles (over all of its territory), while the United States would acquire the "right" to deploy in Europe - in addition to the existing United Kingdom and French nuclear weapons and forward-based nuclear weapons of the United States itself - as many new United States missiles as there were Soviet missiles remaining. In this case also, the Soviet Union would have to accept a "minus", while NATO would gain a "plus". Clearly, it is impossible to reach agreement on this basis either.

17. On 26 September 1983, in his speech in the United Nations General Assembly, the President of the United States made a statement concerning "new United States initiatives" at the negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe.
An analysis of these proposals shows that on the two essential questions involved in the negotiations - non-deployment of new United States nuclear weapons and inclusion of the nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France - the position of the United States remained unchanged.

18. All of this indicates that the United States does not want and does not seek agreement. It is attempting to secure, on any pretext, the deployment of its new nuclear missiles in western Europe, thereby destroying the existing balance of forces both in the continent of Europe and world-wide.

19. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is not seeking to put itself ahead even by a single missile, a single aircraft or a single nuclear warhead. It has proposed a radical solution to the problem, the true zero option - that is to say, the liquidation of all nuclear weapons in the European zone, both medium-range and tactical. However, recognizing that the other parties to the negotiations are not ready to accept such a solution, the USSR has proposed the following option: non-deployment of any new medium-range weapons in Europe and reduction of all existing weapons of this kind to about one third of their present number, leaving 300 such weapons on the USSR side and 300 on the NATO side. The Soviet Union is prepared to leave, after the reductions, exactly as many medium-range missiles in Europe as the United Kingdom and France have. Correspondingly, the two sides would have remaining equal numbers of aircraft capable of delivering medium-range nuclear weapons. The USSR is also willing to agree to equality both in the number of delivery vehicles (missiles and aircraft) and in the number of warheads they carry.

20. To sum up, the Soviet Union would have in the European zone both far fewer medium-range missiles and far fewer warheads on them than before 1976, when there were no SS-20 missiles at all. Moreover, the USSR has stated its readiness to take one more major step. In the event of the conclusion of a mutually acceptable agreement, including United States abstention from deployment of new missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union, when it removed medium-range missiles from the European part of the country so as to reach a level equal to the number of missiles possessed by the United Kingdom and France, would liquidate all the missiles so removed. In that case the missiles liquidated would include a large number of the most modern type, known in the West as SS-20 missiles.

21. Whether or not there will be an agreement at the negotiations depends on whether the United States side will finally change its negative attitude and show an interest in honest agreement.

22. At the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe, which have already been going on for 10 years, the USSR, together with the other socialist countries participating, is making vigorous efforts for an early and successful conclusion of the negotiations. In June 1983 the socialist countries proposed a new draft agreement based on a simple and practical approach to the solution of the problems of reduction. The essence of this approach was that irrespective of any disputes or disagreements in the estimates of the number of NATO troops and Warsaw Treaty Organization troops, the process of reducing armed forces and armaments in Central Europe would actually begin and would be reduced to agreed equal collective ceilings on the strength of the armed forces of the two sides at a lower level.
23. The proposals of the socialist countries provide, as a first step, for the immediate removal of a specific portion of USSR and United States armed forces and armaments from the central European area on the basis of a reciprocal model, followed by a freeze on the levels of armed forces and armaments of all direct participants in the negotiations, to remain in effect until a comprehensive agreement was reached. It is proposed that all the negotiations should be completed in a short time, not exceeding one year.

24. The draft agreement requires the States participating directly in the negotiations to reduce their land forces in Central Europe within a period of three years from the time of the entry into force of the agreement in such a way that the total strength of each side's armed forces would be reduced to equal collective levels of 900,000 men, including land forces numbering 700,000 men, with a limitation of each side's air-force strength to 200,000 men. Each side would itself determine the magnitude of the reductions in its own armed forces that would be necessary to bring the total strength of the two sides' armed forces down to equal collective levels. The magnitudes of the reductions in the armed forces of any party to the agreement would be determined within the framework of the respective alliance, using the principle of full collectivity and a formula providing that each party to the agreement which had major military formations in Central Europe would assume a substantial part of the total magnitude of the reductions in the armed forces of its alliance.

25. The draft agreement provides for supervision of the process of reduction not only of foreign armed forces in a country but also of its national armed forces, as well as for sufficiently effective verification of the levels of strength of the armed forces remaining after all the reductions.

26. The set of proposals made by the socialist countries ensures all the necessary conditions for reaching mutually acceptable agreements at Vienna. Thus, the matter is now up to the NATO countries.

27. The positive outcome of the Madrid meeting has been achieved thanks to a trend in international affairs towards dialogue and mutual understanding and towards the settlement of problems at the negotiating table. Particularly significant among the decisions of the Madrid meeting is the agreement on the convening of a conference on measures to strengthen confidence and security and disarmament in Europe.

28. The Soviet Union takes a highly responsible attitude towards the holding of that conference. It is important that the work of the conference should be conducted from the outset in a business-like manner, forming part of the efforts to set up a barrier to the arms race on the European continent.

29. The Soviet Union takes a most serious and responsible attitude towards all negotiations aimed at curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament. It consistently displays good will and a desire for constructive co-operation and for the attainment of mutually acceptable solutions through dialogue. It is prepared to go as far as the other States will agree to go, all the way to general and complete disarmament.