Documents on Disarmament

1965

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
The Documents on Disarmament volumes, issued annually since 1960, contain basic documents on disarmament, arms control, and related matters. International negotiations and the activities of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during 1965 are described in the annual report of the Agency, which is printed at the end of the documents.

The documents are arranged in chronological order. They are preceded by a topical list of documents and followed by a chronological list. Other reference aids include lists of abbreviations, international organizations and conferences, and persons. The volume also includes a bibliography and an index.

The papers were compiled and annotated by Robert W. Lambert, Acting Chief, Reference Research Staff, with the assistance of Ruth Ihara and Jacqueline S. Mithun. Other officers of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency also made useful suggestions.

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<tr>
<td>A/-</td>
<td>General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>atomic, biological, and chemical</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>antiballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>A/C.1</td>
<td>First (Political and Security) Committee of the General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Administrative Committee on Coordination of the Economic and Social Council</td>
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<td>ACD</td>
<td>arms control and disarmament</td>
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<td>ACDA</td>
<td>United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency</td>
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<td>AEC</td>
<td>United States Atomic Energy Commission</td>
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<td>ANF</td>
<td>proposed Atlantic nuclear force</td>
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<td>Com.</td>
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<td>Cong.</td>
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<td>Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
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<td>ENDC</td>
<td>Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee</td>
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<td>F.R.G.</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<td>fiscal year</td>
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<td>G.A.</td>
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<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>gross national product</td>
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<td>H. or H.R.</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>ICBM</td>
<td>intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>LASA</td>
<td>large aperture seismic array</td>
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<td>proposed multilateral nuclear force</td>
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<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>UST</td>
<td>United States Treaties and Other International Agreements</td>
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1 Abbreviation used in documents of United Nations organs or international conferences served by the United Nations Secretariat.
2 Communist regime not recognized by the United States.
LIST OF PRINCIPAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND CONFERENCES

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 1959–. Established by
General Assembly resolution 1472 (XV), Dec. 12, 1959, as a 24-member
body; enlarged on Dec. 20, 1961. In 1965 the Committee was composed of
the following 28 countries: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, India,
Iran, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Poland, Romania,

Disarmament Commission, 1952–. Established by General Assembly resolution
502 (VI), Jan. 11, 1952. Since 1959 the Commission has comprised all
U.N. members.¹ It met for the first time since 1960 during Apr. 21–June 16,
1965.

Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, 1962–. Announced at the United
Nations Dec. 13, 1961, and endorsed by General Assembly resolution 1722
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France,² India,
Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, U.A.R., U.K., U.S.,
Committee of the Whole: all members.³ Subcommittee on a Treaty for the


¹ For previous membership, see Documents on Disarmament, 1960, p. xii.
² France has not participated in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee.
³ Has not met since 1962.
Letter From ACDA Director Foster to President Johnson: Proposed Amendment to Arms Control and Disarmament Act, January 13, 1965 1

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I submit herewith, for your approval and transmittal to the Congress, proposed legislation to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in order to extend the authorization for appropriations for this Agency. This proposed amendment has one purpose: to authorize appropriations of $55 million for the four-year period of fiscal years 1966 through 1969. Since the current authorization is inadequate to permit operations much beyond June 30, 1965, this legislation will be required to keep the Agency operating. Early enactment is necessary to permit timely congressional consideration of the Agency’s fiscal 1966 budget estimates.

As you have repeatedly pointed out, enhancing our national security through the verified control and reduction of world-wide armaments and through other measures to lessen the risk of war is a United States foreign policy goal of the greatest importance. The United States has already achieved three significant measures toward this end: the nuclear test ban treaty,2 the communications link between Washington and Moscow,3 and the United Nations resolution against weapons in space.4 In addition, we are cutting back our planned production of nuclear materials, and the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have announced that they intend to make cutbacks in theirs. The Agency has played a key role in the development of the current United States proposals before the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference; namely, to freeze the production of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, to halt production of fissionable materials for weapons use, to create observation posts to reduce the danger of war by miscalculation and surprise attack, and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons into the national control of countries currently not possessing them.

2 Ibid., 1963, pp. 291–293.
3 Ibid., pp. 236–238.
4 Ibid., p. 538.
Attempts directed toward arms control and other measures to lessen the threat of war are no longer utopian dreams. The work of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has become an integral part of our over-all national security policy. Indeed, the need for arms-control measures is becoming even more acute as more nations develop a nuclear capability and as the arms race remains with us. Armaments alone can no longer increase security; the unchecked increase of these weapons of mass destruction can only diminish our safety and the hope for peace.

Research in arms control and disarmament is imperative if realistic international agreements are to be reached. The complexity of arms-control negotiations requires systematic and comprehensive study in the development of policy proposals. The chief value of this endeavor is to allow the United States to make concrete proposals for arms-control measures which will not jeopardize our security interests vis-à-vis the relative balance of power in the world, and which will assure that such agreements permit proper inspection and verification to prevent possible subterfuges by other nations. It also has an ancillary value in demonstrating to our allies, adversaries, as well as neutrals, the importance we attach to arms control.

To fulfill the Agency’s responsibility as a repository of knowledge on the technical, economic, military, and political aspects of arms control, made especially difficult by the rapidly changing world scene, to back up proposals currently before the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference, and to prepare new proposals in support of your continuing quest for peace, the Agency must have authorization to carry on its efforts during the years ahead. Specifically, the Agency must have resources to pursue vital studies aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, controlling and reducing arms, and developing other measures to reduce the risk of war. Although the United States has already achieved significant progress in making the world safer from the ever present nuclear threat, the quest must continue and even intensify during the coming years.

The road to peace and arms control is slow and arduous, but it is one which we must travel. Therefore, I believe our authorization for appropriations should be for a period adequate to allow for long-range research planning and to emphasize our determination in making this effort. I believe a four-year authorization for fiscal years 1966 through 1969 would accomplish these purposes.

Faithfully yours,

William C. Foster

Enclosure:
Proposed Legislation to Amend Arms Control and Disarmament Act.
TEXT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION

A BILL

To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to increase the authorization for appropriations.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the second sentence of section 49(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, (22 U.S.C. 2589(a)), is amended by inserting immediately after "$20,000,000", the following: “and for the four fiscal years 1966 through 1969, the sum of $55,000,000.”

Letter From President Johnson to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives: Proposed Amendment to Arms Control and Disarmament Act, January 15, 1965

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to forward today to the Congress—with my strongest urging that it be enacted promptly—a draft of a bill to assure the continuing leadership of the United States in the purposeful pursuit of peace.

Four years ago, the United States became the first nation in the world to establish an Agency for Arms Control and Disarmament. The record of achievement since has refuted the doubts of those who questioned whether there was effective work for such an agency to perform. While the journey toward peace remains long, we have begun to take the first steps—and we have found others of the family of nations willing to walk with us.

In the last year and a half, we have concluded the nuclear test ban treaty now joined by over 100 other nations. We have established a direct communications link between Washington and Moscow, joined in a United Nations resolution against weapons in space, and initiated cutbacks in the planned production of fissionable material—a step which the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have announced that they intend to take also.

2 Supra.
5 Ibid., pp. 236–238.
6 Ibid., p. 538.
We have, in addition, placed before the 18-nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva a number of important, concrete proposals for the control and reduction of armaments on which agreement has not yet been achieved.

In our times, as always, vigilance remains the price of liberty and we stand today as a strong, ready and vigilant nation, prepared and determined to defend our freedom and the freedom of those who stand with us. But as a nation vigilant to danger, we must also be vigilant for opportunities for improving the hopes for peace. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency helps us keep this most vital vigil.

Since existing authorization expires on June 30, 1965, I am asking the Congress to extend that authority for four years. I do so because it is my purpose to intensify our efforts in this critical area. I am determined to work in every way that I can for safeguarded agreements that will halt the spread of nuclear weapons, lessen the risk of war and reduce the dangers and costly burdens of armaments. This effort—as much as our continuing preparedness efforts militarily—is essential to our security for a continued increase and spread of modern weapons can actually decrease our security.

The first legislation creating the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is a proud and honored memorial to the initiative and vision of President John F. Kennedy. It is also a living tribute to the responsibility of the Members of Congress, and, in particular, to the dedicated leadership offered through the years by the Vice President-elect. Such legislation so clearly reflects the spirit and the will of the American people that I hope the Congress will act with all dispatch to give approval to this extension of the Agency's valuable role.

The background and justification for my recommendation are amplified in the accompanying letter to me from the Director of the Agency, William C. Foster. I share Mr. Foster's conclusions fully and confidently trust that the action of the Congress will impressively reaffirm to the world the dedication of this generation of Americans to the untiring quest for peace for ourselves and all mankind.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Statement by the Atomic Energy Commission on Soviet Underground Nuclear Test, January 16, 1965 ¹

The United States yesterday recorded seismic signals from an event in the Soviet nuclear testing area in the Semipalatinsk region.

Statement by the Atomic Energy Commission on Venting From Soviet Underground Nuclear Test, January 19, 1965

As previously reported, the United States detected through seismic signals a Soviet underground nuclear test in the Semipalatinsk area on January 15 with a yield in the intermediate range. The United States detection system has now detected a certain amount of venting connected with the test. The amounts of radioactivity measured to date will not produce measurable exposures to persons. In view of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the Department of State has asked the Government of the Soviet Union for information on this event.

Communiqué of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, January 20, 1965

The Political Consultative Committee of the partners to the Warsaw Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid, which was in session in Warsaw on Jan. 19 and 20, 1964, discussed the new situation arising in connection with the plans of several North Atlantic Pact states to form a NATO multilateral nuclear force, as well as the possible consequences for the world that a realization of these plans would entail.

The major tendency of the present-day development of international events is a growth of the forces that favor the preservation and strengthening of peace. The might of the socialist countries, which consistently pursue a peace-loving policy, is growing constantly. The Communist Parties and popular masses of the states of Europe and other countries fight resolutely for improvement in the international atmosphere. The independent states of Asia, Africa and Latin America actively contribute to the strengthening of peace.

At the same time, imperialist forces manifest considerable energy and stubbornness in their attempts to aggravate the international atmosphere in various regions of the world. The hostile policy of the U.S.A. against the Republic of Cuba has not ceased. The

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2 Supra.
3 *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.
4 See *post*, pp. 9–10.
dangerous provocations of the U.S.A. against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam continue. This aggressive policy is resolutely condemned by the Warsaw Treaty states, as well as all other socialist countries.

The imperialist forces interfere in the domestic affairs of independent states and use methods of economic, military and political pressure. They use their military grouping for the suppression of national-liberation movements. Examples are provided by the continuing war against the people of South Vietnam, the intervention in the Congo and the aggressive actions of the colonialists in Malaysia. The Warsaw Treaty states declare their solidarity with the peoples who are fighting for their freedom and independence or for the strengthening of their independence.

The plans for creating a NATO multilateral nuclear force are to play a special role in implementing the aggressive policy of imperialism. The Warsaw Treaty states regard the plans for creating a NATO multilateral nuclear force, which are favored by the ruling circles of the U.S.A. and of West Germany, as a grave threat to peace in Europe and the world over. The formation of a multilateral nuclear force in any form would mean a proliferation of nuclear weapons and, in particular, the presentation of these weapons to the West German militarists.

This applies to the U.S. plan for a multilateral nuclear force, supported by the F.R.G., as well as to the British plan for an "Atlantic nuclear force." Both variants are incompatible with the desires of the peoples and of the peace-loving states, which favor a cessation of the nuclear arms race, elimination of the threat of nuclear war and the realization of general and complete disarmament. They are incompatible with the efforts of many states toward creating nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world.

A NATO multilateral nuclear force aims at the consolidation of a separate American-West German bloc within the North Atlantic Alliance. It is a sort of a deal, through which the U.S.A. wants to ensure its military and political hegemony in Western Europe and the F.R.G., in return for its willingness to support this American line, will gain access to nuclear weapons.

F.R.G. access to nuclear weapons, whether within the framework of the "multilateral" or the "Atlantic" nuclear force, is viewed by the West German militarists merely as a step on the way to obtaining their own nuclear weapons.

When the F.R.G. became a member of the North Atlantic Pact, it gained an opportunity to create, in violation of the Potsdam Agreements concluded after the unconditional surrender of Hitlerite Germany, an aggressive military force. Access to nuclear weapons would undoubtedly stimulate the desire of the West German revanch-
ist forces to change the situation that came about in Europe after the end of the second world war and to realize territorial claims upon the German Democratic Republic and other states. No assurances from the Western powers can serve as a guarantee against this threat to peace.

The true intentions of the F.R.G. are indicated by facts such as the provocational plan, proposed by the leadership of the Bundeswehr, for creating an atomic-mine belt along the eastern frontiers and by the announcement of the so-called “front-line strategy,” which requires the use of nuclear weapons from the very outset of any military conflict in Central Europe. This attests to the desires of the F.R.G. revanchist forces to make the U.S.A. and other NATO countries party to their adventurous plans.

But any attempts to effect the West German revanchist demands with the help of nuclear weapons are of the greatest danger to the German people, because such attempts would inevitably lead to a nuclear war, resulting not in the reunification of Germany but in its reduction to an atomic desert.

The Warsaw Treaty states resolutely oppose giving nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic of Germany in any form whatever—directly or indirectly, through groupings of states, for its exclusive use or in any form of participation in the use of these weapons.

The Warsaw Treaty states fully support the peace-loving policy of the German Democratic Republic and consider that participation by the Federal Republic of Germany in creating a NATO multilateral nuclear force to mean that the F.R.G. government is writing off the unification of Germany. A relaxation of tension and effective agreements on disarmament in Germany and in Europe are the only ways to create conditions for the unification of the two existing sovereign and equal German states in the spirit of the principles of the Potsdam Agreements.¹

The formation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force is aimed not only against the interests of peace and security in Europe. It would also increase imperialist and neocolonialist pressure on the newly liberated peoples and those fighting for their independence.

The basic interests of all peoples demand a renunciation of the plans for creating a NATO multilateral nuclear force. But if the NATO states, acting contrary to the interests of peace, realize their plans for creating a multilateral nuclear force, no matter in what form this may be done, then the Warsaw Treaty states, faced with the grave dangers this would entail for peace and security in Europe, will be compelled to take the necessary defensive measures to ensure their security.

¹ For the Potsdam agreement, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–49 (S. Doc. 123, 81st Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 34–48.
The chief goal of the policy of the Warsaw Treaty states is to ensure peaceful conditions for building socialism and communism in their countries and for the liberation of mankind from the threat of a nuclear world war through the joint efforts of all the peace-loving peoples.

The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty states have submitted a whole series of proposals for improving the international situation. The Warsaw Treaty states will continue to support measures leading toward an easing of international tension and the creation of favorable conditions for a cessation of the arms race and the attainment of general and complete disarmament.

The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty states considers that an urgent demand of our time is to ensure European security, which is threatened by the plans for creating a multilateral nuclear force. This goal would be served by the realization of the proposal for freezing nuclear armaments and the proposal for creating an atom-free zone in Central Europe.

Supporting the initiative of the Polish People's Republic, the Political Consultative Committee proposes the convocation of a conference of European states to discuss measures ensuring collective security in Europe.

The Warsaw Treaty states remain willing to conclude a non-aggression pact with the NATO states that would greatly contribute to a relaxation of tension in Europe and the world over.

The Warsaw Treaty states support the efforts toward attaining a German peace settlement in the interests of ensuring peace in Europe. The attainment of this goal would be furthered by legal recognition of the existing frontiers, the liquidation of the remnants of the second world war and pledges by the two German states not to add nuclear weapons to their armed forces and to carry out measures toward disarmament.

The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty states also supports the proposal of the G.D.R. that the two German states renounce nuclear weapons.

The Warsaw Treaty states support the proposal of the government of the Chinese People's Republic for calling a conference of world heads of state on the complete prohibition and complete destruction of nuclear weapons and, as a first step, on prohibiting the use of these weapons.

The Warsaw Treaty states also support the convocation of a world conference on disarmament, which was proposed by the Cairo conference of nonaligned states.

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1 *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 53-55.
3 See ENDC/124, Feb. 3, 1964 (circulated as a Soviet paper).
4 *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, p. 455.
The Political Consultative Committee declares that the socialist countries are in complete unity and solidarity in the face of the imperialist threat and that any attempts by imperialist circles to undermine this solidarity are doomed to failure.

The Warsaw Treaty states will continue to exert their efforts toward universally contributing to a relaxation of tension, to disarmament, to peaceful coexistence and to ensuring a peaceful future to all the peoples.

Statement by ACDA Director Foster to House Foreign Affairs Committee: Venting From Soviet Underground Nuclear Test, January 26, 1965

This will take 3 of your 5 minutes, perhaps. On January 15 the explosion took place and on January 16 the United States made this announcement:

The United States yesterday recorded seismic signals from an event in the Soviet nuclear testing area in the Semipalatinsk region.

On January 19 there was a further development of what we knew and that was a statement by the AEC:

As previously reported, the United States detected through seismic signals a Soviet underground nuclear test in the Semipalatinsk area on January 15 with a yield in the intermediate range. The U.S. detection system has now detected a certain amount of venting connected with the test. The amounts of radioactivity measured to date will not produce measurable exposures to persons. In view of the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater, the Department of State has asked the Government of the Soviet Union for information on this event.

Yesterday the Soviet Ambassador came in with an oral message in response to that question. In an oral reply to our inquiry the Soviet Government has stated that a nuclear explosion was carried out deep underground on January 15 and that some radioactive debris was released into the atmosphere. However, the oral reply states that the amount is so insignificant that the Soviet Government excludes the possibility of a violation of the limited nuclear test ban treaty. The United States is continuing its own evaluation of the facts involved.

1 To Amend Further the Arms Control and Disarmament Act: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-ninth Congress, First Session, on H.R. 2998, pp. 7–8.
2 Ante, p. 4.
3 Ante, p. 5.
4 For the treaty, see Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291–293.
Further than that we have come to this conclusion: This particular event—which on the basis of what we now know appears to have been accidental—may have been a technical violation—but again, on the basis of what we know now, it does not by itself represent a threat to our national security or to the purposes of the test ban treaty, nor standing alone does it represent a resumption of testing prohibited by the treaty.

This point of view is not just my own, but represents the considered judgment of the Committee of Principals. Because of the importance of the subject, however, the matter is under continuing study.¹

Letter From AEC Chairman Seaborg to President Johnson: Reduction of Enriched Uranium Production, February 2, 1965 ²

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

We have recently completed a reassessment of our plans for the production of enriched uranium in the Atomic Energy Commission's gaseous diffusion plants. This review has been based on guidance from the Department of Defense concerning its projected requirements and a current analysis of the future needs for enriched uranium for non-military purposes.

We have concluded that the power usage rate in the diffusion plants can be further reduced, and still assure the nation of adequate supplies of enriched uranium for both military and peaceful uses. These reductions in power would extend over several years permitting the utilities, both public and private, to redistribute the power in an orderly fashion and minimize the impact on any particular geographic region.

The Atomic Energy Commission, therefore, recommends a further reduction of one-third in the projected power level approved in April 1964. This additional reduction would begin in 1966 and would be completed in 1969. When completely effected, there will result an estimated annual additional savings of $34 million.

¹ On Nov. 19, 1965, the State Department stated that further American-Soviet discussions had taken place and that the United States had concluded that the effects of the Jan. 15 Soviet test were the result of "a miscalculation by the Soviet Union." The Department also said that the United States had asked the Soviet Union to take precautionary measures so that the limited test-ban treaty would be observed.

The Department of Defense states that the proposed reduction in enriched uranium production will not affect our planned military strength.

Respectfully yours,

GLENN T. SEABORG

Report by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Amendment to Arms Control and Disarmament Act, February 10, 1965

Mr. MORGAN, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany H.R. 2998]

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 2998) to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to increase the authorization for appropriations, having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the bill do pass.

COMMITTEE ACTION

The President transmitted to the Congress on January 18, 1965, a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended (H. Doc. 55, 89th Cong.), which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

A bill to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to increase the authorization for appropriations was introduced by Hon. Thomas E. Morgan, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, on January 18, 1965. Identical bills were introduced on January 25, 1965, by Hon. Donald M. Fraser (H.R. 3371) and Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (H.R. 3372) and on January 27 by Hon. Richard S. Schweiker (H.R. 3721), all of which were referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

On January 26, 1965, the committee in open session heard testimony from Hon. William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in support of the bill. The following day the committee heard further testimony from Mr. Foster and from Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in executive session.

1 H. Rept. 37, 89th Cong., 1st sess.
On February 2, the committee met to consider the bill for amendment and ordered it favorably reported without amendment.

PURPOSE

The sole purpose of the bill is to authorize $55 million for the 4-year period: Fiscal years 1966 through 1969. The intent of the Arms Control Agency is to request appropriations as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Appropriations (Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal year 1966</td>
<td>$12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal year 1967</td>
<td>$12.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiscal year 1968</td>
<td>$15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal year 1969</td>
<td>$15.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the $55 million for the 4-year period, $16.8 million (30 percent) would be used for program operations and $38.2 million (70 percent) for contract research.

Authorizations and appropriations for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

[In thousands]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Authorization/Appropriation</th>
<th>Amount (In thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 26, 1961 (Public Law 87-297): Authorized, to remain available until expended</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 30, 1961 (Public Law 87-332, 1st supplemental)</td>
<td>$1,000.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 30, 1961: Transferred by the State Department to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under the authority of sec. 47(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Act (Public Law 87-297)</td>
<td>$840.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 20, 1962: State Department authorized the transfer back of funds which it had obligated for disarmament administration activities</td>
<td>$-9.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total funds made available for fiscal year 1962</td>
<td>$1,831.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 18, 1962 (Public Law 87-843—State, Justice, and Commerce appropriation)</td>
<td>$6,500.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 26, 1963 (Public Law 88-186): Authorized for fiscal years 1964 and 1965, to remain available until expended</td>
<td>$20,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 30, 1963 (Public Law 88-245—State, Justice, and Commerce appropriation)</td>
<td>$7,500.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 31, 1964 (Public Law 88-527—State, Justice, and Commerce appropriation)</td>
<td>$9,000.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total amount authorized</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total amount made available to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency</td>
<td>$24,831.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See footnotes on facing page
AGENCY ACTIVITIES

In establishing the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in 1961, Congress recognized that any fruitful results in arms control must be predicated upon intensive study and analysis of many areas of activity that bear upon the subject. The 1961 act states that:

This organization must have the capacity to provide the essential scientific, economic, political, military, psychological, and technological information upon which realistic arms control and disarmament policy must be based.

To cover this broad spectrum of statutory responsibility, ACDA has devoted its efforts to research, much of it in fields that have hitherto been unexplored. "In-house" research has provided some information sufficient to deal with so-called short-term negotiating needs. But such limited research is insufficient to cope with recent international developments. The Director testified that:

The most urgent mission of the Agency today is the prevention of nuclear spread—a problem made more immediate by the Communist Chinese explosion and the rapidly developing capability of other countries to follow suit. The possession of nuclear weapons by more individual countries, some of which may be unstable, can increase the chances of accidental war and the consequent escalation of local conflicts. Even small or underdeveloped countries could possess enough bombs to trigger a worldwide nuclear exchange.

Hence the Agency has been giving increased emphasis to studies in depth in order that our Government may have a fund of knowledge to formulate our policy and to assist our negotiators on intricate and technical issues. All of these studies require the services of highly skilled technicians and, in some cases, the development of specialized...
equipment. In those instances it is to the advantage of the Government to draw upon the resources of private contractors rather than attempt to recruit individuals for a limited period of time.

The Agency's research activities may be identified under seven categories:

1. Measures directed at the control and reduction of armaments and armed forces.
2. Measures calculated to lessen the risk of war.
3. Inspection and verification.
4. Arms control field tests.
5. Economic, social, international political and other factors related to the achievement of arms control and disarmament.
6. The impact of arms control and disarmament measures.
7. Supporting activities such as computing services to help evaluate the effects of arms control and disarmament concepts on military capability and bibliographic and abstracting services.

**ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDIES**

The sixth category of the Agency's research activities formed the basis for considerable interrogation of the Director. Under the basic act creating ACDA, the Director is specifically authorized to explore the economic implications of arms control and disarmament, including the problem of readjustment arising in industry and the reallocation of national resources. The recently announced decision of the Department of Defense to close certain military and naval installations cannot be attributed to any international accomplishments in the field of arms control. It was made solely on the basis of national considerations.

The Agency's interest in the economic effects of such closings arises from its desire to develop a body of knowledge as to what may happen if installations are curtailed or closed because of arms control activities. In cooperation with other interested agencies of the Government, the Agency has underway studies measuring the distribution of defense production and employment, labor mobility information and analysis, impacts on specific industries or segments of the economy, and impacts on specific regions of the country.

**REQUIREMENT FOR FUNDS**

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency authorization request makes provision for an increase of only 24 persons above the present authorized level of 214 positions (of which only 192 are on board) over a 4-year period. The cost of carrying on the operations of the Agency, including "in-house research," is programed at $4,100,000 per year for the fiscal years 1966 and 1967 and $4,300,000 per year
for fiscal years 1968 and 1969—a total for the 4-year period of $16,800,000.

The cost of contract research during this same period is programmed for $8,200,000 for fiscal year 1966, $8,600,000 for fiscal 1967, and $10,700,000 per year for fiscal years 1968 and 1969.

The committee was concerned about the request for a 4-year authorization. It was the view of the Director that the longer authorization period would permit long-range planning for studies that cannot be completed in a relatively short time. More importantly, it would permit "the development of expertise and the buildup of not only our own (i.e., Agency) personnel * * * but also the buildup in the hands of contractors who are now becoming a very important part of this activity." Private contractors, including universities, "have at their own expense established divisions or departments to bid on and to work with [the Agency] * * *. If they know that this is the kind of business that is going to go on for a longer period, they would be willing to invest more in it * * *." 1

The committee gave detailed consideration to a number of contract research projects either completed or underway, but regards the evaluation of the need for a particular study or the qualifications of a contractor to do the work as being essentially executive functions. Those officials with responsibility for action should determine what studies are essential to them in order to do their jobs and should be held responsible for their accomplishments.

The extent of duplication of research by other agencies and the imposition of sufficient limits on the availability of research funds to assure that priority will be given to studies relating to recognized problems has been the primary concern of the committee.

The procedures established by the President to assure coordination and avoid duplication in the area of arms control and disarmament research have been reviewed by the committee and appear to be effective.

In the judgment of the committee, the amount authorized for research must be regarded as reasonable in view of the novelty, complexity, and variety of the problems with which the Agency must deal.

CONCLUSION

Nuclear weapons are a fact of international life. How to deal with them poses difficult questions. On the one hand, to leave the subject of their control unattended only increases the dangers that arise from unfettered proliferation. On the other hand, to rush into agreement for the sake of agreement alone, without a searching examination of

1 Ibid., p. 9.
the implications for our security, is dangerous. Only a cautious, methodical, and exhaustive study of the multiple and interrelated issues connected with arms control will enable our policymakers and negotiators to proceed with maximum assurance for the welfare and safety of the country.

Our interest for the foreseeable future is focused on arms control. Only when there has been some measure of success in this field will we be faced with the problem of general disarmament.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

SECTION 49(a) OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT, AS AMENDED

SEC. 49. (a) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated not to exceed $10,000,000 to remain available until expended, to carry out the purposes of this Act. In addition, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal years 1964 and 1965, the sum of $20,000,000, and for the four fiscal years 1966 through 1969, the sum of $55,000,000, to remain available until expended, to carry out the purposes of this Act.

SEPARATE VIEWS

We are all interested in effective arms control and disarmament and are especially cognizant of congressional responsibility in this field. Therefore, we feel very strongly that the action to authorize for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency an appropriation of funds for 4 years in the future is an abdication of congressional responsibility for reviewing the program. It is taken at a time when the world situation requires closer and more frequent scrutiny by the responsible committee—not a lesser one.

Our committee's own study mission, which visited the Soviet Union in 1964, surmises that a new struggle for influence has already begun among the new leaders in the Kremlin with the outcome uncertain. Red China has announced a vast new armament program with emphasis on nuclear weapons. Whether or not the Axis rift will narrow or widen is speculative. Russia has veered away from a clash with Red China by postponing until March the all-party meeting originally called by Khrushchev for December 1964. In the face of
these threats, it is imperative that we exercise closer periodic review of what the Agency is doing and the extent to which funds should be authorized.

In view of the public support which the Soviet Union is giving the North Vietnamese Communist regime, any agency negotiating with the Soviet Union should welcome close congressional review.

It makes little sense to argue the theme that a shorter authorization disturbs the Agency's long-range planning. Any disarmament plan must of necessity be tentative and broad enough to permit changes with security requirements from time to time. Furthermore, the Agency cannot commit its funds without appropriation and no move is perceived to appropriate funds on any other basis than 1 year at a time.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee should be careful to fulfill its serious and heavy responsibility for congressional review in these difficult and changing times. This is especially important when we recognize that it is the one committee which should be most closely concerned with how our foreign policy programs are being carried out. Experience has shown under pressures of other legislative business that programs are not examined with sufficient care except when authorization requests are made.

This committee has primary responsibility to review and scrutinize authorizations which it has granted in various fields. The long history of legislative review has established the authorization process as an integral part of congressional control over our Nation's purse strings and policy determination. No good reasons have been put forth to justify diminution of that control at this time.

Moreover, we feel it is most practical to dramatize our position by quoting from the 1963 committee report, when the committee was requested to provide continuing authorization:

The requested continuing authorization was not approved because of the belief that the Congress should retain at all times a limit on the development and scale of operation of the Agency.1

When the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency authorization bill reaches the House floor, we shall offer an amendment to set the authorization for a 2-year period. We feel that prudence, logic, and

1 H. Rept. 863, 88th Cong., 1st sess., p. 4.
respect for congressional leadership in this field will lead the House as a whole to support our view.

H. R. Gross.
E. Y. Berry.
Edward J. Derwinski.
Bill Broomfield.
Peter H. B. Frelighuyseg.
W. S. Mailliard.
Vernon W. Tomson.
Frances P. Bolton.
E. Ross Adair.
J. I. Whalley.
James G. Fulton.
Brad Morse.

Statement by the Atomic Energy Commission on Reduction of Enriched Uranium Production Rate, February 15, 1965

The Atomic Energy Commission will reduce the rate of production of enriched uranium beyond the decreases announced in early 1964. This action was approved by the President on the basis of a recommendation by the Commission after a reassessment of the production level necessary to meet projected military and civilian requirements. A copy of the Commission's letter to the President is attached.

The new reduction will become effective in steps beginning in mid-1966 and extending into 1969, at which time power consumption in the AEC's three gaseous diffusion plants will reach a level of 2000 megawatts. This is a decrease of 970 megawatts beyond the reductions announced on January 8, 1964 and April 20, 1964. When all power reductions are completed, the diffusion plant operating power level will be about 60 per cent below the 4850-megawatt level planned prior to the 1964 cutbacks.

The Commission emphasized that the lower level of enriched uranium production will meet currently projected military and civilian requirements. In future years, however, as a result of the growth of civilian nuclear power now anticipated, increases in the production levels of the diffusion plants will be required.

2 Ante, pp. 10–11.
The three gaseous diffusion plants for the production of enriched uranium are located at Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Paducah, Kentucky and Portsmouth, Ohio. The new power cutback of 970 megawatts is made up of the following components: 205 megawatts of Tennessee Valley Authority power at Oak Ridge; 240 megawatts of TVA power at Paducah; 325 megawatts of Electric Energy, Inc. power at Paducah; and 200 megawatts at Portsmouth supplied by the Ohio Valley Electric Corporation. The new power reduction, when completed, will reduce the Government's annual power costs by about $34 million. The new reduction, when added to the reductions announced in January and April 1964, will ultimately save the Government approximately $100 million in annual power costs.

The employment level at the three AEC diffusion plants is expected eventually to be reduced by a total of about 100 positions as a result of the latest power cut. However, since the power reduction will not begin for some time, it is expected that the personnel reduction will be accomplished by normal attrition. The Oak Ridge and Paducah diffusion plants are operated for the Commission by Union Carbide Corporation and the Portsmouth facility is operated by Goodyear Atomic Corporation.

The power curtailment will not affect existing AEC commitments for the purchase of uranium concentrates, nor will it result in further cutbacks in the AEC uranium feed processing plants.

Report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Amendment to Arms Control and Disarmament Act, March 5, 1965

Mr. Fulbright, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany H.R. 2998]

The Committee on Foreign Relations, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2998) to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to increase the authorization for appropriations, report the same favorably to the Senate with an amendment, and recommend that it be passed.

1 S. Rept. 73, 89th Cong., 1st sess.
WHAT THE BILL DOES

This bill, as amended by the committee, authorizes the appropriation for the expenses of the Disarmament Agency of not to exceed $10 million for each of 2 years, fiscal 1966 and fiscal 1967. This bill, as amended, is in contrast to the administration request of a $55 million authorization for 4 years and the action of the House of Representatives which authorized $40 million over a period of 3 years.

BACKGROUND

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was established in 1961 with a mandate to acquire a fund of practical and theoretical knowledge concerning disarmament; to that end to engage in research, directly or by contract; to coordinate work on disarmament matters being conducted by other Government agencies; to advise the President and the Secretary of State on disarmament matters; and to conduct disarmament negotiations, under the direction of the Secretary of State.¹

The growth of the Agency since 1961 is illustrated in part by the following table of authorizations and appropriations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Authorization</th>
<th>Appropriation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1 $10,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
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<td>7,500,000</td>
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<td>9,000,000</td>
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¹ No year funds.
² Net transfer by State Department to the ACDA.

The ACDA's unobligated balance of appropriated funds as of June 30, 1965, is expected to be zero. The unutilized authorization of appropriations is $3,500,000, but that authority will expire on June 30, 1965. The present bill makes provisions for the future funding of the Agency.

COMMITTEE ACTION

On January 15, 1965, the administration submitted a draft bill with "strongest urging that it be enacted promptly."² S. 672 was introduced by Senator Fulbright, by request, on January 22, 1965. As requested by the executive branch the bill would have authorized the appropriation of $55 million for fiscal years 1966–69. On Febru-

¹ Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 482–495.
² Ante, p. 3.
ary 17, 1965, however, by a vote of 302 to 63 the House of Representa­
tives passed H.R. 2998, an amended version of the administration
request. It provided a 3-year authorization of $40 million—the
sum of the Agency’s proposed appropriation requests for the fiscal
years 1966–68.

The Committee on Foreign Relations announced on January 28 its
intention to hold hearings beginning on February 22. Two days of
hearings were held and the committee heard all those who had sub-
mitted timely requests to testify.

Although the committee had pending before it the House bill as
well as the Senate bill, Mr. William C. Foster, Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, accompanied by Mr. Adrian Fisher,
the Deputy Director, addressed himself to the Senate bill and urged
its enactment. The majority of the non-Government witnesses, repre-
senting themselves or organizations such as the American Coalition of
Patriotic Societies, Americans for National Security, Republican Com-
mittee of 100 of New York, the Sons of the American Revolution, and
the Liberty Lobby, testified in opposition to the bill and some recom-
mended abolition of the Agency. Testimony was also received in
support of the recommendations of the President. The record of the
hearing was held open for additional statements until close of business
on March 2, and it is available in printed form.

On March 3, the committee in executive session ordered H.R. 2998
reported to the Senate, with amendments authorizing an appropria-
tion of $20 million for the fiscal years 1966 and 1967, thus continuing
the authorization on precisely the same basis as during fiscal years
1964 and 1965.

NEGOTIATIONS

As noted, in testimony as well as in mail received by the committee,
some opponents suggested that the ACDA be abolished. It was
alleged that the Agency was negotiating for the unilateral disarmament
of the United States and the surrender of its sovereignty to the United
Nations. Apparently some statements, quoted out of context from
certain studies made for the Agency, are the source of these beliefs.

The committee knows these fears are without foundation. Every
Government employee is sworn to uphold the Constitution. Each
study completed for the ACDA contains this statement: “The
judgments expressed in the report are those of [the contractor] * * * and
do not necessarily reflect the view of * * * any agency of the
U.S. Government.”

The principal U.S. effort to make headway in disarmament negoti­
tions is participation in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Confer­
ence (ENDC) at Geneva. As the President stated in his communica­
tion to the Congress (H. Doc. 55): “We have * * * placed before
the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference a number of important concrete proposals for the control and reduction of armaments on which agreement has not yet been achieved.\textsuperscript{1} These concrete proposals, presented by the President to the ENDC on January 21, 1964,\textsuperscript{2} are fully described in the ACDA's fourth annual report to Congress (H. Doc. 66, pp. 4–10).\textsuperscript{3} They do not include any proposals to disarm the United States unilaterally or to place it under the United Nations.

The ACDA, under the direction of the Secretary of State, has been representing the United States at the Geneva Conference, and the committee finds no criticism with the conduct of these negotiations.

**CONTRACT RESEARCH**

The ACDA proposes to allot from its requested resources 30 percent to operations such as the conduct of negotiations at Geneva, discussed above, and 70 percent to research contracts. This latter category constitutes the Agency's major effort and it is this activity that the committee questioned.

Over 70 contracts or grants have been made to date, ranging in amounts from $3,000 to more than $350,000. A list of contracts as of December 31, 1964, appears in the appendix to the hearings. They come to a total of about $8.3 million.

Copies of a number of the finished studies resulting from these contracts were obtained by the committee and a number of questions were raised about them. These included the relevancy of some of these studies to the work of the ACDA; the availability of alternative contractors for such research, either government or private; and the value of such studies in promoting the national interest. Although Mr. Foster testified as to his satisfaction with the results of these contracts, the committee was not entirely persuaded that all of the studies were relevant, that they could not or would not have been undertaken without ACDA sponsorship, and that all of them justified their cost. To assure itself on these points, the committee requested the Disarmament Agency to furnish its evaluation of a representative sample of finished studies. These evaluations are printed in the appendix to the hearings and, with one exception, the Disarmament Agency defends the usefulness and the cost of the studies. Nonetheless and although the committee has only scratched the surface of contracts made by the ACDA, the information gathered indicates that a number of the contracts the Agency has made were questionable in some respects. To assist in public scrutiny of these contracts, the committee recommends that all studies produced by the Agency which are not classified because of security reasons should be made

\textsuperscript{1} *Ante*, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{2} *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 7–9.
available to the public and that they should show the cost at which they were produced.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

The Committee on Foreign Relations recommends that the 3-year authorization in the amount of $40 million contained in H.R. 2998 be amended to limit the authorization to 2 years in an amount of not to exceed $10 million for each year. It noted that several contracts now in process were questioned by members at the hearing by title alone; i.e., a contract with the Brookings Institution on “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in the Congo” and one with Los Angeles State College Foundation on “Historical Analysis of Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, 1919–39.” Also some of the more costly undertakings of the ACDA in this field are still in process and the committee would welcome the opportunity to examine them when finished. Since ACDA contracts have, in general, a 1-1½-year duration, a 2-year authorization would seem to be adequate for contract research.

In this connection, the committee believes that the Bureau of the Budget could undoubtedly give the ACDA more careful scrutiny to ascertain whether there might not be substantial savings by reducing dependence on outside contractors, by increasing the amount of in-house research, and by utilizing more of the services and knowledge of the Department of State, even to the extent of considering bringing the Agency within the Department. Furthermore, the committee believes that the General Accounting Office might wish to audit some ACDA contracts, pursuant to the authority of section 46 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

A 2-year limit on the authorization does not affect the permanency of the Agency. In its report on the ACDA’s authorization bill in 1963 (S. Rept. 215, 88th Cong.) the committee stated its view “that the ACDA is as permanent as such statutory agencies as the Peace Corps and the Agency for International Development which have thus far been required to seek annual authorizations for appropriations * * * since the method selected by Congress for providing funds for the operations of an agency is totally unrelated to its permanency.”

The committee states its gratification that the executive branch has not requested an open end authorization for the ACDA, as it did in 1961 and 1963, and that the growth outlined in the ACDA’s presentation this year is far more modest than that projected in the Agency’s 1961 and 1963 presentations. For example, in 1961 the executive branch estimated that for its first year of operations the Agency would require 250 people. As of December 31, 1964, the Agency had 214 authorized positions, of which 192 were filled. Similarly, with respect to appropriations, the ACDA proposed requesting
$15 million for fiscal year 1964. In its current presentation, this figure will not be requested now until fiscal year 1968. Generally speaking, therefore, the committee believes that the Agency is approaching its task with greater realism and caution than it showed in its early days.

In conclusion, the committee wishes to make it clear that it is not opposed to continuing efforts of the Disarmament Agency to seek ways to promote world peace by studying and developing practical proposals to reduce not only the burden of armaments but to reduce the chances of war. The committee recommends that the authorization contained in H.R. 2998 with the committee amendment be approved by the Senate.

**Changes in Existing Law**

In compliance with subsection 4 of rule XXIX of the Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

Section 49(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as Amended

Appropriation

Sec. 49. (a) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated not to exceed $10,000,000 to remain available until expended, to carry out the purposes of this Act. In addition, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal years 1964 and 1965, the sum of $20,000,000 and for the two fiscal years 1966 and 1967, the sum of $20,000,000, to remain available until expended, to carry out the purposes of this Act.

**Individual Views of Senators Clark and Morse on H.R. 2998, a Bill to Amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as Amended**

We support the request of the President of the United States for a 4-year authorization of $55 million for the work of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. We regret that a majority of the committee has voted to cut the President's request to 2 years and $20 million.

We should like, first, to review briefly the origin and history of the Agency since its creation by statute on September 16, 1961 (Public Law 87-297, title III, par. 35, 75 Stat. 635).¹

**Brief Summary of Organization and Functions of ACDA**

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was created in the early fall of 1961 at the specific request of President John F. Kennedy.

¹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 482-495.
Prior to that time, a Disarmament Administration had been operated out of the White House under the chairmanship of Mr. John J. McCloy. At that time Mr. McCloy was engaged in intensive negotiations with Ambassador Zorin, of the U.S.S.R., which resulted in the McCloy-Zorin Eight Point Agreement of Principles for General and Complete Disarmament.\(^1\) Also, at about the same time, President Kennedy made his famous speech before the United Nations in which he committed the United States to seek general and complete disarmament under enforceable world law, and challenged the Soviet Union to a peace race rather than an arms race.\(^2\)

The statute creating the ACDA stated in its preamble of congressional intent that the ultimate goal of the United States is a world free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments in which the role of force would be subordinated to the role of law and in which international adjustments in a changing world would be achieved peacefully.

The statute further stated: "This organization must have the capacity to provide the essential scientific, economic, political, military, psychological, and technological information upon which realistic arms control and disarmament policy must be based."

The functions of the Agency were stated to be (1) research, (2) the conduct of arms control and disarmament negotiations, (3) the dissemination and coordination of arms control and disarmament information to the public, and (4) the preparation and operation of arms control and disarmament systems.

In section 31 of the act, the Director of the Agency was required to insure the acquisition of a fund of theoretical and practical knowledge regarding arms control and disarmament.

Since its creation, the Agency has pursued the goals and followed procedures laid down by the Congress.

**The President's Request for a 4-Year $65 Million Authorization**

In his letter of January 15, 1965, to the President pro tempore of the Senate, President Johnson, after reviewing the record of achievement of the Agency over the past 4 years and the concrete proposals for the control and reduction of armaments presently pending before the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, said:

But as a nation vigilant to danger, we must also be vigilant for opportunities for improving the hopes for peace. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency helps us keep this most vital vigil.

Since existing authorization expires on June 30, 1965, I am asking the Congress to extend that authority for 4 years. I do so because it is my purpose to intensify our efforts in this critical area. I am determined to work in every way that I


can for safeguarded agreements that will halt the spread of nuclear weapons, lessen the risk of war, and reduce the dangers and costly burdens of armaments.

The President then referred to "the dedicated leadership offered through the years by the Vice-President-elect" in the support of arms control and disarmament, and added, "Such legislation so clearly reflects the spirit and the will of the American people that I hope the Congress will act with all dispatch to give approval to this extension of the Agency's valuable role." 1

In support of the President's recommendations, he forwarded, with his approval, a letter from the Director of the Agency, William C. Foster, in which it was stated:

To fulfill the Agency's responsibility as a repository of knowledge on the technical, economic, military, and political aspects of arms control, made especially difficult by the rapidly changing world scene, to back up proposals currently before the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, and to prepare new proposals in support of your continuing quest for peace, the Agency must have authorization to carry on its efforts during the years ahead. Specifically, the Agency must have resources to pursue vital studies aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, controlling and reducing arms, and developing other measures to reduce the risk of war. Although the United States has already achieved significant progress in making the world safer from the ever-present nuclear threat, the quest must continue and even intensify during the coming years.

The road to peace and arms control is slow and arduous, but it is one which we must travel. Therefore, I believe our authorization for appropriations should be for a period adequate to allow for long-range research planning and to emphasize our determination in making this effort. I believe a 4-year authorization for fiscal years 1966 through 1969 would accomplish these purposes.2

In his testimony before the committee, Director Foster summarized his support of the 4-year $55 million authorization as follows:

There is nothing unusual about a long-term authorization. In fact, we are the only Agency in the State, Justice, Commerce, Judiciary, and related agencies appropriations bill which regularly needs a new authorization just to stay in business.

A 4-year authorization would, first of all, permit longer range research and planning by the Agency and its contractors.

No one believes the problems the Agency was set up to deal with will be solved in a year or so. Long-continued effort is indispensable to progress in this field. And if the Government wishes to commit key people and important institutions to such an effort, it should itself be prepared to indicate that funds will be available for more than a year or two.

Major research concerns, both profit and nonprofit, will more readily devote their funds to setting up or continuing arms control groups to bid and work on our contracts if they know that money has been authorized for at least 4 years.

Within the Agency itself, it will be easier to get and keep key staff experts if the Agency has a longer authorization.

1 Ante, p. 4.
2 Ante, p. 2.
Second, a 4-year authorization would let the world know that we intend to give even greater emphasis to long-range planning for peace at a time when tensions have increased.

This committee said in recommending the creation of the Agency during the Berlin crisis in 1961:

"* * * increased tensions make it more essential than ever before for the United States to devote a substantial effort to determine conditions under which some international agreement for the control of arms might be developed."

This is as true today as it was in 1961. * * * In a world confronted by an uncontrolled arms race and the increasing threat of nuclear spread, each new crisis is more dangerous than the last.1

We believe the President and Mr. Foster made a convincing case for the 4-year $55 million authorization they request.

THE WITNESSES BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

The only witnesses to appear in opposition to the request were those representing the following self-styled "conservative organizations": The American Coalition of Patriotic Societies, the Americans for National Security, the Republican Committee of 100 of New York, the Sons of the American Revolution, and the Liberty Lobby.

Strong support for the President's proposal was presented by Prof. Amitai Etzioni, of the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, on behalf of Americans for Democratic Action, and Mr. H. Don Cummings, representing the American Veterans Committee.

It is a fair statement that all of the organizations opposing the President represent the extreme rightwing in American public affairs.

CONTRACT RESEARCH

The majority report questions the desirability and pertinence of the research contracts to which the Agency proposes to allot 70 percent of its requested resources. It suggests that alternative sponsors of such research, either governmental or private, were available and questions the value received. In this regard, members of the majority are in dispute with Director Foster, who testified to his satisfaction with the contracts on all accounts, their need and their desirability in performing the functions delegated to the Agency by the Congress.

We differ with the feeling of the majority that the kinds of contracts the Agency is making are questionable in many respects. We join, however, with the majority in recommending that all studies produced by the Agency which are not classified because of security reasons should be made available to the public, together with a statement of the cost at which they were produced.

The majority also state in direct opposition to Mr. Foster that, since these contracts have in general a 1- to 1½-year duration, a 2-year

1 To Amend Further the Arms Control and Disarmament Act: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-ninth Congress, First Session, on S. 672 and H.R. 2998, pp. 7–8.
authorization is quite adequate for contract research. We refer, in this regard, to Mr. Foster's testimony cited above, particularly his plea for longer range research and planning. As he stated, if the Government wishes to commit key people and important institutions to the arms control and disarmament effort, it should itself be prepared to indicate that funds will be available for more than 2 years.

Since dissatisfaction with the research program and its expense are the only reasons given by the majority for ignoring the recommendation of the President, it seems worthwhile to list the particular contracts to which objection was raised by members of the committee. We believe each of the following subject matters of investigation fall quite clearly within the duties of the Agency, as prescribed in the act creating it to "provide the essential scientific, economic, political, military, psychological, and technological information upon which realistic arms control and disarmament policy must be based and * * * to insure the acquisition of a fund of theoretical and practical knowledge respecting arms control and disarmament."

The subject matter of eight of the contracts to which one or more of the majority members of the committee took exception are:

1. "A study by seven outstanding scholars who had no prior commitment for or against the proposition that reliable substitutes for national armed forces must exist to protect the vital interests of states if they are to agree to extensive disarmament."

This panel on peacekeeping produced seven essays representing a carefully planned and coordinated analysis of fundamental issues underlying the relationship between disarmament and arrangements to maintain international peace and security. Among the experts contributing to the report was Ambassador Livingston T. Merchant, who wrote about the control and accountability of a United Nations Peace Force. The cost of the survey was based in large part on the regular salaries of the participants.

2. "Verification measures for control of missile testing and space weapons."

The purpose of the study was to conduct research on the design and effectiveness of possible inspection systems to accompany a ban on weapons of mass destruction in space and restrictions on missile flight tests.

3. "Alternative ways of handling conflict: behavioral science research toward peace."

The purpose of the study was to pursue the directive to the Agency to study the psychological factors relating to the prevention of war. The contribution of the Agency to the study was $15,000 out of a program budget of some $63,000.

The result of the study was a volume entitled "International Conflict and Behavioral Science" published by Basic Books, Inc. With
respect to this volume, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey stated: 
"It presents a great deal of impressive original thought and opens up a whole new area of scholarly study on the most important problem in human history—the achievement of an honorable peace."

4. "Indirect aggression and subversion."

The purpose of this study was to secure a small-scale preliminary analysis of the problems of indirect aggression and subversion as they relate to arms control and disarmament. The total cost was $4,500.

In formulating arms control and disarmament measures, it would seem obvious that the effect of such measures upon the ability of Communist states to wage indirect aggression and subversion, and our ability to resist and defeat them, would be a pertinent subject of inquiry.


It is obvious that a program directed at halting the arms race would have to include arms control agreements limiting strategic delivery vehicles such as long-range missiles and bombers.

6. "Peaceful settlement of international disputes in the Communist bloc."

The purpose of the study was to determine whether techniques utilized by the Communist bloc in settling disputes among themselves would be at all feasible in working out procedures for settling disputes between the West and the East or the uncommitted bloc of nations. The report was useful in appraising the negotiability of various third-party settlement proposals often advanced as part of general disarmament plans.

7. "Inspection concepts and procedures for tactical arms control verification."

The desirability of developing an inspection system for verifying retained levels of tactical forces and armaments under a possible arms control agreement would seem obvious.


Clearly, arms control and disarmament among European nations would be essential to the feasibility of any comprehensive arms control or disarmament plan.

We repeat that, in our judgment, each of these studies assisted the Agency in carrying out the duties delegated to it by the Congress.

The cost of most of them was based on an hourly charge for the work of experts in the field. Nevertheless some of them may have cost more than they should have. The results of some of them may not have measured up to the expectations under which the contracts were let. But to suggest that these contracts provide a valid reason
for disregarding the request of the President for a 4-year extension of the life of the Agency seems to us to be pushing a point too far.

Surely there are less drastic means by which the Congress, the Budget Bureau, and the General Accounting Office can exercise their unquestioned right of oversight of the operations of the Agency than to cut in half the period needed, in the judgment of the President, to permit the Agency to function properly, and to cut significantly the amount recommended by the President for its annual authorization.

We would grant the Agency the full authorization requested by the President.

Letter From the Soviet Representative (Fedorenko) to Secretary-General Thant: Proposed Meeting of Disarmament Commission, March 31, 1965

On the instructions of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics I hereby request you to convene the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

As is stated in the report transmitted by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the nineteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, protracted discussion on disarmament questions in the Committee did not lead to the attainment of any specific agreement either on questions of general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension. On adjourning its proceedings in September 1964, the Eighteen-Nation Committee decided to resume its meetings "as soon as possible after the termination of the consideration of disarmament at the nineteenth session of the General Assembly, on a date to be decided by the two Co-Chairmen after consultation with the members of the Committee". For known reasons, however, it proved impossible for the Eighteen-Nation Committee's report and the state of the disarmament negotiations as a whole to be discussed at the nineteenth session of the General Assembly. Nevertheless, the course of international events requires the adoption of effective measures in the matter of disarmament and limitation of the arms race.

The problem of disarmament affects the vital interests of all States. The peoples are entitled to expect the United Nations to make a thorough examination of the disquieting state of disarmament negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and to help in charting

1 DC/210, Mar. 31, 1965.
2 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 435-440.
specific courses along which progress can be made in those negotiations. Since no such discussion took place in the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet Government considers it necessary that the United Nations Disarmament Commission, on which all States Members of the United Nations are represented, should be convened.

The Soviet Government considers it desirable that the United Nations Disarmament Commission should begin work as soon as possible, in the first half of April 1965.

Please circulate this letter as an official document of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

(Signed) N. Fedorenko
Permanent Representative of the USSR to the United Nations

Statement by Ambassador Stevenson on Proposed Meeting of Disarmament Commission, March 31, 1965

The United States believes that disarmament is of such primary importance that it should have continuous attention. And that is why we have been pressing vigorously to reconvene the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, which in our judgment is the best forum in which to reach agreement on concrete disarmament proposals.

While we would prefer a negotiating committee to a debating committee, we have no objection to convening the whole membership of the United Nations and affording everyone an opportunity to express his views. So if a majority approves such a meeting, the United States would participate constructively and hope that from the ensuing discussion will come useful and constructive ideas which might then be considered in detail by the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee.

United States Report to Secretary-General Thant on Economic Impact of Disarmament, April 7, 1965

This memorandum is in response to the request of the Secretary-General (EC 121 (13)) with reference to resolution 1026 (XXXVII)

of the Economic and Social Council.\(^1\) Since the report last year to the Secretary-General in response to the referenced resolution,\(^2\) the United States Government has greatly accelerated its efforts and widened the breadth of the various research programmes which are involved in studying the opportunities and problems of reallocating resources in the economy from defence to non-defence purposes.

Several of the projects alluded to in the report submitted last year in response to a similar request by the Secretary-General are nearing completion and a number of other studies have been initiated.

The work of the President's Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament has been intensified and it is anticipated that the first report of that work, and of the Committee's recommendations, will soon be submitted to the President.\(^3\)

There was a continuation of the effort to trace the industrial and geographic pattern of income and employment resulting from defence spending and to develop techniques for estimating more precisely the industrial and geographic impacts of changes in such spending. The Bureau of the Census has conducted a survey of firms in thirty defence-oriented industries to identify, by product, sales to and receipts from the Department of Defense and other pertinent Federal agencies to or from other contractors for ultimate use by these agencies. The questionnaire supplements the 1963 Annual Census of Manufacturers. A large volume of the returns already received has been partially analysed and some estimates have been made of value added and employment arising in these thirty industries. Results are also being tabulated by industry and region.

Under its current research programme the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has contracted for several research studies on the economic impact of reduced defence expenditures. A listing of these research contracts is attached to this memorandum.\(^4\)

Among the principal areas of study within the United States Government, the following would appear most significant:

1. **Labour Mobility**

Manpower retraining, relocation and other economic impact policy decisions will be enhanced greatly by knowledge of factors affecting occupational and geographic mobility. Such knowledge is being sought through studies being conducted of re-employment experience in major lay-offs, at the Boeing Company in Seattle, Washington; Martin Company in Denver, Colorado; and Republic Aviation on Long Island, New York. The three projects are being co-ordinated

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3. See *post*, pp. 290–293.
4. *Not printed here.*
to maximize comparability. The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is providing financial support for all three projects, and the Department of Defense is also doing so for those involving Seattle and Long Island. The Department of Labor is also concerned with the Long Island project in connexion with the first use of relocation allowances and manpower training specifically for defence worker lay-offs.

(2) Regional Economic Impact

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency let two research contracts to assess public and private policies and types of administrative machinery available for dealing with regional economic adjustment (both transitional and longer-run) to assumed changes in defence spending. Using case study situations, one project looks to the organization and experience of three metropolitan areas: Baltimore, Seattle-Tacoma, and New London-Groton-Norwich; the second to those of the State of New Mexico.

(3) Distribution and Significance of Special Skills—R and D

The studies undertaken by the Federal agencies in the manpower field take special account of the importance of the employment of scientists and engineers in connexion with the defence effort. The Annual Survey of scientific and technical personnel in industry conducted by the Department of Labor is expected to provide this year survey data on scientists and engineers engaged in work supported by Government funds, broken down by agency (Department of Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, National Aeronautics and Space Administration).

The National Science Foundation collects and publishes a great deal of data on American scientific and technical personnel (e.g., “American Science Manpower 1962”, “Federal Funds for Science Series”, “Profiles of Manpower in Science and Technology”). This material is very helpful for analysis of the problems and opportunities associated with the release of defence-associated scientific and technical personnel. More information is required on the characteristics of the segment of the scientific manpower pool specifically related to defence and efforts in this direction now are under way.

In a study of the Los Angeles metropolitan area, jointly sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Defense, an investigation of the utilization of scientific and engineering manpower by defence contractors is now in process. The aim is to develop data on mobility, salaries, turnover, education, and productivity.
(4) **Industrial Conversion**

The implications of reduced defence spending for the electronics industry are being examined under a contract placed by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. A further contract was made recently for research on the industrial conversion potential of the shipbuilding industry. A third contract, also by that Agency, involves case studies of past industrial conversion experience in a variety of other industries. Another research project, to be jointly undertaken by the Department of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Small Business Administration, will consider the conversion problems of small business R and D firms. All four studies point toward appropriate action to minimize adjustment difficulties and develop alternative marketing possibilities.

The legislative branch of the United States Government during the past year has manifested concern for the problems of reallocating resources from defence to civilian purposes. On 19 August 1964 Public Law 88–444 was enacted which established the National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress. The President appointed to the Commission fourteen members from persons outside the Government with a competency in the areas to be dealt with by the Commission. A Federal Government inter-agency committee co-chaired by the Secretaries of Labor and of Commerce has been established to advise the Commission. The Commission will identify and assess the impact of technological and economic change in the past and over the next ten years in order to define areas of unmet community and human needs and the use of technology in meeting these needs. In its final report of its findings and recommendations to be submitted to the President and the Congress by 1 January 1966, the Commission will recommend appropriate actions by management and labour, and by Federal, state and local Governments.

In addition, a revised version of the bill referred to in the last report to the Secretary-General as the McGovern Bill was submitted to the Congress. The new bill (S30) would establish a National Economic Conversion and Diversification Commission composed of the heads of twelve Executive Branch Agencies. The Commission would examine the programmes and policies which the Federal Government might adopt to promote economic conversion and diversification. It would provide for the convening of a National Conference on Industrial Conversion and Growth to consider the problems arising from shifts and reductions in defence outlay and to encourage planning by State and local Governments and all sectors of the economy.

State and local Governments continue to examine the problems and opportunities which would be created by substantial changes in the
level, distribution or composition of national defence expenditures. The State of California has signed contracts for $100,000 each for four studies which should shed light on the capabilities of large defence aerospace firms in solving complex problems of the non-defence sector. These four studies are to design systems for dealing with the State of California’s responsibilities in the following problem areas: (1) the transportation network; (2) the system to deal with California’s criminal population and the administration of criminal justice; (3) the control of waste and pollution problems and (4) an information gathering, storage and retrieval system. It is expected that these studies will be completed in mid-1965 and the results may have applicability to other states.

In addition, at the State and local level, there are many meetings, seminars and symposia held at which representatives of industry, commerce, finance, the educational community, and Government consider problems of conversion of defence resources to peaceful use. There continued to be substantial private research in the United States on the economic and social consequences of disarmament. There is no known listing of all the relevant studies. However, for research in the field of arms control and disarmament, including those on economic aspects, the attached compilation lists those in progress or recently completed. The compilation was prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The work started under the Economic Opportunity Act is an example of the types of related programmes which bear on the opportunities available to fully utilize defence resources in a peaceful way. The systems management approach has been found to be most useful in its applicability to the administration and organization of Job Corps centres. These centres are designed to train and fit youths aged 16–21 for useful employment. Major United States defence contractors have been successful in securing several contracts in this field.

Though the activities mentioned above are those which in the United States appear to be of most direct relevance to the inquiry of the Secretary-General, it may be noted that this year, as was true last year, a very large amount of study and analysis on economic and social matters is being undertaken in the United States, officially and privately, which does or may contribute significantly to understanding the problems of reallocating resources in the economy from defence to non-defence purposes.

1 Not printed here. The compilation is entitled Arms Control and Disarmament: Studies in Progress or Recently Completed (ACD–4), Nov. 1964.
Report by the Congressional Conference Committee on Amendment to Arms Control and Disarmament Act, April 12, 1965

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 2998), to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to increase the authorization for appropriations, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate to the text of the House bill and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate amendment insert the following: , and for the three fiscal years 1966 through 1968, the sum of $30,000,000; and the Senate agree to the same.

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate to the title of the House bill and agree to the same.

THOMAS E. MORGAN,
CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
EDNA F. KELLY,
WAYNE L. HAYS,
E. ROSS ADAIR,
W. S. MAIILIARD,
E. Y. BERRY,
Managers on the Part of the House.

J. W. FULBRIGHT,
JOHN SPARKMAN,
MIKE MANSFIELD,
By J. W. FULBRIGHT
Managers on the Part of the Senate.

STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS ON THE PART OF THE HOUSE

The managers on the part of the House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 2998) to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to increase the authorization for appropriations, submit the following statement in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the conferees and recommended in the accompanying conference report:

1 H. Rept. 233, 89th Cong., 1st sess.

The amendment of the Senate to the text of the House bill reduced the amount of the authorization from $40 million to $20 million, and reduced the period of authorization from 3 fiscal years to the 2 fiscal years 1966 and 1967.

The compromise agreed to by the conferees provides an authorization of $30 million for the 3 fiscal years 1966, 1967, and 1968.

The managers on the part of the House recognized that there remained an unappropriated authorization of $1,669,000 against the $10 million authorized in 1961. Together with the authorization carried in this bill the Agency will have an authorization for the next 3 fiscal years of almost $32 million. This will permit it to continue its operations at a level higher than it has been able to do in the current fiscal year for which it received an appropriation of $9 million.

The title of the House bill recited that the amendment to existing law was "to increase the authorization for appropriations." The amendment of the Senate to the title of the House bill changed the word "increase" to "continue." The House recedes.

Thomas E. Morgan,
Clement J. Zablocki,
Edna F. Kelly,
Wayne L. Hays,
E. Ross Adair,
W. S. Mailliard,
E. Y. Berry
Managers on the Part of the House.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Fedorenko) to the Disarmament Commission, April 26, 1965

Mr. Chairman, I should like first of all to congratulate you on your election to the high and responsible post of Chairman of the Disarmament Commission. The duties of the Chairman of this very important United Nations body are just as honourable as they are responsible.

7. Allow me to express the hope that your vast diplomatic experience, your profound knowledge of the subject and your high qualities will enable you to do everything necessary to ensure that the
current session of the Disarmament Commission will be successful and yield positive results. The Soviet delegation wishes you every success.

8. The problem of disarmament is one of the fundamental problems of the present day and affects the vital interests of all States and all peoples, whether they live in Africa, Asia, Europe or America. There is no need to repeat the obvious truth that any procrastination or delay in arriving at a solution of this problem aggravates what is already a terrible danger hanging over mankind. The military arsenals of many States, already filled to capacity, continue to be strengthened by the addition of deadly weapons of mass destruction with truly unlimited power and range. Tens of millions of persons have been taken from peaceful labour and forced to work for war. Man's greatest achievements in the fields of science and technology have been made to serve the cause of destruction. All of us are fully aware that the peoples of the world are saddled with the very heavy burden of astronomical military expenditures. This enormous waste of resources is taking place at a time when people are suffering from hunger, poverty, and disease in many parts of the world.

9. If the tremendous amounts of material and other resources which are being dissipated in the armaments orgy were diverted to peaceful ends, great benefits would result for mankind and especially for the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which could be given considerably more economic and technical assistance than at present. All of this makes clear the extreme importance of the tasks before us.

10. The Soviet Government has deemed it necessary to take the initiative in convening the United Nations Disarmament Commission, considering that the time had come for all States Members of the United Nations jointly to examine the unsatisfactory and alarming situation that has arisen in connexion with the disarmament talks.

11. Examination of this matter by the United Nations Disarmament Commission is especially important in view of the artificial obstacles which have been raised by the United States of America and have, as we all know, prevented consideration of the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and even the discussion of the question of disarmament at the nineteenth session of the General Assembly.

12. The results of the discussion in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament are completely unsatisfactory, as can be seen from that Committee's report. Throughout its entire existence, the Committee has not made any progress towards reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament and has not taken a positive decision on any of the aspects of disarmament discussed by it.
13. The Committee states in its report that it "has not reached any specific agreement either on questions of general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension".1

14. When the Treaty on the banning of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963 went into effect,2 hopes arose for the possibility of real progress in the matter of disarmament. The overwhelming majority of States regarded that step as a beginning and as an earnest of continuing and steady progress towards limiting the arms race and strengthening international peace and security. However, the favourable prospects created by the Moscow Treaty and by other steps aimed at limiting the arms race, for achieving success at the disarmament talks, came to naught.

15. The Soviet Union did everything in its power to ensure that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would carry out its tasks. The entire history of the discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee at Geneva is one of unceasing and energetic efforts by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to move the talks forward. The Soviet Union has striven and will continue to strive for disarmament. Speaking at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 9 December 1964, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin, pointed out that:

There is no better guarantee for universal peace than the complete destruction of the weapons possessed by States, including nuclear weapons . . . The people demand that statesmen, politicians and Governments become imbued with a feeling of high responsibility for the fate of the world and the future of mankind. The Soviet Government therefore regards the struggle for general and complete disarmament as one of the principal points of its foreign policy. Disarmament must not be a subject for sterile speeches at international conferences. We want the ideas and plans for disarmament to become a reality and are prepared to seek ways for solving this highly important problem.3

This readiness of the Soviet Union to seek, without any preconceived ideas, for ways to solve the problem of disarmament has been confirmed not by words but by deeds.

16. In order to bring the positions of the parties closer together and thus finally to achieve some progress in the talks, the Soviet Union has repeatedly introduced into its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament4 additions and clarifications which take into account the points of view of our partners in the discussions.

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1 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 439.
2 Ibid., 1963, pp. 291–293.
4 The revised Soviet draft treaty appears post, pp. 77–102.
17. Thus, the Soviet Government deferred to the wishes of the Western Powers that, with regard to the destruction of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage of disarmament, exceptions should be made for a strictly limited and agreed number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft "ground-to-air" missiles, which would be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States on their own territories.

18. At first the Soviet Union proposed that this "nuclear umbrella of rockets" should be kept until the end of the second stage of disarmament; later, however, once more taking into account the wishes of the Western Powers, and in particular those of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union agreed that this "umbrella" should be retained not only until the end of the second stage but also until the end of the third stage, namely until the completion of the whole process of general and complete disarmament.

19. In its efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament the Soviet Union advocates the earliest possible implementation of measures for limiting the arms race and reducing international tension.

20. The proposals of the Soviet Government in this regard are set forth in the memorandum submitted to the General Assembly for consideration at its nineteenth session. They were drafted with full regard for the views expressed by a number of States during discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee as well as outside it.

21. The proposals in the Soviet memorandum are aimed at limiting the arms—including nuclear weapons—race and concern: prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; establishment of demilitarized zones in various parts of the world; reduction of military expenditure; cessation of underground nuclear tests; elimination of at least some of the means of delivering nuclear weapons such as bomber aircraft; removal of foreign military bases from the territories of other countries; conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries, and the adoption of certain other practical measures.

22. The Soviet Government supports the proposal[s] of the Polish People's Republic for the freezing of nuclear armaments in Central Europe and the convening of a conference of European States to discuss measures for guaranteeing collective security in Europe.

23. However, no matter what constructive proposals the Soviet Union has put forward for limiting the arms race and reducing international tension, the United States and the other NATO countries which have participated in the discussions of the Eighteen-Nation Committee have invariably said "no".

1 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 509-517.
2 Ibid., pp. 53-55.
24. Progress in the Eighteen-Nation Committee is blocked by the negative attitude of the United States and the other NATO countries, which reject all the proposals of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries aimed at solving the problem of disarmament and designed to take into account many of the wishes of the Western Powers. For their part, during the three years of discussions in the Committee, the United States of America and the other NATO countries have done nothing to give effect to the General Assembly's decisions concerning general and complete disarmament and have not submitted a single constructive proposal.

25. Let us take up the question of general and complete disarmament. What are the respective positions of the United States and the Soviet Union on the basic aspects of general and complete disarmament?

26. The Soviet Union is in favour of the unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons, the discontinuance of the production of nuclear weapons and the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons.

27. The United States in its plan \(^1\) makes no provision at all for the banning of nuclear weapons and resorts to every pretext in an effort to prevent the stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction from being destroyed; it even supports the retention of nuclear weapons after disarmament for the purpose of placing such weapons at the disposal of so-called international armed forces.

28. The Soviet Union advocates the destruction, at the very beginning of the process of disarmament, of the means of delivering nuclear weapons and the removal of military bases from the territories of other countries, thus quickly and effectively eliminating the threat of nuclear attack.

29. The United States of America is opposed to the destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles at the beginning of the process of disarmament, and does not wish to hear about the elimination of foreign military bases.

30. The Soviet Union proposes that general and complete disarmament should be completed within a period of four or five years. The United States indicates no time limit for giving effect to the measures for general and complete disarmament and seeks to postpone a solution of this problem indefinitely.

31. The Soviet Union is in favour of strict international control over the measures to give effect to general and complete disarmament. The United States seeks to establish control, not over disarmament, but over armaments, that is to say, it seeks to create a wide-spread international espionage network in very sensitive areas directly affecting the security of States.

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\(^1\) For the U.S. plan, see *post*, pp. 111-140.
32. The United States and its military-bloc allies have in the Eighteen-Nation Committee taken a completely negative stand in regard to the implementation of so-called partial measures. The United States is against banning the use of nuclear weapons. The United States is against the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Europe. The United States is against the elimination of bomber aircraft. The United States is against an agreement to reduce military budgets. The United States is against the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries.

33. In a speech which he recently made in New York before the American Newspaper Publishers Association, Mr. Stevenson, the United States representative to the United Nations, saw fit to describe the Soviet proposals indiscriminately as slogans and platitudes. And he did so in a very light-hearted way. But was he not too hasty? The peoples and States of Asia, Africa and Latin America will not agree that a reduction in expenditure, the establishment of denuclearized zones, the elimination of foreign military bases, the banning of nuclear weapons and the elimination of bomber aircraft are merely empty slogans. These “slogans” are supported by hundreds of millions of people and dozens of States and by most of the Members of our Organization.

34. Resolute statements in favour of the destruction of all nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them were made in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament last year by the representatives of a number of non-aligned countries. They thus demonstrated that their approach to the solution of this fundamental question of general and complete disarmament is the same as that of the socialist countries. The non-aligned countries have supported many Soviet proposals regarding partial measures, as is demonstrated not only by the discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament but also by the decisions adopted in a larger forum—the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964.¹ That Conference, in which almost half the independent countries of the world participated, demonstrated that the overwhelming majority of States in the world have become convinced of the need for establishing nuclear-free zones, eliminating foreign military bases, withdrawing foreign troops from the territories of other countries and substantially reducing military budgets, and of the inadmissibility of any policy conducive to the spread of nuclear weapons.

35. No tricks or ruses can help United States diplomats evade responsibility for the lack of progress on all questions of disarmament.

¹ Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 443-448.
The United States asserts that it is striving to achieve the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests, but it is precisely the unwillingness of the United States to recognize the facts, namely, that national detection systems are adequate to control a ban on underground tests, that is preventing a solution of this problem.

36. In the statement already referred to, Mr. Stevenson pathetically asked why there should not be an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but he immediately laid down a condition and made a reservation with regard to so-called inter-allied nuclear agreements. That reservation explains why no agreement has yet been reached to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Gromyko said, in his statement in the General Assembly on 7 December 1964, the picture is strange. His remarks were as follows:

... On the one hand, the representatives of some leading NATO Powers try to convince everyone that they are opposed to making nuclear weapons available to other States and that they would like to reach agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. On the other hand they say that they cannot resist the demands of some of their allies who are clamouring for nuclear weapons, or, at least, for access to them. However, since it is on a NATO bloc basis that a new group of countries is being given access to nuclear weapons, they maintain that this in no way amounts to the spread of nuclear weapons.

But do the authors themselves believe that their arguments are convincing and logical? It looks as if, for the sake of appearances, they have agreed to keep the front door of the NATO nuclear club closed, but at the same time are ready to open wide the back door to some of their allies.1

37. The substance of the latest United States proposals in the Eighteen-Nation Committee is to retain conventional armaments and the basic mass of armed forces as they are, to leave military bases and troops on foreign territory intact, to keep military expenditure at the present level and to confine themselves to “freezing” merely some of the means of delivering nuclear weapons. Surely it is obvious that the implementation of such proposals, which no one would even dare to call disarmament, would not only fail to diminish the threat of nuclear war, but could aggravate that threat, undermine the security of the peace-loving States and reward the aggressors.

38. Even a mere listing of the United States proposals, even their very names, reveal their true meaning, which has nothing in common with disarmament. Was it by mere chance that Mr. Stevenson, speaking about the United States proposals, was forced to explain that “technical data” and “complex problems of the balance of power” had to be taken into account and that, as he put it, “the road to disarmament cannot be a short one”. The United States representative forgot to add only that the United States is concerned above all not

1 General Assembly Official Records; 1292nd Meeting, p. 7.
with the need for disarmament, but with the demands of the Pentagon
and of the armaments manufacturers who are making fantastic profits
out of the arms race.

39. The Soviet Union is not only submitting constructive proposals
at the disarmament talks but is also taking practical steps to create
conditions for limiting the arms race. Here is a concrete example.

40. The Soviet Union's military appropriations in 1965 are again
being reduced by 500 million roubles. Thus, the total reduction
compared to 1963 will be 1,100 million roubles, i.e., about 8 per cent,
and the total sum saved over two years will amount to 1,700 million
roubles. Consequently expenditure on national defence will total
12.9 per cent of all budgetary expenditure, as against 14.5 per cent
in 1964.

41. The Western Powers are trying to direct events in a diamet-
rically opposite direction. Military expenditure in the NATO
countries in 1964 has again increased, and totals $76,000 million
compared to $72,700 million in 1963.

42. The moving spirit and leader in the armaments race continues
to be the United States. Since the end of the Second World War
the United States has spent about $800,000 million for military pur-
poses. The United States budget for 1966 provides for direct and in-
direct expenditure for military purposes of more than $60,000 million.

43. Fantastic sums are being spent in the United States on the
development of still newer and more modern means of destruction.
United States expenditure on work in this field in 1966 will, according
to reports in that country's Press, increase by $500 million compared
to the current financial year and will total more than $15,000 million.
Under the five-year programme (1966-1970) for the development of
new types of weapons, the proposed expenditure on only one project
out of many—the production of a new bomber—is between $8,900
million and $11,500 million.

44. Thus, the United States squanders over $60,000 million
annually on completely wasteful purposes, while many developing
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America are experiencing an acute
shortage of financial or other means needed for the attainment of
economic progress. The sum of $60,000 million is equivalent to the
national income of the developing countries of two continents, Africa
and Latin America, taken together. The sum of $15,000 million which
the United States plans to spend in 1966 on military research alone is
equivalent to approximately twice the annual export receipts of the
African countries.

45. An extremely active part in the arms race is also played by a
number of military bloc allies of the United States of America, and
chiefly by the Federal Republic of Germany. At the beginning of this
year, as is well known, the formation of the West German Bundeswehr
was completed. Recently Defense Secretary McNamara stated in an interview published on 12 April 1965 in the periodical *U.S. News & World Report*: “The major increases [in NATO armed forces] that are being made today are being made by the West Germans”.

46. Is it possible in this connexion to forget that in 1945 the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union came to an agreement on the “complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany”? It was declared at that time that “German militarism and Nazism will be eradicated” and that the necessary measures would be taken in order that “Germany will never again be able to threaten its neighbours or world peace”. What do we see now, on the threshold of the significant date of the twentieth anniversary of the destruction of the brown plague?

47. Today, the Federal Republic of Germany, with the most energetic support of the United States, has been turned into a military State, and its territory has become an armed camp literally crammed with rockets, nuclear ammunition depots, military bases and arsenals.

48. The Federal Republic of Germany has passed a law on compulsory military service and has created one of the most powerful armies in Europe, an army which in equipment and combat training is superior to the armed forces of all the other European members of NATO. At the present time the Federal Republic of Germany has almost 500,000 men under arms.

49. Military expenditure in the Federal Republic of Germany amounts to almost one-third of the country’s total budget. And this is only the beginning. At the end of last year, during the visit by Mr. von Hassel, the Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, to the United States, new agreements were concluded between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States for the purpose of speeding the rearmament of the Bundeswehr. Under these agreements, Bonn intends in particular to purchase $700 million worth of United States weapons annually. West Germany has enlisted support for carrying out its plans to produce a new tank and a vertical take-off aircraft. As the Western Press has noted, a secret agreement has been reached between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany under which the Federal Republic will receive rockets which can be used for carrying out strikes against strategic targets in the territory of the Soviet Union.

50. The Bundeswehr is hiding less and less the fact that it has long outgrown its NATO clothes. It is even starting to go into Africa, and the armaments industry of the Federal Republic of Germany is becoming a supplier of weapons for other countries. For instance, facts were recently revealed concerning military co-operation between West German militarists and Israel extremists, who are making provocative appeals for the use of arms against the Arab countries.
51. In 1964 West Germany supplied Portugal with 10,000 sub-machine-guns; 500 West German officers and men are in Portugal as military experts. On the Rhine it is known full well how West German arms are being used by the Portuguese colonialists, and for what purposes above all the Portuguese army is being used, an army which is cruelly suppressing the struggle for national liberation of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and other Portuguese colonies in Africa.

52. The armaments race is also continuing in the United Kingdom, despite promises to reduce military expenditure made by the leaders of the Labour Party in their election campaign last year. The arms race is also proceeding at full speed in other countries belonging to the aggressive military alliances of the Western Powers.

53. What is particularly alarming, of course, is that the stockpiles of weapons accumulated in the United States are not lying as dead weight in the arsenals. The most barbaric means of destruction are being used to the full by the United States militarists on battlefields many thousands of miles from the United States territory.

54. United States imperialism is carrying out bloody punitive actions on an unparalleled scale to suppress the widely-supported movement of the people of South Viet-Nam, who are carrying on the struggle for their freedom and independence and for the right to determine their own fate. Possessed by expansionist madness, the United States is now committing open acts of aggression against a sovereign State, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

55. For three months now the United States Air Force has been subjecting objectives in the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to ceaseless bombardments and destruction, spreading death among the peaceful population.

56. It is not surprising that there is talk in the United States of increasing the military expenditure of the United States under the pretext of the high cost of the aggressive actions in Viet-Nam. The President of the United States has even asked Congress to give him a blank cheque for expenditure in connexion with the aggressive war in Viet-Nam. As he said in a press conference on 8 April 1965, the United States annually spends almost $1,000 million on bombs, bullets and aircraft sent to South-East Asia, and for the maintenance of the armies of countries of that area, as well as from $450 million to $500 million for, as he put it, "firm military assistance".

57. A whole range of armaments consisting of napalm, phosphorous bombs, gases, aircraft and tanks has been brought into action in Viet-Nam, where the United States is resorting to cruel methods to suppress the movement of national liberation.
58. The United States militarists have brought to Viet-Nam the barbarity of the colonialists compounded by the destructive power of modern means of annihilation. The officials of the Pentagon, who, without any military necessity and as an experiment and a demonstration of military power, once gave the order to drop atom bombs on the Japanese towns of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, now look upon another Asian country as a proving-ground for various types of armaments that can be used for punitive operations. Not only the present generation, but future generations too, will recall these monstrous crimes by the United States militarists with loathing and hatred.

59. The indignation and resentment of the whole of mankind has been aroused by the use of poison gases by the United States against the people of South Viet-Nam. The use of chemical weapons in the war being waged by the United States in Viet-Nam is yet another crime against humanity; it is a flagrant act of lawlessness, a crude violation of universally accepted standards of international law, and a flouting of the elementary principles of morality.

60. The feelings of resentment experienced by the peoples of the whole world were reflected, in particular, in the note of protest from the Government of Cambodia, which was circulated on 1 April 1965 to the Missions of States Members of the United Nations in New York and which states that the Royal Government officially condemns this violation of all international conventions respected by civilized countries.

61. The United States Press and United States officials make no secret of the fact that widespread and intensive preparation is going on in the United States for the military use of chemical and bacteriological weapons—terrible weapons for the mass destruction of human lives.

62. Laurence Barrett, writing in the *New York Herald Tribune* on 11 April 1965, stated that:

... the Army is developing, testing and manufacturing chemical and biological weapons in at least six facilities ... The Government is spending perhaps $200 million a year on this activity; the actual figure is secret.

Most military officers and civilian scientists in the Pentagon regard gas and germ devices as just another set of weapons that have no special moral stigma attached. ... They express frustration at what they regard as foolish emotionalism in the public's attitude that dates back to World War I.

The article goes on to state that it is generally believed that "the U.S. could send microbes to war if it chose to do so".

63. All these facts shed further light on the reasons for the United States refusal to ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the prohibition

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1 S/6268.
of the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare.¹

64. It is no accident that when, a few years ago, a proposal was introduced in the United States Congress favouring the adoption of a bill to endorse the statement made by President Roosevelt on 4 August 1943 renouncing the use of poisonous gases,² the Pentagon opposed it and, according to The New York Times of 28 March 1965, stated (and I quote) that: "As research continues there is increasing evidence that some forms of these weapons, differing from previous forms, could effectively be used for defensive purposes with minimum collateral consequences".

65. Not only in the countries of Asia, where United States bombs are being dropped and United States poisonous gases are being used, but also in the countries of Africa and America, in Europe, and everywhere, men's eyes are being opened to the fact that the credo of United States policy is not disarmament, but a frenzied arms race, not a world without the threat of war, but a reprehensible balancing on the brink of war and actual war. By resorting to aggression and to the aggravation of the international situation in order to achieve the aims of their foreign policy, the United States and some of its allies are in fact trying to make the world turn backwards. Accordingly, in the disarmament talks their main concern is to prevent the achievement of any successes in the field of disarmament and peace. It suits their purposes that the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has not yielded any results. But we are sure that such a situation is not acceptable to the peoples of the world and that it will not satisfy peace-loving States.

66. Detailed and serious discussions in the United Nations Disarmament Commission will enable a wide circle of States, both members and non-members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, both large countries and small, and those with or without an effective military potential, to express their views on the questions of disarmament, make any observations they may have, and jointly plan the measures which are absolutely essential to overcome the impasse in the disarmaments talks, the ways that will lead to progress and the main directions in which we should concentrate our efforts. Every State not only can but must make a contribution to solving the question of disarmament and raise its voice against any acceleration of the arms race, which is fraught with the danger of war with all its frightful consequences for the people of this age of the atom, of

² President Roosevelt's statement was made on June 8, 1943 (Department of State Bulletin, June 12, 1943, p. 507). It also appeared in Current History, vol. 4 (Aug. 1943).
intercontinental ballistic missiles and of electronics, this age of unprecedented developments in military technology.

67. The Soviet delegation, for its part, would like to express its views concerning the directions in which our joint efforts should mainly be concentrated. We consider it essential to continue the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, bearing in mind that it is essential to eliminate as quickly as possible the danger of a nuclear war.

68. In the present situation it is especially urgent, regardless of how much longer the search for agreement on general and complete disarmament may go on, that a number of measures be taken to reduce international tension and limit the arms race. The Soviet Government proposes for consideration the programme of such measures set out in its memorandum of 7 December 1964, which the United Nations General Assembly was unable to discuss. We are also ready, of course, to consider proposals by other States directed towards the same end. In our opinion it would be appropriate, in approaching the problem of so-called partial measures, to consider which of them, in present conditions, would go farthest towards reducing international tension and checking a dangerous course of events that is apt to lead to nuclear war. What does living reality suggest to us in this connexion, on what do international events compel us to concentrate our attention?

69. First of all, this is a question of the speedy dismantling of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries.

70. The events of recent years bear witness to the fact that among the main sources of international conflict and tension, fraught with danger for the cause of peace and for the development of those countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America that are endeavouring to strengthen their national independence, are foreign military bases and the presence of troops in the territories of other States. There can be no justification for maintaining or in future establishing military bases in dependent territories, where they serve as instruments of colonialism.

71. The stationing of foreign troops in the territories of other States in peace-time is clearly an abnormal phenomenon which is the outcome of the aggressive and essentially colonialist aspirations of the United States of America and some other Western Powers. The United States has more than 1 million of its officers and troops in foreign territories, that is to say, more than one third its total armed forces. It has literally encircled the whole world with hundreds of strategic and tactical military bases, many of which have been
adapted, or are being adapted, to serve as bases for the unleashing of a nuclear war or of local wars, including specifically colonial wars.

72. Against whom, may we ask, are all these bases and troops in foreign territories directed? The answer is that they form an important element in the aggressive machine of the military blocs of the Western Powers directed against the socialist States. But this is only one aspect of the matter. There is another which is no less important.

73. The troops and bases of the United States, the United Kingdom, Portugal and other States in the territories of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America represent a very dangerous weapon which is being used to suppress national liberation movements and which enables the colonialists to interfere in the internal affairs of the emerging independent States of Asia, Africa and Latin America and to enslave and subjugate them.

74. How great is the danger to international peace and to the national liberation movement from the presence of United States military bases and troops in the territories of other countries is shown first of all by the aggressive actions of the United States in Indo-China. These aggressive actions are inextricably linked with the use of foreign bases and troops in the territories of other States.

75. In violation of the Geneva Agreements on Indo-China, which, in particular, prohibit "the introduction into Viet-Nam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions" (article 4 of the Final Declaration of 21 July 1954), the United States has turned Indo-China into a theatre of savage military operations and has virtually occupied the territory of South Viet-Nam.

76. There are more than 30,000 United States servicemen in South Viet-Nam. The United States Government is continuing to send more and more units there and is planning to increase still further the strength of its troops in South Viet-Nam. At a recent meeting of United States military leaders at Honolulu, plans were worked out for a further significant increase in the strength of United States troops in South Viet-Nam and for intensifying the "dirty war" against the people of Viet-Nam.

77. A widespread network of United States air and naval bases has been set up in South Viet-Nam. A vast number of troops have been assembled at United States military bases on foreign territories—in Thailand, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea and on the island of Okinawa. These troops are acting as the main police force of the imperialists in that part of the world.

78. The United States Navy is constantly cruising in the waters around the Indo-China peninsula. Bandits of the air are taking off

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from United States aircraft carriers to bomb the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

79. From the territory of South Viet-Nam, the United States interventionists and their Saigon puppets are carrying out armed attacks not only on the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, but also on Laos and Cambodia, "the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity" of which the United States is bound to respect under the Geneva Agreements.

80. Three nuclear submarines equipped with "Polaris" nuclear missiles have already been transferred to the Pacific Ocean.

81. The Pentagon is attempting to extend the sphere of activity of nuclear submarines to the Indian Ocean also. A plan is being worked out for the establishment of a United States naval base on the Diego Garcia atoll, a United Kingdom possession, which is part of the Chagos Archipelago.

82. The United Kingdom is not far behind its United States partners. The United Kingdom has a military base at Singapore and a number of other bases on the Malaccan peninsula which have modern means of waging war, including, in particular, "Vulcan" strategic bombers capable of dropping nuclear bombs, and "Bloodhound" missiles with nuclear warheads. It is quite understandable that countries neighbouring upon Malaysia, in particular Indonesia, see in this a direct threat to their own security. We might remember that in 1958-1959 United States aircraft took off from United Kingdom bases to bomb Indonesian territory and supply weapons to the counter-revolutionary rebels.

83. The United States and the United Kingdom have thus embarked on a course of nuclear blackmail in the belief that they can intimidate the peoples of Asia, exert pressure on those who oppose the imperialist policy of the colonial Powers, and force the Asian countries from the path of peaceful and independent development.

84. In doing this, the neo-colonialists clamour about the existence of a so-called "power vacuum" in this area, which they say must be filled. They advance the base theory that it is essential to create a kind of "nuclear umbrella" for the countries of Asia. In essence, this is only another way of establishing an imperialist trusteeship over the countries of Asia.

85. It is said, quite rightly, in the countries of Asia that if a threat to their security does in fact exist, it arises mainly from the presence of the United States Navy and United States bases.

86. The imperialist plans of the United States received a decisive rebuff from the countries which participated in the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, which was held at Cairo. The Declaration of the Cairo Conference emphasized that:
The Conference condemns the expressed intention of imperialist powers to establish bases in the Indian Ocean, as a calculated attempt to intimidate the emerging countries of Africa and Asia and an unwarranted extension of the policy of neo-colonialism and imperialism.\(^1\)

87. Events in the Congo, Kenya, Tanganyika and Yemen have shown again and again what a danger foreign bases and troops represent for the peoples of Africa and the Arabian peninsula.

88. We all remember that the United Kingdom military base on Ascension Island served as a staging post for the transport of troops to suppress the national liberation movement of the Congolese people.

89. In violation of the Security Council resolution, not only have foreign mercenaries not been removed from the Congo, but their numbers have considerably increased in recent months. Since the beginning of this year alone, more than 300 additional mercenaries have arrived in the Congo from South Africa and Rhodesia.

90. One of the largest United Kingdom bases is at Aden in the Arabian peninsula and serves as the main support for the struggle against the national liberation movement in that area.

91. United Kingdom bases in Cyprus are a threat to the security of the countries of the Near East.

92. It is impossible not to support the firm demand for the removal of all foreign bases from the area of the Middle East and the Mediterranean which was made last year by Mr. Gamal Abdel Nasser, the President of the United Arab Republic. President Nasser stated that foreign military bases are a “threat to our security and must be destroyed”.

93. Foreign military bases and troops are also being actively used against the peoples of Latin America. Suffice it to recall the recent events in Panama, where United States troops are stationed.

94. It is well known that the tension in the Caribbean area is directly linked to the fact that there is a United States military base at Guantanamo, on Cuban soil, despite the clearly expressed wishes of the people of Cuba.

95. The organization of attacks on Cuba by bandit gangs of mercenaries in April 1961, the inhuman economic blockade, the continued dispatch of mercenary bands to Cuba, provocations originating from the United States military base at Guantanamo and the violation of Cuban airspace, all this has been carried out and is being carried out by the United States against a small Latin American country with a single and quite obvious objective, namely, by means of gross interference from outside the country, to overthrow the existing people’s régime in Cuba, to trample on the sovereignty of an independent State that is a Member of the United Nations, and to impose

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\(^1\) Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 446.
on Cuba, by means of the threat or use of force, a régime alien to the will of the Cuban people.

96. The concentration of large masses of foreign troops and weapons in Central Europe is a serious obstacle to the improvement of relations between States belonging, on the one hand, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, on the other, to the Warsaw Pact.

97. Consequently, there is a clear need for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from South Viet-Nam, Taiwan, the Congo, South Korea, Malaysia and also, of course, from the territories of European States and other areas of the world; it is essential to dismantle military bases in the territories of other countries in all parts of the world, and particularly the base on Cuban soil.

98. Another matter requiring urgent consideration is the question of preventing the creation of multilateral nuclear forces in any form whatever and the granting of access to nuclear weapons to the West German revenge-seekers. The creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force in any form would mean a proliferation of nuclear weapons and, in particular, access to these weapons by the West German militarists. This is a serious threat to the cause of peace in Europe and throughout the world.

99. In their efforts somehow to calm public opinion, which is profoundly disturbed at the plans to give the West German militarists access to nuclear weapons, the authors of those plans are attempting to represent the multilateral nuclear force as a panacea against the acquisition by West Germany of its own nuclear weapons, as "the lesser of two evils" and as an insignificant concession to West Germany in exchange for its promise not to establish its own independent nuclear force. However, the peoples of the world well remember that concessions to West German militarism have never dulled its appetite, but have, on the contrary, impelled it to engage in ever new adventures. And let no one have any illusions about the danger of concessions and favours to the West German revenge-seekers and militarists. Soothing assurances that there are restrictions which prevent West Germany from having nuclear weapons can deceive nobody. The worth of such short-lived restrictions is very well known. Has not the Federal Republic of Germany, in violation of the Potsdam Agreement, been allowed to establish an aggressive military potential? Are we not witnessing how the so-called restrictions imposed by the Brussels, London and Paris Agreements of 1954 are being discarded one after another? What is more, these Agreements do not even prevent West Germany from

1 See A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49 (S. doc. 123, 81st Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 34-48.
2 See London and Paris Agreements, September-October 1954 (Department of State publication 5659, 1954).
producing nuclear weapons for its Wehrmacht in the Territory of
other countries or through the agency of other countries.

100. Just such a "back door" to the acquisition of nuclear weapons
is the growing military and economic co-operation between Bonn
and the South African racists. The racists of the Republic of South
Africa have found their best friends in the militarists of the Federal
Republic of Germany, who are attempting to establish an atomic
base for the Bundeswehr in the Republic of South Africa.

101. There is no need to dwell on the nature of the threat which
this alliance between West Germany and the Republic of South
Africa holds for the African peoples.

102. The danger of establishing a NATO nuclear force with the
participation of the West German militarists is equally great,
regardless of how "multilateral" or "Atlantic" it is to be. The
proposal by the United Kingdom Government to establish an Atlantic
nuclear force also envisages "certain mixed forces", in which West
Germany would participate, and thus leaves the situation basically
unaltered. The striving to secure nuclear weapons for itself at any
price lies at the heart of the entire foreign policy of West Germany.

103. The Federal Republic of Germany is in the forefront of
NATO'S atomic strategists. It is not by chance that the provocative
plan to mine vast areas of Central Europe, threatening the lives of
millions of people in a number of European countries, was put forward
in the military circles of Bonn. The leaders of the Bundeswehr also
put forward the so-called "strategy of the advanced front", which calls
for the use of nuclear weapons from the very outset of any military
conflict in Central Europe.

104. The vengeful aspirations of the ruling circles in the Federal
Republic of Germany are a serious threat not only to the vital interests
of the people of Europe. It must not be forgotten that in our day and
age an exacerbation of the international situation in one part of the
globe inevitably results in a worsening of the political climate through­
out the world.

105. It should also be borne in mind that the establishment of a
NATO joint nuclear force as a striking unit for imperialist reaction
would inevitably lead to an intensification of imperialist and neo­
colonialist pressure on the peoples who have obtained their inde­
pendence or are struggling for it. The implementation of the plans
of the Pentagon and Bonn increases many times over the capacity
of the most reactionary military and political groups in NATO to set
off a world explosion.

106. Is there any need to speak of how vastly the danger of a new
world war being unleashed would increase if the West German militarists
should gain access, in any form, to nuclear weapons? Is there any
need to dwell on what the consequences would be if access to the most
terrible weapons of modern times was to be given to West Germany, where the upper hand is being gained by the reckless elements which twice in our generation have plunged the peoples of the world into wars of annihilation and are now planning new military adventures with the aim of breaking down frontiers in Europe and taking revenge for the defeat of Nazi Germany?

107. Is there any need to recall the shameless hostility of Bonn to the other German State, the German Democratic Republic, which is carrying on a ceaseless struggle for peace in Europe? We take the liberty of pointing out in this connexion that recently, on 25 January 1965, a statement by the Government of the German Democratic Republic on the agenda item of the nineteenth session of the General Assembly concerned with general and complete disarmament was circulated to representatives of the State[s] Members of the United Nations.

108. That statement, which, in particular, reaffirms the proposal by the Government of the German Democratic Republic that both German States should renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons, should agree to giving their territories the status of a denuclearized zone and should significantly reduce their military expenditures, is further evidence of the peace-loving aspirations of the German Democratic Republic.

109. In contrast, revenge-seeking has become the state policy of the authorities in West Germany, who refuse to recognize the existing German frontiers and advocate redrawing the political map of Europe.

110. The Defence Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. von Hassel, is calling for a policy of force, the chairman of the parliamentary group of the parties in power in the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Barzel, is calling for a struggle to overcome the status quo, the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany leaves its seat and goes to West Berlin, a city which has no connexion with the Federal Republic of Germany, and every effort is made to exempt from prosecution Nazis who have committed monstrous crimes against humanity. These are all facts of life in West Germany today.

111. The Cairo Conference of Non-Aligned Countries was quite right in calling on the great Powers to refrain from any policy which would contribute to the spread of nuclear weapons. It was by no mere coincidence that the President of an African country, Mr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and the president of a European country, Mr. Urho Kekkonen of Finland, pointed out that a multilateral nuclear force was a threat to peace throughout the world. Many European countries are seriously alarmed by the plans to give the West German revenge-seekers access to nuclear weapons. Also, the
fact that even many NATO members, including the great Power France, are refraining from participation in this dangerous project, speaks for itself.

112. The plans for a multilateral nuclear force are incompatible with the desire of peace-loving peoples and States for an end to the arms race, elimination of the danger of nuclear war, and the achievement of general and complete disarmament. They are incompatible with the efforts of many countries to create denuclearized zones in various parts of the world.

113. The Disarmament Commission must take a firm and decisive stand against the transfer of nuclear weapons to West Germany in any form whatsoever—whether directly or indirectly through groups of States, and whether such weapons are for West Germany's own use or for its participation in any way in the control over them. The Commission must make an appeal against the establishment of a NATO multilateral nuclear force in any form.

114. An important step towards removing the threat of nuclear war and slowing down the armaments race would be to ban the use of nuclear weapons. Throughout the post-war years, the Soviet Union has consistently advocated and continues to advocate the banning and destruction of nuclear weapons. And what is most encouraging is that today the idea of banning nuclear weapons has received widespread support throughout the world.

115. The Soviet Government welcomed the initiative taken by Ethiopia and a number of other African and Asian countries for the adoption at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly of a Declaration (resolution 1653 (XVI)) stating that the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and the rules of international law and would be a war directed against mankind in general.

116. The Soviet Union has also affirmed its support for the proposal contained in that Declaration that a conference should be convened for signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

117. The question of convening such a conference was, as we know, also discussed in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, most of whose members spoke in favour of convening it as soon as possible, rightly pointing out that a decision to ban the use of nuclear weapons would have a strong restraining influence and would be a kind of moral preparation for the final elimination of nuclear weapons.

118. Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and the neutralist members of the Committee spoke in favour of banning the use of nuclear weapons. The representative of India, for example, said

1 Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 648–650.
at the 212th meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament:

... We have always been opposed and continue to be opposed to the manufacture, use or possession of nuclear weapons. We consider that the use of nuclear weapons is a violation of the Charter and is contrary to the rules of international law. ... We have also supported the Ethiopian proposal for a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.¹

119. However, in this case, too, as in many others, the Committee was unable to achieve any constructive results because of obstruction on the part of the United States, which evidently wishes to leave itself a free hand in the use of these barbaric weapons of mass destruction.

120. This resistance by the imperialist Powers must be overcome. The Soviet Union therefore considers that the Disarmament Commission should appeal to all States of the world to conclude an international agreement on banning the use of nuclear weapons.

121. The Soviet Government proposes that, even before the conclusion of such an agreement, the States possessing nuclear weapons should make a declaration that they will not be the first to use them. The Soviet Union is ready to make such a pledge if the other nuclear Powers do the same.

122. Another important task for the members of the United Nations Disarmament Commission is to discuss the question of further disarmament talks. The discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva have not produced any positive results. This has led to legitimate criticism not only by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries but also by the neutralist States which are members of the Committee and which have in their turn made valuable efforts to ensure the success of the disarmament negotiations.

123. In this connexion, the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference, which was put forward at the Cairo Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in October 1964, is fully justified and understandable. I should like to quote an important part of the Declaration of the Cairo Conference which contains this proposal:

The Conference is convinced that the convening of a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations to which all countries would be invited, would provide powerful support to the efforts which are being made to set in motion the process of disarmament and for securing the further and steady development of this process.²

Such is the opinion of many of the members of our Commission which took part in the Cairo Conference of Non-Aligned Countries.

¹ ENDC/PV.212, pp. 5–6.
² Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 445.
124. The Soviet Union fully shares this opinion. We consider that our Commission should support the idea of convening a world disarmament conference.

125. Other proposals have also been put forward regarding the means of conducting disarmament talks. The Soviet Union is favourably disposed, in particular, towards the proposal by the Government of the People’s Republic of China for convening a conference of heads of State to discuss the question of the complete banning and the complete destruction of nuclear weapons.¹

126. The Soviet Union also supports the proposal by France that all States possessing nuclear weapons should take part in future disarmament negotiations.²

127. The importance of convening the United Nations Disarmament Commission, consisting as it does of all the States Members of the United Nations, lies in the fact that this should infuse a genuinely fresh spirit into the negotiations. We consider that the Commission should discuss before all else those questions which brook no delay. In our view, the Commission should declare itself in favour of the earliest possible withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries and the dismantling of foreign military bases. We consider it important to take urgent steps against the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force of any kind and against allowing the West German revenge-seekers to have access to nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it is essential for the Commission to discuss the question of concluding an agreement on the banning of nuclear weapons: We must in all seriousness examine the question of the ways in which further negotiations on disarmament should be conducted.

128. The Soviet delegation calls upon the members of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to exchange views on all these questions and to take the necessary decisions. There can be no doubt that the tasks facing the Commission are not easy ones. We must therefore strive all the more boldly and earnestly to fulfil the hopes of the people, and we must attempt all the more resolutely to arrive at decisions which are realistic and can help circumvent the stumbling-blocks which are holding us back from the noble goal of delivering mankind from the scourge of war, from the arms race and from dread for the future.

¹ Ibid., p. 455.
² See ibid., pp. 478-479.
Statement by Ambassador Stevenson to the Disarmament Commission, April 26, 1965

1. My delegation attaches great importance to this meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which has not convened for several years. Therefore we feel that the competence and impartiality of the Chairman is most important; accordingly, your unanimous selection, Mr. Chairman, is most reassuring to my delegation. We congratulate you, Sir, and look forward to an orderly and, we hope, productive session of this Commission under your leadership.

2. We had hoped that the USSR's motive in calling for this meeting would turn out to be mainly a constructive one. I am afraid that this morning's attack by the USSR on the United States, so reminiscent of the period before Khrushchev, has only served to confirm widespread doubts about the USSR's motives in calling for this meeting. In any case, I regret that I must reply to this morning's irrelevant assault. I hope we shall thereafter be able to return to the subject of disarmament exclusively.

3. The representative of the USSR has laid down a barrage of words against virtually every action of the United States to resist communist expansion, overt or covert, since 1945. In one of the standard Soviet approaches, he focused much of his polemic on foreign bases, but, as usual, he neglected to mention why those bases had been established. They have been established, I am obliged to repeat, because independent States subjected to or threatened by communist aggression have asked for protection and assistance.

4. I need remind the Commission only of the Berlin blockade and other USSR actions in Europe which brought about the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to organize the defence of Europe, of the unprovoked aggression against South Korea which brought about in that country the defensive United Nations action which still continues, of North Viet-Namese aggression in South Viet-Nam and Laos since 1954 when the ink was hardly dry on the Geneva Agreements. The need for bases stems directly from this pattern of aggression and threats of aggression which could be vastly amplified. It is as simple as that.

5. The broad-brush description of world events by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Fedorenko, has suffered from the same defect which characterizes much of the Soviet Union's polemics: an utter disregard for the facts of history—history at least as it is recorded, read and taught outside the Soviet Union and like societies.

1 Disarmament Commission Official Records; 73rd Meeting, pp. 1–9.
6. I was, and I remain, one of those who found it genuinely hearten­ing that the post-Stalin leadership in the Soviet Union was moved, albeit belatedly, to acknowledge and condemn the multitude of sins and outrages which that leader of the Soviet Union perpetrated upon his own countrymen during the quarter of a century that he dictated to both Party and State. But it remains incomprehensible, to me at least, that the post-Stalin era has not witnessed a similar acknowledge­ment and condemnation of the sins and outrages perpetrated against other States and other peoples.

7. Every step to increase our military capability since our unilateral disarmament—which was not reciprocated by the USSR—at the end of the Second World War has been taken in response to the expan­sionist policies of the communist world, first of the Soviet Union and now Communist China. It is well to remember that, during the course of the Second World War and its immediate aftermath the Soviet Union forcibly added over 264,000 square miles and over 24 million people to its own territory and population.

8. There was the outrage against Poland in 1939 when, and here I quote from Mr. Molotov: "... a quick blow against Poland, first by the German army and then by the Red Army, sufficed to leave nothing remaining of that ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty." ¹ Then, only a few months later, came the seizure of the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. There was the outrage against the people of Iran in 1945 and 1946, when the Soviet Union blocked the entry of Iranian troops into part of Iran's own territory and proceeded with the installation of a puppet régime on Iranian soil. Then there was the Soviet Union's behaviour throughout Eastern Europe where, in violation of the agreement reached at Yalta in February 1945,² the USSR army remained, in what I suppose its representatives would not call an abnormal stationing of troops abroad in peace time, to occupy Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary; Poland, East Germany and most of Czechoslovakia, denying the very right of self-determination which the USSR has professed to cherish so dearly and proclaims in these halls so frequently. There was the USSR-fomented guerrilla warfare in Greece and efforts to obtain control of the Dardanelles in Turkey.

9. Nor were such outrages limited to Europe. In Malaya, in the Philippines, in Indo-China and elsewhere, communist adherents, under the then unchallenged leadership of the USSR, incited, encouraged and supported guerrilla uprisings against national Governments. Then, in 1950, the USSR supported, and the Chinese joined in, the

² A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–49 (S. Doc. 123, 81st Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 27 ff.
aggression against South Korea, perhaps the most blatant effort in
the post-war era to extend domination and impose their will by force
of arms.

10. There followed the suppression of the East German uprisings in
1953 and the Hungarian revolution in 1956, a series of USSR-manu-
factured crises over Berlin, designed to succeed where the 1949
blockade had failed, and the erection of that shameful wall in Berlin,
not to keep anyone out of the East but to prevent even greater
numbers from fleeing to the West. Then there was the USSR's
attempt in 1962, acting with stealth and deception, to transform Cuba
into an offensive bridgehead of nuclear blackmail.

11. After this record, the USSR presumes to lecture the United
States about aggression and in the wrong forum and under an agenda
item on disarmament.

12. We in the West have not in recent times spoken of these deeds.
It is not that we have forgotten them nor that we expect thereby to
mollify USSR leadership. Rather have we been hoping, and I for
one continue to hope, for an evolution which will bring to USSR
leaders greater realization and greater esteem for the rights of States
and societies lying outside their borders.

13. Perhaps as a new and even more aggressive Power presses its
militaristic views on the world, the USSR will begin to see the advan-
tages of cooperation with others for a peaceful world—and more
clearly. In recent years, certainly, the aggressive efforts of Com-
munist China have required increasing world vigilance. When Tibet
was seized by military force in 1959, too few voices were raised against
that outrage, but the constant pressures of Communist China have
since alerted the world to the true nature of its intentions. Even the
USSR has publicly protested Communist Chinese pressure on their
long common border and transferred troops to its Far Eastern sectors.
Certainly since the time of Peking's overt military attack on India in
1962, all pretense of its peaceful aims must have been exposed.

14. It is not accidental, therefore, that in South East Asia we are
now faced with the greatest current threat to peace in the new form of
aggression mounted by North Viet-Nam against South Viet-Nam
with the blessings, possibly for different reasons, of Communist China
and the USSR.

15. It is perhaps not surprising that a large portion of the speech
we heard from the USSR representative this morning was another
attack upon the policies of the United States in Viet-Nam and another
presentation of his version of what has happened and what is happen-
ing to the valiant people of South Viet-Nam. I am not surprised.
On the basis of the record of twenty years I confess, I repeat, that I
had hoped that this meeting, which he called and which we all agreed
to attend in good faith to discuss disarmament, would be used for the
purpose intended and not for more of the familiar polemics about Viet-Nam. The USSR seems bound and determined, however, to express its views on the situation in South East Asia in every United Nations forum at its disposal except the proper forum, the very forum which the USSR insists is the only forum competent to take any action on this situation.

16. I do not doubt that there are reasons for the USSR's unwillingness to resort to that forum. Not the least, I venture to guess, is the contemptuous rejection by their communist partners in Asia of any United Nations role in the South-East Asian situation.

17. The USSR, to begin with, has repeated the wholly false charge, which it knows to be false, that the United States is engaging in gas warfare in Viet-Nam. The President of this country, the Secretary of State of the United States, and I myself, in a letter of 2 April to the President of the Security Council, have all made clear that the United States has not engaged in gas warfare in Viet-Nam. It should not be necessary to do so again. But since the Soviet Union appears to be unable to desist from these spurious charges, I will assure this Commission that the United States has not engaged in gas warfare in Viet-Nam and I will again state the already well-known facts. Only riot control agents have been used to avoid death or injury to innocent persons. The use of such agents has nothing to do with gas warfare, which is waged with deadly poisonous gas. The obvious purpose of these charges is to divert attention from the real problem in Viet-Nam today, which is the armed intervention in the Republic of Viet-Nam by the authorities of North Viet-Nam.

18. I am sure that members have noted that the representative of the Soviet Union did not once touch upon the fact that it is Hanoi, not the Republic of Viet-Nam or my Government, which has as an official, publicly-proclaimed policy the subjugation by force of a neighbouring country. You need not take my word for it. The records of the third National Congress of the Communist Party held in Hanoi in September 1960 include the final resolution, "The liberation of South Viet-Nam" as one of the two tasks of the Party. The resolution called for the "stepping up" of the revolution in South Viet-Nam. In other words, the Communist Party in one country resolves to step up communist military attacks on the Government and people of another.

19. It is clear from Communist Chinese sources too that they see the situation in Viet-Nam for what it is: an effort by the North to take over the South. The recent commentaries on the Viet-Namese situation flowing from Peking are remarkably frank. The People's

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Daily editorial of 16 April 1965, for example, took contemptuous note of the fact that the United States had asked that “the people of North Viet-Nam immediately discontinue their support to their compatriots in the South”. The same editorial went on to note derisively that President Johnson had asked that “trained men who flow in a consistent stream from North to South must be withdrawn”. There is no denial that such aggression is in fact taking place. On the contrary, there is only an out-of-hand rejection of the demand that it stop.

20. The statement of the USSR representative this morning, furthermore, did not once touch upon the fact that Hanoi has not only initiated a policy of aggression against South Viet-Nam, but is actively carrying it out. Not once did it note the fact that Hanoi has established, and continues to direct and control on the territory of its neighbour, a movement to overthrow by force that neighbour’s Government. The statement did not once touch upon the fact that Hanoi is training and sending soldiers under military orders across international boundaries into the territory of its neighbours. It did not once touch on the fact that some 40,000 armed personnel have been so infiltrated. And there are accounts in the newspapers even this morning of organized units of the North Viet-Namese army fighting in South Viet-Nam.

21. The role of my Government in assisting the Republic of Viet-Nam to resist this aggression and to maintain its independence, as in so many previous cases since the war, has been clearly explained in numerous public statements, both in and outside the United Nations. The action of the United States Government is wholly consistent with its goal of helping to protect the integrity of South Viet-Nam, securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relations with all others, free from outside interference, tied to no alliance, a military base for no other country.

22. The United States has striven, and will continue to strive, to achieve this goal by peaceful means, but we will not yield or falter in our resistance to aggression. We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of that country be permitted to develop and guide their future in their own way. They could begin to do this now peacefully, if their neighbour and its communist partners were to accept rather than ridicule the repeated and still valid offer to enter on the path of discussions, the path of peaceful settlement, as the only sane alternative to the effort, painful for all concerned, to impose their domination and will by means of force. They could begin to do this now, fruitfully, if their neighbour to the North and its communist partners were willing to match their professed dedication to the welfare of the peoples of South Viet-Nam and all of South-East Asia by joining in a collective effort to develop, rather than to destroy, the vast human and natural resources of this strife-torn area.
23. One of the most disingenuous attacks which we heard from the distinguished representative of the USSR today was his long polemic against the Federal Republic of Germany, no doubt timed as part of the campaign geared to the twentieth anniversary of the ending of the Second World War. Such charges, unrelated in tone or in substance to our work here, have also in the past been features of USSR disarmament statements elsewhere. Their introduction here is the more regrettable as they have been fully answered on several occasions in the past by my Government and by other Governments.

24. Not only has Western Europe faced the constant series of USSR expansionist pressures that I have already reviewed, but for many years it has also been subjected to the threat of hundreds of USSR nuclear missiles targeted directly against European cities. It is not surprising that after the USSR rejected efforts designed to avert such a missile growth, the countries of Western Europe developed a grave concern for their security and a legitimate interest in the strategic nuclear deterrent which protects them to this day.

25. One of these countries, the Federal Republic of Germany, represents a front line of Western Europe's defence. Yet despite its vulnerable position, the West German Government has committed its armed forces entirely to international military command through NATO. Moreover, its leaders have emphatically denied that they seek nuclear weapons. They have repeated countless times their renunciation of the use of force for attainment of political ends and their desire to settle the German boundaries question by peaceful negotiations only.

26. Let me add that every nuclear weapon that the United States has placed in Europe to offset USSR missiles is under United States control.

27. The USSR is well aware of these facts and the political motivation for these perpetually unfounded attacks is obvious. It is also aware of the facts regarding the suggestions for a multilateral nuclear force. It would be fully consistent with the firm opposition of the United States to the dissemination of nuclear weapons potential and with General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI), of 4 December 1961, calling for a non-dissemination agreement.

28. The USSR maintains that it is deeply concerned over the dangers of nuclear dissemination. I might note in this connexion parenthetically that the only country to embark on a nuclear weapons programme with the help of a nuclear Power was Communist China, and it was not the United States which furnished that help.

29. A non-dissemination agreement in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI) would be the best way to meet this
concern, and we urge the Soviet Union to join in seeking such agree­
ment. If we argue endlessly about future fears and let pass our
chance to conclude a non-proliferation agreement while there is yet
time, we will all lose. The surest way to prevent proliferation is to
sign an agreement based on this resolution, and as soon as possible.

30. The charges against Germany have nothing to do with talks
on disarmament; but the USSR authorities will no doubt print them
in their Press, as they have done many times before, hoping that they
can wring a little more support from their own citizens. But such
charges do little more than disguise an unwillingness to seek real
progress towards a just solution of the German problem. Certainly
history will find it lamentable and bitter that two decades after the
end of the Second World War the USSR could not devise a better
idea for Germany than partition, nor a better idea for Berlin than the
cruel wall that divides that city and its inhabitants.

31. We meet at a time of increasing international tension; our work
is therefore all the more imperative, and a clearer understanding of
the situation with regard to disarmament all the more important.
For the opinion of the world, marshalled and articulated by this
Commission, can be a powerful and constructive influence in these
critical and dangerous times. I hope, therefore, that we can agree
that our discussions in this Commission should remain focused on
the central purpose for which this body was created. For among the
problems which beset our nations, this menacing mountain of arma­
ment dwarfs all others and casts a shadow over all mankind.

32. The arms race involves the very future of man on this planet,
and the fact that we have endured this threat for a number of years
should not lessen our resolve to remove it. We must act soon and
wisely, for in this situation time is not our ally. Beginnings have
been made during the past two years—the “hot-line” agreement,1
the limited test-ban treaty,2 General Assembly resolution 1884
(XVIII) of 17 August 1963, calling on all States to refrain from orbiting
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction,3 and the announce­
ments concerning reductions in planned production of fissionable
materials.4 I might add that, contrary to the charge made by the
representative of the USSR this morning that the United States is not
interested in disarmament, each of the measures that I have just
enumerated came about as a result of an initiative taken and a pro­
posal made by the United States. But we cannot rest with these
beginnings. If they have slowed the arms race, they have certainly
not brought it to a halt.

1 Ibid., 1963, pp. 236–238.
2 Ibid., pp. 291–293.
3 Ibid., p. 538.
33. In the present circumstances, it is important that we maintain a certain sense of perspective about the prospect for fruitful discussions and negotiations, especially during periods of increased tension. A period of relaxation of tensions would obviously improve the prospects for progress through negotiation, but periods such as this need not be barren; indeed, they afford opportunities for the relief of tension and danger by collateral action.

34. Thus, I remind members of this Commission that in 1961, during the period of high tension occasioned by events relating to Berlin, a Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations was negotiated by the USSR and the United States.1 It became the basis for negotiations in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Then in 1963, a few months after the height of the grave world crisis occasioned by the secret installation of missiles in Cuba, the direct communications link between Moscow and Washington—the first arms control agreement of the post-war period—was signed. And shortly thereafter, and indeed as a result of the initiative undertaken in the immediate shadow of the Cuban missile crisis the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water was signed.

35. Recalling these events, we are entitled to retain our hopes for the present and our expectations for the future. At the same time, we cannot be complacent about the results of the discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Conference last year. The optimism that the breakthroughs of 1963 would quickly be followed by comparable agreements in 1964 was not fulfilled. Yet the momentum of progress was not entirely lost.

36. The United States and the USSR found it possible to announce some reduction in their military budgets. Moreover, as I have noted, during 1964 the United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom announced their intentions to make reductions in their planned production of fissionable materials. These were not agreements. Nevertheless, they were, we believe, contributions to peace.

37. While the Eighteen-Nation Conference did not produce formal agreements, there was value in the new proposals introduced, and in the clarification of positions. There was also some narrowing of the differences.

38. The reasons for the failure to reach agreements are numerous and the story would undoubtedly vary with the teller. I am sure there would be general agreement in this room that some of the reasons lay outside the conference hall. For our part, however, I wish to say that the United States does not intend during our discussions

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1 Ibid., 1961, pp. 439-442.
here to engage in recriminations with respect to the intentions and the motives of other parties.

39. The representative of the USSR opened his speech by listing a series of disarmament issues on which he alleged that the USSR position had been entirely positive and the United States position entirely negative. It is precisely such sweeping distortions of this kind which caused me in a recent speech, which Mr. Fedorenko quoted, to characterize USSR proposals as slogans. Of course, these slogans are appealing because they ignore all of the practical problems, and propose to carry out disarmament by making pledges or waving a magic wand. Needless to say, there would be no effective inspection to determine whether the magic wand had worked and any real disarmament had taken place. I do not propose to compete with my distinguished colleague in misleading the Commission by indulging in misrepresentation. I do not propose to compete with him in trying to raise the temperature of our deliberations by loose and groundless charges. What I propose to do, on the contrary, is to inform the Commission of exactly what the United States has proposed in the field of disarmament and what it concretely and realistically proposes be done to relieve the world of the threat and the burden of armaments.

40. My Government hopes that the USSR is genuinely interested in reaching agreements in the field of disarmament and of arms control. The USSR has no reason, on the basis of the record, to take a different view of our intentions. Accordingly, there can be no nourishment, I repeat, in recriminations about motivations. Indeed, the cry of bad faith is seldom the herald of the serious negotiator.

41. There is a related consideration which is important for fruitful discussion. It is that the Governments represented here do not need to be persuaded of the advantages of progress in disarmament. We have progressed so far into the nuclear age that all of us are fully conscious of the necessity, the imperative necessity, of controlling the arms race. After almost two decades of discussion, we are well beyond the slogan stage, and our attention should be focused on the harder task of developing the specific plans—I repeat, specific plans—that will bring our easily expressed and common aspirations within reach.

42. This meeting of the Disarmament Commission takes place following the inability of the General Assembly to discuss disarmament at its last session. It can serve as an opportunity to acquaint the other Members of the United Nations with the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and with the views of the various participants in those negotiations. It also offers the opportunity for all Member Governments to express their views and to offer such suggestions as they may feel would contribute to the resolution of existing differences.
43. I should like now to discuss briefly the approach of my Government to the vital task of arms control and disarmament.

44. We are determined to work for general and complete disarmament as part of our common, long-term effort to achieve a better and safer world through the application of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the steady development of international law and effective peace-keeping arrangements. The outline for a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world which the United States has submitted and discussed in Geneva would, in our view, provide a sound framework for this common effort. But, if we are to achieve this goal, we must first halt the present arms race, and particularly the nuclear race, and turn it back. We must begin with those areas of arms control and reductions where agreement seems possible—and we must begin now. We must avoid the lure of easy slogans and deceptive generalities and face the fact that agreements in this area involve complex matters of military balance, of scientific technology, and, where necessary, of verification.

45. This approach was reflected in the programme of action which my country placed before the Eighteen-Nation Conference in Geneva. Our proposals were outlined in President Johnson's message of 21 January 1964 to the Conference. As our President stated in the opening words of his message: "There is only one item on the agenda of this Conference—it is the leading item on the agenda of mankind—and that one item is peace."

46. In this spirit, the President outlined five major types of agreement for study and negotiation.

47. First, he stated that the United States would be prepared to discuss means of preventing the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly—whether by aggression, subversion, or clandestine supply of arms—to change boundaries or demarcation lines, to interfere with access to territory, or to extend control or administration over territory by displacing established authorities. This remains an area of central concern for all of us who seek to make the rule of law and pacific settlement become the only rule of international behaviour.

48. The second suggestion submitted at that time was that, while the Conference continued its efforts to achieve a safeguarded programme for general and complete disarmament, an effort should be made to halt further increases in strategic armaments. Specifically, the United States proposed that the United States, the USSR and their respective allies explore a verified freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. The President pointed out that such a measure would prevent the further

1 Ibid., 1964, pp. 7-9.
expansion of the deadly and costly arms race and would open the path for reductions in all types of forces.

49. In the same spirit of attempting to halt the arms race now, rather than at some distant future time, President Johnson, in his third proposal, reiterated the offer of the United States to halt all production of fissionable material for weapons use. Implementation of this measure would halt the stockpiling of the nuclear explosives which are the essential and central ingredient of nuclear arsenals. The President indicated our further flexibility with regard to this proposal by offering to begin this action through both sides' closing comparable production facilities on a plant-by-plant basis, with mutual verification.

50. As a fourth area for consideration, my Government proposed that further steps be taken to reduce the danger of war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack. President Johnson indicated that, in consultation with our allies, we would be prepared to discuss proposals for the creation of a system of observation posts as an initial move in this direction. Agreement on such a system could open the way to broader political advances.

51. The President's fifth proposal was directed at the urgent task of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. To this end, he urged, firstly, a nonproliferation agreement, as I have said; secondly, acceptance by the major nuclear Powers of the same type of inspection of their peaceful uses of nuclear materials which they recommend for other States, and, thirdly, a verified comprehensive test ban agreement.

52. During the course of the Geneva talks in 1964, the United States delegation set forth in detail its suggestions for the specific terms and methods of implementation of its various proposals. We sought, both in the conference and in private discussion, to clarify our positions, to advance additional proposals, and to search for areas of agreement. And, I might add, we gave careful attention to the views and proposals of other delegations.

53. In March, the United States delegation proposed that a start be made in the actual destruction of some armaments with the United States and USSR each agreeing to destroy over a two-year period some 720 medium jet bombers. It was our view that such bombers might lend themselves to an early start in actual arms reduction because of the relatively equal number possessed by both parties and their comparable position as the basic medium bombers of the two countries. Unfortunately, the USSR did not see fit to agree to this measure.

54. Nevertheless, as I shall later indicate, the United States has initiated action to phase out large numbers of these bombers from

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its operational inventory. This is part of our basic philosophy of taking such self-restraining actions as are possible while still maintaining a military establishment within the bounds of our security needs. The proposal made last March, however, would already have given us some practical experience in the actual destruction of armaments by agreement. It would have speeded up the process of destruction of our medium bombers, and, one assumes, would have hastened the process of reduction of USSR bombers. Such a measure could also play an important part in preventing the dissemination of such strategic delivery vehicles, with the unsettling effects this could have around the world. And it would have been a start in positive arms reduction by agreement—a start that must be made somewhere, and the sooner the better.

55. The proposals I have just outlined are as concrete and practical as they are far-reaching. They are clearly defined and are accompanied by the necessary scientific and technical detail. They were the result of months of hard work by a highly qualified technical staff. We did not expect that they would necessarily be accepted when first offered. But we did hope they would at least be subjected to as intensive study by others as we had put into their formulation.

56. To facilitate such study, I would like to add a few words of explanation about two of these proposals.

57. The philosophy underlying the proposal to explore a freeze in the number and characteristics of strategic vehicles for delivery of nuclear weapons was that the most direct and logical way to halt the nuclear arms race was to stop the production of these vehicles. We felt it advisable to explore a freeze limited to strategic vehicles because of widespread agreement that this was the place to begin. These long-range vehicles carry the greatest destructive force. The verification of a freeze on such vehicles is easier than in the case of some other kinds of armaments. Finally, a freeze of such costly vehicles would release the largest amount of resources for the constructive work of economic and social development.

58. During the Geneva talks in 1964, the United States delegation also submitted the results of extensive studies as to how, given the scientific and technical facilities available at the time, such an agreement could be adequately verified with a minimum amount of intrusion. If we are ever to proceed beyond the talking stage of agreements involving very complicated weapons systems, the negotiating parties must be prepared to deal with complicated technical details. I commend to those of you who are interested in the exposition on a strategic vehicle freeze submitted by the United States delegation to the Geneva Conference last year to consult the verbatim record of the Conference's 211th meeting, held on 27 August 1964.¹

¹ Ibid., pp. 367-373.
59. It should be a matter of concern to all of us that this measure has not already been implemented, I believe. To halt the production race in the most dangerous of all weapons systems would be an accomplishment far more significant than any confidence-building measure possible at this time. And it is one that could be accomplished now. The United States continues to believe that this is an area for negotiation which holds great promise. We urge the USSR to join us in exploring further its possibilities. Our position is flexible. We are willing to consider constructive suggestions from any source. There is no reason, then, why the United States and the USSR could not jointly explore the area covered by this proposal, for it could show the way and open the door to reductions in all types of forces.

60. Let me turn now to our proposal for a halt in the production of fissionable material for weapons. This could be another important step that the nuclear Powers could take to halt the spiralling arms race at this time. During the discussions in Geneva we submitted, on 25 June 1964, a working paper on inspection procedures and arrangements for this measure. This paper was the result of an intensive study by my Government to develop an adequate verification system with a minimum amount of inspection.

61. Pending agreement on such a measure, the United States has sought to take such action as it could in this direction consistent with its security. As the President of my country indicated in two announcements last year concerning reduction in the planned production of fissionable materials, the United States is making reductions in the production of plutonium and U-235. Three of our production reactors have already been shut down and a fourth will be shut down later this year. The power level of the gaseous diffusion plants has already been reduced by 20 per cent. These reductions will continue until, by 1969, the United States will be producing enriched U-235 at a level of production 60 per cent lower than that planned before these cut-backs were announced.

62. We were encouraged by the announcement made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, on 21 April 1964, concerning reductions of planned USSR production. We presume we will hear from representatives of the USSR as to what progress they have made in this direction.

63. It is the desire of my Government to proceed faster to halt the "nuclear explosive" build-up. This, of course, can be done only by agreements. If such agreements can be reached, not only can we halt this central aspect of the arms race now, but we can begin immediately to reduce fissionable material stockpiles for weapons use.

1 Ibid., pp. 235-238.
2 Ibid., pp. 4, 165-166.
3 Ibid., pp. 166-168.
64. In conjunction with a cut-off in the production of fissionable material, the United States has proposed to transfer sizable, agreed quantities of such material to uses other than weapons. Moreover, we took into consideration the fact that we have been a producer of such material for a longer period than the USSR, and, therefore, we stated our willingness to consider unequal transfers. As an illustrative suggestion, we proposed that the United States transfer 60,000 kilogrammes of weapons grade U-235 to non-weapons use if the USSR would, for its part, transfer 40,000 kilogrammes.

65. Again we deeply regret that the response to this proposal has not been more affirmative. We believe the time is ripe for an agreement to reduce the existing supply of nuclear explosives for weapons, and to halt future production altogether.

66. I should like now to discuss another area in which none can deny that progress is urgently needed. I say "area" rather than "measure", because the problem cannot be dealt with by a single measure. I refer to the problem of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, which engaged the attention of the USSR representative this morning. We are here talking about one of the central consequences of the arms race about which we have been warning each other for over a decade. We may be approaching our last chance to halt the spread of nuclear weapons before effective action becomes impossible.

67. I am sure I need not dwell on the dangers of nuclear proliferation in such a meeting as this. Many thoughtful people are saying that to stop it while there is yet time is the most urgent test of international reason and co-operation the modern world has ever faced. A number of non-nuclear nations already have the potential to develop their own nuclear weapons. Yet the ability to make them is no assurance that the necessary effort and expenditure would be forthcoming to provide for the effective safety and control of such weapons. And, as the number of nuclear Powers increases, so does the possibility of irresponsible or irrational acts. Moreover, proliferation begets more proliferation. As each nation feels its security menaced by nuclear weapons next door, the political pressure rises to protect itself by the same means; and then the process will be repeated in the next nation, and so on. Thus, we face the possibility of nuclear anarchy.

68. We all recognize that the nuclear Powers have themselves an obligation to halt the build-up and begin the reduction of nuclear arms. After a decade of frustration a beginning has been made. Much more significant progress can and must be made in the near future if we are to grasp the opportunity now at hand.

69. My country has borne steadfastly the awesome responsibility that goes with being a major nuclear Power. We believe the USSR
also recognizes equally this responsibility. My country has in the past taken action in accord with this responsibility. I remind you that President Truman initiated the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1946, twenty years ago, designed to halt the spread of nuclear weapons until international control could be achieved. President Eisenhower proposed the Atoms for Peace Plan which led, in 1957, to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to assist in the peaceful uses of the atom and to protect against the diversion of materials to military purposes. President Kennedy's initiative in seeking the limited test-ban Treaty was further evidence of our determination to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and the dangers of fall-out from atmospheric tests.

70. The United States has, moreover, declared that it will take no action inconsistent with General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI) against proliferation. We have encouraged expansion of the IAEA system of safeguards to large reactors, and we have also urged that the IAEA should safeguard several peaceful nuclear projects we have helped other countries to build. We have offered the large power reactor in Rowe, Massachusetts, for IAEA inspection, and visits by inspectors from that international organization have already taken place.

71. Much has been accomplished, but as I say, much more is needed.

72. The initiation of a broad programme to halt the spread of nuclear weapons is essential. We believe that we must work together to that end while there is yet time; otherwise, the future depends on the exercise of a degree of self-restraint on which history offers little comfort.

73. What is needed now, and as soon as possible, is, I repeat, a non-proliferation agreement that will record our determination to avoid nuclear anarchy. The agreement should be consistent with General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI), adopted unanimously by the General Assembly in 1961. We need an agreement by which the nuclear Powers pledge themselves not to relinquish control of nuclear weapons or provide assistance necessary for their manufacture to nations not possessing them. And at the same time, the non-nuclear Powers would pledge themselves not to manufacture or seek or receive the assistance necessary for their manufacture, or otherwise acquire control of nuclear weapons. This would be a simple and effective act.

1 Public Law 585; 60 Stat. 755.
3 American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, pp. 915-933.
4 Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 694.
5 See ibid., 1964, pp. 66-68.
6 Ibid., pp. 214-221.
74. Moreover, the members of this Commission could indeed declare the intentions of their Governments to follow such a policy pending the time when a formal legal commitment for adherence by all has been drafted in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. The drafting of this solemn legal document should be given the highest priority when the Eighteen-Nation Committee resumes its work. Such an agreement has been delayed too long by alleged USSR concern frequently relating to discussions among the NATO Powers of a multilateral nuclear force. Why should we not conclude a non-proliferation agreement now and, by so doing, provide reassurance that any future nuclear arrangements among any group of allies will be consistent with the principle of non-dissemination?

75. As responsibility for the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons cannot be neglected, so also the security of nations that forgo nuclear weapons must be given consideration. For the United States, our President has stated:

The nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that, if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it.1

This important subject is of concern to many and should be considered more fully by the United Nations and by the principal nuclear Powers.

76. A further step in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban agreement. With respect to this, let me say that the long history of the test-ban negotiations is more familiar to some of you than to others. It is replete with high hopes and great disappointments, with fruitful and barren scientific and technical consultations. The negotiations occurred in a period when the expansion of existing knowledge in such relatively new fields as seismology both increased and lessened the problems of the negotiators.

77. Throughout this period the scientific progress we have made in detection and in identification capabilities has been reflected in the proposals covering underground testing that we have submitted. My Government has sought to speed up the assistance which science could give to the resolution of the remaining differences by the expenditure of many millions of dollars to improve scientific verification capabilities. We have made significant progress in this area. This progress will be reflected in our efforts to achieve a comprehensive test-ban agreement acceptable to all parties concerned.

78. While all present scientific evidence indicates that a number of inspections continues to be necessary to provide verification, the United States continues to be willing to explore what would constitute an adequate verification system in the light of these recent and pro-

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1 Ibid., p. 468.
spective developments in our capabilities for detection. If such exploration indicates that verification requirements can be satisfied by a different number and type of inspections from those previously discussed, we will take those facts into account gladly. We remain prepared to discuss these questions with the other parties primarily concerned.

79. We believe that the time is ripe for an agreement on a comprehensive test ban, an achievement that will be in the interest of all nations interested in stopping the arms race and the spread of nuclear weapons. We believe it is important that negotiations on this subject be resumed as soon as possible by the Eighteen-Nation Committee so that the work begun with the treaty signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963 can be completed.

80. I have not discussed in this statement all the subjects considered in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. I have not discussed the various proposals submitted by the USSR over the past several years which were restated in the USSR memorandum of 7 December. Suffice it to say at this point in our discussions that we have not, unfortunately, so far, been able to discover many areas for more fruitful discussion of these proposals. A number of them are not disarmament measures so much as proposals for bringing about strategic redeployments of forces in a manner which would obviously benefit the USSR, given its central location. This, of course, does not apply to those USSR proposals that are common to both sides; for here, in spite of differences that do exist, there is a prospect of agreement.

81. I should also say that while we discuss actions to be taken to limit and reverse the arms race, we should all be conscious of what we ourselves can do. Each nation has an obligation to make its contribution in the way that is in the first instance most immediate, that is to say, by its own actions. For its part, the United States has taken some actions which we hope will be reciprocated. I have mentioned the effort made by my Government that has resulted in reduction of military expenditures; I have noted the reductions in the planned production of fissionable material; and I have commented on the programme initiated to begin the reduction of B-47 strategic bombers from our active inventory.

82. In connexion with this last point I might observe that by mid-1966 the United States will have inactivated or destroyed over 2,000 B-47 bomber-type aircraft. I might also add that none have been provided as potential strategic nuclear vehicles to other countries. In addition, the United States will make a reduction during 1965 in the number of B-52 heavy bomber aircraft in the existing operational forces. These reductions also will be accomplished by the destruction of aircraft. Moreover, the United States now plans to forgo the

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1 Ibid., pp. 509-517.
construction of some Minutemen missiles which were included in our plans, as well as further increments of such missiles for the future.

83. Those are examples of restraint on the part of a nation which is capable, as I am sure everyone here knows, of far greater military production. There are limits, however, to the restraints or other actions that can be taken unilaterally without reciprocity. We believe that all nations should exercise restraint in the armament field. Indeed, we believe that it might be well for each nation to ask itself whether or not it could profitably engage in constructive discussions with its neighbours, either regionally or under other arrangements, to restrain the temptation for competition in arms. This might also apply to nations which do not have large military establishments but whose military establishments could be of concern to their neighbours.

84. I have attempted, as I have said, to summarize the United States position on certain specific measures which offer the prospect for constructive negotiations. I believe that it will be most constructive if we hear what each has to say during the opening meetings of this Commission and then attempt in all seriousness to ponder the prospects for some early action. We should, I believe, make a habit of listening to each other and not merely talking at each other. If we can but begin the process of disarmament, not only can we begin to dissipate the shadow of fear and mistrust that lies across our lands, but we can also press on with the massive task of meeting the social and economic needs of all our peoples.

85. My Government has great plans for improving the quality of our society and great hopes that more of the resources of our economy can, with safety, be redirected to those ends and to the creation of a safer, saner and better world.

86. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has given away billions in aid to others. We are proud of this effort, but it has taught us to dream of even further horizons for man's accomplishments. We believe that we and other nations must seek a massive redirection of the efforts of nations to meet the needs of the family of man.

87. The President of the United States made the following statement on 7 April, and I take the liberty of repeating it:

We often say how impressive power is. But I do not find it impressive at all. The guns and the bombs, the rockets and the warships, are all symbols of human failure. They are necessary symbols. They protect what we cherish. But they are witness to human folly.¹

88. We have had enough of human folly. But it will not surrender to pious hopes or to invective. It will surrender to men of goodwill

who work with sincerity, generosity and a decent respect for the concerns of others to redirect the course of history.


PREAMBLE

The States of the world,
Acting in accordance with the aspirations and will of the peoples,
Convinced that war cannot and must not serve as a method for settling international disputes, especially in the present circumstances of the precipitate development of means of mass annihilation such as nuclear weapons and rocket devices for their delivery, but must forever be banished from the life of human society,
Fulfilling the historic mission of saving all the nations from the horrors of war,
Basing themselves on the fact that general and complete disarmament under strict international control is a sure and practical way to fulfil mankind's age-old dream of ensuring perpetual and inviolable peace on earth,
Desirous of putting an end to the senseless waste of human labour on the creation of the means of annihilating human beings and of destroying material values,
Seeking to direct all resources towards ensuring a further increase in prosperity and socio-economic progress in all countries in the world,
Conscious of the need to build relations among States on the basis of the principles of peace, good-neighbourliness, equality of States and peoples, non-interference and respect for the independence and sovereignty of all countries,
Reaffirming their dedication to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,
Have resolved to conclude the present Treaty and to implement forthwith general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

1 DC/213/Add.: 1, Apr. 28, 1965. This is the revised Soviet draft treaty of Sept. 22, 1962 (Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 913-938) as amended Feb. 4, 1964 (ibid., 1964, p. 22). The Soviet Union also circulated, as DC/213/Add. 2, its memorandum of Dec. 7, 1964, on "measures for the further reduction of international tension and limitation of the arms race." This memorandum may be found in Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 509-517.
PART I. GENERAL

ARTICLE 1

Disarmament obligations

The States parties to the present Treaty solemnly undertake:

1. To carry out, over a period of five years, general and complete disarmament entailing:

   The disbanding of all armed forces and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form whatsoever;
   The prohibition and destruction of all stockpiles and the cessation of the production of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, including atomic hydrogen, chemical, biological and radiological weapons;
   The destruction and cessation of the production of all means of delivering weapons of mass destruction to their targets;
   The dismantling of all kinds of foreign military bases and the withdrawal and disbanding of all foreign troops stationed in the territory of any State;
   The abolition of any kind of military conscription for citizens;
   The cessation of military training of the population and the closing of all military training institutions;
   The abolition of war ministries, general staffs and their local agencies, and all other military and paramilitary establishments and organizations;
   The eliminating of all types of conventional armaments and military equipment and the cessation of their production, except for the production of strictly limited quantities of agreed types of light firearms for the equipment of the police (militia) contingents to be retained by States after the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament;
   The discontinuance of the appropriation of funds for military purposes, whether from States budgets or by organizations or private individuals.

2. To retain at their disposal, upon completion of general and complete disarmament, only strictly limited contingents of police (militia) equipped with light firearms and intended for the maintenance of internal order and for the discharge of their obligations with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter and under the provisions of article 37 of the present Treaty.

3. To carry out general and complete disarmament simultaneously in three consecutive stages, as set forth in parts 2, 3 and 4 of the present Treaty. Transition to a subsequent stage of disarmament shall take place after adoption by the International Disarmament
Organization of a decision confirming that all disarmament measures of the preceding stage have been carried out and verified and that any additional verification measures recognized to be necessary for the next stage have been prepared and can be put into operation when appropriate.

4. To carry out all measures of general and complete disarmament in such a way that at no stage of disarmament any State or group of States gains any military advantage and that the security of all States parties to the Treaty is equally safeguarded.

**Article 2**

**Control obligations**

1. The States parties to the Treaty solemnly undertake to carry out all disarmament measures, from beginning to end, under strict international control and to ensure the implementation in their territories of all control measures set forth in parts 2, 3 and 4 of the present Treaty.

2. Each disarmament measure shall be accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verification of that measure.

3. To implement control over disarmament, an International Disarmament Organization composed of all States parties to the Treaty shall be established within the framework of the United Nations. It shall begin operating as soon as disarmament measures are initiated. The structure and functions of the International Disarmament Organization and its bodies are laid down in part 5 of the present Treaty.

4. In all States parties to the Treaty the International Disarmament Organization shall have its own staff, recruited internationally and in such a way as to ensure the adequate representation of all three groups of States existing in the world.

   This staff shall exercise control on a temporary or permanent basis, depending on the nature of the measure being carried out, over the compliance by States with their obligations to reduce or eliminate armaments and the production of armaments and to reduce or disband their armed forces.

5. The States parties to the Treaty shall submit to the International Disarmament Organization in good time such information on their armed forces, armaments, military production and military appropriations as is necessary for the purpose of carrying out the measures of the stage concerned.

6. Upon completion of the programme of general and complete disarmament, the International Disarmament Organization shall be kept in being and shall exercise supervision over the fulfilment by States of the obligations they have assumed so as to prevent the
re-establishment of the military potential of States in any form whatsoever.

**ARTICLE 3**

**Obligations to maintain international peace and security**

1. The States parties to the Treaty solemnly confirm their resolve in the course of and after general and complete disarmament:
   
   (a) To base relations with each other on the principles of peaceful and friendly coexistence and co-operation;
   
   (b) Not to resort to the threat or use of force to settle any international disputes that may arise, but to use for this purpose the procedures provided for in the United Nations Charter;
   
   (c) To strengthen the United Nations as the principal institution for maintenance of peace and for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

2. The States parties to the Treaty undertake to refrain from using the contingents of police (militia) remaining at their disposal upon completion of general and complete disarmament for any purpose other than the safeguarding of their internal security or the discharge of their obligations for the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

**PART 2. FIRST STAGE OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT**

**ARTICLE 4**

**First stage tasks**

The States parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the first stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the simultaneous elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons and of all foreign military bases in alien territories, to withdraw all foreign troops from these territories and to reduce their armed forces, their conventional armaments and production of such armaments, and their military expenditure.
CHAPTER I. ELIMINATION OF THE MEANS OF DELIVERING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN MILITARY BASES IN ALIEN TERRITORIES, AND WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM THOSE TERRITORIES; CONTROL OVER SUCH MEASURES

A. Means of Delivery

Article 5

Elimination of rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons

1. All rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons of any calibre and range, whether strategic, operational and tactical, and pilotless aircraft of all types shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed, except for an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category; to be retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, exclusively in their own territory, until the end of the third stage. A strictly limited number of rockets to be converted to peaceful uses under the provisions of article 15 of the present Treaty shall also be retained.

All launching pads, silos and platforms for the launching of rockets and pilotless aircraft, other than those required for the missiles to be retained under the provisions of this article, shall be completely demolished. All instruments for the equipment, launching and guidance of rockets and pilotless aircraft shall be destroyed. All underground depots for such rockets, pilotless aircraft and auxiliary facilities shall be demolished.

2. The production of all kinds of rockets and pilotless aircraft and of the materials and instruments for their equipment, launching and guidance referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. All undertakings, or workshops thereof, engaged in their production shall be dismantled; machine tools and equipment specially and exclusively designed for the production of such items shall be destroyed; the premises of such undertakings as well as general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses. All proving grounds for tests of such rockets and pilotless aircraft shall be demolished.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

4. The production and testing of appropriate rockets for the peaceful exploration of space shall be allowed, provided that the plants producing such rockets, as well as the rockets themselves, will be subject to supervision by the inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.
Article 6

Elimination of military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons

1. All military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Military airfields serving as bases for such aircraft and repair and maintenance facilities and storage premises at such airfields shall be rendered inoperative or converted to peaceful uses. Training establishments for crews of such aircraft shall be closed.

2. The production of all military aircraft referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. Undertakings or workshops thereof designed for the production of such military aircraft shall be either dismantled or converted to the production of civil aircraft or other civilian goods.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

Article 7

Elimination of all surface warships capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons, and submarines

1. All surface warships capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons and submarines of all classes or types shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Naval bases and other installations for the maintenance of the above warships and submarines shall be demolished or dismantled and handed over to the merchant marine for peaceful uses.

2. The building of the warships and submarines referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. Shipyards and plants, wholly or partly designed for the building of such warships and submarines, shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful production.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

Article 8

Elimination of all artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivering nuclear weapons

1. All artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivering nuclear weapons shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. All auxiliary equipment and technical facilities designed for controlling the fire of such artillery systems shall be destroyed.
Surface storage premises and transport facilities for such systems shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. The entire stock of non-nuclear munitions for such artillery systems, whether at the gun site or in depots, shall be completely destroyed. Underground depots for such artillery systems and for the non-nuclear munitions thereof shall be destroyed.

2. The production of the artillery systems referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. To this end, all plants, or workshops thereof, engaged in the production of such systems shall be closed and dismantled. All specialized equipment and machine tools at these plants and workshops shall be destroyed, the remainder being converted to peaceful uses. The production of non-nuclear munitions for these artillery systems shall be discontinued. Plants and workshops engaged in the production of such munitions shall be completely dismantled and their specialized equipment destroyed.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

B. Foreign Military Bases and Troops in Alien Territories

**Article 9**

Dismantling of foreign military bases

1. Simultaneously with the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons under articles 5–8 of the present Treaty, the States parties to the Treaty which have army, air force or naval bases in foreign territories shall dismantle all such bases, whether principal or reserve bases, as well as all depot bases of any type. All personnel of such bases shall be evacuated to their national territory. All installations and armaments existing at such bases and coming under articles 5–8 of the present Treaty shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall either be destroyed on the spot in accordance with article 11 of the present Treaty or evacuated to the territory of the State which owned the base. All installations of a military nature at such bases shall be destroyed. The living quarters and auxiliary installations of foreign bases shall be transferred for civilian use to the States in whose territory they are located.

2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be fully applicable to military bases which are used by foreign troops but which may legally belong to the State in whose territory they are located. The said measures shall also be implemented with respect to army, air force and naval bases that have been set up under military treaties and agreements for use by other States or groups of States,
regardless of whether any foreign troops are present at those bases at
the time of the conclusion of the present Treaty.

All previous treaty obligations, decisions of the organs of military
blocs and any rights or privileges pertaining to the establishment or
use of military bases in foreign territories shall lapse and may not be
renewed. It shall henceforth be prohibited to grant military bases
for use by foreign troops and to conclude any bilateral or multilateral
treaties and agreements to this end.

3. The legislatures and Governments of the States parties to the
present Treaty shall enact legislation and issue regulations to ensure
that no military bases to be used by foreign troops are established in
their territory. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organi-
zation shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.

**Article 10**

**Withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories**

1. Simultaneously with the elimination of the means of delivering
nuclear weapons under articles 5–8 of the present Treaty, the States
parties to the Treaty which have troops or military personnel of any
nature in foreign territories shall withdraw all such troops and person-
nel from such territories. All armaments and all installations of a
military nature which are located at points where foreign troops are
stationed and which come under articles 5–8 of the present Treaty
shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall either be
destroyed on the spot in accordance with article 11 of the present
Treaty or evacuated to the territory of the State withdrawing its
troops. The living quarters and auxiliary installations previously
occupied by such troops or personnel shall be transferred for civilian
use to the States in whose territory such troops were stationed.

2. The measures set forth in paragraph 1 of this article shall be fully
applicable to foreign civilians employed in the armed forces or engaged
in the production of armaments or any other activities serving military
purposes in foreign territory.

Such persons shall be recalled to the territory of the State of which
they are citizens, and all previous treaty obligations, decisions by
organs of military blocs, and any rights or privileges pertaining to
their activities shall lapse and may not be renewed. It shall hence-
forth be prohibited to dispatch foreign troops, military personnel,
or the above-mentioned civilians to foreign territories.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall
verify the withdrawal of troops, the destruction of installations and
the transfer of the premises referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.
The International Disarmament Organization shall also have the
right to exercise control over the recall of the civilians referred to in paragraph 2 of this article. The laws and regulations referred to in paragraph 3 of article 9 of the present Treaty shall include provisions prohibiting citizens of States parties to the Treaty from serving in the armed forces or from engaging in any other activities serving military purposes in foreign States.

CHAPTER II. REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES, CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE; CONTROL OVER SUCH MEASURES

ARTICLE 11

Reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments

1. In the first stage of general and complete disarmament the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty shall be reduced to the following levels: United States of America—1,900,000 enlisted men, officers and civilian employees; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—1,900,000 enlisted men, officers and civilian employees. [Agreed force levels for other States parties to the Treaty shall be included in this article.]

2. The reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out in the first place through the demobilization of personnel released as a result of the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories, as provided for in articles 5–10 of the present Treaty, but chiefly through the complete disbandment of units and ships' crews, their officers and enlisted men being demobilized.

3. Conventional armaments, military equipment, munitions, means of transportation and auxiliary equipment in units and depots shall be reduced by 30 per cent for each type of all categories of these armaments. The reduced armaments, military equipment and munitions shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and auxiliary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds belonging to such units, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities.

4. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control at places where troops are being disbanded and released conventional armaments and military equipment are being destroyed, and shall also verify the conversion to peaceful uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.
**Article 12**

Reduction of conventional armaments production

1. The production of conventional armaments and munitions not coming under articles 5–8 of the present Treaty shall be reduced proportionately to the reduction of armed forces provided for in article 11 of the present Treaty. Such reduction shall be carried out primarily through the elimination of undertakings engaged exclusively in the production of such armaments and munitions. These undertakings shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and their premises and general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

**Article 13**

Reduction of military expenditure

1. The States parties to the present Treaty shall reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes proportionately to the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons and the discontinuance of their production, to the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories as well as to the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and to the reduction of the production of such armaments, as provided for in articles 5–12 of the present Treaty.

   The funds released through the implementation of the first-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. A certain portion of the funds thus released shall also be used for the provision of economic and technical assistance to under-developed countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article through its financial inspectors, to whom the States parties to the Treaty undertake to grant unimpeded access to the records of central financial institutions concerning the reduction in their budgetary appropriations resulting from the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign military bases and the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, and to the relevant decisions of their legislative and executive bodies.
CHAPTER III. MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF STATES

Article 14

Restrictions on the movement of means of delivering nuclear weapons

1. From the beginning of the first stage until the final destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons in accordance with articles 5–8 of the present Treaty, it shall be prohibited for any special devices capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to be placed in orbit or stationed in outer space, for warships or military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction to leave their territorial waters or to fly beyond the limits of their national territory.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over compliance by the States parties to the Treaty with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article. The States parties to the Treaty shall provide the International Disarmament Organization with advance information on all launching of rockets for peaceful purposes provided for in article 15 of the present Treaty, as well as on all movements of military aircraft within their national frontiers and of warships within their territorial waters.

Article 15

Control over launchings of rockets for peaceful purposes

1. The launching of rockets and space devices shall be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article through the establishment, at the sites for peaceful rocket launchings, of inspection teams which shall be present at the launchings and shall thoroughly examine every rocket or satellite before its launching.

Article 16

Prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons

The States parties to the Treaty which possess nuclear weapons undertake to refrain from transferring control over nuclear weapons and from transmitting information necessary for their production to States not possessing such weapons.

The States parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons undertake to refrain from producing or otherwise obtaining nuclear weapons and shall refuse to admit the nuclear weapons of any other State into their territories.
ARTICLE 17

Prohibition of nuclear tests

The conducting of nuclear tests of any kind shall be prohibited (if such a prohibition has not come into effect under other international agreements by the time this Treaty is signed).

ARTICLE 17a

Measures to reduce the danger of outbreak of war

1. From the commencement of the first stage, large-scale joint military movements or manoeuvres by armed forces of two or more States shall be prohibited.

The States parties to the Treaty agree to give advance notification of large-scale military movements or manoeuvres by their national armed forces within their national frontiers.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall exchange military missions between States or groups of States for the purpose of improving relations and mutual understanding between them.

3. The States parties to the Treaty agree to establish swift and reliable communication between their Heads of Government and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

4. The measures set forth in this article shall remain in effect after the first stage until the completion of general and complete disarmament.

ARTICLE 18

Measures to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security

1. With a view to ensuring that the United Nations is capable of effectively protecting States against threats to or breaches of the peace, all States parties to the Treaty shall, between the signing of the Treaty and its entry into force, conclude agreements with the Security Council by which they undertake to make available to the latter armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, as provided in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter.

2. The armed forces specified in the said agreements shall form part of the national armed forces of the States concerned and shall be stationed within their territories. They shall be kept up to full strength and shall be fully equipped and prepared for combat. When used under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, these forces, serving under the command of the military authorities of the States concerned, shall be placed at the disposal of the Security Council.
CHAPTER IV. TIME LIMITS FOR FIRST-STAGE MEASURES; TRANSITION FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND STAGE

ARTICLE 19

Time limits for first-stage measures

1. The first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be initiated six months after the Treaty comes into force (in accordance with article 46), within which period the International Disarmament Organization shall be set up.

2. The duration of the first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be eighteen months.

ARTICLE 20

Transition from the first to the second stage

In the course of the last three months of the first stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of the first-stage measures of general and complete disarmament with a view to submitting a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

PART 3. SECOND STAGE OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

ARTICLE 21

Second stage tasks

The States parties to the Treaty shall undertake, in the course of the second stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and to make a further reduction in their armed forces, conventional armaments and production of such armaments, and military expenditure.

CHAPTER V. ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS; CONTROL OVER SUCH MEASURES

ARTICLE 22

Elimination of nuclear weapons

1. (a) Nuclear weapons of all kinds, types and capacities, with the exception of the warheads pertaining to missiles temporarily retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of
America under article 5, paragraph 1, of this Treaty, shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Fissile materials extracted from weapons, whether directly attached to units or stored in various depots, shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for direct reconstitution into weapons and shall form a special stock for peaceful uses, belonging to the State which previously owned the nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear components of such weapons shall be completely destroyed.

All depots and special storage spaces for nuclear weapons shall be demolished.

(b) All stockpiles of nuclear materials intended for the production of nuclear weapons shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for direct use in nuclear weapons and shall be transferred to the above-mentioned special stocks.

(c) Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures to eliminate nuclear weapons referred to above in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

2. (a) The production of nuclear weapons and of fissile materials for weapons purposes shall be completely discontinued. All plants, installations and laboratories specially designed for the production of nuclear weapons or their components shall be eliminated or converted to production for peaceful purposes. All workshops, installations and laboratories for the production of the components of nuclear weapons at plants that are partially engaged in the production of such weapons shall be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes.

(b) The measures for the discontinuance of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissile materials for weapons purposes referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above shall be implemented under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to inspect all undertakings which extract raw materials for atomic production or which produce or use fissile materials or atomic energy.

The States parties to the Treaty shall make available to the International Disarmament Organization documents pertaining to the extraction and processing of nuclear raw materials and to their utilization for military or peaceful purposes.

3. Each State party to the Treaty shall, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, enact legislation completely prohibiting nuclear weapons and making any attempt by individuals or organizations to reconstitute such weapons a criminal offence.
ARTICLE 23

Elimination of chemical, biological and radiological weapons

1. All types of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, whether directly attached to units or stored in various depots and storage places, shall be eliminated from the arsenals of States and destroyed (neutralized). All instruments and facilities for the combat use of such weapons, all special facilities for their transportation, and all special devices and facilities for their storage and conservation shall simultaneously be destroyed.

2. The production of all types of chemical, biological and radiological weapons and of all means and devices for their combat use, transportation and storage shall be completely discontinued. All plants, installations and laboratories that are wholly or partly engaged in the production of such weapons shall be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes.

3. The measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be implemented under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

CHAPTER VI. FURTHER REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES, CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES; CONTROL OVER SUCH MEASURES

ARTICLE 24

Further reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments

1. In the second stage of general and complete disarmament the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty shall be further reduced to the following levels: United States of America—one million enlisted men, officers and civilian employees; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—one million enlisted men, officers and civilian employees. [Agreed force levels for other States parties to the Treaty shall be included in this article.]

The reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out in the first place through the demobilization of personnel previously manning the nuclear or other weapons subject to elimination under articles 22 and 23 of the present Treaty, but chiefly through the complete disbandment of units and ships' crews, their officers and enlisted men being demobilized.

2. Conventional armaments, military equipment, munitions, means of transportation and auxiliary equipment in units and depots shall be reduced by 35 per cent from the original levels for each type of all categories of these armaments. The reduced armaments, military equipment and munitions shall be destroyed, and the means of
transportation and auxiliary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds belonging to such units, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities.

3. As in the implementation of such measures in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control at places where troops are being disbanded and released conventional armaments and military equipment are being destroyed, and shall also verify the conversion to peaceful uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

**Article 25**

**Further reduction of conventional armaments production**

1. The production of conventional armaments and munitions shall be reduced proportionately to the reduction of armed forces provided for in article 24 of the present Treaty. Such reduction shall, as in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, be carried out primarily through the elimination of undertakings engaged exclusively in the production of such armaments and munitions. These undertakings shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and their premises and general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses.

2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

**Article 26**

**Further reduction of military expenditure**

1. The States parties to the Treaty shall further reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes proportionately to the destruction of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons and the discontinuance of the production of such weapons as well as to the further reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and the reduction of the production of such armaments, as provided for in articles 22-25 of the present Treaty.

The funds released through the implementation of the second-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. A certain portion of the funds thus released shall also be used for the provision of economic and technical assistance to under-developed
countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. Control over the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 13 of the present Treaty. Financial inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall also be granted unimpeded access to records concerning the reduction in the budgetary appropriations of States resulting from the elimination of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

CHAPTER VII. MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF STATES

Article 27

Continued strengthening of the capacity of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security

The States parties to the Treaty shall continue to implement the measures referred to in article 18 of the present Treaty regarding the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council for use under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter.

CHAPTER VIII. TIME LIMITS FOR SECOND-STAGE MEASURES; TRANSITION FROM THE SECOND TO THE THIRD STAGE

Article 28

Time limits for second-stage measures

The duration of the second stage of general and complete disarmament shall be twenty-four months.

Article 29

Transition from the second to the third stage

In the course of the last three months of the second stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of this stage.

Measures for the transition from the second to the third stage of general and complete disarmament shall be similar to the corresponding measures for the first stage, as laid down in article 20 of the present Treaty.
PART 4. THIRD STAGE OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

ARTICLE 30

Third stage tasks

The States parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the third stage of general and complete disarmament, fully to disband all their armed forces and thereby to complete the elimination of the military machinery of States.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America undertake to complete the total elimination of all the missiles and the nuclear warheads pertaining thereto, which remained at their disposal under article 5, paragraph 1, of this Treaty.

CHAPTER IX. COMPLETION OF THE ELIMINATION OF THE MILITARY MACHINERY OF STATES; CONTROL OVER SUCH MEASURES

ARTICLE 31

Completion of the elimination of armed forces and conventional armaments

1. With a view to completing the process of the elimination of armed forces, the States parties to the Treaty shall disband the entire personnel of the armed forces which remained at their disposal after the accomplishment of the first two stages of disarmament. The system of military reserves of each State party to the Treaty shall be completely abolished.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall destroy all types of armaments, military equipment and munitions, whether held by the troops or in depots, that remained at their disposal after the accomplishment of the first two stages of the Treaty. All military equipment which cannot be converted to peaceful uses shall be destroyed.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the disbanding of troops and over the destruction of armaments and military equipment, and shall control the conversion to peaceful uses of transport and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

The International Disarmament Organization shall have access to documents pertaining to the disbanding of all personnel of the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty.
Article 32

Complete cessation of military production

1. Military production at factories and plants shall be discontinued, with the exception of the production of agreed types and quantities of light firearms for the purposes referred to in article 36, paragraph 2, of the present Treaty. The factories and plants subject to elimination shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and the premises, general purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses. All scientific research in the military field at all scientific and research institutions and at designing offices shall be discontinued. All blueprints and other documents necessary for the production of the weapons and military equipment subject to elimination shall be destroyed.

All orders placed by military departments with national or foreign government undertakings and private firms for the production of armaments, military equipment, munitions and material shall be cancelled.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 33

Abolition of military establishments

1. War ministries, general staffs and all other military and paramilitary organizations and institutions for the purpose of organizing the military effort of States parties to the Treaty shall be abolished. The States parties to the Treaty shall:

   (a) Demobilize all personnel of these institutions and organizations;
   (b) Abrogate all laws, rules and regulations governing the organization of the military effort and the status, structure and activities of such institutions and organizations;
   (c) Destroy all documents pertaining to the planning of the mobilization and operational deployment of the armed forces in time of war.

2. The entire process of the abolition of military and paramilitary institutions and organizations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

Article 34

Abolition of military conscription and military training

In accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, the States parties to the Treaty shall enact legislation prohibiting all
military training, abolishing military conscription and all other forms of recruiting the armed forces, and discontinuing all military courses for reservists. All establishments and organizations dealing with military training shall simultaneously be disbanded in accordance with article 33 of the present Treaty. The disbanding of all military training institutions and organizations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

**Article 35**

Prohibition of the appropriation of funds for military purposes

1. The appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form, whether by government bodies or private individuals and social organizations, shall be discontinued.

The funds released through the implementation of general and complete disarmament shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction or complete abolition of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. A certain portion of the funds thus released shall also be used for the provision of economic and technical assistance to under-developed countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. For the purpose of organizing control over the implementation of the provisions of this article, the International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access to the legislative and budgetary documents of the States parties to the present Treaty.

**Article 35a**

Elimination of missiles and of nuclear warheads pertaining thereto, retained until the end of the third stage

1. At the end of the third stage there shall be carried out the elimination of all intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the ground-to-air category retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in accordance with the provisions of article 5, paragraph 1, of this Treaty, together with the nuclear warheads, launching devices and guiding systems.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the implementation of the measures referred to above in paragraph 1.
CHAPTER X. MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF STATES AND TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL PEACE

**Article 36**

**Contingents of police (militia)**

1. After the complete abolition of armed forces, the States parties to the Treaty shall be entitled to have strictly limited contingents of police (militia), equipped with light firearms, to maintain internal order, including the safeguarding of frontiers and the personal security of citizens, and to provide for compliance with their obligations in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

   The strength of these contingents of police (militia) for each State party to the Treaty shall be as follows:

   2. The States parties to the Treaty shall be allowed to manufacture strictly limited quantities of light firearms intended for such contingents of police (militia). The list of plants producing such arms, the quotas and types for each party to the Treaty shall be specified in a special agreement.

   3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over compliance by the States parties to the Treaty with their obligations with regard to the restricted production of the said light firearms.

**Article 37**

**Police (militia) units to be made available to the Security Council**

1. The States parties to the Treaty undertake to place at the disposal of the Security Council, on its request, units from the contingents of police (militia) retained by them, as well as to provide assistance and facilities, including rights of passage. The placing of such units at the disposal of the Security Council shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. In order to ensure that urgent military measures may be undertaken, the States parties to the Treaty shall maintain in a state of immediate readiness those units of their police (militia) contingents which are intended for joint international enforcement action. The size of the units which the States parties to the Treaty undertake to place at the disposal of the Security Council as well as the areas where such units are to be stationed shall be specified in agreements to be concluded by those States with the Security Council.

2. The command of the units referred to in paragraph 1 shall be composed of representatives of the three principal groups of States
existing in the world on the basis of equal representation. It shall decide all questions by agreement among its members representing all three groups of States.

**ARTICLE 38.**

Control over the prevention of the re-establishment of armed forces

1. The police (militia) contingents retained by the States parties to the Treaty after the completion of general and complete disarmament shall be under the control of the International Disarmament Organization, which shall verify the reports by States concerning the areas where such contingents are stationed, concerning the strength and armaments of the contingents in each such area, and concerning all movements of substantial contingents of police (militia).

2. For the purpose of ensuring that armed forces and armaments abolished as a result of general and complete disarmament are not re-established, the International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access at any time to any point within the territory of each State party to the Treaty.

3. The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to institute a system of aerial inspection and aerial photography over the territories of the States parties to the Treaty.

**CHAPTER XI. TIME LIMITS FOR THIRD-STAGE MEASURES**

**ARTICLE 39**

The third stage of general and complete disarmament shall be completed over a period of one year. During the last three months of this stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of the third-stage measures of general and complete disarmament with a view to submitting a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

**PART 5. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT ORGANIZATION**

**ARTICLE 40**

Functions and main bodies

The International Disarmament Organization to be set up under article 2, paragraph 3, of the present Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the “Organization,” shall consist of a Conference of all States parties to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the “Conference,” and a Control Council, hereinafter referred to as the “Council.”
The Organization shall deal with questions pertaining to the supervision of compliance by States with their obligations under the present Treaty. All questions connected with the safeguarding of international peace and security which may arise in the course of the implementation of the present Treaty, including preventive and enforcement measures, shall be decided by the Security Council in conformity with its powers under the United Nations Charter.

**Article 41**

**The Conference**

1. The Conference shall comprise all States parties to the Treaty. It shall hold regular sessions at least once a year and special sessions, which may be convened by decision of the Council or at the request of a majority of the States parties to the Treaty with a view to considering matters connected with the implementation of effective control over disarmament. The sessions shall be held at the headquarters of the Organization, unless otherwise decided by the Conference.

2. Each State party to the Treaty shall have one vote. Decisions on questions of procedure shall be taken by a simple majority and on all other matters by a two-thirds majority. In accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty, the Conference shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

3. The Conference may discuss any matters pertaining to measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament and may make recommendations to the States parties to the Treaty and to the Council on any such matter or measure.

4. The Conference shall:

   (a) Elect non-permanent members of the Council;

   (b) Consider the annual, and any special, reports of the Council;

   (c) Approve the budget recommended by the Council;

   (d) Approve reports to be submitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations;

   (e) Approve amendments to the present Treaty in accordance with article 47 of the present Treaty;

   (f) Take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the Conference for this purpose by the Council;

   (g) Propose matters for consideration by the Council and request from the Council reports on any matter relating to the functions of the Council.
ARTICLE 42

The Control Council

1. The Council shall consist of:

   (a) The five States which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council;
   (b) . . . [number] other States parties to the Treaty, elected by the Conference for a period of two years.

   The composition of the Council must ensure proper representation of the three principal groups of States existing in the world.

2. The Council shall:

   (a) Provide practical guidance for the measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament; set up such bodies at the headquarters of the Organization as it deems necessary for the discharge of its functions; establish procedures for their operation, and devise the necessary rules and regulations in accordance with the present Treaty;
   (b) Submit to the Conference annual reports and such special reports as it deems necessary to prepare;
   (c) Maintain constant contact with the United Nations Security Council as the organ bearing the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; periodically inform it of the progress achieved in the implementation of general and complete disarmament, and promptly notify it of any infringements by the States parties to the Treaty of their disarmament obligations under the present Treaty;
   (d) Review the implementation of the measures included in each stage of general and complete disarmament with a view to submitting a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations;
   (e) Recruit the staff of the Organization on an international basis so as to ensure that the three principal groups of States existing in the world are adequately represented. The personnel of the Organization shall be recruited from among persons who are recommended by Governments and who may or may not be citizens of the country of the recommending Government;
   (f) Prepare and submit to the Conference the annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Organization;
   (g) Draw up instructions by which the various control bodies are to be guided in their work;
   (h) Make a prompt study of incoming reports;
   (i) Request from States such information on their armed forces and armaments as may be necessary for control over the implementation of the disarmament measures provided for by the present Treaty;
(j) Perform such other functions as are envisaged in the present Treaty.

3. Each member of the Council shall have one vote. Decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be taken by a simple majority, and on other matters by a two-thirds majority.

4. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. The Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure and shall be authorized to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

**Article 43**

**Privileges and immunities**

The Organization, its personnel and representatives of the States parties to the Treaty shall enjoy in the territory of each State party to the Treaty such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of independent and unrestricted control over the implementation of the present Treaty.

**Article 44**

**Finances**

1. All the expenses of the Organization shall be financed from the funds allocated by the States parties to the Treaty. The budget of the Organization shall be drawn up by the Council and approved by the Conference in accordance with article 41, paragraph 4 (c), and article 42, paragraph 2 (f), of the present Treaty.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall contribute funds to cover the expenditure of the Organization according to the following scale:

   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

   [The agreed scale of contributions shall be included in the present article.]

**Article 45**

**Preparatory Commission**

Immediately after the signing of the present Treaty, the States represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament shall set up a Preparatory Commission for the purpose of taking practical steps to establish the International Disarmament Organization.
PART 6. FINAL CLAUSES

ARTICLE 46

Ratification and entry into force

The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States in accordance with their constitutional procedures within a period of six months from the date of its signature, and shall come into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification with the United Nations Secretariat by all the States which are permanent members of the Security Council, as well as by those States that are their allies in bilateral and multilateral military alliances, and by . . . [number] non-aligned States.

ARTICLE 47

Amendments

Any proposal to amend the text of the present Treaty shall come into force after it has been adopted by a two-thirds majority at a Conference of all States parties to the Treaty and has been ratified by the States referred to in article 46 of the present Treaty in accordance with their constitutional procedures.

ARTICLE 48

Authentic texts

The present Treaty, done in the Russian, English, French, Chinese- and Spanish languages, all texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited with the United Nations Secretariat, which shall transmit certified copies thereof to all the signatory States.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed the present Treaty.

Done at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

United States Memorandum Submitted to the Disarmament Commission: Measures To Stop the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Halt and Turn Down the Arms Race, and Reduce International Tension, April 29, 1965

A. Measures to stop the spread of nuclear weapons

President Johnson’s proposal to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament:

1 DC/214/Add.1, Apr. 29, 1962, pp. 2–14. This document also included the texts of President Johnson’s message of Jan. 21, 1964, to the ENDC (Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 7–9) and the revised U.S. treaty outline (infra).
To stop the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now controlling them, let us agree:

(a) that nuclear weapons not be transferred into the national control of States which do not now control them, and that all transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes take place under effective international safeguards;

(b) that the major nuclear powers accept in an increasing number of their peaceful nuclear activities the same inspection they recommend for other States; and

(c) on the banning of all nuclear weapons tests under effective verification and control.

Elaboration of proposal (a) by William C. Foster, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in a statement to the ENDC on 6 February 1964:

... my Government voted in favour of the Irish resolution (A/RES.1665 (XVI)) unanimously adopted by the sixteenth session of the General Assembly.1 You will recall that that resolution calls upon all States, and in particular upon the States at present possessing nuclear weapons, to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement under which nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons to States not possessing such weapons. The agreement called for by the Irish resolution would also contain provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons. The United States has long sought an agreement which would implement the terms of the Irish resolution.

We wish to make it clear that the creation of multilateral defence forces within the framework of existing collective security arrangements would not result in additional States obtaining national control of nuclear weapons. The creation of such forces would be fully consistent with the Irish resolution and would, in fact, reinforce common policies to prevent wider dissemination of national nuclear weapon capabilities.

... As an immediate step and to facilitate progress in these discussions, the United States, for its part, does not intend to take any actions inconsistent with the terms of the Irish resolution. That is the declared policy of the United States.2

Elaboration of President Johnson's proposals (a) and (b) (quoted above) by Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in a statement to the ENDC, 5 March 1964:

At present only a few countries can produce nuclear weapons. It is in the interest of all the world that their number not be increased.

An increasingly large number of countries have peaceful nuclear programmes. It is in the interest of all that their number continue to increase.

However, without effective safeguards, the materials and technology which are acquired for peaceful uses of nuclear energy may be diverted to produce nuclear weapons...
The United States has given its strong support to the development of an effective system of international safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The United States bilateral system is fully consistent with that IAEA system.

It is the policy of the United States to transfer the administration of safeguards under its existing bilateral agreements to the IAEA as rapidly as possible.

Some two years ago, the IAEA was also invited by the United States to apply Agency safeguards to several of its own smaller research and power reactors.

The United States does not believe that the opening of these reactors to international inspection is a derogation of its national sovereignty. Nor is the safeguard system onerous. It involves record-keeping, reporting, and inspection—the same kind of controls as prudent management would naturally set up internally.

I should now like to develop further the United States proposals regarding international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities.

First, the United States proposes that all future transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes take place under effective international safeguards. We believe that this proposal could be implemented by appropriate agreements, which would grow out of this Conference, covering all such future transfers. Fissionable materials or raw materials or equipment essential to the production of fissionable materials would be covered.

Suppliers would agree to transfer materials and equipment only under IAEA safeguards or similar arrangements.

Recipients would agree to receive materials or equipment only under such safeguarded arrangements.

Provisions relating to open technology and authorized visits by scientists for study and observation might also be included.

We believe that the agreement regarding transfers should, in addition, provide for the extension of IAEA or similar safeguards to an increasing number of the peaceful-use facilities of all States receiving assistance.

Second, the United States proposes that the major nuclear Powers accept in an increasing number of their own peaceful nuclear activities the same inspection as recommended for other States.

As a first step in that direction, the United States has already accepted IAEA safeguards on certain of its peaceful-use facilities, as I have described previously.

As a second step, the United States will invite the IAEA to apply safeguards to a large power reactor in the United States. The Yankee power reactor at Rowe, Massachusetts, has been selected for this purpose. This privately-owned reactor, which is rated at a power level of 600,000 thermal kilowatts, is one of the largest nuclear power reactors in operation in the United States. In 1963 it produced over 1 billion electrical kilowatt hours.

We are offering the Yankee reactor for IAEA inspection for two reasons. First, it will assist the IAEA further in developing and demonstrating the effectiveness of its inspection techniques for large reactor facilities. Second, we intend it as an example to other nuclear Powers. We hope that other States will join us in this step and invite the application of IAEA safeguards on some of their
large civil reactors; indeed, we urge them, and in particular we urge the Soviet Union, to do so.¹

Elaboration of President Johnson's proposal for a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests by William C. Foster, Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in a statement to the ENDC on 3 September 1964:

One way in which we can realistically hope to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war is by continuing our efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to nations which do not now have them. If we are concerned now about the danger of a nuclear holocaust when there are only four nuclear Powers, what will our concern be when there are five, ten or twenty?

A comprehensive test ban is one important way of dealing with this problem....

A comprehensive ban would of course prevent all testing by signatories. It would thereby severely inhibit efforts by them to acquire the knowledge and the ability to make nuclear weapons. For that reason my Government believes that a verified agreement banning all nuclear weapon tests is an urgent necessity. The Committee will remember that President Johnson has twice this year proposed such a ban (ENDC/119, 120). Concerning that proposal I have three points to make.

First: since the limited nuclear test-ban treaty was signed, our scientists have continued to press forward with research into the problems of nuclear test detection and identification. My Government's Vela research programme² costs more than $50 million a year, and much of this is devoted to the detection and identification of underground nuclear tests. However, no technical advances have been reported by our scientists which would justify modification of the United States position that on-site inspections are essential. Therefore, the requirement for on-site inspection to verify compliance with a ban on underground nuclear tests still exists...

Second: the Soviet Union has withdrawn the offer of two to three on-site inspections, made by Premier Khrushchev in a letter to President Kennedy on 19 December 1962.³ On 20 August the representative of the Soviet Union stated again that his Government was prepared to agree to a comprehensive test ban—

...without the establishment of international control but with the use of national means of detection for the verification of compliance with the agreement banning nuclear tests underground.⁴

We do not believe that this step backward by the Soviet Union can be justified on scientific or technical grounds. Indeed, the Soviet Government has not seen fit to share with other nations any new technical or seismological data which might conceivably support its present position.⁵

¹ Ibid., pp. 79-82. For the U.S.-IAEA agreement on inspection of the Yankee reactor, see ibid., pp. 214-221.
³ Ibid., pp. 1239-1242.
⁴ Ibid., 1964, p. 366.
⁵ Ibid., pp. 387-389.
B. A verified cutoff in the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, and a transfer of such materials to peaceful uses

President Johnson’s proposal to the ENDC:

The United States believes that a verified agreement to halt all production of fissionable materials for weapons use would be a major contribution to world peace. Moreover, while we seek agreement on this measure, the United States is willing to achieve prompt reductions through both sides closing comparable production facilities on a plant-by-plant basis, with mutual inspection. We have started in this direction—we hope the Soviet Union will do the same—and we are prepared to accept appropriate international verification of the reactor shut-down already scheduled in our country.

Elaboration of that proposal by William C. Foster to the ENDC on 13 February 1964:

Regarding the cutoff, the United States is willing to agree to either a complete halt in the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons or a reciprocal plant-by-plant shut-down. This approach seems to embrace the entire range of possible methods of bringing a cutoff into effect. We are prepared to halt production all at once or over a period of time. We would welcome an indication from the Soviet delegation of the sort of approach which they would find acceptable.

Regarding the transfer, the United States position is similarly flexible. The proposal originally put forward by the United States called for the transfer to non-weapon uses of the same quantity of weapons-grade U-235 by both sides. We have, however, indicated our willingness to consider other ratios whereby the United States would transfer a larger amount than the Soviet Union.

... This might be for the United States to transfer an amount such as 60,000 kilograms if the Soviet Union would agree to transfer 40,000 kilograms. We are still flexible on the question of amounts of weapons-grade U-235 to be removed from availability for nuclear weapons. We would welcome and give serious consideration to any reasonable Soviet counter-proposal.

This proposal is not merely a gesture. Some figures illustrate its scope. As examples, the approximate monetary value of 60,000 kilograms of weapons-grade U-235 is $720 million. If completely fissioned in explosions, 60,000 kilograms would release about 1,000 megatons, or one third of a ton of TNT equivalent for every man, woman, and child on earth. On the other hand, if the 60,000 kilograms were completely converted to electrical energy in nuclear power reactors, it would produce 370 billion kilowatt-hours, or somewhat more than one third as much as the entire United States production of electrical energy in 1963. These figures give some idea of the dimensions of the United States proposal.

Now I should like to consider some of the possible methods of verifying the cutoff. One of the reasons why the United States delegation believes that this proposal is promising is because the inspection required can be limited in scope.

For example, inspection of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons would not be necessary.

The extent of inspection initially required would depend on whether the Soviet Union preferred a complete halt in the production of fissionable materials for weapons or a reciprocal plant-by-plant shut-down.
If a complete production cutoff were agreed upon, the International Atomic Energy Agency might monitor declared facilities for the production of fissionable material.

Those facilities declared to have been shut down would be inspected to make sure that no production of fissionable materials was taking place. Other declared facilities might continue to produce fissionable materials for peaceful purposes. These facilities and the produced materials would be monitored to ensure that no such product was diverted to the fabrication of nuclear weapons.

Each side would also need to have assurance that the other was not engaging in clandestine production at undeclared facilities. We believe that inspection to guard against this possibility could be carried out on a reciprocal basis. We also believe that a reciprocal system could be devised that would not be onerous.

If, on the other hand, production were halted on a plant-by-plant basis by the United States and the Soviet Union, inspection would be even more limited at the outset. Only the plant or plants actually shut down would be inspected. The possibilities of International Atomic Energy Agency inspection of a plant-by-plant shut-down appear promising to us also, and we believe they should be carefully explored.

Elaboration of President Johnson's action in closing facilities for the production of fissionable material for use in weapons by Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to the ENDC on 21 April 1964:

President Johnson, in the third point of his message to this conference when it reconvened on 21 January of this year, mentioned not only a cutoff of production of fissionable materials for weapons use but also a cutback in the production of such materials, as a possible major contribution towards world peace. These subjects—both a cutoff and a cutback—have been put before the conference and have been discussed both at private meetings and in plenary session. Therefore, on behalf of the United States, I am happy to be able to point to concrete steps being taken to turn down the arms race in this area.

Yesterday President Johnson announced:

I am taking two actions today which reflect both our desire to reduce tensions and our unwillingness to risk weakness. I have ordered a further substantial reduction in our production of enriched uranium, to be carried out over a 4-year period. When added to previous reductions, this will mean an over-all decrease in the production of plutonium by 20 per cent, and of enriched uranium by 40 per cent. By bringing production in line with need . . . we think we will reduce tensions while we maintain all the necessary power.

In reaching these decisions, I have been in close consultation with Prime Minister Douglas-Home. Simultaneously with my announcement now, Chairman Khrushchev is releasing a statement in Moscow, at 2 o'clock our time, in which he makes definite commitments to steps toward a more peaceful world. He agrees to discontinue the construction of two big new atomic reactors for the production of plutonium over the next several years, to reduce substantially the production of U-235 for nuclear weapons and to allocate more fissionable material for peaceful uses.

This is not disarmament. This is not a declaration of peace. But it is a hopeful sign and it is a step forward which we welcome and which we can take

\[1\text{Ibid., pp. 46-48. See also U.S. working paper of June 25, 1964 (ibid., pp. 235-238).}\]
in hope that the world may yet, one day, live without the fear of war. At the same time, I have reaffirmed all the safeguards against weakening our nuclear strength which we adopted at the time of the test ban treaty.¹

C. A verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic aircraft and missiles for carrying nuclear weapons

President Johnson's proposal to the ENDC:

While we continue our efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, we must first endeavour to halt further increases in strategic armaments now. The United States, the Soviet Union and their respective allies should agree to explore a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. For our part, we are convinced that the security of all nations can be safeguarded within the scope of such an agreement and that this initial measure preventing the further expansion of the deadly and costly arms race will open the path to reductions in all types of forces from present levels.

Elaboration of this proposal by William C. Foster in a statement to the ENDC on 31 January 1964:

This proposal is patterned after measures which have already been successfully negotiated, measures having a common general philosophy. This philosophy is that a logical first step is to freeze things where they are and thereby remove future obstacles to disarmament. This philosophy lay behind the Antarctic Treaty,² which was easier to achieve because Antarctica was still free of armaments. It lay behind the resolution against nuclear weapons in orbit,³ which was easier to achieve because space was still free of weapons of mass destruction.

President Johnson's ["freeze"] . . . would halt the race for more and better strategic nuclear vehicles and open the path to reductions from present levels in all types of forces. Where the test ban treaty limited warhead size, and the United States proposal for a fissionable material cutoff would limit the amount of explosive materials available for warheads, the present proposal would limit numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear vehicles.

We suggest that the specifics of the freeze be explored by allies on both sides before detailed negotiations are undertaken. For our part, of course, we would give weight to the general reaction which delegations may wish to express here in the near future. To assist in their consideration, we suggest that the following be explored:

First, the freeze should, we believe, include strategic missiles and aircraft . . .

Secondly, the United States believes the freeze should also include antiballistic missile systems . . . .

Thirdly, the immediate objective of the freeze on numbers should be to maintain the quantities of strategic nuclear vehicles held by the East and the West at constant levels . . . .

¹ Mr. Fisher's statement appears ibid., pp. 169-170. For the President's statement, see ibid., pp. 165-166.


³ Ibid., 1963, p. 538.
Fourthly, the objective of the freeze on characteristics should be, the United States believes, to prevent the development and deployment of strategic vehicles of a significantly new type . . . .

Fifthly, as I have already indicated, we have singled out strategic vehicles partly because we believe that the verification requirements would be less onerous than for a production freeze on the entire range of major armaments included within our general and complete disarmament plan . . . .

The freeze we wish to explore would have important advantages for all States. It would curb a key area of the arms race; it would inhibit development of costly, new, and more destructive weapon systems; it would be an accomplishment far beyond any "confidence building" measure in significance, yet one that could be achieved in a reasonable period of time; it would lay a firm basis for the achievement of the balanced reductions contemplated in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles; it would tend to reduce any fears which may exist that either side could achieve a decisive first-strike capability; it would permit significant reduction of military expenditures; it would help to reduce tensions and accelerate the forward movement toward general disarmament.

D. A verified “bomber bonfire” of U.S. B-47 and Soviet TU-16 aircraft

United States proposal made and elaborated by Adrian S. Fisher to the ENDC on 19 March 1964:

Today I should like to present to the Committee a proposal for the physical destruction of armaments. The arms we propose to destroy are of real significance. They are bomber aircraft which can carry weapons of immense destructive capability. Agreement on and implementation of this measure would present a graphic example of armament reduction to the entire world.

The United States proposes destruction by the United States and the Soviet Union of an equal number of B-47 and TU-16 bombers. We propose that this destruction be carried out at the rate of twenty per month on each side, the bombers to be taken from the operational inventory. We are prepared to continue destruction of these bombers at this rate for a period of two years. In addition, we are prepared to increase the total number destroyed by adding to the monthly quota an additional agreed number to be taken from bombers stored and preserved for emergency mobilization.

We are prepared to negotiate the manner in which this destruction will be verified. The verification should be relatively simple. It should include no more than the observation of the destruction of the monthly quota of agreed bombers from each country at designated depots.

The B-47 bomber which we are ready to destroy as our part of this agreement is a truly formidable weapon. The B-47 is a six-engine jet bomber which can fly over 4,000 miles without refuelling. With in-flight refuelling, it is an intercontinental bomber. It can carry a multi-megaton bomb load. We can gather some measure of the danger of our times by noting that the explosive yield from the bomb load of one B-47 is greater than that from all bombs dropped by all bombers in the Second World War.

As long as such bombers remain in existence in the hands of the nuclear Powers—whether actually flying or stored so that they can easily be rendered flyable—they remain a substantial factor of military power. In the hands of non-nuclear nuclear

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1 Ibid., 1964, pp. 17-21. See also ibid., pp. 157-162, 367-373.
Powers—and used without nuclear weapons—these planes are no less a factor of military power. The B-47 is superior in many respects to any other bomber outside the forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, summed it up last Thursday when he said that bomber aircraft "still remain one of the powerful means of carrying on a war of aggression . . .".

The United States and the Soviet Union are the possessors of the world's greatest military arsenals. That is particularly true with regard to nuclear delivery vehicles.

The B-47 and TU-16 bombers are logical armaments with which to start the process of physical destruction of arms. The United States and the Soviet Union possess roughly comparable numbers of those aircraft. The two types of aircraft have been assigned generally similar strategic roles. Thus, the balance in the over-all force structure of the two sides would be maintained at the reduced levels resulting from their destruction. This, of course, is in keeping with the fifth principle in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles: that measures of this kind should be balanced so that no State or group of States should gain a military advantage and that security should be ensured equally for all.

E. Measures to reduce the danger of war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack.

President Johnson's proposal to the ENDC:

We must further reduce the danger of war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack. In consultation with our allies, we will be prepared to discuss proposals for creating a system of observation posts as a move in this direction.

Elaboration of proposal by Adrian S. Fisher in a statement to the ENDC on 26 March 1964:

The United States believes that a properly-designed system of observation posts would be a measure which in itself would advance the cause of peace. It would be of value in enhancing military security for both sides, in strengthening international confidence, and in facilitating progress toward future arms control and disarmament measures.

The nature of such a system should be such that it is capable of providing prompt and reliable information on unusual military movements and events. By providing early warning of any indication of possible preparations for hostile actions, it would increase the time available for diplomatic or other action to avert any threat of hostilities. It should be capable of providing timely and reliable information during an international crisis, and thus help to reduce the risk of war through misunderstanding of the posture of the other side. It would be an instrument available to each side through which concrete evidence of peaceful intent would be provided and through which unusual events which otherwise might be subject to misleading interpretations could be clarified.

1 Ibid., pp. 16, 95.
2 For the Joint Statement, see ibid., 1961, pp. 439-442. Mr. Fisher's statement appears ibid., 1964, pp. 101-105. On verification of the proposed destruction of bombers, see ibid., pp. 289-293.
The scope of such a system should include posts established by mutual agreement in North America, the United Kingdom, Europe and the Soviet Union.1


In order to assist in the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the United States submits the following outline of basic provisions of such a treaty. The Preamble of such a treaty has already been the subject of negotiations3 and is therefore not submitted as part of this treaty outline.

**A. Objectives**

1. To ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) general and complete disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the settlement of disputes and by effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Taking into account paragraphs 3 and 4 below, to provide, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:

   (a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;

   (b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons;

   (c) Elimination of all means of delivery and weapons of mass destruction;

   (d) Abolition of the organizations and institutions designed to organize the military efforts of States, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions;

   (e) Discontinuance of military expenditures.

3. To ensure that, at the completion of the programme for general and complete disarmament, States would have at their disposal only

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those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

4. To ensure that during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament, States also would support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations Peace Force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments necessary to ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms.

5. To establish and provide for the effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations for the purpose of ensuring that all obligations under the disarmament programme would be honoured and observed during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament; and to this end to ensure that the International Disarmament Organization and its inspectors would have unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

B. Principles

The guiding principles during the achievement of these objectives are:

1. Disarmament would be implemented until it is completed by stages to be carried out within specified time limits.

2. Disarmament would be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage, and so that security would be ensured equally for all.

3. Compliance with all disarmament obligations would be effectively verified during and after their entry into force. Verification arrangements would be instituted progressively as necessary to ensure throughout the disarmament process that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded.

4. As national armaments are reduced, the United Nations would be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to ensure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the development of international co-operation in common tasks for the benefit of mankind.

5. Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next would take place upon decision that all measures in the preceding stage had been implemented and verified and that any additional arrangements required for measures in the next stage were ready to operate.

INTRODUCTION

The Treaty would contain three stages designed to achieve a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful
world. The Treaty would enter into force upon the signature and ratification of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and such other States as might be agreed. Stage II would begin when all militarily significant States had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition requirements had been satisfied. Stage III would begin when all States possessing armed forces and armaments had become Parties to the Treaty and other transition requirements had been satisfied. Disarmament, verification, and measures for keeping the peace would proceed progressively and proportionately beginning with the entry into force of the Treaty.

STAGE I

Stage I would begin upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would be completed within three years from that date.

During Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

1. To reduce their armaments and armed forces and to carry out other agreed measures in the manner outlined below;
2. To establish the International Disarmament Organization upon the entry into force of the Treaty in order to ensure the verification in the agreed manner of the obligations undertaken; and
3. To strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace through the measures outlined below.

A. Armaments

1. REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

(a) Specified Parties to the Treaty, as a first stage toward general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, would reduce by 30 per cent the armaments in each category listed in sub-paragraph (b) below. Each type of armament in the categories listed in sub-paragraph (b) would be reduced by 30 per cent of the inventory existing at an agreed date.

(b) All types of armaments within agreed categories would be subject to reduction in Stage I (the following list of categories, and of types within categories, is illustrative):

(1) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 40,000 kilogrammes or greater; missiles having a range of 5,000 kilometres or greater, together with their related fixed launching pads; and submarine-launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles having a range of 300 kilometres or greater.

(Within this category, the United States, for example, would declare as types of armaments: The B-52 aircraft; Atlas missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Titan missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Polaris missiles;
Hound Dog missiles; and each new type of armament, such as Minute-
man missiles, which came within the category description, together 
with, where applicable, their related fixed launching pads. The 
declared inventory of types within the category by other Parties to the 
Treaty would be similarly detailed.)

(2) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 
15,000 kilogrammes and 40,000 kilogrammes and those missiles not 
included in category (1) having a range between 300 kilometres and 
5,000 kilometres, together with any related fixed launching pads. 
(The Parties would declare their armaments by types within the 
category.)

(3) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 
2,500 and 15,000 kilogrammes. (The Parties would declare their 
armaments by types within the category.)

(4) Surface-to-surface (including submarine-launched missiles) 
and air-to-surface aerodynamic and ballistic missiles and free rockets 
having a range of between 10 kilometres and 300 kilometres, together 
with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would declare 
their armaments by types within the category.)

(5) Anti-missile-missile systems, together with related fixed 
launching pads. (The Parties would declare their armaments by 
types within the category.)

(6) Surface-to-air missiles other than anti-missile-missile systems, 
also with any related fixed launching pads. (The Parties would 
declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(7) Tanks. (The Parties would declare their armaments by 
types within the category.)

(8) Armoured cars and armoured personnel carriers. (The 
Parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(9) All artillery, and mortars and rocket launchers having a 
calibre of 100 mm. or greater. (The Parties would declare their 
armaments by types within the category.)

(10) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons 
or greater of the following classes: Aircraft carriers, battleships, 
cruisers, destroyer types and submarines. (The Parties would 
declare their armaments by types within the category.)

2. METHOD OF REDUCTION

(a) Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the reduc-
tion of armaments would submit to the International Disarmament 
Organization an appropriate declaration respecting inventories of 
their armaments existing at the agreed date.

(b) The reduction would be accomplished in three steps, each 
consisting of one year. One third of the reduction to be made during 
Stage I would be carried out during each step.
(c) During the first part of each step, one third of the armaments to be eliminated during Stage I would be placed in depots under supervision of the International Disarmament Organization. During the second part of each step, the deposited armaments would be destroyed or, where appropriate, converted to peaceful uses. The number and location of such depots and arrangements respecting their establishment and operation would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(d) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in a Treaty annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing reduction and would provide assurance that retained armaments did not exceed agreed levels.

3. LIMITATION ON PRODUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND ON RELATED ACTIVITIES

(a) Production of all armaments listed in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 above would be limited to agreed allowances during Stage I and, by the beginning of Stage II, would be halted except for production within agreed limits of parts for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments.

(b) The allowances would permit limited production of each type of armament listed in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 above. In all instances during the process of eliminating production of armaments, any armament produced within a type would be compensated for by an additional armament destroyed within that type to the end that the 10 per cent reduction in numbers in each type in each step, and the resulting 30 per cent reduction in Stage I, would be achieved.

(c) The testing and production of new types of armaments would be prohibited.

(d) The expansion of facilities for the production of existing types of armaments and the construction or equipping of facilities for the production of new types of armaments would be prohibited.

(e) The flight testing of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.

(f) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

4. ADDITIONAL MEASURES

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine unresolved questions relating to means of accomplishing in Stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. In light of
this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrange­ments concerning chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

B. Armed Forces

1. Reduction of Armed Forces

Force levels for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to 2.1 million each and for other specified Parties to the Treaty to agreed levels not exceeding 2.1 million each. All other Parties to the Treaty would, with agreed exceptions, reduce their force levels to 100,000 or 1 per cent of their population, whichever were higher, provided that in no case would the force levels of such other Parties to the Treaty exceed levels in existence upon the entry into force of the Treaty.

2. Armed Forces Subject to Reduction

Agreed force levels would include all full-time, uniformed personnel maintained by national Governments in the following categories:

(a) Career personnel of active armed forces and other personnel serving in the active armed forces on fixed engagements or contracts.
(b) Conscripts performing their required period of full-time active duty as fixed by national law.
(c) Personnel of militarily organized security forces and of other forces or organizations equipped and organized to perform a military mission.

3. Method of Reduction of Armed Forces

The reduction of force levels would be carried out in the following manner:

(a) Those Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing reductions would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating their force levels at the agreed date.
(b) Force level reductions would be accomplished in three steps, each having a duration of one year. During each step force levels would be reduced by one third of the difference between force levels existing at the agreed date and the levels to be reached at the end of Stage I.
(c) In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the reduction of force levels and provide assurance that retained forces did not exceed agreed levels.

4. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty which were subject to the foregoing reductions would agree upon appropriate arrangements, including
procedures for consultation, in order to ensure that civilian employment by military establishments would be in accordance with the objectives of the obligations respecting force levels.

C. Nuclear Weapons

1. Production of Fissionable Materials for Nuclear Weapons

(a) The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons.

(b) This measure would be carried out in the following manner:

(1) The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration listing by name, location and production capacity every facility under their jurisdiction capable of producing and processing fissionable materials at the agreed date.

(2) Production of fissionable materials for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons would be limited to agreed levels. The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization periodic declarations stating the amounts and types of fissionable materials which were still being produced at each facility.

(3) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared facilities and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared facilities.

2. Transfer of Fissionable Material to Purposes Other than Use in Nuclear Weapons

(a) Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would each transfer to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons agreed quantities of weapons grade U-235 from past production. The United States of America would transfer _____ kilograms, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would transfer _____ kilograms of such weapons grade U-235. For this purpose, "weapons grade U-235" means the U-235 contained in metal of which at least 90 per cent of the weight is U-235.

(b) To ensure that the transferred materials were not used in nuclear weapons, such materials would be placed under safeguards and inspection by the International Disarmament Organization either in stockpiles or at the facilities in which they would be utilized for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. Arrangements for such safeguards and inspection would be set forth in the annex on verification.
3. Transfer of Fissionable Materials Between States for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

(a) Any transfer of fissionable materials between States would be for purposes other than for use in nuclear weapons and would be subject to a system of safeguards to ensure that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.

(b) The system of safeguards to be applied for this purpose would be developed in agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

4. Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to seek to prevent the creation of further national nuclear forces. To this end the Parties would agree that:

(a) Any Party to the Treaty which had manufactured, or which at any time manufactures, a nuclear weapon would:

   (1) Not transfer control over any nuclear weapons to a State which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before an agreed date;
   (2) Not assist any such State in manufacturing any nuclear weapons.

(b) Any Party to the Treaty which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before the agreed date would:

   (1) Not acquire, or attempt to acquire, control over any nuclear weapons;
   (2) Not manufacture, or attempt to manufacture, any nuclear weapons.

5. Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions

(a) If an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons test explosions and providing for effective international control had come into force prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, such agreement would become an annex to the Treaty, and all the Parties to the Treaty would be bound by the obligations specified in the agreement.

(b) If, however, no such agreement had come into force prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, all nuclear weapons test explosions would be prohibited, and the procedures for effective international control would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

6. Additional Measures

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine remaining unresolved questions relating to the means of accomplishing in Stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles. In the light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements concerning nuclear weapons stockpiles.
D. Outer Space

1. Prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Orbit
   The Parties to the Treaty would agree not to place in orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction.

2. Peaceful Co-operation in Space
   The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support increased international co-operation in peaceful uses of outer space in the United Nations or through other appropriate arrangements.

3. Notification and Pre-Launch Inspection
   With respect to the launching of space vehicles and missiles:
   (a) Those Parties to the Treaty which conducted launchings of space vehicles or missiles would provide advance notification of such launchings to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization together with the track of the space vehicle or missile. Such advance notification would be provided on a timely basis to permit pre-launch inspection of the space vehicle or missile to be launched.
   (b) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would conduct pre-launch inspection of space vehicles and missiles and would establish and operate any arrangements necessary for detecting unreported launchings.

4. Limitations on Production and on Related Activities
   The production, stockpiling and testing of boosters for space vehicles would be subject to agreed limitations. Such activities would be monitored by the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification.

E. Military Expenditures

1. Report on Expenditures
   The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization at the end of each step of each stage a report on their military expenditures. Such reports would include an itemization of military expenditures.

2. Verifiable Reduction of Expenditures
   The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine questions related to the verifiable reduction of military expenditures. In light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would consider appropriate arrangements respecting military expenditures.
F. Reduction of the Risk of War

In order to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to the following measures:

1. Advance Notification of Military Movements and Manoeuvres

Specified Parties to the Treaty would give advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization. Specific arrangements relating to this commitment, including the scale of movements and manoeuvres to be reported and the information to be transmitted, would be agreed.

2. Observation Posts

Specified Parties to the Treaty would permit observation posts to be established at agreed locations, including major ports, railway centres, motor highways, river crossings, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces. The number of such posts could be progressively expanded in each successive step of Stage I. Specific arrangements relating to such observation posts, including the location and staffing of posts, the method of receiving and reporting information, and the schedule for installation of posts would be agreed.

3. Additional Observation Arrangements

The Parties to the Treaty would establish such additional observation arrangements as might be agreed. Such arrangements could be extended in an agreed manner during each step of Stage I.

4. Exchange of Military Missions

Specified Parties to the Treaty would undertake the exchange of military missions between States or groups of States in order to improve communications and understanding between them. Specific arrangements respecting such exchanges would be agreed.

5. Communications between Heads of Government

Specified Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of rapid and reliable communications among their heads of Governments and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Specific arrangements in this regard would be subject to agreement among the Parties concerned and between such Parties and the Secretary-General.

6. International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War

The Parties to the Treaty would establish an International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War as a subsidiary body of the
International Disarmament Organization to examine and make recommendations regarding further measures that might be undertaken during Stage I or subsequent stages of disarmament to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of communications, or surprise attack. Specific arrangements for such measures as might be agreed to by all or some of the Parties to the Treaty would be subject to agreement among the Parties concerned.

G. The International Disarmament Organization

1. Establishment of the International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would be established upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would function within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Treaty.

2. Co-operation of the Parties to the Treaty

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to co-operate promptly and fully with the International Disarmament Organization and to assist the International Disarmament Organization in the performance of its functions and in the execution of the decisions made by it in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

3. Verification Functions of the International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would verify disarmament measures in accordance with the following principles which would be implemented through specific arrangements set forth in the annex on verification:

(a) Measures providing for reduction of armaments would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization at agreed depots and would include verification of the destruction of armaments and, where appropriate, verification of the conversion of armaments to peaceful uses. Measures providing for reduction of armed forces would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization either at the agreed depots or other agreed locations.

(b) Measures halting or limiting production, testing, and other specified activities would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization. Parties to the Treaty would declare the nature and location of all production and testing facilities and other specified activities. The International Disarmament Organization would have access to relevant facilities and activities wherever located in the territory of such Parties.
(c) Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded and that activities limited or prohibited by the Treaty were not being conducted clandestinely would be provided by the International Disarmament Organization through agreed arrangements which have the effect of providing that the extent of inspection during any step or stage would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the Parties to the Treaty of possible violations. This might be accomplished, for example, by an arrangement embodying such features as the following:

(1) All parts of the territory of those Parties to the Treaty to which this form of verification was applicable would be subject to selection for inspection from the beginning of Stage I as provided below.

(2) Parties to the Treaty would divide their territory into an agreed number of appropriate zones and at the beginning of each step of disarmament would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the total level of armaments, forces, and specified types of activities subject to verification within each zone. The exact location of armaments and forces within a zone would not be revealed prior to its selection for inspection.

(3) An agreed number of these zones would be progressively inspected by the International Disarmament Organization during Stage I according to an agreed time schedule. The zones to be inspected would be selected by procedures which would ensure their selection by Parties to the Treaty other than the Party whose territory was to be inspected or any Party associated with it. Upon selection of each zone, the Party to the Treaty whose territory was to be inspected would declare the exact location of armaments, forces and other agreed activities within the selected zone. During the verification process, arrangements would be made to provide assurance against undeclared movements of the objects of verification to or from the zone or zones being inspected. Both aerial and mobile ground inspection would be employed within the zone being inspected. In so far as agreed measures being verified were concerned access within the zone would be free and unimpeded, and verification would be carried out with the full co-operation of the State being inspected.

(4) Once a zone had been inspected it would remain open for further inspection while verification was being extended to additional zones.

(5) By the end of Stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the Treaty.
4. Composition of the International Disarmament Organization

(a) The International Disarmament Organization would have:

(1) A general Conference of all the Parties to the Treaty;
(2) A Control Council consisting of representatives of all the major signatory Powers and permanent members and certain other Parties to the Treaty on a rotating basis; and
(3) An Administrator who would administer the International Disarmament Organization under the direction of the Control Council and who would have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to ensure effective and impartial implementation of the functions of the International Disarmament Organization.

b. The General Conference and the Control Council would have power to establish such subsidiary bodies, including expert study groups, as either of them might deem necessary.

5. Functions of the General Conference

The General Conference would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

a. Electing non-permanent members to the Control Council;
b. Approving certain accessions to the Treaty;
c. Appointing the Administrator upon recommendation of the Control Council;
d. Approving agreements between the International Disarmament Organization and the United Nations and other international organizations;
e. Approving the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;
f. Requesting and receiving reports from the Control Council and deciding upon matters referred to it by the Control Council;
g. Approving reports to be submitted to bodies of the United Nations;
h. Proposing matters for consideration by the Control Council;
i. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power by the General Assembly of the United Nations;
j. Approving amendments to the Treaty for possible ratification by the Parties to the Treaty;
k. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty or disarmament in general.
6. **FUNCTIONS OF THE CONTROL COUNCIL**

The Control Council would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

a. Recommending appointment of the Administrator;

b. Adopting rules for implementing the terms of the Treaty;

c. Establishing procedures and standards for the installation and operation of the verification arrangements, and maintaining supervision over such arrangements and the Administrator;

d. Establishing procedures for making available to the Parties to the Treaty data produced by verification arrangements;

e. Considering reports of the Administrator on the progress of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation and operation of the verification arrangements;

f. Recommending to the Conference approval of the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;

g. Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power by the General Assembly of the United Nations;

h. Recommending to the Conference approval of certain accessions to the Treaty;

i. Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the Treaty or to disarmament in general.

7. **FUNCTIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATOR**

The Administrator would have the following functions among others which might be agreed:

a. Administering the installation and operation of the verification arrangements, and serving as Chief Executive Officer of the International Disarmament Organization;

b. Making available to the Parties to the Treaty data produced by the verification arrangements;

c. Preparing the budget of the International Disarmament Organization;

d. Making reports to the Control Council on the progress of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation and operation of the verification arrangements.

8. **PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES**

The privileges and immunities which the Parties to the Treaty would grant to the International Disarmament Organization and its staff and to the representatives of the Parties to the International Disarmament Organization, and the legal capacity which the International Disarmament Organization should enjoy in the territory of
each of the Parties to the Treaty would be specified in an annex to the Treaty.

9. Relations with the United Nations and Other International Organizations

(a) The International Disarmament Organization, being established within the framework of the United Nations, would conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It would maintain close working arrangements with the United Nations, and the Administrator of the International Disarmament Organization would consult with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on matters of mutual interest.

(b) The Control Council of the International Disarmament Organization would transmit to the United Nations annual and other reports on the activities of the International Disarmament Organization.

(c) Principal organs of the United Nations could make recommendations to the International Disarmament Organization, which would consider them and report to the United Nations on action taken.

Note: The above outline does not cover all the possible details or aspects of relationships between the International Disarmament Organization and the United Nations.

H. Measures To Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping the Peace

1. Obligations Concerning Threat or Use of Force

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake obligations to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force of any type—including nuclear, conventional, chemical or biological means of warfare—contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

2. Rules of International Conduct

(a) The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study by a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization of the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament.

(b) The Parties to the Treaty would refrain from indirect aggression and subversion. The subsidiary body provided for in subparagraph (a) would also study methods of assuring States against indirect aggression or subversion.

3. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

(a) The Parties to the Treaty would utilize all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of all disputes which might arise between them and any other State, whether or not a Party to the
Treaty, including negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, submission to the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations, or other peaceful means of their choice.

(b) The Parties to the Treaty would agree that disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty which were not settled by negotiation or by the International Disarmament Organization would be subject to referral by any party to the dispute to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties concerned agreed on another mode of settlement.

(c) The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study under the General Assembly of the United Nations of measures which should be undertaken to make existing arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature, more effective; and to institute new procedures and arrangements where needed.

4. MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support measures strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to improve its capability to maintain international peace and security.

5. UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCE

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to develop arrangements during Stage I for the establishment in Stage II of a United Nations Peace Force. To this end, the Parties to the Treaty would agree on the following measures within the United Nations:

(a) Examination of the experience of the United Nations leading to a further strengthening of United Nations forces for keeping the peace;

(b) Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter;

(c) Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force in Stage II, including definitions of its purpose, mission, composition and strength, disposition, command and control, training, logistical support, financing, equipment and armaments.

6. UNITED NATIONS PEACE OBSERVATION CORPS

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support the establishment within the United Nations of a Peace Observation Corps, staffed with a standing cadre of observers who could be dispatched promptly to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or a breach of the peace. Elements of the Peace Obser-
vation Corps could also be stationed as appropriate in selected areas throughout the world.

I. Transition

1. During the last three months of Stage I, the Control Council would review the situation respecting the following listed circumstances with a view to determining, in the light of specified criteria, whether these circumstances existed at the end of Stage I:

   (a) All undertakings to be carried out in Stage I had been carried out;
   (b) All preparations required for Stage II had been made; and
   (c) All militarily significant States had become Parties to the Treaty.

2. Transition from Stage I to Stage II would take place at the end of Stage I or at the end of any periods of extension of Stage I, upon a determination, in the light of specified criteria, by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Control Council, including at least the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the foregoing circumstances existed.

3. If, at the end of Stage I, one or more permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of Stage I would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

4. Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the Control Council would again consider whether the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist and would vote upon transition in the manner specified in paragraph 2 above.

STAGE II

Stage II would begin upon the transition from Stage I and would be completed within three years from that date.

During Stage II, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

1. To continue all obligations undertaken during Stage I;
2. To reduce further the armaments and armed forces reduced during Stage I and to carry out additional measures of disarmament in the manner outlined below;
3. To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during Stage II; and
4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace through the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force and through the additional measures outlined below.
A. Armaments

1. Reduction of Armaments

(a) Those Parties to the Treaty which had during Stage I reduced their armaments in agreed categories by 30 per cent would during Stage II further reduce each type of armaments in the categories listed in Section A, sub-paragraph 1 (b) of Stage I by 50 per cent of the inventory existing at the end of Stage I.

(b) Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been subject to measures for the reduction of armaments during Stage I would submit to the International Disarmament Organization an appropriate declaration respecting the inventories by types, within the categories listed in Stage I, of their armaments existing at the beginning of Stage II. Such Parties to the Treaty would during Stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by 65 per cent in order that such Parties would accomplish the same total percentage of reduction by the end of Stage II as would be accomplished by those Parties to the Treaty which had reduced their armaments by 30 per cent in Stage I.

2. Additional Armaments Subject to Reduction

(a) The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration respecting their inventories existing at the beginning of Stage II of the additional types of armaments in the categories listed in sub-paragraph (b) below, and would during Stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by 50 per cent.

(b) All types of armaments within further agreed categories would be subject to reduction in Stage II (the following list of categories is illustrative):

1. Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of up to 2,500 kilograms (declarations by types).
2. Specified types of unarmed military aircraft (declarations by types).
3. Missiles and free rockets having a range of less than 10 kilometres (declarations by types).
4. Mortars and rocket launchers having a calibre of less than 100 mm. (declarations by types).
5. Specified types of unarmoured personnel carriers and transport vehicles (declarations by types).
6. Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater which had not been included among the armaments listed in Stage I, and combatant ships with standard displacement of less than 400 tons (declarations by types).
(7) Specified types of non-combatant naval vessels (declarations by types).
(8) Specified types of small arms (declarations by types).

(c) Specified categories of ammunition for armaments listed in Stage I, Section A, sub-paragraph 1(b), and in sub-paragraph (b) above would be reduced to levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage II.

3. METHOD OF REDUCTION

The foregoing measures would be carried out and would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in a manner corresponding to that provided for in Stage I, Section A, paragraph 2.

4. LIMITATION ON PRODUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND ON RELATED ACTIVITIES

(a) The Parties to the Treaty would halt the production of armaments in the specified categories except for production, within agreed limits, of parts required for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments.

(b) The production of ammunition in specified categories would be reduced to agreed levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of Stage II.

(c) The Parties to the Treaty would halt development and testing of new types of armaments. The flight testing of existing types of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.

(d) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

5. ADDITIONAL MEASURES

(a) In the light of their examination during Stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures respecting such weapons:

(1) The cessation of all production and field testing of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

(2) The reduction, by agreed categories, of stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction to levels 50 per cent below those existing at the beginning of Stage II.

(3) The dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of all facilities engaged in the production or field testing of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.
(b) The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(c) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex, on verification the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that retained levels of chemical and biological weapons did not exceed agreed levels and that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.

B. Armed Forces

1. Reduction of Armed Forces

(a) Those Parties to the Treaty which had been subject to measures providing for reduction of force levels during Stage I would further reduce their force levels on the following basis:

(1) Force levels of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to levels 50 per cent below the levels agreed for the end of Stage I.

(2) Force levels of other Parties to the Treaty which had been subject to measures providing for the reduction of force levels during Stage I would be further reduced, on the basis of an agreed percentage, below the levels agreed for the end of Stage I to levels which would not in any case exceed the agreed level for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of Stage II.

(b) Those Parties to the Treaty which had not been subject to measures providing for the reduction of armed forces during Stage I would reduce their force levels to agreed levels consistent with those to be reached by other parties which had reduced their force levels during Stage I as well as Stage II. In no case would such agreed levels exceed the agreed level for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of Stage II.

(c) Agreed levels of armed forces would include all personnel in the categories set forth in Section B, paragraph 2 of Stage I.

2. Method of Reduction

The further reduction of force levels would be carried out and would be verified by the International Disarmament Organization in a manner corresponding to that provided for in Section B, paragraph 3 of Stage I.

3. Additional Measures

Agreed limitations consistent with retained force levels would be placed on compulsory military training, and on refresher training for reserve forces of the Parties to the Treaty.
C. Nuclear Weapons

1. Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

In the light of their examination during Stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake to reduce in the following manner remaining nuclear weapons and fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons:

(a) The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the amounts, types, and nature of utilization of all their fissionable materials.

(b) The Parties to the Treaty would reduce the amounts and types of fissionable materials declared for use in nuclear weapons to minimum levels on the basis of agreed percentages. The foregoing reduction would be accomplished through the transfer of such materials to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. The purposes for which such materials would be used would be determined by the state to which the materials belonged, provided that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.

(c) The Parties to the Treaty would destroy the non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons from which fissionable materials had been removed to effect the foregoing reduction of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons.

(d) Production or refabrication of nuclear weapons from any remaining fissionable materials would be subject to agreed limitations.

(e) The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(f) In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the verification annex to the Treaty, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.

2. Registration of Nuclear Weapons for Verification Purposes

To facilitate verification during Stage III that no nuclear weapons remained at the disposal of the Parties to the Treaty, those Parties to the Treaty which possessed nuclear weapons would, during the last six months of Stage II, register and serialize their remaining nuclear weapons and would register remaining fissionable materials for use in such weapons. Such registration and serialization would be carried out with the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with procedures which would be set forth in the annex on verification.
D. Military Bases and Facilities

1. Reduction of Military Bases and Facilities

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses agreed military bases and facilities, wherever they might be located.

2. Method of Reduction

(a) The list of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing measures and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or converting them to peaceful uses would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(b) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures.

E. Reduction of the Risk of War

In the light of the examination by the International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War during Stage I the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Parties to the Treaty would also consider extending and improving the measures undertaken in Stage I for this purpose. The Commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be undertaken during and after Stage II.

F. The International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II through an extension of the arrangements based upon the principles set forth in Section G, paragraph 3 of Stage I.

G. Measures To Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping the Peace

1. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

(a) In the light of the study of peaceful settlement of disputes conducted during Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to assure the just and peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature.

(b) The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to accept without reservation, pursuant to article 36, paragraph (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the compulsory jurisdiction of that Court to decide international legal disputes.
2. Rules of International Conduct

(a) The Parties to the Treaty would continue their support of the study by the subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization initiated in Stage I to study the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to the establishment of procedures whereby rules recommended by the subsidiary body and approved by the Control Council would be circulated to all Parties to the Treaty and would become effective three months thereafter unless a majority of the Parties to the Treaty signified their disapproval, and whereby the Parties to the Treaty would be bound by rules which had become effective in this way unless, within a period of one year from the effective date, they formally notified the International Disarmament Organization that they did not consider themselves so bound. Using such procedures, the Parties to the Treaty would adopt such rules of international conduct related to disarmament as might be necessary to begin Stage III.

(b) In the light of the study of indirect aggression and subversion conducted in Stage I, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements necessary to assure States against indirect aggression and subversion.

3. United Nations Peace Force

The United Nations Peace Force to be established as the result of the agreement reached during Stage I would come into being within the first year of Stage II and would be progressively strengthened during Stage II.

4. United Nations Peace Observation Corps

The Parties to the Treaty would conclude arrangement for the expansion of the activities of the United Nations Peace Observation Corps.

5. National Legislation

Those Parties to the Treaty which had not already done so would, in accordance with their constitutional processes, enact national legislation in support of the Treaty imposing legal obligations on individuals and organizations under their jurisdiction and providing appropriate penalties for non-compliance.

H. Transition

(1) During the last three months of Stage II, the Control Council would review the situation respecting the following listed circum-
stances with a view to determining, in the light of specified criteria, whether these circumstances existed at the end of Stage II:

(a) All undertakings to be carried out in Stage II had been carried out;
(b) All preparations required for Stage III had been made; and
(c) All States possessing armed forces and armaments had become parties to the Treaty.

(2) Transition from Stage II to Stage III would take place at the end of Stage II or at the end of any periods of extension of Stage II, upon a determination, in the light of specified criteria, by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the Control Council, including at least the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the foregoing circumstances existed.

(3) If, at the end of Stage II, one or more permanent members of the Control Council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of Stage II would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

(4) Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the Control Council would again consider whether the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist and would vote upon transition in the manner specified in paragraph 2 above.

STAGE III

Stage III would begin upon the transition from Stage II and would be completed within an agreed period of time as promptly as possible.

During Stage III, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake:

(1) To continue all obligations undertaken during Stages I and II;
(2) To complete the process of general and complete disarmament in the manner outlined below;
(3) To ensure that the International Disarmament Organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during Stage III and of continuing verification subsequent to the completion of Stage III; and
(4) To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace during and following the achievement of general and complete disarmament through the additional measures outlined below.

A. Armaments

1. REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

Subject to agreed requirements for non-nuclear armaments of agreed types for national forces required to maintain internal order-
and protect the personal security of citizens, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all armaments remaining at their disposal at the end of Stage II.

2. Method of Reduction

(a) The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements that would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(b) In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that retained armaments were of the agreed types and did not exceed agreed levels.

3. Limitations on Production of Armaments and on Related Activities

(a) Subject to agreed arrangements in support of national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and subject to agreed arrangements in support of the United Nations Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would halt all applied research, development, production, and testing of armaments and would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses all other facilities for such purposes.

(b) The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(c) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

B. Armed Forces

1. Reduction of Armed Forces

To the end that upon completion of Stage III they would have at their disposal only those forces and organizational arrangements necessary for agreed forces to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and that they would be capable of providing agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace Force, the Parties to the Treaty would complete the reduction of their force levels, disband systems of reserve forces, cause to be disbanded organizational arrangements comprising and supporting their national military establishment, and terminate the employment of civilian personnel associated with the foregoing.
2. METHOD OF REDUCTION

(a) The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(b) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that the only forces and organizational arrangements retained or subsequently established were those necessary for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and to protect the personal security of citizens and those for providing agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace Force.

3. OTHER LIMITATIONS

The Parties to the Treaty would halt all military conscription and would undertake to annul legislation concerning national military establishments or military service inconsistent with the foregoing measures.

C. Nuclear Weapons

1. REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

In light of the steps taken in Stages I and II to halt the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons and to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal, would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful use all facilities for production of such weapons, and would transfer all materials remaining at their disposal for use in such weapons to purposes other than use in such weapons.

2. METHOD OF REDUCTION

(a) The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(b) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that no nuclear weapons or materials for use in such weapons remained at the disposal of the Parties to the Treaty and that no such weapons or materials were produced at undeclared facilities.

D. MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES

1. REDUCTION OF MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES

The Parties to the Treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses the military bases and facilities remaining at their disposal,
wherever they might be located, in an agreed sequence except for such agreed bases or facilities within the territory of the Parties to the Treaty for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

2. Method of Reduction

(a) The list of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing measure and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling or converting them to peaceful uses during Stage III would be set forth in an annex to the Treaty.

(b) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measure at declared locations and provide assurance that there were no undeclared military bases and facilities.

E. Research and Development of Military Significance

1. Reporting Requirement

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake the following measures respecting research and development of military significance subsequent to Stage III:

(a) The Parties to the Treaty would report to the International Disarmament Organization any basic scientific discovery and any technological invention having potential military significance.

(b) The Control Council would establish such expert study groups as might be required to examine the potential military significance of such discoveries and inventions and, if necessary, to recommend appropriate measures for their control. In the light of such expert study, the Parties to the Treaty would, where necessary, establish agreed arrangements providing for verification by the International Disarmament Organization that such discoveries and inventions were not utilized for military purposes. Such arrangements would become an annex to the Treaty.

(c) The Parties to the Treaty would agree to appropriate arrangements for protection of the ownership rights of all discoveries and inventions reported to the International Disarmament Organization in accordance with sub-paragraph (a) above.

2. International Co-operation

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support full international co-operation in all fields of scientific research and development, and to engage in free exchange of scientific and technical information and free interchange of views among scientific and technical personnel.
F. Reduction of the Risk of War

1. Improved Measures

In the light of the Stage II examination by the International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War, the Parties to the Treaty would undertake such extensions and improvements of existing arrangements and such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The Commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be taken during and after Stage III.

2. Application of Measures to Continuing Forces

The Parties to the Treaty would apply to national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens those applicable measures concerning the reduction of the risk of war that had been applied to national armed forces in Stages I and II.

G. International Disarmament Organization

The International Disarmament Organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity (1) to verify the measures undertaken in Stage III through an extension of arrangements based upon the principles set forth in Section G, paragraph 3 of Stage I so that by the end of Stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of Parties to the Treaty; and (2) to provide continuing verification of disarmament after the completion of Stage III.

H. Measures To Strengthen Arrangements for Keeping the Peace

1. Peaceful Change and Settlement of Disputes

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to provide a basis for peaceful change in a disarmed world and to continue the just and peaceful settlement of all international disputes, whether legal or political in nature.

2. Rules of International Conduct

The Parties to the Treaty would continue the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament in the manner provided in Stage II and by any other agreed procedure.

3. United Nations Peace Force

The Parties to the Treaty would progressively strengthen the United Nations Peace Force established in Stage II until it had
sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no State could challenge it.

I. Completion of Stage III

1. At the end of the time period agreed for Stage III, the Control Council would review the situation with a view to determining whether all undertakings to be carried out in Stage III had been carried out.

2. This determination would be made by affirmative vote of two thirds of the members of the Control Council, including at least the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. If an affirmative determination were made, Stage III would be deemed completed.

3. In the event that one or more of the permanent members of the Control Council should declare that such undertakings had not been carried out, the agreed period of Stage III would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended for a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of completing any uncompleted undertakings. Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the Control Council would again consider whether such undertakings had been carried out and would vote upon the question in the manner specified in paragraph 2 above.

4. After the completion of Stage III, the obligations undertaken in Stages I, II and III would continue.

GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL STAGES

1. Subsequent Modifications or Amendments of the Treaty

The Parties to the Treaty would agree to specific procedures for considering amendments or modifications of the Treaty which were believed desirable by any Party to the Treaty in the light of experience in the early period of implementation of the Treaty. Such procedures would include provision for a conference on revision of the Treaty after a specified period of time.

2. Interim Agreement

The Parties to the Treaty would undertake such specific arrangements, including the establishment of a Preparatory Commission, as were necessary between the signing and entry into force of the Treaty to ensure the initiation of Stage I immediately upon the entry into force of the Treaty, and to provide an interim forum for the exchange of views and information on topics relating to the Treaty and to the achievement of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.
3. **Parties to the Treaty, Ratification, Accession and Entry into Force of the Treaty**

(a) The Treaty would be open to signature and ratification, or accession by all members of the United Nations or its specialized agencies.

(b) Any other State which desired to become a Party to the Treaty could accede to the Treaty with the approval of the Conference on recommendation of the Control Council.

(c) The Treaty would come into force when it had been ratified by __________ States, including the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and an agreed number of the following States: ________________

(d) In order to assure the achievement of the fundamental purpose of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the Treaty would specify that the accession of certain militarily significant States would be essential for the continued effectiveness of the Treaty or for the coming into force of particular measures or stages.

(e) The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to exert every effort to induce other States or authorities to accede to the Treaty.

(f) The Treaty would be subject to ratification or acceptance in accordance with constitutional processes.

(g) A Depositary Government would be agreed upon which would have all of the duties normally incumbent upon a Depositary. Alternatively, the United Nations would be the Depositary.

4. **Finance**

(a) In order to meet the financial obligations of the International Disarmament Organization, the Parties to the Treaty would bear the International Disarmament Organization’s expenses as provided in the budget approved by the General Conference and in accordance with a scale of apportionment approved by the General Conference.

(b) The General Conference would exercise borrowing powers on behalf of the International Disarmament Organization.

5. **Authentic Texts**

The text of the Treaty would consist of equally authentic versions in English, French, Russian, Chinese and Spanish.
Joint Communiqué on Franco-Soviet Talks, April 30, 1965

Upon the invitation of the French Government, the Foreign Affairs Minister of the USSR, Mr. Andrei Gromyko, paid an official visit to Paris from April 25, to 30, 1965.

During his stay, Mr. Gromyko was received by General de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, and had conversations with M. Georges Pompidou, French Premier, and M. Louis Joxe, French Minister of State.

The Soviet Foreign Minister had several conversations with his French colleague, M. Couve de Murville. Mr. Valerian Zorin, Soviet Ambassador to France, and M. Phillippe Baudet, French Ambassador to the USSR, took part in the conversations. These comprehensive exchanges of views dealt with the principal international policy problems concerning France and the USSR, as well as relations between the two countries.

The Ministers first discussed questions concerning Southeast Asia. It was noted that the situation in the Indochinese Peninsula, and particularly in Vietnam, has worsened following recent events and creates dangers for peace.

Mr. Gromyko and M. Couve de Murville were in agreement in considering that a solution to the problems of this region can be found only by a return to the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, and to the 1962 agreement on Laos—agreements which are based on the recognition of the independence and sovereignty of these States and on nonintervention in their internal affairs.

The two Ministers took note that the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom had given their agreement to holding an international conference on Cambodia. They recalled that the Soviet and French Governments had already previously declared themselves in favor of convening such a conference.

The Foreign Affairs Ministers of the USSR and of France set forth the views of their Governments on various problems of European security. It was emphasized that the USSR and France, as European powers, have a fundamental interest in that a solution to these problems be agreed upon. The Foreign Affairs Minister of the USSR outlined the position of the Soviet Union on the matter of a peaceful settlement of the German problem.

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3 TIAS 5410; 14 UST 1104.
The Foreign Affairs Ministers of the USSR and of France, on behalf of their Governments, expressed the hope that an agreement will be reached between all those concerned. The two Governments will continue to exchange their views on the situation in Europe and on their respective positions.

Both sides stressed the importance of the disarmament problem. The Foreign Affairs Minister of the USSR stated the reasons for which the Soviet Government proposed convening the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which includes all the members of that Organization. On behalf of the Soviet Government, he stated his agreement on the proposal made by France to examine the nuclear disarmament problem at a conference of the five nuclear powers.

With respect to the United Nations Organization, the two Ministers were in agreement in considering that there should be a return to strict observance of the principles established by the Charter, particularly with respect to its provisions on the distribution of the attributes and powers of the various organs of that institution.

Bilateral relations were examined in the economic, cultural, scientific and technical domains, including cooperation between the USSR and France in the area of color television—questions to which the two Governments attach great importance. Both sides expressed the desire to develop relations between the USSR and France in all domains.

The French-Soviet exchanges of views, which took place in Paris, were of great interest. They demonstrated the areas of understanding which exist between the two Governments and which will therefore contribute to the subsequent development of useful consultations between them.

Mr. Gromyko and M. Couve de Murville agreed that there would be continued exchanges of views on all problems of common interest.

It is in this spirit that M. Couve de Murville, upon the invitation of the Soviet Government, will pay an official visit to the USSR in the autumn. The date of the visit will be determined later.

Statement by the Indian Representative (Chakravarty) to the Disarmament Commission [Extracts], May 4, 1965 ¹

18. Disarmament is indeed the most urgent and the most vital issue facing humanity today, and the Indian delegation is happy that

¹ Disarmament Commission Official Records; 76th Meeting, pp. 2–6.
the Disarmament Commission is presently in session to give the needed stimulus to responsible and constructive negotiations on disarmament. This is a world forum where all States Members of the United Nations are represented. We are sure that many new ideas will emerge from our deliberations here, and some new guidelines will be indicated for detailed study and consideration by the Disarmament Committee in Geneva.

19. The present difficulties need not unduly dishearten us. The international community has to its credit many achievements in the fields of disarmament and reduction of tension. The year 1963 was a particularly notable year in our quest for international peace and security. It witnessed the establishment of a direct communication link between the two super Powers. It witnessed one of the most heartening agreements, which has been subscribed to by over 100 nations, the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.1 This was a momentous landmark and a significant first step towards sanity. Most nations have observed the prohibition, whether they signed the Treaty or not. There has been only one solitary defiance of international will as reflected in the Moscow Treaty. Barring this cynical disregard for human welfare by one nation, all other nations have refrained from polluting the earth's atmosphere, from subjecting the present and the future generations of mankind to the health hazards of radioactive fall-out. With this one and only exception, the international community has decided not to wage war on defenceless men, women and children, both of our age and those yet unborn. Of course, the defiance hurled by the People's Republic of China needs to be countered, and we trust the international community will take note of the affront given to it and the damage—one hopes the damage is not irreparable—done to it by the explosion at Lop Nor.

20. The year 1963 witnessed yet another hopeful development with the agreement not to station or orbit nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space.2

21. These are significant steps in the right direction but there were no comparable developments last year, except for the cut-back in fissile material production,3 nor has there been any progress during the current year so far. The Indian delegation would, however, like to express the hope that the convening of the Disarmament Commission will mark the beginning of another fruitful series of endeavours toward disarmament and reduction of tension, notwithstanding the unfortunate happenings in Viet-Nam and elsewhere.

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1 Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291-293.
2 Ibid., p. 538.
3 See ibid., 1964, pp. 165-171.
23. Despite this general demand, it is not easy to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. A lot of patient negotiation is necessary to iron out the differences that still persist and to find solutions to the problems that may arise in course of such negotiations. Even leaving out of consideration the views of those few countries who still believe in the inevitability of war and the glory of war, it would be unrealistic on our part to think that nations can agree to negotiate a comprehensive treaty on disarmament without adequate assurances of their own security. The cold war is still with us and countries continue to confront each other. Disarmament has, therefore, to be achieved in well-calculated and acceptable stages with the assurance that no country is put at a relative disadvantage during the actual process of disarmament. This requires patient and detailed negotiations, generally of a technical nature, and naturally these negotiations need to be spread out over a period of time.

24. Disarmament has been engaging the attention of the United Nations since its very inception and, as some representatives have already emphasized, the first resolution adopted by the General Assembly, resolution 1(I), dealt with an aspect of disarmament. Since the eleventh session in particular, we have been attempting to establish a forum for purposeful negotiations on disarmament and, fortunately, the United Nations has, after a period of trial and error, agreed upon suitable bodies for the purpose. We have, in the first place, set up the Disarmament Commission consisting of the entire membership of the United Nations, and through this Commission the United Nations discharges its responsible functions in the field of disarmament. For the actual negotiations on the detailed issues of disarmament and related matters, the General Assembly has entrusted the task to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. This Committee has been doing useful work. We would, of course, all like to have speedier progress and achieve more substantial results. But bearing in mind how difficult it is to achieve the objective of general and complete disarmament—an objective which mankind never attempted to tackle seriously in the past—and remembering that detailed and technical negotiations have to be conducted in the context of safeguarding national and international security, my delegation has no hesitation in saying that the work done so far has been, on the whole, useful and rewarding. The Disarmament Committee can, for example, claim some credit for the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty, as also for the decision of the major nuclear Powers to reduce their production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The Committee recessed last year with hopes for some progress in several promising fields in the near future.

25. The presence of eight non-aligned delegations in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee has proved to be most useful. This was the first time that nations not aligned with any of the Power blocs were included in a body negotiating disarmament, and there has been a general recognition of the effective role played by these delegations. The Memorandum submitted by them on a nuclear test ban has been of particular significance.\(^1\)

26. The document which forms our agenda concerns the entire gamut of the problems concerning disarmament and the memoranda submitted by the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic deal with these problems in some detail.\(^2\) We hope that some tangible progress will be made on at least some of these issues when the Disarmament Committee reconvenes in the near future.

27. One of the most important tasks facing the Disarmament Commission, therefore, is to give the necessary impetus and directives to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to proceed with its work with determination and urgency. The work done so far has been useful, but that is only the beginning. The Disarmament Committee first met in the midst of a crisis and a confrontation; we are facing another crisis and a confrontation today. We expect, however, that the Eighteen-Nation Committee will continue its work in the true spirit of co-operation undaunted by passing storms, for what is at stake is the future of entire mankind. If we fail to achieve our objective, the survival of humanity will be in jeopardy.

28. The memorandum of the Indian delegation sets forth our views both on the broad issue of general and complete disarmament as well as on the specific issues of various collateral measures.\(^3\) It is not, therefore, necessary for me to go into detail at the present stage. We have, however, now reached a stage when isolated collateral measures are no longer easy to undertake or implement. In the early period of consideration of measures of arms control, it was possible, for example, to select an isolated first step like the nuclear test ban and implement it. This first step has not only not been adequately followed up by other steps, but it has in fact been defied with impunity. In the circumstances, it has now become necessary to take some integrated steps. Also, as we make further advances and come nearer to the problem of disarmament, it becomes necessary to take co-ordinated steps covering two, three or more measures of arms control and limitation, in order that the security considerations of individual nations not be affected in any way. The United States and the USSR have both put forward various constructive suggestions in regard to col-

\(^1\) Ibid., 1964, pp. 428-429.
\(^2\) Ibid., pp. 403-427.
\(^3\) Ibid., pp. 408-412.
lateral measures of arms control and limitation, and reduction of tension. In considering these measures in detail, we feel that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will need to adopt an integrated approach—an approach which tackles two or more measures simultaneously. The Indian delegation notes with appreciation that, despite differences in detail, this is the approach which the major Powers have also adopted in this respect.

29. India has always taken a prominent part in all discussions relating to disarmament. Apart from our historical and cultural traditions, this is because we believe that we have now reached a stage when the stockpile of nuclear weapons is enough to destroy the whole world several times over. There is an increasing danger of war by accident or miscalculation, if not by design. If war was always bad, it is now unthinkable, as it would engulf all humanity, combatants as well as non-combatants, and destroy all that civilization has built up over the centuries. Our instinct of self-preservation dictates that we destroy these weapons before they destroy us. India and the other developing countries, constituting the bulk of the human race, have another war to wage—a war against poverty, ignorance and disease. They have embarked on the task of building a world of peace, justice, progress and prosperity. The results of all these endeavours would be buried under the radio-active debris, once a conflict escalates into a thermonuclear war. We have, therefore, to make substantial progress, and that most urgently, towards a disarmed world.

30. It is because of this urgency that collateral measures have assumed such special importance. Apart from leading the international community by stages to the goal for general and complete disarmament, these measures are also expected to lead to a reduction of tension and to the building up of mutual confidence. These objectives are desirable in themselves and we should all bend our energies to achieve them.

31. The first measure that strikes us to be of overwhelming importance is that of a comprehensive test ban treaty. India was the first country to urge a cessation of nuclear weapons tests and it was as early as 1954 that our late Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, urged the United Nations to take up that issue urgently.1 Thereafter, we moved resolutions in the United Nations and, although at first we were not successful, we now rejoice that we have a partial test ban treaty. We have now to make some further progress by converting this partial prohibition into a comprehensive prohibition. The nuclear Powers have given a solemn undertaking that they will continue negotiations towards this end, and we urge that these should

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be continued with a view to reaching a comprehensive treaty as soon as possible. We realize that there are differences on this issue between the major nuclear Powers. While negotiations are conducted for reconciling these differences, particularly in the light of the developing technology of identification, it is imperative that all underground tests be discontinued immediately, either by agreement or through a policy of mutual example. It is equally vital that those countries which have not yet subscribed to the existing treaty should do so immediately, for the international community cannot for long tolerate a situation and idly stand by when one or more countries embark on a programme of nuclear weapons. By its resolution 1762 (XVII), the General Assembly condemned all nuclear weapon tests 1 and we trust that this condemnation will be proclaimed again and again and, what is more, the international community will have to consider what positive steps can be taken to discipline those who ignore this condemnation.

32. The second issue on which my delegation places particular emphasis is that of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. India had inscribed an item on this subject on the agenda of the nineteenth session of the General Assembly. Unfortunately, the Assembly was unable to consider that item along with many others. We are glad that the Disarmament Commission has now been convened and we hope that it will direct its attention to this important question and ask the Disarmament Committee in Geneva to proceed with purposeful negotiations on that all-important issue, in the light of the broad principles that may emerge from this Commission.

33. The unfortunate development that took place soon after the inscription of the item on non-proliferation was the nuclear weapons explosion conducted by the People's Republic of China in defiance of the international will as expressed in the Moscow Treaty and in utter disregard for the Bandung Declaration of 1955, 2 to which at least, it was a party. We are, therefore, now in a situation when proliferation has already started. It is that situation which we have to face. We want not only the prevention of further proliferation but also the reversal of present proliferation. Statements were made by many delegates in the General Assembly pointing out that it is unrealistic to ask countries to forswear forever a programme of nuclear weapons production, when the existing nuclear Powers continue to hold on to their awesome arsenals and when, we may add, new countries embark on nuclear programmes. My delegation is in entire agreement with this view. It has warned the international community time and again of the dangers of proliferation. Its constructive suggestions have not yet borne fruit, and today we are witnessing further proliferation.

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The Government of India has reaffirmed its determination to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes, but at the same time it fears that unless the world community does something to reverse the existing situation, there is hardly any likelihood of preventing further proliferation. The spread of nuclear weapons capacity from two to three Powers and then to four Powers has not been a healthy development. And now yet another country is embarking on a nuclear weapons programme. That is not a situation which we or the international community can view with equanimity.

34. This, of course, is not a cry of despair, although it may be a cry of anguish. It is not yet too late to take to the path of sanity. An integrated programme of purposeful measures can still bring us back on the road leading to a disarmed world.

35. I have no doubt that the Disarmament Committee in Geneva will discuss this matter in detail, but I would like at this stage to outline for the consideration of the Commission, what, in the view of my delegation, could form the basis of an integrated solution of the problems of proliferation. The elements which should enter into an arrangement on non-proliferation could be the following:

(1) An undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons technology to others;

(2) An undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against countries which do not possess them;

(3) An undertaking through the United Nations to safeguard the security of countries which may be threatened by Powers having a nuclear weapons capability or about to have a nuclear weapons capability;

(4) Tangible progress towards disarmament, including a comprehensive test ban treaty, a complete freeze on production of nuclear weapons and means of delivery as well as a substantial reduction in the existing stocks; and,

(5) An undertaking by non-nuclear Powers not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons.

36. It is an integrated proposal of this nature which alone could solve the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons. One or two isolated measures within this integrated programme will not be adequate. For example, it is no use telling countries, some of which may be even more advanced in nuclear technology than China, that they should enter into a treaty which would stipulate only that they must not acquire or produce these weapons. Again, it is no use telling them that their security will be safeguarded by one or other of the existing nuclear Powers. Such an assurance has to be really dependable. Moreover, nations are not interested in having another Hiroshima on their soil before an assurance of this nature could come
into effect. Unless the nuclear Powers and would-be nuclear Powers undertake from now on not to produce any nuclear weapons or vehicles for weapons delivery and, in addition, agree to reduce their existing stockpile of nuclear weapons, there is no way of doing away with the proliferation that has already taken place or of preventing further proliferation.

37. I hasten to add that this does not mean that countries with knowledge of nuclear technology would otherwise straightaway go ahead with a nuclear weapons programme. As far as India is concerned, we have emphasized our present determination to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. I am, however, speaking now of the international community as a whole and I must point out the danger that some countries may find it necessary, in the interest of their own security, to acquire nuclear weapons, if proliferation is allowed to go on. We must, therefore, stop proliferation urgently. The only way of doing so lies in some integrated arrangement of the type outlined by me.

38. The Indian delegation fully realizes that this is a matter which requires detailed and technical discussions, but as our Foreign Minister, Mr. Singh, said in the General Debate in the last session of the Assembly:

. . . The importance of non-proliferation cannot be over-emphasized. This question is as important as that of banning nuclear tests. We feel that the Assembly should direct the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to discuss the question of non-proliferation as a matter of highest priority. . . .

We suggest that the Disarmament Commission now do what the Assembly could not do.

39. India like most other countries believes that nuclear arms pose the most serious danger to international peace and security and that it is essential that we deal with that problem with the utmost urgency. At the same time, we must not lose sight of the awesome panoply of conventional arms in the armories of the world. We must remember that the conflicts which plague us today are being waged entirely with conventional arms. In any case, disarmament is an objective to be subscribed to by all nations. We, in India, are particularly conscious of the danger posed by large conventional armies. One of our neighbouring countries, for example, boasts of an army of 3 million men with the support of 200 million militiamen. It is all very well to talk of a world conference to destroy nuclear weapons of other countries, but the international community must also demand that pari passu with nuclear disarmament there should be a full scale reduction of such menacingly large armies and armaments. Along with the conversion of atomic weapons to peaceful uses, there should also be the

1 Ibid., 1964, p. 530.
classical conversion of the sword into the ploughshare. Here again, the Indian delegation is glad to note that despite differences—and some of these differences are vital—the draft treaties submitted by the two sides adopt the correct integrated approach towards comprehensive disarmament, both nuclear and conventional. Large military Powers, both nuclear and conventional, have, therefore, to adopt bold and far-reaching measures of substantial reductions in their arsenals.

40. My delegation is encouraged to note that the representatives who have already spoken before us have put forward several constructive suggestions and we have no doubt that many more ideas will be put forward by other speakers. An idea that we particularly welcome is the one advanced by the representative of Italy. He referred to the noble appeal made by His Holiness the Pope at the end of his memorable visit to my country in December 1964.\(^1\) The Indian delegation would like to commend the suggestion made by the representative of Italy, namely the acceptance of the principle that savings made in the military expenditure by the affluent members of the international community should be earmarked for aid to developing countries in some form of fraternal collaboration.

41. The representatives of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and Hungary also made some valuable suggestions in regard to the ban on nuclear weapons, the consequences of improved scientific verification capabilities and the reduction of nuclear weapons to lower, safer and less costly levels. All these suggestions will, of course, need to be examined in detail by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. I should also like to take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to the Minister of State of the United Kingdom for the handsome tribute paid by him to my country for refusing to be hustled into a nuclear arms race despite its technological capacity to do so.

42. References have been made to the idea of a world conference on disarmament. My Government is a signatory to the Cairo Declaration of Non-aligned States\(^2\) and agrees that a conference of this nature will be useful at an appropriate stage. At the same time, we believe that the present is not an appropriate time for such a conference. Unlike the questions of trade and development, where we needed enunciation of certain broad principles, what we need today on disarmament is detailed discussions on the terms of a treaty based on broad principles which have already been laid down. The international community is agreed upon the broad objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The in-

\(^1\) Disarmament Commission *Official Records; 73rd Meeting*, p. 12.

\(^2\) *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 443–448.
national community has also accepted the broad features of the Zorin-Stevenson [sic] set of principles.\(^1\) Draft treaties on fairly similar lines have already been put forward by the two sides.\(^2\) What we need at present, therefore, is the finalization of the details of a treaty, or at least some tangible progress in that direction. The Government of India still adheres to the views that were expressed by our Prime Minister in his letter to the Prime Minister of China on 27 November 1964. He said:

In the reply we sent to your last communication, we pointed out that the problems of general and complete disarmament, including nuclear and conventional arms, were highly complicated matters requiring a lot of detailed work and were not matters which could be debated and settled at a large conference of the kind proposed by Your Excellency.

By their very nature, these intricate issues need to be negotiated in smaller committees and often at the level of experts, as was being done by the United Nations.

We agreed that it was essential that all countries subscribe to a treaty on general and complete disarmament, but we felt that a conference of plenipotentiaries of the countries of the world could be useful only when substantial progress had been made in working out a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The Government of India continue to adhere to these views, which are also the views of the majority of the nations of the world.

What is needed is not declarations or exhortations, but concrete and specific steps, like cessation of tests, prohibition of the use of fissile material for purposes of weapons, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, reduction of large and intimidating armies, etc.

In this context, I trust Your Excellency's Government will take early steps to subscribe to the nuclear test-ban Treaty and stop the production of these weapons of mass destruction.\(^3\)

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Statement by the U.A.R. Representative (Fahmy) to the Disarmament Commission, May 4, 1965\(^4\)

It is repeatedly stated that the disarmament question is the most important subject which has preoccupied and is still preoccupying mankind. The importance of the disarmament question does not stem only from the fact that it is a complex problem, but also from the fact that it deals with matters which have a direct impact on us all, and will have for many years to come. The concern of humanity is thus legitimate, particularly in the light of the rapid advances in science and technology.

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1 For the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, see ibid., 1961, pp. 439-442.
2 See ante, pp. 77-102, 111-140.
3 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 490-491.
107. In the nuclear age in which we live, the importance of this topic far exceeds that of any other problem which mankind is facing, because of the fact that no one can guarantee against the hazardous results of any armed conflict or war by accident or miscalculation.

108. Wherever humanity at large has the opportunity to express its concern regarding the devastating results of a nuclear war, we usually do not find any disagreement on the seriousness of the situation which at present faces us because of the continuous arms race between the big Powers.

109. I do not believe that I can express that feeling better than the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries during their meeting in Cairo in October 1964, when they said:

The Conference notes with concern that the continuing arms race and the tremendous advances that have been made in the production of weapons of mass destruction and their stockpiling threaten the world with armed conflict and annihilation.\textsuperscript{1} . . .

110. This strong voice expresses the deep concern of a big majority of nations from Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America. This concern is a genuine one, especially when we see that the arms race is still continuing at an unprecedented pace; that when, from time to time, there is an armed conflict in one area or another no one can guarantee that these limited conflicts will not extend their scope; that the continuous mobilization of the resources of the world for destructive purposes automatically cripples the healthy and sound development and growth of the world; and, lastly, the human race cannot continue forever to live under the nightmare of a devastating war from which neither victor nor vanquished can emerge with any justifiable gains.

111. For all these reasons the United Arab Republic, together with many delegations, welcomed the principles agreed between the United States and the USSR in September 1961, to form a framework for the discussions related to the disarmament question.\textsuperscript{2} That agreement created the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, which has handled this problem for the last three years. All these steps held out some hope that at last it might be possible to proceed to an agreement on some solution for this chronic problem.

112. We have to admit that the deliberations of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee have opened some avenues for possible agreement, and its efforts have led to various steps in the right direction, namely, the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty,\textsuperscript{3} the

\textsuperscript{1} Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 443-444.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., 1961, pp. 439-442.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., 1963, pp. 291-293.
resolution to keep nuclear weapons out of outer space and the reciprocal unilateral actions which were taken by the United States and the USSR in a spirit of mutual example.

113. In spite of certain criticism which has been voiced in connexion with the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, we believe that it has served a useful purpose, not only because it has kept the dialogue on disarmament going, but also because of its representative character. It has expressed the concern of world public opinion and kept the issues alive and tried its best to make a bridge between the two big Powers.

114. For these reasons the Eighteen-Nation Committee again needs your full support so that, when this Commission adjourns, it can be convened as soon as possible to continue its efforts in a businesslike manner.

115. The United Arab Republic was in favour of an early session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee because we felt that the disarmament question was not amply discussed during the nineteenth session of the Assembly and could not wait till the twentieth session is convened—we hope to function in a normal way.

116. For the same reasons we welcomed the initiative taken by the Government of the USSR in requesting the present meeting of the Disarmament Commission. The concurrence of the United States and others in the USSR initiative made it possible for all of us to try once again to focus on this vital issue of disarmament.

117. I for one do not believe that it is possible in a Commission like this to discuss in detail the general question of disarmament. The United Arab Republic is a member of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, and its representative on that Committee, Mr. A. F. Hassan, has put forward the views of the United Arab Republic.

118. The memorandum submitted by the United Arab Republic delegation in Geneva on 14 September 1964 includes the views of the Government of the United Arab Republic on the question of general and complete disarmament. I do not intend to elaborate on these specific proposals.

119. All I can say in relation to this complex problem is that the Government of the United Arab Republic is in favour of new and urgent steps to be taken towards achieving general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

120. We in the United Arab Republic believe that, in this connexion, the onus rests on the great Powers and on their real intent and desire to achieve some progress in this regard. We are aware that it is

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1 Ibid., p. 538.
practically impossible that they disarm by some magic wand. Disarmament is a long process which needs, as a prerequisite, the proper political atmosphere to provide the confidence necessary for the implementation of any programme of disarmament.

121. While we believe that the big Powers have a special responsibility, on the other hand it is incumbent upon us from time to time that we urge them to heed world public opinion and proceed in a practical manner to pave the way for general agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament.

122. As a practical approach, we share the view that any discussion related to the disarmament question will not bear fruit unless all the nations of the world take part in it. In the United Arab Republic, we believe that it is high time to consider seriously the necessity of having the People's Republic of China take part in any discussion pertaining to this vital issue. This could be achieved either by inviting the Government in Peking to the negotiating table in Geneva, or by convening a world conference in which all States should participate. If the former procedure entailed some difficulties, there would be no other alternative but to agree in this Commission on the recommendation approved by the Cairo Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries, namely to convene a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations to which all countries would be invited. This is a crucial point which we should face with courage and deal with on a realistic basis.

123. We hardly see how any substantial progress on disarmament can be achieved if the Government in Peking does not take part in it. To illustrate this, I do not believe that we can disagree that the Moscow Treaty cannot maintain its importance as long as China and France do not adhere to it. Similarly, any international agreement on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be meaningless unless all—and I underline the word "all"—nuclear Powers, including China, are party to it.

124. Having said that, it is therefore proper for this Commission to recommend to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva to tackle this practical problem and discuss the ways and means which would, in the near future, make it possible for the conference to materialize. In this connexion, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva could act as a preparatory commission for that conference, and as such it should report to the twentieth session of the General Assembly on this particular issue.

125. Another important problem on which this Commission should concentrate is that of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

126. Listening to the distinguished representatives who preceded me, I do not find any disagreement on the importance as well as the

1 Ibid., p. 445.
urgency and necessity of coming to grips with this particular problem. The more we are hesitant in our action, the more difficult the situation will be, especially in the face of the increasingly rapid development and progress in the nuclear field in many countries. Science and technology will no longer be a monopoly of a few countries. Moreover, because of the widespread use of nuclear reactors, the potential of many countries to develop atomic weapons is more than a possibility. If this happens, we will have an inevitable chain of reaction from other countries because of their legitimate concern regarding their own security. Then the ultimate result would be, as the representative of the United States rightly said, a nuclear anarchy.

127. This leads me to the resolution on this issue which was unanimously adopted by the African Summit Conference convened in Cairo.¹ The essentials of that resolution were unanimously confirmed at the Second Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries.²

128. When I had the honour to present that resolution during the Conference of the Foreign Ministers which preceded the African Summit Conference, I witnessed the unanimity with which it was adopted, which proves beyond any doubt the sense of awareness and responsibility of the African States. Later, in the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, some sixty nations from all over the world approved the same declaration without a single dissenting vote.

129. In both cases, the Heads of State and Government in Cairo declared their readiness not to produce, acquire or test any nuclear weapons. They furthermore expressed their readiness that this solemn undertaking be the subject of a treaty to be concluded in an international conference held under the auspices of the United Nations. This conference was to be open to all States. Furthermore, the Heads of State called upon all nuclear Powers to observe and respect the spirit of this declaration.

130. This is the basic issue on which we hope some action by this Commission will be approved, in the form of guiding principles, before it is referred to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. It is by now abundantly clear that there is general agreement on the importance of this problem and, therefore, it should not be difficult to concentrate on it. It should be given top priority either here or in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee when it meets in Geneva.

131. A new important concept has begun to emerge in the various categories of nuclear guarantees: I mean the multilateral or international nuclear guarantee, to which the representative of India alluded just a moment ago. This is a very complex problem of a highly

¹ Ibid., pp. 294–295.
² Ibid., p. 444.
political, strategic and military nature; it should be very carefully and cautiously examined because of its far-reaching implications.

132. When we speak about the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, we always believe that it is necessary as a first step to complete the Moscow test-ban Treaty to include underground tests. It is clear that, scientifically, there is a very narrow margin between the positions of the interested parties as regards agreement on this remaining point. There again, if there is a will there is always a way to bring the two positions together, and I believe many constructive ideas were proposed to this effect in Geneva, as, for instance, the joint memorandum submitted on 14 September 1964 by the eight non-aligned countries.¹

133. With reference to the Moscow Treaty, it is again of paramount importance that all States should adhere to it. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, in the general debate in the General Assembly, said the following in this connexion:

... the overdue agreement on partial cessation of nuclear tests, signed in Moscow last year, still remains as an isolated beginning of an unfulfilled course. The natural steps to make the Treaty of Moscow both universal and comprehensive have not followed. Two of the five nuclear Powers still have not adhered to this treaty, nor has there been an agreement on the cessation of underground tests.²

134. In this connexion, we again propose that there should be a voluntary moratorium by the nuclear Powers, under which they would refrain from any further underground tests pending agreement on the technicalities needed for the completion of the Moscow Treaty.

135. One of the contemporary issues which engage the attention of many Governments and nations at the present time is the problem of denuclearized zones. The Government of the United Arab Republic has made it clear on various occasions that it is in favour of the principle of denuclearized zones, and that we will be more than happy to see as many denuclearized zones as possible. In this connexion, we are still bound by our support of the resolution regarding the denuclearization of Africa.³

136. Similarly, we are pleased and encouraged by the further developments and efforts of the Latin American countries to denuclearize their continent.

137. This, however, leads me to draw attention to some general points which should always be examined when this topic is under consideration.

138. To begin with, the desire for denuclearization of any area should come from within the area itself, and all details relating to it

¹ Ibid., pp. 428–429.
should be prepared and thoroughly discussed by the countries concerned through their regional organizations, established in accordance with Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations. Secondly, when that discussion takes place all political, geographical, economic and scientific factors related to any particular area should be considered together, so that the various implications related to each area may be thoroughly examined. Thirdly, the denuclearization of any area should take into account the situation or situations prevailing around it. With this in mind, my delegation will attentively follow the evolution of this concept, either in the United Nations or in other forums.

139. Related to this particular issue is the fact that we in the United Arab Republic find it rather difficult to discuss such an important problem while in Africa and around it there are foreign military bases. The way in which, in 1956, the use of certain bases as a spring-board led to war and aggression against my country is still fresh in our minds.

140. These and other bases scattered in the African continent make it difficult for us to see how the denuclearization of Africa—and for that matter, any other area—can be achieved before all these considerations are taken into account. Only in this way could the denuclearization of any area be as effective as it should be.

141. The position of the Government of the United Arab Republic is, therefore, against all military bases, which it views as a source of aggression and the real cause of international tension.

142. All these and other issues which were raised by the speakers who preceded me merit serious consideration, and I hope it will serve as an impetus to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva.

143. There is no doubt in our mind that the two statements which were delivered by the representatives of the USSR and the United States will be thoroughly and seriously examined. Similarly, we have listened to the interesting and stimulating statement delivered by Lord Chalfont on 28 April. It is a constructive effort to approach certain vital points, especially the problem of nondissemination of nuclear weapons. We look on these statements as serious and honest endeavours which deserve our attention, and for that reason we believe that this Disarmament Commission at its present session should try to concentrate on the various topics where agreement is possible and adopt the necessary resolutions to serve as guidance to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva when it meets.

1 Ante, pp. 37–58.
3 Disarmament Commission Official Records; 74th Meeting, pp. 1–6.
we hope very soon, to continue its important task of studying this vast area of disarmament in order to find possible solutions and areas of agreement, and of serving as a mediator in narrowing the gap between the two big Powers. With this in mind, we firmly believe and expect that this Commission will come to an agreement on the basic and immediate issues which preoccupy mankind. The deliberations of this Commission, I hope, will end by achieving some substantial progress so that the United Nations, as represented here, will not fail the aspirations of the community at large.

Statement by the Swedish Representative (Myrdal) to the Disarmament Commission {Extracts}, May 10, 1965

68. In regard to general and complete disarmament—which is the overriding objective of the negotiations, according to General Assembly resolutions—the important differences in ideological approach on the part of the major Powers have actually been somewhat narrowed down. Modifications have been introduced from both sides; they are reflected in the versions of their two draft proposals, if we compare the original ones with those we now have before us. Most salient among the modifications introduced is, without question, the so-called Gromyko umbrella, that is, the fact that now also the Soviet Union accepts the idea that both the nuclear super-Powers retain a certain, although strictly reduced, nuclear deterrent force throughout the disarmament process. In principle, this means that their mutual security would be safeguarded, which in turn must make them more ready to embark on a course of disarmament. During the last session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament considerable preparatory work was going on for finding a method to determine the size and the composition of this nuclear umbrella, or “shield”, as some of us prefer to call it.

74. Turning now to the more specific plans for early disarmament agreements which are favoured by the Swedish Government, I do not intend to present any new scheme. We continue to believe that the approach made in the statement by the Swedish Foreign Minister to the General Assembly on 22 January 1965 is the one which gives most promise of early achievement. We hold—and this was also empha-
sized by the United Kingdom representative, Lord Chalfont, in his statement at the Commission's 74th meeting—that priority should be given, not to one isolated measure, but to several elements combined into a "package" to be agreed upon simultaneously. Such a "package" must consist of well-integrated measures, aimed at achieving a reduction of armaments, or at least a "freeze" of the status quo over a fairly broad field, and giving scope for active contributions by both nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. The three measures contained in the Swedish "package" for implementation without delay all envisage renunciatory action in the nuclear field, namely: (a) a comprehensive test ban, also covering underground explosions; (b) the halting of all production of fissionable material for military purposes; and (c) an agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

75. The main rationale for preferring a combination of disarmament measures is related to the problem of balance. To achieve a balance, where security considerations would not be inequitably affected, must appear as a practically insoluble task if change is introduced in regard to one measure only. The varying weights of several measures, chosen with circumspection and linked in a coherent plan, should make the sacrifices incurred more equitably distributed. The proposals included in the Swedish package have been chosen with that purpose in mind. The impact of these three different disarmament measures—which must obviously be judged as negative by those in each country affected who are responsible for military policy—would weigh more heavily on the great Powers, in some on the smaller ones, in some cases probably implying somewhat greater sacrifices on the part of the United States and in others, on the part of the Soviet Union. If we have not succeeded in striking such a fair balance that it is reasonably acceptable to all, we are of course quite willing to listen to recommendations for an exchange of elements in the package. Those included in the present one do not represent any specific political predilection on our part. The chief reason for advocating this particular combination of interdependent measures is, as I have just said, that it would seem to facilitate early agreement on account of its inherent system of counterbalances. It would also commend itself for early implementation, because the concurrent control measures are comparatively easy to master, since on these considerable preparatory studies have been carried out. From a political point of view, such a combined approach is also to be recommended, as delegations would not be compelled to choose between exclusive alternatives, advocated by one great Power or another, probably not without a certain consideration concerning which measures are the least harmful to their own security interests.

76. Some of the speakers that have preceded me have suggested a different selection of disarmament measures which are to be encom-
passed in an integrated programme for primary consideration. I want to refer particularly to the very interesting suggestions for a set of integrated measures contained in the statement made by the representative of India on 4 May 1965.\(^1\) They were conceived as forming part and parcel of an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; as a matter of fact, they seemed to constitute a set of conditions which would have to be fulfilled before the non-nuclear Powers entered upon the fifth and last step, the undertaking by them not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. The Swedish delegation has studied this programme with great interest. We are not in a position today to substitute it for our own, probably less far-reaching, proposal, but we are eager to see both of them—as well as any other suggestions for combined approaches—submitted to closer scrutiny at the negotiation table in Geneva. That holds also for the very interesting outline of a minimum programme presented by Yugoslavia at our last meeting.\(^2\) Canada at the same time offered yet another combination for consideration. I might add that various suggestions about some kind of practical combination of complementary measures were made in Geneva by the representatives of Brazil, of Burma, of Nigeria and of the United Arab Republic, these suggestions being detailed in document ENDC/144, which is appended to the report before this Commission.\(^3\) It is high time they were all submitted to serious, businesslike examination in the Geneva negotiations, and we hope they will be when those negotiations resume. My delegation would favour the mentioning of the particular task of studying an equitable combination of collateral measures in the directives for work in Geneva which we hope will emanate from this Commission.

77. Taking a closer view of the three specific measures recommended for simultaneous consideration by the Swedish Government, it would seem to us that a comprehensive test ban would be a “must”, as it falls logically in line with the most important step in the direction of disarmament so far taken, namely the Moscow Treaty of August 1963.\(^4\) Its effect would be to “freeze” the development of nuclear weapons. For the nuclear Powers this must be welcome as a safeguard against surprising breakthroughs in the development of weapon systems. At the same time, it would obviously diminish the risks of independent production of nuclear weapons on the part of nations that have hitherto not taken a seat in what is euphemistically called the “nuclear club”.

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\(^1\) Ante, pp. 142–151.


\(^3\) Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 403–427.

\(^4\) Ibid., 1968, pp. 291–293.
78. We have already in this Commission heard statements both from the United States and from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, expressing their hopes and wishes that an agreement on a comprehensive test ban would soon be reached. The concern of the non-nuclear Powers is already forcefully expressed in document ENDC/145, at the end of the Committee’s report, reproducing a joint memorandum by the eight non-aligned members of the Geneva Conference,¹ which urges the nuclear Powers to take immediate steps towards the banning of all nuclear tests as they themselves had promised in the preamble to the Moscow agreement and as the General Assembly has called for in its resolution 1910 (XVIII).²

79. Those eight delegations acknowledge the existence of certain differences between the nuclear Powers on the question of identification and on the need for verification of underground tests, but they refuse to regard those as insurmountable difficulties. We are all aware that these very questions have hitherto constituted a stumbling block; but I believe that we are also all aware that so much progress has now been made in the scientific and technological capabilities for detection and identification of nuclear tests that the requirements for control can be reduced to levels where an agreement should be within easy reach. We may take great encouragement from the fact that reference to this technological progress has been made in the statements to this Commission by practically all speakers, including particularly the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. Thus we have the right to expect tangible results in this field.

80. Again, most promising groundwork for such an agreement has been laid in Geneva, prepared by technical studies conducted in a number of countries. Thus, it has already become an established fact that the primary task of monitoring and detecting possible clandestine tests rests with national observation systems. In many countries national seismological stations are being set up for that very purpose. The next requirement is to organize a rapid and complete flow of data from those stations through an international network and to place an increasing reliance for the evaluation of the findings on disinterested collaboration between scientists in this field. We must continue to hope that full international co-operation, consisting of an open exchange of data, will be secured for this purpose, preferably with the participation of all countries that have detecting capabilities. If great-Power co-operation would not be forthcoming immediately, a suggestion has been made that non-nuclear Powers might begin by establishing a less ambitious “detection club” on the basis of voluntary co-operation among their scientific stations.

¹ Ibid., 1964, pp. 428–429.
² Ibid., 1963, p. 627.
81. Of course, there still remains the most vexing problem of all, namely, that of verification of registered, suspicious events, to find out and to prove whether they emanate from the play of natural forces or are wilfully man-made. It is the most vexing problem partly because it has become politically loaded, and partly also because the on-site inspection envisaged as the main verification method is a most difficult one to handle in a practical, effective way. It has been said that it would be as hard for an accusing party to use this method for obtaining conclusive evidence that a test explosion has occurred as it would be easy for an accused but innocent party to use it for proving that innocence.

82. In the circumstances of today, a new look at the whole problem of verification is clearly called for. A set of quite practical compromise proposals had been made at an earlier stage by the non-aligned delegations in Geneva and the further amendments which would be necessary to make an agreement operational could without doubt be worked out—as soon as a session dedicated to negotiation is again opened.

83. I will only briefly mention the second element in the proposed package, namely, the cut-off of present facilities for producing fissionable material for military purposes. Such a measure would have the function of constituting a "freeze" as to the quantitative strength of nuclear arsenals. It would have its impact directly and predominantly on the nuclear Powers which are carrying on such production, but indirectly it would also mean a blocking of the possibility of the non-nuclear Powers starting production. In this field, as well as in that of a test ban, the major guarantee that faithful compliance is observed would be the utilization of scientific procedures for control. The International Atomic Energy Agency already provides international machinery of the kind that might be used for this purpose. A good beginning can be made if more countries accept in practice the IAEA safeguards which have already been accepted in principle.

84. I have purposely deferred the mentioning of an agreement to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to nations which do not now possess them or control them to third place. The reason is that my Government has not expected such an agreement, in the form it has been envisaged, to have the character of an "Open sesame". There exists an interdependence, both technically and politically, as I have tried to indicate earlier, between measures intended to close the door to the "nuclear club" and the question whether the production and testing of nuclear weapons should be allowed to continue by members of that nuclear club. This connexion between curtailing present activity and preventing the start of the same kind of activity is particularly evident to smaller countries, and most particularly, of course, to
those outside of any alliances with nuclear Powers. To institute an international obligation which binds only the non-nuclear Powers to the status quo does not seem to us to be as significant a disarmament measure as the world is now expecting. And having passed various disarmament proposals in such close review as we have done over the years, we all know that this measure is not in reality so much easier to agree on than others, for instance, agreement on a broader combination of arms regulation measures which would call for similar sacrifices of future potentials for increasing nuclear strength on the part of nuclear and non-nuclear Powers alike.

85. I hope that nobody will construe this as being in any way an apology for the right of the non-nuclear countries to acquire these weapons of mass destruction. As far as Sweden is concerned, let me just quote a few opening words from the Speech of the Throne, pronounced by our King when opening Parliament last January:

In order to preserve peace, there must be progress in disarmament, especially in respect of measures to prevent further spread of nuclear weapons. Sweden will continue her efforts to promote international agreements in this vital area. And the political position with regard to the question whether Sweden, which possesses fairly advanced technological and industrial capacity for producing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, would contemplate manufacturing nuclear weapons has been made clear in a statement by our Minister of Defence, Mr. Sven Andersson, who, in a recent speech, said that:

There exists today no small Power having independent possession of nuclear weapons and no such weapons are stationed on Scandinavian territory. In the present situation it must be regarded as being completely out of the question that Sweden would take the lead among the small Powers to start nuclear arming and to contribute to further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such a Swedish line of action would not fail to have international consequences and would run counter to the plans for a limitation of the dissemination of nuclear weapons, which plans have our strong support. The effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons through international agreements is a security interest of the first order also for our country and as long as there are prospects for progress we in Sweden should be prepared to abide.

86. That is for Sweden. But when I speak today, as a representative to this Commission and as a member of the Eighteen-Nation Commission on Disarmament, I partake in the deliberations under our joint responsibility of thinking not only of what is good for our own country but also what is good for the world. More specifically, we must ponder what practically is attainable for the world. And under present circumstances, my Government and I are convinced that a broader opening to the avenue of disarmament has a better chance to win support.

87. Thus it would seem preferable that a proposal for preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons should be coupled with such other
measures as would also give the great Powers a chance to prove that they are willing to reduce their nuclear strength.

88. So far I have only reviewed some of the measures which have been under active discussion for some time in the General Assembly and in Geneva, accounting for the positions my Government has taken on them and stressing that these positions are determined largely by the hope of achieving an early and effective start on the road to disarmament and armament regulation measures. Of course, our minds are not closed to new ideas and new departures. We intend to study with great care the suggestions proferred in statements made or to be made before this Commission. When suggestions have been made or invitations issued, that ad hoc conferences on various aspects of the disarmament problem should be organized, we have no objection in principle. If, as the Government of the People's Republic of China has suggested, there should be convened a summit conference with the object of discussing demobilization of all nuclear arsenals,¹ we should, as my Prime Minister, Mr. Tage Erlander, said in his reply,

be prepared to study in a positive spirit any procedure which might lead to progress in this field (disarmament). An important prerequisite for the acceptance of any new arrangement is, of course, that such procedure should meet with general support.

89. In the circumstances as they actually exist it has seemed to us more practical to centre our attention not on such spectacular new breakthroughs in world politics, but on the machinery which already exists for the purpose of disarmament deliberations—in the United Nations and this Commission—and disarmament negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Our attitude has been a similar one towards the suggestion originally made by the Government of Ethiopia and supported by several Governments that a conference be called to draft a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. We share the view held by many others, that it seems preferable that the assignment to provide a preparatory draft be given to some smaller body such as the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

90. In this context I find it important, however, to voice once more our conviction that a way must be found to bring the People's Republic of China into the negotiations on disarmament. The fact that two new Powers are taking steps to acquire nuclear weapon capabilities and that they have neither signed the Moscow treaty nor participated in the more active recent deliberations on disarmament, constitutes an inherent weakness in all such work. France is an elected member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. A very real weakness of that organ—as one of the instruments by which we try

¹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 455.*
to achieve a world order that gradually renounces the use of violence for settling conflicts—is that the seat of France has so far remained vacant and that China has not been given an opportunity to participate.

Progress Report by Secretary-General Thant to the Economic and Social Council: Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament and Conversion to Peaceful Needs of the Resources Released by Disarmament, May 12, 1965

Preface

Pursuant to resolution 1026 (XXXVII) of the Economic and Social Council which called for the continuation, and acceleration as far as possible, of activities relating to the economic and social consequences of disarmament, the Secretary-General again addressed to member Governments a note verbale on the subject, attaching to it a framework for reporting on relevant national and international studies and activities.

All the replies that had been received by the end of April are reproduced below. Replies that may be received subsequently will be reproduced in the form of addenda to the present report.

Work relating to the economic and social consequences of disarmament has also been pursued by a number of agencies of the United Nations family. At its thirty-seventh session in April 1964, the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination examined the action which its members should take in response to General Assembly and ECOSOC resolutions on Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament—particularly General Assembly resolution 1931 (XVIII) and ECOSOC resolution 982 (XXXVI)—and to the relevant decisions of the governing bodies of the agencies, which constituted the legislative framework for the inter-agency programme of activities in this field. The members of the ACC concerned agreed that:

(a) The Secretary-General of the United Nations would act as the central point of co-ordination in respect of all studies of the economic and social aspects of disarmament;

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1 E/4042, May 12, 1965, pp. 3-6.
2 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 326-327.
3 Not printed here.
5 Ibid., pp. 279-281.
(b) All the organizations of the United Nations family proposing to undertake such studies would co-operate with the Secretary-General in the preparation of concerted programmes of work within the general framework of which such studies might be undertaken; and

c) The ACC would set up a committee of agency representatives to co-operate with the Secretary-General in developing such a programme.

In accordance with these decisions an Inter-Agency Committee on the Conversion to Peaceful Needs of the Resources Released by Disarmament was set up. This new Committee has held two sessions, and has made arrangements for close co-operation among the agencies in respect of future activities.

The Inter-Agency Committee also reached general agreement on two questions of substance, one concerning the hypotheses that might be adopted for purposes of future studies as to the nature and pace of disarmament and the other concerning the methodology to be used in future work.

With regard to appropriate hypotheses, the Committee discussed whether various assumptions concerning the nature and pace of disarmament—in addition to that of general, complete and rapid disarmament—could usefully be made as a basis for any future work in the field of economic and social consequences of disarmament to be undertaken by the various members of the United Nations system. It was noted in this connexion that the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the ECOSOC on the subject have not, so far, contained any explicit statement regarding the assumptions that might properly be made by Governments or by international bodies in making arrangements for and studies of the process of disarmament and its repercussions. The question was therefore examined against the background of the various agreements, decisions and proposals on collateral measures of disarmament that have been made in the past year or two.

Taking into account the nature and scope of the various studies being conducted or planned by member organizations and the limited possibilities of securing the necessary information and data, the Committee came to the conclusion that a pragmatic approach should be used. It might be more appropriate, at this stage, therefore, not to limit all studies to one single uniform assumption as to the nature and pace of disarmament but to adopt the most suitable hypothesis for each study. Such an approach would also provide the necessary flexibility in selecting topics which lend themselves to fruitful exploration.

After reviewing the various studies that might be undertaken by the agencies, the Committee examined the various methods which
were at the disposal of the United Nations system for securing the necessary information and data. It was recognized that most of the studies of the economic and social consequences of disarmament have necessarily to be based on information which is in the hands of Governments and is not readily available. This applies more particularly to material relating to the current and emerging situation. As long as some basic data and information are not available, the studies will inevitably tend to remain to a large extent of a theoretical or rather speculative character. In this context the Committee examined, against the experience acquired so far, the various channels which could be used for gathering the necessary material from Governments, namely:

(a) from published information,
(b) from direct questions,
(c) through the intermediary of "consultants" or "experts".

The Committee was of the opinion that the international secretariats should continue to have recourse to the various sources of information already used. However, in view of the requests made by the General Assembly and by ECOSOC for further studies in the field and of the need to assemble the additional material indispensable for this purpose, the Committee felt it was appropriate to discuss the desirability of submitting a questionnaire on the subject to member Governments.

A questionnaire for this purpose was drawn up by the Committee and submitted to the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC). The Committee recommended that the introductory memorandum accompanying the questionnaire might include a suggestion that each Government consider the desirability of appointing an interdepartmental group which would be responsible for preparing the national reply. It also recommended that to the covering memo there should be appended a list of activities in the field of economic and social consequences of disarmament prepared by the various members of the United Nations system.

The ACC concurred in these recommendations and felt that the questionnaire, as approved, should be circulated to Governments as soon as possible.1

The note verbale hitherto sent to Governments has sought information about studies and activities being conducted in connexion with the conversion to peaceful uses of the resources released by disarmament. As the replies reproduced below again show, this type of inquiry has yielded a good deal of information about Governments' concern and intentions, but relatively little information about the underlying facts. A number of Governments have now set up regular activities in the field.

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1 See the Thirty-first Report of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (E/4029), pars. 34–37.
machinery for studying disarmament problems—including the economic and social consequences—and it is clear that many studies are being and will be carried out at the national level.

Particularly noteworthy is the research at present being conducted by the major Powers concerned: both the United States and the Soviet Union are now engaged in detailed studies of conversion problems. The United States is examining the impact on factories and on regions of cancellations and revisions of important defence contracts, the difficulties and opportunities facing such industries as electronics and shipbuilding under conditions of reduced military demand and numerous other practical conversion problems. The Soviet Union has also launched factory-level studies of the process of switching from military to peaceful production and is investigating various possibilities of using military material and equipment for ordinary civilian purposes such as dam building and hail prevention.

Conclusions

The publication of national studies such as those referred to above will add considerably to the general knowledge of the problems of converting to peaceful uses resources released by disarmament. The replies to the United Nations note verbale have served a more useful purpose in making generally known what studies are under way in various countries. However, it is less clear what can be achieved at the international level. If further United Nations work is to be fruitful or indeed feasible, the United Nations will need to have at its disposal a great deal more information from Governments concerning relevant matters of substance than is currently available. The function of the questionnaire is to obtain this information. The switch from the note verbale to the questionnaire means a switch from reporting about studies to reporting about facts.

The Secretary-General believes that the Council may wish to draw this questionnaire to the particular attention of Governments and to emphasize the need for an adequate response to it, if the United Nations and the agencies concerned are to be in a position to continue and develop meaningful work in this area.

Chinese Communist Communique on Second Nuclear Test, May 14, 1965

China exploded another atom bomb over its western areas at 10:00 hours (Peking time) on May 14, 1965, and thus successfully concluded its second nuclear test.

1 Peking Review, May 21, 1965, p. 6. The communique was issued by the Hsinhua News Agency.
Following on the explosion of China's first atom bomb on October 16, 1964, this nuclear test is another important achievement scored by the Chinese people in strengthening their national defense and safeguarding the security of their motherland and world peace.

Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, the Chinese People's Liberation Army and China's scientists and technicians have wholeheartedly worked together to ensure the complete success of this nuclear test. It is a great victory for the Party's general line of socialist construction. It is a great victory for Mao Tse-tung's thinking.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council extend their warm congratulations to all the commanders and fighters of the People's Liberation Army who took part in this test, and to all the workers, engineers, technicians, scientists and other personnel who contributed to it, and hope that they will redouble their efforts and continue to work tirelessly for the further strengthening of our country's defences.

China is conducting necessary nuclear tests within defined limits and is developing nuclear weapons for the purpose of coping with the nuclear blackmail and threats of the United States and for the purpose of abolishing all nuclear weapons. When China exploded its first atom bomb, the Government of the People's Republic of China issued a statement which contained a full explanation of our fundamental stand on nuclear weapons and a concrete proposal for a summit conference of all countries to discuss the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

Since then, the United States has been continuing its development and mass production of various kinds of nuclear weapons, and has indulged in further nuclear blackmail and threats against China and the whole world. China is developing nuclear weapons solely for defensive purposes. China will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. It is the sincere hope of the Chinese people that there will never be a nuclear war. Together with all the peace-loving countries and people of the world, the Chinese Government and people will, as always, continue to strive unswervingly for the noble aim of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

Statement by the Indian Representative (Trivedi) to the Disarmament Commission: Second Chinese Communist Nuclear Test, May 14, 1965

2. I am sure all of us must have been deeply shocked at the great and serious damage done to international peace and security, and to

our quest for disarmament and reduction of tension, by the second nuclear explosion conducted by the People's Republic of China, with impunity and in total disregard of all that we have stood for and all that we are doing today in this hall. The explosion conducted by the People's Republic of China is an attack not only on all that we stand for and all the efforts that we are making; it is an attack on all of humanity. The atmospheric explosion carried out by the People's Republic of China, with its attendant radio-active fall-out, constitutes a genetic and health danger not only to the present generation but to the future generations as well.

3. The General Assembly of the United Nations had, in its resolution 1762 (XVII), passed without a single vote of opposition—I repeat without a single vote of opposition—a resolution that condemned all tests. The Chinese tests, therefore, ipso facto stand condemned. And it is not only that a non-member can defy with impunity the resolutions of the United Nations, for the People's Republic of China was a signatory to the Bandung Declaration, and that Declaration specifically stated:

Pending the total prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, this Conference appealed to all the powers concerned to reach agreement to suspend experiments with such weapons.

This was a declaration of the Afro-Asian powers which was signed by the People's Republic of China.

4. In fact, it has become a habit for the People's Republic of China to defy, with impunity, all that the international community does. There is General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVII); there is the Bandung Declaration; there is the Moscow test-ban treaty. And what is more, the Cairo Declaration, in which all of the non-aligned Powers took part, specifically asked that nuclear tests not be undertaken. This is what section VII of the Cairo Declaration says:

The Conference calls upon all States to accede to the Moscow Treaty partially banning the testing of nuclear weapons, and to abide by its provisions in the interests of peace and the welfare of humanity.

5. Thus once again the People's Republic of China has shown that it has no regard at all for, and pays no respect whatsoever to, any international gathering; and for that country to indulge in an attack of this nature on humanity, particularly when the Disarmament Commission is in session, is a very grave affront of which all of us, I am sure, will take serious notice.

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3 Ibid., 1963, 291–293.
4 Ibid., 1964, p. 444.
Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the Disarmament Commission, May 17, 1965

We have studied carefully the statements made to date in this Commission, and I should like to comment on some of them. If I do not refer to all the suggestions that have been made, it is for the sake of brevity. Moreover, I await with interest the statements to be made by other representatives.

26. Let me begin with the subject on which the strongest and clearest consensus has emerged: the urgent need to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

27. The burden of the important statements made by the representatives of India, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Sweden, Japan, and others, is that no single measure, such as a non-proliferation agreement, would be adequate to halt proliferation for all time, and that what is needed is a broad programme of measures affecting both the nuclear and the non-nuclear Powers.

28. The United States recognizes the merit of this concept. As Mr. Stevenson said in his statement of 26 April, this problem "cannot be dealt with by a single measure". The United States has, in fact, offered a broad programme for discussion and negotiation, and I would like to reiterate the main items in this programme.

29. To halt the further stockpiling of nuclear explosives, the United States has proposed a verified halt in the production of fissionable materials for weapons use. In conjunction with a cut-off in the production of fissionable material, we have proposed to transfer sizable agreed quantities of fissionable material to uses other than for weapons.

30. As an illustrative suggestion, we have offered to transfer 60,000 kilogrammes of weapons-grade U-235, if the Soviet Union would, for its part, transfer 40,000 kilogrammes. We are ready right now to negotiate a cut-off and transfer agreement.

31. We have also said that the United States believes the time is right for an agreement on a comprehensive test ban, a key element in halting the nuclear arms race.

32. While present scientific evidence indicates that a number of inspections continue to be necessary to provide verification, the progress we have made in scientific detection and identification capabilities will be reflected in our efforts to achieve such a ban. For those who may still doubt the need for improved technical capabilities, let me say that the United States has spent over $300 million for this purpose—a sum we would much rather have used for other purposes.

1 Disarmament Commission Official Records; 82nd Meeting, pp. 4–9.
2 Ante, p. 72.
But we are willing to explore what would constitute an adequate verification system in the light of recent and prospective developments in our capabilities. If such exploration indicates that verification requirements can be satisfied by a different number and type of inspections from those previously proposed, we will take those facts into account. We are ready to begin this exploration as soon as possible at a resumed session of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

33. In this connexion I must add that, in our view, a moratorium on tests, pending agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, would not contribute to the goal we have in common. Our experience with such an arrangement does not inspire us to repeat it.

34. Another potential source of nuclear proliferation is the diversion of peaceful nuclear activities to weapons development. It is vital that such activities be under international safeguards. As summarized in the United States memorandum of 29 April, the United States has given its strong support to the development of an effective system of international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).\(^1\) It is United States policy to transfer to the IAEA the administration of safeguards under our existing bilateral agreements as rapidly as possible. I am happy to report that considerable progress has already been achieved in implementing this policy.

35. Another important element which would contribute to halting proliferation is President Johnson's proposal to explore a verified freeze on the number and characteristics of nuclear offensive and defensive delivery vehicles,\(^2\) agreement on which would, in turn, open the door to reductions in such vehicles. An agreement such as this would enable us to halt the most destructive segment of the arms race. It would permit a significant reduction in military expenditures. It would also constitute a confidence-building measure which, having halted the production race, could open the door to the next logical step of actual reductions. We are ready to explore such a measure now.

36. Mr. Stevenson also reported to this Commission several examples of restraint on our part in the armament field, including plans to reduce the number of our B-52 heavy bombers and to forego the construction of certain missiles which had been included in our plans. I should be interested to hear the Soviet representative report similar examples of self-restraint on the part of his Government.

37. Here, then, is a programme of related measures, agreement on any or all of which would move us substantially towards our goal of halting nuclear proliferation. It is essential that we make

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\(^1\) See ante, pp. 103-105.

\(^2\) See ante, pp. 108-109.
progress along the broadest possible front of this programme if we are to succeed; but I cannot conceal my concern over an implication which has crept into the statements of some representatives, that, unless we achieve progress on all these fronts more or less simultaneously, nothing can be done.

38. The vital nature of the nuclear danger that confronts us compels me to speak frankly. We are confronted with a familiar dilemma, a dilemma which has plagued disarmament discussions from the beginning. It arises from the view that unless we can achieve at one time everything that is desirable we can do nothing. Acceptance of such a view would lead to one certain result: a continuing stalemate in our negotiations.

39. There are two ways by which we could make sure that we would soon live in an era of nuclear anarchy. One is to do nothing. The other is to insist that we must implement more or less simultaneously the whole range of measures which I have outlined. I submit that we dare not adopt either of those courses; rather, we must press ahead as rapidly as possible with each component of a sound programme to halt nuclear proliferation.

40. If we have learned anything from recent history, it is that programmes which have been characterized as "non-armament" are just as essential as, and often more feasible than, measures to eliminate acquired stocks of weapons. That is why we attach particular importance to an early non-proliferation agreement applicable to both the nuclear and the non-nuclear Powers. Such an agreement is necessary now and it can be negotiated now. If we delay for long, we may lose the opportunity which is still within our grasp.

41. Nor can we neglect the security of nations that forego nuclear weapons. As Mr. Stevenson stated on 26 April, this important subject should be considered more fully by the United Nations and the principal nuclear Powers.

42. I am grateful to the Minister for External Affairs of Ireland, Mr. Aiken, for having described so graphically the dangers that would result from delay in seeking a non-proliferation agreement.1 As one who has convinced us all of his profound understanding of this problem, his warning to States that might embark on the production of nuclear weapons carries special authority.

43. From my own and my Government's study of this problem, let me say that I share his concern and that I would underscore his admonition. The pursuit of a nuclear-weapon capability by non-nuclear States is not likely to increase but would in all probability decrease their national security. The political pressures that would

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immediately be generated by such efforts, to say nothing of the increased military risks to which such countries would be exposed, would give rise to a highly unstable international situation. It cannot be said too often that the process and cost of attempting to acquire a nuclear deterrent, and thereafter of maintaining and safeguarding it, are apparently endless. To the economic drain, therefore, must be added the inescapable political and military consequences.

44. With all due respect, therefore, I must conclude that there is a serious element of danger in the view that, unless various conditions are met or certain prior measures are implemented by others, those countries which feel that they can do so must consider the necessity of acquiring nuclear weapons. Such an approach could only add to the difficulties which already complicate the search for agreement among the nuclear Powers to reduce and eventually eliminate the threat of nuclear war. If we have learned anything from our negotiations so far, it is that we must grasp each opportunity to achieve a sound agreement and, as in the case of the limited nuclear test-ban treaty, we must take the smaller step when the larger is not presently feasible.

45. As the representatives of India and Japan stated last Friday, the detonation of a second nuclear device by Communist China is a deplorable step in the wrong direction.\(^1\) It is deeply regrettable that the Chinese Communist leaders have chosen again to carry out a test in total disregard of the test-ban treaty to which more than 100 countries have adhered. However, we cannot allow their cynical disregard for world opinion to turn us away from the goal of halting nuclear proliferation. We must take those steps which are open to us, even in the face of Communist China's defiance.

46. I shall now turn to certain other suggestions made by preceding speakers. One, which has been advanced in several forms, would aim at a ban on the use of nuclear weapons.

47. Let me say at the outset that I am aware of the differences in the approaches taken by various representatives to that suggestion. As for the United States, our opposition to a conference to sign a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons is a matter of record. The reasons for my Government's position were fully set forth in a letter of 30 June 1962 from Secretary of State Rusk in answer to the Secretary-General's inquiry on this subject.\(^2\) Representatives of the United States have also explained these views on numerous occasions before the General Assembly and at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Nevertheless, since the subject has again been raised in this Commission, I should like to make clear my country's position on this matter.

\(^{1}\) For the Japanese statement, see *ibid.*, 81st Meeting, pp. 7–9. The Indian statement appears *supra*.

48. There can be no doubt about the desire of the United States to minimize the danger of nuclear war and to eliminate nuclear weapons. As the world's first nuclear Power, my country has, from the beginning, when we had a nuclear monopoly, consistently sought agreements to control and reduce the ever-increasing stockpiles of these weapons. We can, therefore, understand and we share the impatience for progress in this area. However, we cannot agree that a declaratory ban or pledge on the use of nuclear weapons will advance our goals.

49. There is no easy alternative to effective, well-defined disarmament measures to halt the arms race. Secretary of State Rusk stated in the letter to which I have just referred: "My Government believes that the cause of disarmament cannot be advanced by the propagation of illusions about the ease with which it can be solved." The Secretary of State went on to caution that disarmament measures must take into account the security needs of States.

50. Until nuclear weapons are eliminated by solid verifiable agreements, they serve to deter potential aggression. As Secretary Rusk's letter to the Secretary-General pointed out:

The United States Government can and does offer the fullest assurances that it will never use any weapon, large or small, with aggressive intent. But the United States, like other free nations, must be fully prepared to exercise effectively the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense as provided in the United Nations Charter.

51. We are aware that some who are disposed to favour this proposal realize that as long as nuclear weapons exist their use could not effectively be banned by statements of good intention, but they feel that a declaratory ban could, nevertheless, improve the international atmosphere. However, the adoption of an admittedly ineffective arms control proposal might, on the contrary, create a false sense of progress and create misunderstanding as to the need for more meaningful arrangements.

52. My Government strongly favours partial measures to ease international tensions if they can be effective towards that end, but we do not believe that to be the case in regard to this proposal.

53. As Secretary of State Rusk also pointed out in his letter to the Secretary-General:

The Charter of the United Nations makes a distinction, not between one weapon and another, but between the use of force for aggression and for defense. This distinction is critical. It is the firm belief of the United States that the only sure way to eliminate the threat to mankind posed by nuclear weapons is to remove them from the arsenals of the nations through a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

54. I should like now to refer to the long-standing Soviet proposals for withdrawal of troops from foreign countries and for dismantling
of foreign military bases. These are proposals which the USSR has been urging for many years. Their repetition in the USSR memorandum of 7 December 1964 ¹ at least demonstrates the tenacity with which that country pursues its political and propaganda goals, but it does not argue for their adoption.

55. The United States has opposed the adoption of such proposals which it considers outside the context of general disarmament and as measures isolated from the total complex of strategic and political problems of particular regions. Indeed, as Mr. Stevenson pointed out on 26 April, these are not measures of disarmament so much as they are proposals for bringing about the redeployment of forces in a manner which would obviously benefit the USSR.²

56. We cannot ignore the plain fact that the USSR occupies an enormous, centrally-located land mass. It borders on many countries smaller and militarily less powerful than itself. Moreover, while it promotes the doctrine of “peaceful coexistence”, the USSR also—and quite openly—supports what it calls “wars of national liberation”. In all too many cases, as the world has come to know, these wars represent nothing less than subversion against legitimate national Governments by those who mock at liberty itself. Russia’s neighbour, Communist China, not only supports such wars, but is openly engaged in promoting one in Viet-Nam.

57. We are compelled to recall these facts when we examine the likely consequences of proposals entailing the withdrawal of troops from foreign countries and the dismantling of foreign bases. We are compelled to recall also that the deployment of United States forces abroad and the creation of certain bases was the direct consequence of Soviet threats and aggressive acts after the United States had gone a long way towards unilateral disarmament following the Second World War.

58. It is, I believe, generally agreed that the success of partial measures depends largely on their not tipping the military balance in favour of one side or another. The true nature of military bases and the forces stationed on these locations can be best understood in terms of the idea of interdependence. The complexities of the modern world—economic, political, and military—have impelled independent nations to enter into ever closer relationships for mutual benefit and protection. Since the requirements for defence against modern weapons transcend national boundaries, the response to the needs of defence is a co-operative undertaking.

59. Bases depend upon forces and armaments necessary to provide security and should be considered in that context. They must be

¹ Ibid., 1964, pp. 510–511.
² Ante, p. 75.
regarded as one of a variety of logistic arrangements upon which any military establishment depends. In this context, it is difficult to distinguish domestic from foreign bases. We do not believe that disarmament can begin with separate measures involving base reductions or force withdrawals.

60. Rather than concentrate our efforts now on a consideration of reductions in bases and troop withdrawals, which would upset the current military balance, let us instead exert our efforts towards agreeing on balanced and equitable reductions in armaments and armed forces along the lines proposed by the United States in its draft outline of a treaty for general and complete disarmament. ¹

61. I should like to mention an aspect of our discussions which appears to me to deserve greater attention than it has received, although I am pleased to note that it has been mentioned by several speakers, including the representative of Chile this morning. I refer to the desirability of local and regional initiatives to turn back or head off arms races among the smaller military Powers.

62. We can, I think, all agree that the most urgent task before us is to bring to a halt the nuclear weapons race and to bring about verified reductions in the arms levels of the major Powers. But the objective of arms limitation is equally valid as regards most countries, not merely the major Powers.

63. We are well aware of the special military situations and, indeed, of the serious threats confronting various smaller countries; some are only now beginning to develop adequate defence establishments. Others have had to strengthen their establishments in the face of aggression or threats of aggression.

64. At the same time, we cannot ignore the threat to world peace arising from regional arms races among the smaller Powers. Arms races involving advanced armaments already pose a threat in some areas. It is neither appropriate nor necessary for me to identify the situations I have in mind. The point is that in today's world, even local or regional arms races are a source of danger to world peace. On 3 January 1965, Secretary of State Rusk paid particular attention to the great misfortune that would occur if newly independent countries became entangled in arms races among themselves. ²

65. Moreover, in many cases the funds expended on armaments are urgently needed for economic development. The procurement and subsequent maintenance of advanced weapons systems in particular would constitute a tragic and unnecessary drain on the many countries which are striving for social, industrial and agricultural development.

¹ Ante, pp. 111-140.
66. In discussing the requirements of the developing countries, President Johnson, on 14 January 1965, said:

They need to undertake sound measures of self-help—to mobilize their own resources, eliminate waste, and do what they can to meet their own needs. And they need to avoid spending their resources on unnecessary armaments and foreign adventures. Our aid can contribute to their economic and social progress only if it can be provided within a framework of constructive and sensible policies and programs.¹

67. The principal objective of United States assistance to the developing nations is to foster economic and social development, and not to increase armament levels beyond minimum security requirements. Indeed, in providing future assistance, the United States will continue to regard favourably efforts by the countries concerned to avoid excessive armament undertakings which would interfere with such social and economic development.

68. Whether based on an inaccurate estimate of national security needs or on prestige considerations, the inevitable result of an attempt to acquire weapons of greater range or power than is clearly adequate for foreseeable needs is to set off an arms race in the area. Such a race can only create new tensions and result in less security.

69. This Commission, of course, is not the place to consider measures specifically applicable to particular regions, and I am not suggesting that we should do so. But I do believe that self-restraining initiatives taken at the local, and preferably at the regional level, would make a great contribution to international stability and security generally. Perhaps the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations² could provide a guide for regional action as it does for other disarmament negotiations.

70. In any event, it seems clear that local and regional initiatives for arms control and arms reduction agreements might well enhance the security of the nations concerned and release funds for the constructive work of economic and social development. Such regional initiatives would have to be respected by outside Powers to be fully effective. For our part, I can say that the United States would greatly welcome them.

71. I am pleased at this point to welcome one regional initiative that was brought to our attention by the representative of Brazil. I refer to the study undertaken by our Latin American neighbours on the requirements of an effective denuclearized zone in Latin America.

72. It is the view of my Government that, in certain areas and under appropriate conditions, nuclear-free zone arrangements would be of value in curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and as a

² Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 439-442.
step in preventing regional arms races. On 17 February 1965, in a speech at the Pacem in Terris Conference in New York, the Vice-President of the United States underlined the benefits to peace which could result from creating nuclear-free zones in Latin America, Africa, and the Near East.¹

73. We have on other occasions set forth the general criteria which, in our view, should govern the consideration of denuclearized zones. I shall not take the time to restate them as they will be found in the verbatim records of the First Committee of the General Assembly for 29 October 1963.²

74. Some have alleged that the United States opposes the idea of nuclear-free zones; this is simply not true. What we do oppose are attempts to promote denuclearized zones without regard to the wishes of the States concerned, and in circumstances where such zones would upset the military balance. This would, for example, be the case with a nuclear-free zone in Europe or the Mediterranean since it would in no way affect the hundreds of Soviet missiles targeted on Western Europe and would be thus clearly to the military advantage of the Soviet Union.

75. But we do feel that the objectives of the resolution on the "Denuclearization of Africa,"³ which was adopted by the Organization of African Unity, and the efforts of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America are in harmony with our policy to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

76. In conclusion, I would like to stress the importance my Government attaches to the earliest possible resumption of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Our discussions here will provide many fruitful areas for more intensive exploration in Geneva and I hope they will provide fresh impetus as well.

77. But I must say that the reactions of certain representatives to the last report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament remind me of the ancient practice of killing the bearer of bad news. What is worse, the news reports have been grossly distorted in this case. The Committee did not report that it had failed. What we reported instead was the following:

In general the questions before the Committee were discussed in a thorough and concrete manner. All the participants in the Committee took an active part in this discussion. Many interesting proposals were put forward.

Thus far,—and this refers to 1964 when the Committee adjourned for the start of the General Assembly—the Committee has not reached any specific agreement either on questions of general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension.

² Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 553-554.
³ Ibid., 1964, pp. 294-295.
The Committee expresses the hope that the useful discussions and exchange of views during the period covered by the report will facilitate agreement in the further work of the Committee.1

78. I am certain that I speak for a large majority of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in saying that this is an interim report by a group of negotiators who, far from admitting failure, are aware of the anxious desire of their Governments, and indeed of virtually all Governments, for early progress in this vital effort, and are determined to press their search for agreement.

79. I doubt that any of the participants of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament felt that their inability to achieve concrete agreements up to that point constituted a failure or that it was due to the absence of particular Governments from the negotiating table, however much they may have desired the presence of one Government or another. I know that most of the participants attach great value to the very real progress that was made at the two sessions of the Committee during 1964 in illuminating some exceedingly complex, and I may say, promising areas for agreement. The Geneva discussions have delved into intricate technical and strategic matters. Such discussions are the essential prerequisite for disarmament agreements and we, for our part, believe that they have prepared the way for future agreements. We also believe we achieved a better understanding of the preoccupations of others and that there was a substantial narrowing of differences that stand in the way of agreement.

80. Of course, we regret our inability to reach agreements, but it would be most unrealistic to adopt the view that each session must produce concrete agreements. The complex technical issues we must solve in order to achieve agreement will not yield to any assembly line techniques. Nor would they disappear if the forum were modified or changed. The representative of Tanzania put it well when he said that there is no simple panacea for our problems and that “there must exist, too, the ingredient of tireless patience on the part of the negotiators”.2

81. We welcome the strong consensus that has emerged from our discussions on the need for an early resumption of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. My Government wishes to return to the negotiating table in Geneva for we have been busy examining the proposals of others and refining and perfecting our own proposals in the light of the discussions that took place there and of the advances made through our extensive research efforts. And we have kept busy preparing the grounds for additional proposals which we hope to present for discussion in due time.

1 Ibid., p. 439.
2 Disarmament Commission Official Records; 80th Meeting, p. 9.
82. Finally, we attach the greatest importance, particularly in a period of increased tension, to maintaining a forum for constructive dialogue with those who share with us so much responsibility for safeguarding the future of mankind. It may well be that the heightened awareness of the risks involved, an awareness which I trust we all share today, will serve to push us towards agreement. I can assure this Commission that the United States is most anxious for progress in our next session in Geneva. We will approach our common task with dedication and sincerity, as we are sure others will.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Tsarapkin) to the Disarmament Commission, May 19, 1965

The USSR delegation feels it necessary to speak now in connexion with the statement of Mr. Foster, the United States representative, on 17 May.2

146. We detected a certain note in Mr. Foster's statement which puts us on our guard and, I would say, causes us concern.

147. In the first place, it is noteworthy that, in both his first and his second statements, the United States representative carefully evaded the question of what the Disarmament Commission's work should actually be, and what should result from our discussion. Mr. Foster made only one passing comment on this point, and I quote his words: "Our discussions here will provide many fruitful areas for more intensive exploration in Geneva and I hope they will provide fresh impetus as well."

148. As this passage indicates, the United States representative feels that the Commission's task is merely to talk for a while and then to refer all questions, still unsolved, to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva.

149. But such an approach is not designed to advance the disarmament negotiations. If the Eighteen-Nation Committee is to resume its work with some prospects of progress, and not a continuation of the present deadlock, then that Committee needs, not records of the Commission's meetings, but specific directives and decisions by the Commission on practical aspects of general and complete disarmament, or on so-called partial measures.

150. If we reach agreement here on such decisions, then the Eighteen-Nation Committee, too, will have a firm basis for progress in its further work. Otherwise the Committee will find itself in exactly

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1 Ibid., 84th Meeting, pp. 13-16.
2 Supra.
the same position, in exactly the same deadlock in which it was before its last recess in September of last year. I might add that this is quite clearly and definitely stated in the Committee's report.\(^1\)

151. In this connexion, a question arises: on which measures should and could the Commission take a decision? In attempting to answer this question, we must take into account the fact that the Disarmament Commission does not exist in a vacuum, and is not an abstract institution, isolated from life and events around us. Consequently, it is essential for the Commission, as indeed for any body concerned with disarmament, if it is to function soundly, to respond to all current developments, to take account of any dangerous course of events and to react to them appropriately, in order to avert or at least, as a first step, substantially reduce any threat of war, any threat to international security.

152. With these considerations in mind, it seems to us that the most urgent questions, which we must settle without delay, are the following: the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from all countries. The aggressive actions of the United States in Viet-Nam, the Dominican Republic and other regions of the world are a most convincing demonstration of the threat to world peace and security presented by foreign troops and foreign military bases in the territory of any country.

153. We all know that the forty-seven countries participating in the Cairo Conference declared themselves in favour of the immediate implementation of these measures\(^2\) which have also been supported in this Commission by the socialist countries and by many speakers in our general discussion. We have not heard any well-founded or convincing arguments in support of the negative position taken by the United States in this matter, since we can hardly regard the threadbare allegations of a "Soviet threat", in which no one in the Western countries or anywhere else now believes, as falling into that category. In addition, Mr. Foster's statement was in complete contradiction with historical fact, since he ignored what has already been pointed out here, which is that scores of military bases had been established by the imperialists in foreign territory before the emergence of the first socialist State.

154. What would it mean if the Commission were to take a decision concerning the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of all countries? First and foremost, it would mean a step towards arresting the armed aggression of the United States in Viet-Nam, and towards the restoration of the right of the people of the Dominican Republic to decide their own fate. It would be a demand by States Members of the United Nations that

\(^1\) Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 435-440.
\(^2\) See ibid., pp. 445-446.
the armed forces of the colonizers should leave the territories which they have enslaved, and in which they are even now endeavouring to maintain their domination by force. It would be a decision that the United States base at Guantánamo, which violates the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cuba, should at last vanish from Cuban territory. By adopting a suitable resolution, the Commission would be expressing its firm intention of putting an end to the plans of the imperialist States to create military bases in the Indian Ocean, in an attempt to intimidate the new countries of Asia and Africa and to extend their policy of neo-colonialism and imperialism. Such a decision would also mean the elimination of the present dangerous situation in Europe, where large numbers of foreign troops and great quantities of armaments are concentrated, and where they constitute a major obstacle in the way of normalizing relations between the States belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and those belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

155. In short, the liquidation of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of all countries would mean a decisive improvement in the international situation and the elimination of one of the principal sources of dangerous conflict and tension. It would help to strengthen the independence of the young States of Africa, Asia and Latin America, to end interference in their internal affairs, and to conclude speedily the historical process of eliminating colonial regimes and uprooting colonialism. The elimination of foreign military bases, together with other measures, would clear the way to a lasting peace.

156. Another issue which has the support of the majority of States is a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. The will of the peoples of the world that the use of these weapons of mass destruction should be forbidden was expressed in the declaration adopted at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, on the proposal of a number of African and Asian countries, by which the use of nuclear weapons was outlawed. The majority of States on that occasion supported the calling of a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and this position was reaffirmed in 1963 by the General Assembly, which charged the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to study urgently the question of convening such a conference. The United States and its allies in NATO prevented the Eighteen-Nation Committee from taking effective measures to implement this resolution of the General Assembly, calling for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. Both in the Committee and here in the Disarmament Commission, the Western Powers have been putting forward precisely the same arguments,

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1 Ibid., 1961, pp. 648-650.
2 Ibid., 1963, p. 626.
which were shown to be contrived, flimsy and unconvincing by Chief Adebo, the representative of Nigeria, in his statement.¹

157. In actual fact, the reasons for the negative position of the United States in this as in other questions are not those mentioned the other day by Mr. Foster, the United States representative. A much clearer explanation of these reasons was given by the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara. In his testimony before the Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations in March 1965, published on 14 May, Mr. McNamara stated that the United States would use nuclear weapons in any situation in the world when it considered it desirable to use them in its own interest. And he also stated that he did not believe that the United States should be limited as to the type of weapons it used. It possessed an arsenal of weapons covering the entire spectrum of modern weaponry, and, he said, he personally believed, and that was the belief of the Government, that the United States should utilize whatever weapons were best suited to the situation at hand.

158. As for the risk of a world war if nuclear weapons were used in any local situation, Mr. McNamara stated that that was not a sufficient risk to warrant refraining from the use of nuclear weapons.²

159. Herein lies the real reason why the United States refuses to undertake any commitments relating to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. This reason is that the United States wants to reserve its freedom of action to use nuclear weapons in any part of the world at any moment and for any reason it chooses.

160. In the light of this United States position, it is not difficult also to understand why United States representatives at disarmament negotiations, including the discussions in our Commission, are careful to say nothing about the Soviet Union's proposal that States possessing nuclear weapons should make a pledge that they would not be the first to use them. The USSR delegation, speaking at the beginning of the present session of the Disarmament Commission, stated, on instructions from its Government, that the Soviet Union is fully prepared to make a pledge not to be the first to make use of nuclear weapons, if other nuclear Powers do likewise.³

161. This is what we should like to hear the United States representative reply to; this could be our reward for the close attention with which we have listened to Mr. Foster's speech, hoping to find in it something constructive which would allow us to move forward, particularly in the matter of reducing the threat of nuclear war.

¹ Disarmament Commission Official Records; 78th Meeting, pp. 4-5.
² Department of Defense Appropriations for 1966: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Eighty-ninth Congress, First Session, pt. 3, pp. 73, 118.
³ See ante, p. 57.
162. The USSR delegation supports the proposal made yesterday by the representative of Ethiopia on this question, and calls on the Disarmament Commission to take a decision regarding the convening of a conference to sign an appropriate convention. The Soviet Union calls on all nuclear Powers to declare solemnly before the whole world that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, this is another question to which there has not been an encouraging response from the United States.

163. Obviously, United States foreign policy should be judged by actions, not words. The United States aggression in Viet-Nam, its armed intervention in the Dominican Republic and acts of aggression in other regions of the world using United States bombs, cannon, machine-guns, toxic gases and napalm against small and weak peoples: these are the aggressive acts of the United States, which totally refute all statements by United States representatives concerning the peace-loving attitude of the United States. Now, more than ever before, the United States must give proof of its peace-loving attitude by its actions, and not by words.

164. Of all the proposals on which there is unanimity among a large number of States in the Commission, the only question which the United States delegation has stated that it is prepared to examine—and even that not now but some time in the future—is that of measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. But even in this matter, the United States representative chose to keep silent on the most important question, which, essentially, has so far prevented the successful conclusion of an agreement to halt the spread of nuclear weapons—namely, the plans to create, in one form or another, a NATO multilateral nuclear force. The plans for creating such a force in fact constitute the greatest practical danger of further dissemination of nuclear weapons and would allow such States as West Germany, which has put forward revanchist demands for the revision of frontiers established in Europe as the result of the Second World War, to have access to them. This fact must be understood, because those who advocate the establishment of such a force are deliberately attempting to deceive our peoples. They would like the situation to appear as if the spread of nuclear weapons meant only the direct transfer of such weapons by one State to another, so that they came under the national control of the latter State; in their view indirect access to nuclear weapons, by way of military alliances, is compatible with an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. But this is a specious argument. If all the members of the Commission are indeed unanimous in their resolve to prevent any and all spread of nuclear weapons, then they must recognize, openly and without reservations, the fact that any plans
for establishing a NATO multilateral nuclear force, in any form, run counter to and are incompatible with the idea of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that, consequently, the Commission must oppose plans for establishing such a force, which would give the West German revanchists access to nuclear weapons.

165. The United States representative also chose to pass over in silence the matter of convening a world disarmament conference, a proposal which had been supported by the overwhelming majority of the delegations which spoke in our Commission. Thus, the Algerian representative stressed that the convening of such a conference would have far-reaching consequences both for progress in the disarmament negotiations and for a reduction in international tension. Resolute support for convening such a conference was expressed by the delegations of the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Guinea, Syria, Chile, Uganda, India, Iraq and the socialist countries and many other representatives who spoke in the debate. The delegations of Brazil, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania expressed their agreement in principle with this proposal.

166. Thus, it can be seen that there is a marked consensus that the holding of such a conference in the very near future is, in the present circumstances, essential, and that such a conference, in which all the countries of the world must take part, would provide a powerful impetus towards the attainment of practical results, in the field of both general and complete disarmament and other disarmament measures.

167. Evidently, the United States representatives are most reluctant to refer to the question of convening a world disarmament conference, although such a conference is considered essential by most of the representatives who have spoken here. Instead of an open discussion on the disarmament situation—a discussion in which all States of the world would participate—the United States is in a hurry to return to the Eighteen-Nation Committee, where negotiations have been dragging on for years without any concrete results. Of course, negotiations can be carried on in the Eighteen-Nation Committee or in any other working body, but we have no reason to suppose that when such negotiations are resumed, the United States will no longer take a negative and obstructionist position on problems for which the peoples of the world are demanding solutions.

168. In assessing further prospects for negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, our starting-point is what we heard and what we failed to hear in the statement by Mr. Foster, the United States representative, of 17 May. We heard a direct refusal to discuss a number of pressing problems, and we failed to hear a single word on

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1 Supra.
other no less urgent matters. Basically, the position which the United States is taking in the Disarmament Commission is to remain silent on extremely important and urgent aspects of the disarmament problem and, in this way, to avoid the taking of any decisions on them.

169. It must be hoped that the statement by the United States delegation, made as it was in the middle of the debate, was not its last and final word on the matters under discussion. At the commencement of our work it was precisely the representative of the United States, Mr. Stevenson, who expressed misgivings that the Commission’s work might not be constructive. We should like to draw the attention of the United States delegation to the fact that it now has every opportunity of making a positive contribution to prevent that from happening, and to enable the Commission to take specific decisions on a number of pressing disarmament questions. The need for such decisions has long been felt, and their significance for the cause of strengthening peace would be enormous.

170. The Disarmament Commission, in our opinion, given the good will of all its members, has every chance of successfully concluding its work by taking definite decisions on at least some disarmament questions which have long been in need of solution. The exchange of views which has taken place in the Commission has shown that we have the basis for taking substantive decisions of that kind, and should not merely confine ourselves to referring those questions again to the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

171. If we, in this Commission, can work out specific decisions on these questions, then the disarmament negotiations will really be given a new impetus, which will start them moving again and make it possible to advance step by step to our final goal—general and complete disarmament.

172. The USSR delegation appeals most urgently to all members of the Commission, and especially to the Western Powers and the United States delegation, to make a constructive contribution to that end.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Fedorenko) to the Disarmament Commission [Extracts], May 24, 1965

1. The general debate in the United Nations Disarmament Commission is coming to an end. My delegation would like to express

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1 Disarmament Commission Official Records; 87th Meeting, pp. 1–7.
its satisfaction at the broad exchange of views which has taken place here and at the support which the Soviet Government's move to convene the Disarmament Commission has received. In the course of the discussion, representatives have put forward many interesting and valuable ideas which should certainly be taken into account in settling disarmament questions. My delegation considers it fitting that many of the speakers should have dealt with the problem of disarmament in the broad context of international events. It would be impossible to solve that problem without taking account of developments in the world around us, particularly since those developments include constantly increasing international tension and bloodshed, resulting from the aggressive policy of the United States.

2. That same United States Government whose representatives are participating in the discussion of disarmament questions here is waging war against the peoples of Viet-Nam, engaging in armed intervention in the Dominican Republic and committing acts of aggression in Africa and other parts of the world. We cannot but compare the words of those representatives with the deeds of the United States Government. We have heard statements by the United States concerning plans for the destruction of certain obsolete bombers to be taken from the inventory of the United States Air Force. Yet for a realistic assessment of that measure we must listen—we cannot help listening—to the unceasing explosions of United States bombs in Viet-Nam. We cannot form our view of the state of world affairs on the basis of what United States diplomats tell us; we cannot regard the destruction of antiquated aircraft as a disarmament measure and as evidence of a desire for peace on the part of the United States when United States weapons are being used to shed blood in various parts of the world.

5. As the acts of aggression committed by the United States speak for themselves, let me concentrate on the question why the position of the United States delegation in the Commission cannot be regarded as constructive.

6. First, the United States delegation has shown no willingness to adopt specific decisions in this Commission on the substance of any questions relating to disarmament.

7. Secondly, from the explanations given by the United States delegation it appears that, in general, it is against the adoption of such measures as the banning of nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign military bases and withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of other countries, and the prevention of the further dissemination of nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever—measures

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1 Ante, pp. 69-70.
which have received the support of a majority of the participants in
the discussion.

8. Thirdly, the complete fruitlessness of the disarmament negotia-
tions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee obviously suits the United
States delegation and we have detected no desire on its part to intro-
duce any new elements into those negotiations—for example, to
breathe new life into them by convening a world disarmament
conference.

9. It is true that Mr. Foster, the United States representative, has
assured us that "very real progress . . . was made" at the two
sessions of the Eighteen-Nation Committee last year.¹ That, how-
ever, is not at all in conformity with the facts, facts which were
acknowledged, incidentally, in the communiques published following
the most recent meeting of the NATO Council in which the Ministers
expressed their regret that so little progress had been made towards
disarmament.²

10. If the United States representative does not agree with the
objective assessments of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee
which have been made in this Commission and which have stressed
that the failure of its work to produce results cannot but cause alarm,
then he should at least refrain from presenting matters in a rosy light
as compared with the view taken of them by the United States and
its allies in other places.

11. The United States delegation found it expedient to voice that
unwarranted praise of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in order to try
to impose on the Commission the adoption of a single decision which
in substance would settle nothing and lead nowhere, i.e. a recommend-
dation to the Eighteen-Nation Committee to examine the matters
which we have been discussing here.

12. Once more the question arises in our minds: does the United
States delegation want disarmament or does it want only talks
about disarmament? It is asserted that negotiations on disarma-
ment are better than no negotiations. Yet can it be said that
there is something useful to be gained from negotiations which
lead to nothing and in which one of the parties takes a position which
is the opposite of constructive and says that it intends to go on
taking such positions in the future? My delegation is not in favor of
negotiations for the sake of negotiations. That would be senseless.
My delegation is in favour of negotiations for the purpose of reaching
agreement on the achievement of general and complete disarmament
and the implementation of measures to ease international tension and
to limit the arms race.

13. In its statement of 26 April, the USSR delegation demonstrated in detail that the United States and some of its allies are preventing agreement from being reached on disarmament questions.\(^1\) We dwelt at length on the United States position with regard to the problem of general and complete disarmament and we exposed its inconsistency. Let us explain briefly once again what is happening in the discussion of this problem.

14. Perhaps it was not what Mr. de Beus, the Netherlands representative, had in mind but he correctly described the attitude of the Western Powers when he said: "... the balance of power should never become a fetish, used lightly as an argument against the acceptance of proposals for disarmament".\(^2\) It is precisely this fetish to which the United States and its supporters invariably resort to frustrate any agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament, and on other disarmament measures as well.

15. What, for example, is the United States position with regard to so-called partial measures? The United States and the other Western Powers do not recommend that any of their proposals on this matter be adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission and this is a fact which speaks most eloquently for itself. The crux of the matter is that the United States is working to replace disarmament by measures to control existing armaments.

16. Let us take as an example the proposal to freeze strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons. It calls for the establishment of control over all such means of delivery and over their production. Obviously the establishment of such control would play into the hands of those States which are pursuing an aggressive policy and are interested in expanding their intelligence activities. The proposal to freeze strategic means of delivery is in fact designed to maintain at their present level the means of delivery already accumulated. That is the same level which United States military leaders, according to their own statements, consider more than adequate and which presupposes the capacity to destroy the enemy not once but many times over.

17. The United States representative's statement that his country is preparing to cut back somewhat the production of intercontinental missiles of the Minuteman type\(^3\) is of course to be explained not by a desire to check the unbridled arms race in which the United States is involved, but by the fact that the United States has already accumulated enough of these means of delivery to satisfy the Pentagon.

18. Indeed, according to data from the United States Department of Defense recently published in the Press, the United States arsenal

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\(^1\) Ante, pp. 37-58.
\(^2\) Disarmament Commission Official Records; 83rd Meeting, p. 7.
\(^3\) Ante, pp. 75-76.
of means of delivery of nuclear weapons consists of 854 intercontinental missiles, 416 submarine-launched missiles and 935 intercontinental bomber aircraft, not to speak of means of delivery with a lesser range. On top of all this, the United States Congress recently allocated $15,300 million for further work on the improvement of missiles and other means of delivery of nuclear weapons. It is obvious that in place of the Minuteman missiles, which Mr. Stevenson says his country has decided not to manufacture, the United States intends to turn out a great quantity of missiles of an improved type.

19. The United States takes a similar approach with respect to the production of nuclear weapons. It is common knowledge that, given the stockpiles of such weapons which the United States already has at its disposal, its intention to transfer 60,000 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium to peaceful uses will in no way alter its nuclear potential.

20. The surplus of accumulated stocks of nuclear weapons also explains the United States proposal for a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons. In that connexion the United States calls for a system of verification of the atomic production of States, which in practice would mean the establishment of the broadest possible control throughout the territory of the States concerned, while the means of waging nuclear warfare at present in their possession would remain entirely intact. The implementation of such a proposal would, again, play into the hands of those who are nurturing aggressive plans.

21. For the consideration of a ban on underground nuclear weapon tests the United States would like, in essence, to substitute a study of the technical difficulties which it has invented and which it claims are involved in the verification of compliance with such a ban. Yet it has long been known that the difficulties standing in the way of a ban on underground nuclear tests are not technical but political. Let me quote the very significant testimony on this point of a highly qualified technical specialist, already referred to by the representative of Mexico. I have in mind Mr. Jerome Wiesner, former special assistant for science and technology to the President of the United States. In a recently published book, Mr. Wiesner frankly acknowledges that on the United States side the obstacle to a comprehensive test-ban treaty was, as he expresses it, "military and political conservatism" and he comments: "... during the bitter Senate hearings on the partial test ban treaty we had reason to wonder whether a comprehensive treaty would indeed have been acceptable given any number of inspections." ¹

22. Instead of showing a desire to settle the question of a ban on underground nuclear weapon tests for the supervision of which national means of detection are entirely adequate, the United States and other Western Powers would like to have that question made the subject of a technical study in order to confuse the issue once and for all and to deprive anyone who does not claim a profound knowledge of seismology and a host of other sciences of the right to express his views on the matter.

23. The members of the Commission have undoubtedly formed a clear idea of the other United States proposals as well, proposals which have deservedly been subjected to severe criticism in our meetings. For example, it is hardly possible not to endorse the cogent remarks made by Mr. Coulibaly, the representative of Mali, who compared the United States proposal to prohibit the threat or use of force to settle territorial disputes or to extend control or administration over territories with the aggressive actions of the United States in various parts of the world, thus demonstrating the utter hypocrisy of that proposal.

24. The absence of a constructive approach on the part of the United States delegation is, of course, no accident. What has the United States Government been doing while the Disarmament Commission has been meeting in this hall? The United States Government has been expanding its aggressive war against the Viet-Namese people. At a time when Mr. Stevenson, the United States representative, was calling, in this Commission for—as he put it—“greater esteem for the rights of States and societies”, the United States marines were already preparing for the armed invasion of Santo Domingo. And during the whole of this period, the provocative intervention in the Dominican Republic not only was not ended, but grew to monstrous proportions.

39. A question which is clear in essence and has long been ripe for solution is the ban on the use of nuclear weapons. For four years now, the question of convening a conference to sign a convention on the banning of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons has been on the agenda of the United Nations. Through all these years, the peoples of the world have continued to live under the constant threat of nuclear war, and, as a result, the international situation has been aggravated and the solution of other important questions hampered. The majority of States have, for a long time, consistently advocated a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, regarding this measure as an important step towards eliminating the nuclear threat and

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2 Ante, p. 61.
keeping the arms race in check. The Soviet delegation fully shares the point of view of Mr. Gebre-Egzy, the representative of Ethiopia, who stressed that “the conclusion of a universal international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would make agreement certain on other aspects of the disarmament problem”. It is high time to eliminate the danger of nuclear war as a factor in the formulation of international policy. Instead of this factor, a different and beneficial one should be brought into play: a ban on the use of nuclear weapons.

40. If no practical steps have so far been taken towards convening a conference and signing a convention on the banning of nuclear weapons, the fault is wholly that of the Western Powers. The arguments which they put forward against such a ban are contrived and flimsy, as Mr. Adebo, the representative of Nigeria, showed so clearly in his statement. I would recall the fact that in addition to the representatives of Ethiopia and Nigeria—States which have long been active in seeking a solution to the question of a ban on the use of nuclear weapons—such a solution has been supported by other African countries, such as Mali, Guinea and Tanzania; by Latin American countries, such as Chile and Mexico; by Asian countries, as for instance, Syria; and by European countries, including Sweden and all the socialist States.

41. Mr. Illanes, the Chilean representative, was absolutely right when he stated that “in the present meetings of the Disarmament Commission a decision might also be taken on the convening of a conference for the prohibition of nuclear weapons”. He added that the decision should be taken now, for such prohibition “represents one of mankind’s most vital needs”. The USSR delegation urges the Disarmament Commission to take a decision on the conclusion of such a convention. The Soviet Union urges those Powers possessing nuclear weapons solemnly to declare before the whole world their refusal to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

42. Another step towards a lasting peace, a step which has been supported in the course of the general debate by many different States, is the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries. This question, too, does not involve any special technical subtleties or difficulties. All that is necessary to settle it is to put the foreign troops on to trains, ships and aircraft and send them home, dismantle military bases and hand the territories over to the Governments of the States in which

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1 Disarmament Commission Official Records; 83rd Meeting, p. 12.
2 Ibid., 78th Meeting, pp. 4–5.
3 Ibid., 82nd Meeting, pp. 3–4.
they are situated. In other words, it is plain to all what must be done to settle this question and how it must be done.

43. With regard to the political significance of such a step, Mr. Asha, the representative of Syria, put it well when he said: "These foreign bases constitute a source of danger perpetually threatening peace and security and are often used as springboards for committing aggression against the integrity, independence and sovereignty of other States. These bases are also used to strangle at the cradle all movements of national liberation".\(^1\)

44. The maintenance of foreign military bases and troops in the territories of other countries was resolutely opposed by the forty-seven States which participated, in October 1964, in the Cairo Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries. In the Declaration issued at the end of the Conference,\(^2\) the Heads of State and Government expressed their conviction that the maintenance or establishment of foreign military bases and the stationing of foreign troops in the territories of other countries against the expressed will of those countries was a flagrant violation of the sovereignty of States, and a threat to freedom and international peace. Stressing that there could be no possible justification for the existence or future establishment of bases in dependent territories—bases which could be used for the maintenance of colonialism—the Declaration pointed out that such bases in fact represented a means of exerting pressure on countries and holding back their liberation and a development based on their own ideological, political, economic and cultural ideals. The non-aligned States declared their full support for countries seeking to obtain the removal of foreign bases from their territory, and called on all States maintaining troops and bases in other countries to remove them immediately. In the Declaration of the Cairo Conference, special mention is made of the need to dismantle the United States base at Guantanamo, Cuba, the plans of the imperialist Powers to establish bases in the Indian Ocean are condemned and it is recommended that the foreign bases in Cyprus should be closed down and the foreign troops withdrawn.

45. The cause of strengthening peace cannot countenance the stationing of troops of the imperialist Powers in foreign territory, since this leads to attempts to make international banditry a regular practice. Recent events have shown very clearly the threat to world peace constituted by the presence of troops of the imperialist Powers in foreign territories.

46. A very characteristic and extremely significant feature of the general debate at the nineteenth session of the United Nations General

\(^1\) Ibid., 80th Meeting, p. 9.
\(^2\) Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 443-448.
Assembly was the fact that a number of representatives of non-aligned States unambiguously and categorically demanded the removal of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries. The subsequent aggressive actions by the United States in Viet-Nam and its intervention in the Dominican Republic proved once again that the troops of the imperialist Powers bring war to other peoples as they have done in the past, create a threat to peace and seriously aggravate the whole international situation. The socialist and non-aligned countries take the same position on this question, which Mr. Fahmy, the representative of the United Arab Republic, stated very well when he stressed that his Government was "against all military bases which it views as a source of aggression and the real cause of international tension".¹

47. We have not heard from the representatives of the Western Powers any sound explanations of their reasons for maintaining military bases and troops in the territories of other countries. It is surely impossible to take seriously the words of Mr. Foster, the United States representative, who alleged that Western Europe was within range of Soviet missiles, and therefore United States forces were required there.² This kind of logic could be used to justify any arbitrary act and any act of banditry on the part of United States militarism. One would suppose that the United States missiles which we mentioned earlier are not aimed at anything and are simply there for aesthetic effect. As to foreign bases and troops in other continents, the United States representatives have nothing to say at all. This is understandable, since the bases and troops stationed by United States imperialists in foreign territory represent a threat to international peace, impair the sovereignty of States, and flagrantly violate the rights of peoples to self-determination and independence. All this is completely irrefutable.

48. In the interest of normalizing international relations and halting imperialist aggression, the Soviet delegation supports the adoption by the Commission of a resolution on the immediate elimination of all foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries.

49. Representatives of a very wide range of States have spoken in the Commission in favour of convening a world disarmament conference. As is well known, that is the position of all the socialist countries. The United Arab Republic, Algeria, Guinea, Yugoslavia, Ghana, Kenya, Nepal, Pakistan, Rwanda, Syria, Tanzania, Uganda, Chile, Jordan, Haiti, Ethiopia, Mali, Iraq and, in principle, Sweden, Nigeria, Tunisia, Brazil and Norway are all in agreement with this

¹ Ante, p. 157.
² See ante, p. 176.
position. Mr. Bouattoura, the representative of Algeria, drew the Commission’s attention to the proposal to convene an international conference to discuss the question of general and complete disarmament, and rightly pointed out that the convening of such a conference in the very near future is by no means impossible. Indeed, he stated: “The need for holding an international conference seems now to be clearly understood by everyone. There can no longer be any doubt”.1

50. My delegation fully supports that proposal. Moreover, it considers that if we are serious about achieving and implementing an agreement on far-reaching disarmament measures—particularly general and complete disarmament—we cannot fail to take into account the cogent arguments put forward by many delegations to the effect that all States should be given an opportunity to participate in the discussion of the situation with regard to disarmament. The question of convening a world disarmament conference should be settled right now in our Commission; it should not be referred to the Eighteen-Nation Committee. We are speaking not of one specific aspect of disarmament which needs to be considered by a working group, but rather of the method to be used in negotiating and discussing the problem of disarmament as a whole. The United Nations Disarmament Commission, in which all Members of the United Nations are represented, is certainly better qualified to express its views on this question than is the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The Commission can and must take the initiative in this matter; it can and must call for the convening of a world disarmament conference.

51. My delegation notes that, in the course of the discussion in the Commission, attention has been given to the question of measures to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons. Many views have been expressed on this matter, views which differ from each other substantially but which have one thing in common: they are all concerned with the search for a way to combine the solution of the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons with other measures aimed at limiting the arms race and easing international tension. The abundance of such “packages”—combinations of various proposals, most of which were put forward during previous disarmament negotiations—is very characteristic of the current session.

52. What we are concerned with is not what we might call the external aspect of the matter—what measures should be taken and in what combination. Regardless of whether the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons is discussed in isolation or in combination with other measures, it is imperative first of all to overcome the obstacle which has been placed in our way by the United States and which has so far made it impossible to achieve an agreement.

I refer to the inadmissibility of the establishment in any form of a NATO multilateral nuclear force and, as a result, the granting of access to nuclear weapons to the West German revanchists.

53. Measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons will be effective only if they deny to non-nuclear States any possibility whatever of access to such weapons, whether direct or indirect, on their own account or through military alliances. The greatest practical danger in this regard lies in the plans for the establishment of either a NATO multilateral nuclear force or an Atlantic nuclear force. The intention of the authors of those plans is to make nuclear weapons available to the West German revanchists who, as everyone knows, are demanding a revision of existing frontiers in Europe.

66. First in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and then at the Cairo Conference of Non-Aligned States, appeals were made to the great Powers to abstain from all policies conducive to the dissemination of nuclear weapons and their by-products among those States which do not at present possess them.

67. It is common knowledge that even many States which are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance refused to take part in the establishment of a NATO multilateral nuclear force, rightly recognizing that this scheme would endanger world peace. Yet despite all this, NATO is continuing the work of planning the establishment of such a force.

68. If an appropriate solution to the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons is to be found, there must be unity of views from the outset with respect to the main consideration, namely, that the objective is the conclusion of an agreement which would rule out any and all possibilities of dissemination of nuclear weapons and close up any and all loopholes through which those who do not now have nuclear weapons might obtain access to them.

69. My delegation is convinced that an appeal by the Disarmament Commission to the effect that no NATO multilateral nuclear force should be established in any form would be an enormously important step towards reaching agreement on measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

70. The USSR Government, when taking the initiative of requesting the convening of the Disarmament Commission, stressed that the course of international events required the adoption of urgent and effective measures in the matter of disarmament and limitation of the arms race. Our exchange of views has shown that the Commission is in a position to take effective steps relating to the substance of specific disarmament questions. It would by no means

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1 Ante, pp. 30-31.
be sufficient for the Commission simply to refer all the questions discussed here to the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

71. It is to be presumed that, even without a special resolution by the Commission, all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee will take the trouble to study attentively the records of the Commission's meetings. Specific constructive decisions by the Commission on questions relating to the limitation of the arms race and the relaxation of international tension, which are now ripe for solution, would far more effectively provide the very much needed new impetus for further disarmament negotiations. My delegation appeals to all the members of the Commission to join in bringing about the adoption of such decisions.

Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the Disarmament Commission, May 24, 1965

73. I do regret that once more I must exercise my right of reply, but had I not already expressed my intention to do so with regard to the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union on 19 May,\(^1\) I should in any case have been obliged to reply to the Soviet representative's statement of today.\(^3\)

74. What I find particularly regrettable is that even at this stage in our proceedings, the representative of the Soviet Union saw fit to continue to engage in polemics and false accusations. Such accusations will not expedite our work nor will they contribute to the optimum results of our labours. They fly directly in the face of one point on which indeed we seem to have reached a consensus: the view that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should resume negotiations in Geneva with the least possible delay. That is why we were disturbed to detect an apparent Soviet effort to get us bogged down here in a fruitless debate on certain proposals on which he knows there can be no agreement in present circumstances.

75. While trying to portray the USSR position on various questions as if it were a consensus which has emerged from our discussions here, the USSR representative conveniently ignored a number of points on which there is in fact a large measure of agreement. What is more—and this refers to the USSR representative's comments last week—he accused me of keeping silent on a number of issues. In fact, if Mr. Tsarapkin will reread my last statement he will find that I fully stated

\(^1\) Disarmament Commission Official Records; 87th Meeting, pp. 7–10.
\(^3\) Supra.
the United States position on such proposals as the elimination of foreign military bases, the withdrawal of troops and the non-use, or, as the present Soviet version of this proposal has it, the no-first-use of nuclear weapons.\(^1\) Mr. Fedorenko again referred to each of those this morning.

76. I shall not therefore take the time of the Commission to state again the reasons why my Government sees no hope of present agreement on such proposals. But I am indebted to my Soviet colleague for having himself cited the underlying reason why United States agreement on such measures is not possible. He said that: "The Disarmament Commission does not exist in a vacuum, and is not an abstract institution, isolated from life and events around us".\(^2\) Indeed, it is not, and that is why I based our opposition to these proposals on the political and military realities of the present world and explained why their adoption would benefit the Soviet Union and those who may be allied with it to the disadvantage of my country and its allies.

77. But it is ironic that he should tax me with being silent or taking a negative position on the proposals he has chosen to stress at this time. He has himself hardly spoken here of several proposals which my Government has sponsored and which have received wide support, both in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and in this Commission. For example, what good reason is there for the continued Soviet opposition to a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons use and the transfer of substantial quantities to non-weapons purposes? What good reason is there for the Soviet refusal even to explore a freeze on offensive and defensive strategic nuclear vehicles? I have not heard anyone except the spokesmen for the Soviet Union and its allies oppose these proposals or allege that they are not significant and valuable suggestions.

78. I must say that Mr. Fedorenko's arguments today against these proposals sound more like excuses than reasoned arguments. He said that there are already too many nuclear vehicles and more than enough fissionable material for weapons. Does he mean to say that we should go on producing even more? How can we proceed to eventual reductions if we do not first agree to halt further production?

79. The USSR representative has referred to possible improvements in the United States force of strategic delivery vehicles, implying that the United States would undertake such improvements even if there were a freeze in such vehicles. Indeed, he seemed even to insinuate that the United States' proposed freeze would be a cover-up for such an improvement programme.

\(^1\) *Ante*, pp. 171–181.
\(^2\) *Ante*, p. 182.
80. I would not be frank if I said that the United States would not seek improved defence capabilities—indeed, it would—in the absence of agreements on measures to limit the arms race. The Soviet Union is also continuing to build up its nuclear forces though, of course, its plans and figures, contrary to ours, are not the subject of discussion and public information, as they are in my country.

81. We have just seen new models of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles displayed at the military parade in Red Square, and a number of boastful statements were made about these by USSR officials. I assume those missiles are designed for use and were not shown merely for aesthetic effect.

82. Thus the arms race is going on—and we do not deny it. It is going on on both sides, and not only on that of the United States, as the USSR representative asserts. The United States deplores this situation, and it is precisely for this reason that we have introduced a number of proposals to stop that race or at least to curb it. USSR rejection of those proposals, USSR unwillingness even to explore them in detail can indicate only one thing: that the USSR does not wish to stop the arms race, that it wishes to continue the arms race while paying lip service to disarmament.

83. In spite of our repeated urging, the Soviet Union has flatly refused even to discuss meaningful arrangements to stop the arms race. We, for our part, are willing and ready to engage in such discussion with a view to finding a mutually acceptable basis for making progress in this most important field.

84. Mr. Fedorenko charged today that the United States is not really interested in disarmament. I ask the members of the Disarmament Commission to look at the record of our discussions here. Which Government has urged programmes on measures that will result in halting production and beginning reductions in nuclear arsenals? Not the Soviet Union. It is the United States which is pressing for such action, while the Soviet Union continues to concentrate on proposals for strategic redeployments which would clearly be to its military advantage.

85. The USSR representatives seem to want to have their favourite proposals inserted in specific directives to guide future negotiations. The implication seems to be that questions of balance, timeliness, mutuality of interest and other factors that must guide disarmament negotiations, can somehow be turned aside. Yet we recall the many occasions, on questions of disarmament and other matters, when the USSR has rejected and has refused to abide by decisions, recommendations and appeals adopted by overwhelming majorities of the representatives seated in this very room.

86. The Soviet representative the other day also charged me with failing to take a constructive position on some of his proposals. In
this connexion, I can think only of his reaction to statements made by us concerning the substantial degree of movement by my Government to narrow the gap that has separated us on the question of a comprehensive test ban. This has been made possible by our research efforts. Instead of seizing an opportunity to renew negotiations on a measure which has virtually universal support, he has done nothing more than repeat his Government’s adherence to a completely non-negotiable position. The Soviet Union still insists that unilateral means are adequate to check on possible violations, but it is not willing, in spite of our many invitations, to give any scientific proof of such a capability or even to talk about it.

87. Moreover, he sought once again to transfer to the United States the onus which his Government bears for blocking a non-proliferation agreement. In this connexion, his attacks on a multilateral or allied nuclear force must be viewed in the light of the fact that, over the years since NATO was established, the Soviet Union has never ceased to attack steps designed to improve NATO’s co-operative defence and to promote European unity and Atlantic partnership. The Soviet Union would have us believe that proposals for such a force are only a pretext to place nuclear weapons in the hands of the Federal Republic of Germany. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has repeatedly and publicly disclaimed any aspirations for national control of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the United States does not have a single nuclear warhead deployed in Europe which is not under the strict custody and control of the United States.

88. It is of interest in this connexion that in the military parade in East Berlin on 8 May of this year—a parade which, incidentally, was in violation of four-Power agreements—some fourteen USSR-made missiles were displayed in the hands of East German troops. These missiles, several of which were earlier displayed by the East German and other East European armies, are capable of carrying nuclear warheads over distances estimated at up to a hundred miles. The range is important since there is little military utility in firing a weapon with such a range unless it carries a warhead of mass destruction.

89. My Government has made clear that all the nuclear warheads which we have deployed in Europe remain under United States control. We would welcome a similar categorical assurance from the Soviet Union regarding the warheads for the nuclear-capable weapons which it has made available to East Germany and several other Eastern European armies.

90. I should also like to recall that I have on several occasions stated on behalf of my Government that the United States will take no action contrary to resolution 1665 (XVI) of the General
I have yet to hear a similar statement of policy on behalf of the Soviet Union.

91. I cannot emphasize too strongly that any shared nuclear force in which the United States would participate would be completely consistent with the firm United States opposition to the dissemination of nuclear weapons capabilities and with resolution 1665 (XVI) of the General Assembly. The proposed force is in fact an outgrowth of that policy. Effective safeguards would ensure that no design information would become available to participants in the collective force. Moreover, the charter established for such a force would require the concurrence of the United States in the firing of the weapons. All this is known to the Soviet Union, and if it still has any genuine concern regarding the danger of dissemination, the best way to meet it would be to join us in drafting a non-proliferation agreement. Indeed, we regret to conclude that, on the face of it, the Soviet Union appears to be more interested in propaganda against the Federal Republic of Germany than in helping us to prevent nuclear proliferation.

92. I shall turn now to the USSR representative's fondness for quoting or—should I say—for partially quoting published remarks of various United States officials. In his statement on 19 May, Mr. Tsarapkin cited parts of Mr. McNamara's testimony before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the United States House of Representatives in March of this year. The record of this hearing was published recently in accordance with the United States custom which makes these hearings public after their completion. Mr. Tsarapkin found it possible to convey a misleading impression by saying nothing of the context in which these remarks were made. From the transcript of the hearing, it is clear that Mr. McNamara was not announcing any new United States doctrine or any modification of existing doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons. Rather, he was replying to questions from certain members of Congress. His replies were intended to refute an erroneous implication in the questions which he was asked, but they obviously do not represent any change of policy regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, his remarks were in the context of possible defense against aggression.

93. Regardless of the impression which the representative of the Soviet Union sought to convey, I believe we can assume that the basic position of the Soviet Union on this matter is essentially the same as ours. Indeed, some light on the Soviet attitude is shed by the comments made by Mr. Khrushchev, then Chairman of the

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2. See ante, p. 184, n. 2.
Council of Ministers, in a discussion with Lord Thomson, as reported in *The Sunday Times* of London on 16 August 1964. After saying that he favoured an agreement by the nuclear Powers not to use nuclear weapons, Mr. Khrushchev is quoted as saying: "The trouble is the losing side will always use nuclear weapons in the last resort to avoid defeat."¹

94. I suggest that we can begin to understand the true attitude of the USSR Government towards its pledges in cases where it feels, rightly or wrongly, that its own security is involved, by recalling the circumstances in which the Government resumed atmospheric nuclear testing several years ago before the conclusion of the limited test ban Treaty. All of those who were gathered at the Conference of the Heads of State of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade in 1961 will recall how rudely their hopes were dashed by the Soviet Union when, despite their understanding that the nuclear Powers had suspended all nuclear weapons tests, despite the overwhelming desire of humanity to be free of radioactive fall-out, and despite the appeals of the General Assembly, expressed in several resolutions, the USSR broke the moratorium with a series of tests in the atmosphere.² Moreover, in the face of a solemn appeal by the General Assembly to refrain from testing a fifty-megaton bomb in the atmosphere, the Soviet Union, on 30 October 1961, exploded the largest single nuclear weapon ever tested.³

95. Finally, as regards the proposal to convene a world conference on disarmament, I said in my statement of 17 May that I doubted that any of the participants in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament felt that their inability to achieve concrete agreements up to the time that the Committee adjourned was due to the absence of one Government or another, or that the difficulties which they encountered would disappear if the forum were modified or changed.⁴

96. There are also a number of other considerations to take into account when considering the advisability and the timeliness of a world conference. Consideration should also be given to other means for achieving certain of the objectives sought by those who have called for a world conference. These considerations have already been expressed or implied in the statements of various representatives here, even though the nuances in a number of these statements seem to have escaped the representative of the Soviet Union.

97. I shall examine the lengthy statement which we have just heard from Mr. Fedorenko, if necessary—and it is necessary—and I may respectfully ask to be heard in exercise of my right of reply at a future

¹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 351–352.
² See *ibid.*, 1961, p. 381.
meeting of this Commission, if there be such. For our part, we attach primary importance, as I said the other day, to maintaining the Eighteen-Nation Committee as a forum for constructive dialogue and negotiation with those who share with us so much responsibility for safeguarding the future of mankind. Despite the USSR representatives’ recent statements, we continue to believe that the maintenance of a potentially constructive dialogue, especially in these times of tension, is of increasing value to us all.

Remarks by President Johnson at Signing of Extension of Arms Control and Disarmament Act, May 27, 1965

Ladies and gentlemen: I want to thank you for your presence here today. I welcome you to the White House Rose Garden.

I want to discuss with you some sober truths of the age in which we live. A full scale nuclear war, if it should occur, might come and go as swiftly as one of our thundershowers. Yet it could wreak more destruction than a lifetime of earthquake, and fire, and flood. It could render life on earth intolerable for many, many years to come.

One modern warhead today carries enough firepower to make the nuclear blast of twenty years ago seem a very pale flicker by comparison. One jet bomber today carries weapons equal in explosive force to all—repeat—all the bombs that were dropped in World War II.

The fearsome engines of today are not mere symptoms of intention. Weapons have themselves become a cause of fear and a cause of distrust among other nations. As weapons become more numerous and more deadly, fear and tension grow.

These are not pleasant thoughts. But they are in my mind as I do my job each day. So when I say to you that I hope for peace, I am making no idle talk.

Today we have come here to mark a very small but a very significant step toward a durable peace. This Act will extend for three years the life of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. As I sign this Act, we can reflect with satisfaction upon the successes in arms control which have been achieved in the last four years. The Nuclear Test Ban of 1963 is helping to keep the air free from nuclear contamination. A United Nations resolution, supported by the United States and Soviet Union, has put space off limits to the instruments of nuclear

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2 See infra.
3 Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291–293.
A Washington-Moscow communications link established in 1963 is open at this very moment, and it is a symbol of our determination to prevent an unintended nuclear exchange.\textsuperscript{2}

In addition, we have taken steps to limit our own supplies of non-essential armaments. We recognize that the accumulation of obsolete weapons, the production of unnecessary weapons accelerate the arms race without contributing to overall security.

These acts are only part of the story. A less dramatic but an equally important aspect of arms control lies behind the steps that I just described—in patient, enduring work by the staff of the Arms Control Disarmament Agency.

This government has repeatedly stated its conviction that steadily mounting nuclear stock does not—repeat—does not insure the security of any nation and that the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries threatens the security of all.

We believe that nuclear war must be avoided. And that is why we place such high hopes in the works of this agency. That is why our prayers go with these able and patient men when they travel to the conference table.

Many times over many years I have been involved in efforts to moderate differences between men. I know that governments cannot easily be persuaded to cease their ancient rivalries or to lay aside their weapons or their arms, but I also know that the nations of mankind that are huddled together on a crowded globe have a common interest in survival.

I do believe it is possible through reason and through patient effort to translate that common interest into concrete proposals.

We meet here today to reaffirm those beliefs and to assert once again our faith that man can turn from violence in order to build a world in which the only conquest that nations seek are greater liberty, are deeper understanding, and a fuller life for all people.

Thank you very much.

\textsuperscript{1} Ibid., p. 538.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., pp. 236–238.
Amendment to the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, May 27, 1965

AN ACT

To amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to continue the authorization for appropriations.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the second sentence of section 49(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2589(a)), is amended by inserting immediately after "$20,000,000", the following: "; and for the three fiscal years 1966 through 1968, the sum of $30,000,000".

Approved May 27, 1965.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

HOUSE REPORTS: No. 37 (Comm. on Foreign Affairs) and No. 233 (Comm. of Conference).

SENATE REPORT No. 73 (Comm. on Foreign Relations).

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 111 (1965):

Feb. 17: Considered and passed House.
Mar. 9: Considered in Senate.
Mar. 10: Considered and passed Senate, amended.
Apr. 13: House agreed to conference report.
May 14: Senate agreed to conference report.

Soviet Draft Resolution Submitted to the Disarmament Commission: Liquidation of Foreign Bases, May 27, 1965

The Disarmament Commission,

Noting with concern that the presence of foreign troops in the territory of other States seriously impedes the normalization of international relations and, as has been confirmed in particular by recent events in Asia, Africa and Latin America, aggravates the international situation and creates a direct threat to the peace and security of peoples,

2 Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 482-495.
4 Ante, pp. 11-18, 36-37.
5 Ante, pp. 19-30.
6 DC/218, May 27, 1965. This resolution was not put to a vote.
Noting further that the maintenance or future establishment of foreign military bases in the territory of other States is a threat to the freedom of peoples and to international peace and is a gross violation of the sovereignty of the States in whose territory such bases are situated,

Noting with concern that foreign military bases are in reality a means of exerting pressure on countries and retarding their emancipation and development on the basis of their own ideological, political, economic and cultural concepts,

Considering that the existence or future establishment of bases in dependent territories is incompatible with the General Assembly Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (resolution 1514 (XV)), since such bases can be used to preserve colonialism or for other purposes,

Considering it necessary that, as soon as possible, all foreign troops should be withdrawn from the territory of other States and foreign military bases should be liquidated,

1. Calls upon all States maintaining military bases in other countries to liquidate them forthwith and refrain henceforth from establishing such bases;

2. Calls upon the States concerned to conclude an agreement providing for the withdrawal of all foreign troops within their national frontiers;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to observe the implementation of the recommendations contained herein and to report on the results to the next session of the General Assembly.

Soviet Draft Resolution Submitted to the Disarmament Commission: Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, May 27, 1965

The Disarmament Commission,
Recalling the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 1653 (XVI),
Proceeding from the fact that the Declaration outlawed the use of nuclear weapons, declaring that it was a direct violation of the Charter

2 DC/219, May 27, 1965. This resolution was not put to a vote.
3 Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 648-650.
of the United Nations, that it was contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity, that it was directed against mankind in general and that it was to be considered a crime against mankind and civilization,

*Considering* that the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would be in conformity with the aims of the Declaration and would be an important step towards eliminating the threat of nuclear war, reducing international tension, checking the arms race and strengthening confidence in relations between States,

*Considering* further that the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would be an important step towards the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and towards general and complete disarmament,

_Taking into account_ the fact that most of the States which responded to the inquiry made by the Secretary-General in accordance with resolution 1653 (XVI) were in favour of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons,¹

*Having studied* the documents of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament relating to the discussion held in the Committee in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1909 (XVIII) on the question of convening such a conference ² and the report submitted by the Eighteen-Nation Committee to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session,³

1. *Calls upon* all States to take steps to bring about the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons as soon as possible, convening for this purpose a special conference of all States in the world not later than the first half of 1966,

2. *Invites* States possessing nuclear weapons to declare, pending the conclusion of such a convention, that they will not use them first.


United States Draft Resolution Submitted to the Disarmament Commission, June 1, 1965

The Disarmament Commission,

Deeply concerned that the continuing arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race, poses a threat to the security of mankind while consuming resources that could otherwise be employed to enhance the welfare of peoples everywhere,

Convinced that any further delay in concluding agreements to halt nuclear proliferation and to stop and turn back the nuclear arms race cannot be justified,

Believing that there must be no interruption in constructive discussions and negotiations designed to achieve, in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for disarmament negotiations, agreements on limitation and reduction of armaments which would increase international security and contribute to the lessening of tension,

Noting the widespread support for the measures listed below,

Convinced that those measures would contribute significantly to halting and turning back the nuclear arms race, thus lessening the danger of nuclear war,

Urges the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to reconvene as soon as possible and to:

A. Resume negotiations as a matter of priority on a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests;

B. Undertake without further delay drafting of an international non-proliferation agreement as called for in General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI);  

C. Conclude as soon as possible an agreement to halt all production of fissionable material for weapons use and to transfer to non-weapons use sizable, agreed quantities of such material; and

D. Explore with a sense of urgency a freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles which would open the path to early reductions in such vehicles.

1 DC/220, June 1, 1965. This resolution was replaced by a revised version on June 10, 1965 (post, pp. 244-245).

2 Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 439-442.

3 Ibid., p. 694.
22. One of the most hopeful aspects of disarmament discussions in recent years has been the increased attention they have paid to problems of balance, security and verification, as well as to the detailed technical questions which are at the heart of each of these problems. Unlike the nineteen fifties, when so much time was wasted debating slogans and other simplistic disarmament notions, discussions in the sixties have begun to deal realistically with the issues that must be faced if we are to make progress in arms control and disarmament.

23. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the Soviet Union felt unable to resist the temptation to revert to its former practice. Once more, as in the fifties, we see the Soviet Union promoting its political and propaganda goals with two draft resolutions presented in the guise of disarmament proposals, and, what is particularly regrettable, the language and tone of these resolutions are also reminiscent of the cold war of the nineteen fifties.

24. In my earlier statements, I have made clear why the United States would vote against both Soviet proposals if they should be pressed to a vote. I shall therefore briefly summarize our objections to these proposals.

25. One of the Soviet draft resolutions calls for a new conference of all States to "ban the bomb." It also asks nuclear Powers to pledge themselves not to use it first until such a ban has been achieved.

26. Soviet "ban-the-bomb" proposals have been put forward almost every year since the late nineteen forties. They have been opposed by the United States and other nuclear Powers ever since that time. Clearly, the Soviet Union has no reasonable basis for expecting agreement now. It must therefore have had other purposes in mind in submitting the draft resolution.

27. The United States has pledged itself in the United Nations Charter not to use nuclear or other force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. We have offered full assurance never to use any weapon, large or small, with aggressive intent. We fully recognize the catastrophe that nuclear war would entail. Therefore, ever since such weapons were first produced, we have sought to reduce the risk of nuclear war by instituting, within the United States armed forces, a command and control system which would preclude the outbreak of such a war through

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1 Disarmament Commission Official Records; 89th Meeting, pp. 3–5.

2 The Soviet draft resolutions appear ante, pp. 206–208.
accident or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. In the international sphere the United States has made numerous proposals aimed at the same objective. We were gratified that one of those proposals, the establishment of a direct communications link between the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, was finally accepted by the Soviet Union in 1963.\(^1\) It represents at least one step in the right direction.

28. The United States has also been advocating measures to curb the nuclear arms race among the existing nuclear Powers and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons among States which do not possess such weapons. It is our firm belief that the danger of nuclear war can be reduced only through specific and meaningful arrangements on which all parties concerned could rely for their security. We are equally convinced that declaratory statements of good intention are totally inadequate for that purpose. Indeed, such statements could make the present situation even more dangerous by creating false illusions. In this we are supported by none other than the former Head of the Soviet Government, whose statement of 1964 I have already had occasion to quote.\(^2\)

29. The other Soviet draft resolution deals with troops and bases abroad. As members of the Commission may recall, the General Assembly has already dealt with this question. In 1946 in resolution 40 (I) it unanimously recommended the withdrawal of Member States' armed forces stationed in the territories of other Member States “without their consent freely and publicly expressed in treaties or agreements consistent with the Charter and not contradicting international agreements”.\(^3\) However, despite this resolution, the Soviet Union has repeatedly urged the withdrawal of foreign troops and the liquidation of foreign bases even though they were authorized by treaty or agreement with the host country. As the West has frequently pointed out, such proposals, if implemented, would result in a redeployment of forces in a manner advantageous to the Soviet Union.

30. The stationing of United States forces abroad and the continued existence of certain bases have been the direct consequence of Soviet and Communist Chinese aggressive acts after the United States had unilaterally disarmed following the Second World War. The United States is hopeful that its efforts towards disarmament will bring about such reduction in arms and in tensions as to alleviate the need for troops and bases abroad. But a vote for this draft resolution would constitute support for an oversimplified and destabilizing approach to a complicated political military situation. A recommendation

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1 *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 236–238.
2 See *ibid., 1964*, pp. 351–352, and *ante*, p. 203.
against bases and troops abroad would, in effect, sanction the threats and aggressive actions which have caused nations to band together in common defence. Adoption of this draft resolution would suggest impairment of the right of individual and collective self-defence which is recognized in Article 51 of the Charter.

31. If we look at the areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America which are named in the Soviet draft resolution, we see not only troops and bases; we see also the results of the policy of the Soviet Union, Communist China and their allies, of promoting what they characterize as "wars of national liberation". They do not even pretend any longer that "wars of national liberation" are needed only, or primarily, to liberate territories still under colonial rule, since happily there are very few such territories left. But they speak of "national liberation" and "national liberation forces" even with regard to independent nations which have freely elected Governments. We know from bitter experience that "wars of national liberation" denote any communist effort to overthrow by force any government which they have marked for destruction.

32. The record of the United States in supporting legitimate expression of the right to self-determination is clear. It compares exceedingly well with that of the Soviet Union which, contrary to the post-war tide of history, moved in the opposite direction. As the present membership of the United Nations shows, more than fifty newly independent nations have emerged since the Second World War. These States were granted freedom and independence by those nations labelled by the Soviet Union as "colonialists" and "imperialists". But to what territory has the Soviet Union granted independence? None; on the contrary, it has forcibly expanded its dominions by incorporating into its territory over 264,000 square miles containing over 24 million people.

33. How then could this Commission consider the Soviet proposal without also noting the actions of the Soviet Union and others in instigating, supplying and directing armed attacks against duly established Governments? How could we fail, at the same time, to note that the increased international tension resulting from such illegal actions has complicated our task of securing a peaceful and disarmed world? And finally, how could we fail to call upon the States concerned to desist forthwith from such activities and to cooperate in achieving peaceful settlement of the situation in the affected countries?

34. These two Soviet draft resolutions constitute a backward step into the propaganda morass of the past. They have nothing to do with the sincere effort we should all be making to facilitate agreement on concrete measures to halt and turn back the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race. They are a politically motivated attempt
to secure one-sided advantages for the Soviet Union and Communist China. We shall therefore not hesitate to vote against them, should they be pressed to a vote.

35. My delegation has introduced a draft resolution designed to deal urgently with the subject upon which the strongest and clearest consensus has developed in our discussions to date: the paramount need to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.\(^1\) Delegation after delegation here has called for steps to halt this spread. Almost without dissent, the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been condemned by the nations of the world. Why then should there be further delay in dealing with it? Why are there even suggestions that we take time out to organize a new conference for further speeches about the dangers of the nuclear arms race? We have already achieved a consensus on the nature of the problem. We should now call upon our most expert negotiators in this field to frame concrete agreements which can then be put before all interested Governments. That is what our draft resolution proposes. It urges the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to reconvene as soon as possible to deal with four specific measures.

36. The first of these is a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests. Every delegation which has addressed itself to such a treaty has favoured it. Most of these speakers have pointed to the urgency of concluding a ban on all nuclear weapon tests as an important step towards halting the nuclear arms race and curbing the further spread of nuclear weapons.

37. The second measure listed in our draft resolution is the non-proliferation agreement called for by resolution 1665 (XVI) of the General Assembly.\(^2\) That resolution was adopted without dissent in 1961, and no delegation here has opposed the agreement which it proposes.

38. The third measure is an agreement to cut off production of fissionable material for weapons use and to transfer to non-weapons use sizable, agreed quantities of such material. A consensus appears to have developed that some way to halt and reduce mounting nuclear stocks should be found. Many delegations have specifically urged consideration of a production cut-off as one means to that end.

39. The fourth measure is a freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive missiles and bombers. The draft resolution points out that such a freeze would open the path to early reductions in such nuclear delivery vehicles. Many delegations have pointed out that nuclear delivery vehicles were a key to the problem of curbing the threat of a nuclear war. Indeed, I am not

\(^1\) Supra.

\(^2\) Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 694.
aware that any delegation is in disagreement with that proposition. Many delegations, moreover, have specifically called for exploration of a freeze such as the United States proposes. Such an agreement would enable us to halt the race for the most destructive bombers and missiles, to open the door to reductions in such nuclear vehicles and to remove any incentive that may exist for additional nations to acquire them.

40. Unlike the measures called for in the Soviet draft resolutions, each of these measures is a concrete proposal on which agreement is realistically possible. Unlike the Soviet proposals, each is based on a principle on which there is widespread agreement. I have heard few, if any, dissents to the principles that all nuclear weapons tests should be stopped, that control of nuclear weapons should not be acquired by non-nuclear nations by transfer or manufacture, that stockpiling of fissionable materials or strategic carriers for nuclear weapons should be halted. Unlike the Soviet proposals, none of the four measures listed in this draft resolution has been rejected in principle over and over again by many of the Powers most directly involved. None would upset an existing balance which presently helps to keep the peace. None is a propaganda proposal calling for simplistic declarations which would be clearly to the advantage of one side over the other.

41. Each of these four measures is important in the campaign against the spread of nuclear weapons. On each one agreement is possible. Each would bring us closer to our objective. If we cannot reach agreement on all of them now, let us achieve as large a measure of agreement as we can, taking one or two or three steps when more prove impossible. This is the approach which produced the limited nuclear test-ban treaty¹ and the other measures negotiated so far. It is the approach which is most likely to be successful again. Limited as these first measures were, they followed sixteen years of post-war disarmament talks which produced neither agreement nor the basis for agreement. In each of them the Eighteen-Nation Committee played an important part. Its deliberations in 1962 formed the foundation for the three forward steps taken in 1963: the test-ban treaty, the "hot line",² and the resolution of the General Assembly against nuclear weapons in space.³

42. My delegation is confident that the deliberations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament can again help to identify areas of agreement in 1965 as they did in 1962, 1963 and 1964.

¹ Ibid., 1963, pp. 291-293.
² Ibid., pp. 236-238.
³ Ibid., p. 538.
Although the Committee's success has been limited so far, it has far surpassed that of earlier conferences in the past. Let us, therefore, return to the forum with greater experience and knowledge and hope, for success. Let us continue there the painstaking search which has already produced concrete agreements. Let us not fall for the apparently simple slogans and the seemingly easy solutions which all of us know will not achieve meaningful results. We trust that all delegations seriously interested in progress will join forces to ensure that disarmament negotiations are resumed promptly for work on practical measures which are capable of achievement.

Statement by the British Representative (Beeley) to the Disarmament Commission, June 2, 1965

1. I have asked for the floor in order to make a brief statement on the attitude of my delegation to the three draft resolutions which have so far been presented.

2. It has been a habitual criticism by representatives of the Soviet Union, against certain Western proposals designed to facilitate the process of disarmament, that they are not in themselves proposals for disarmament. They have used this argument, for instance, in dismissing the proposal of the United States for a freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Against this background it seems paradoxical that neither of the two draft resolutions submitted to this Commission by the Soviet delegation is a proposal for disarmament. Under the first of these draft resolutions States could maintain the whole of their existing armaments, and increase them without restriction, provided only that they kept all their forces on their own territory. Similarly, the second draft resolution would do nothing to limit the growth of nuclear armaments.

3. Is either side going to destroy its nuclear weapons on the strength of a pledge from the other side not to be the first to use them, or of a convention prohibiting their use? I believe the answer of the Soviet Union to that question would be the same as the answer of the West. In fact, I believe the Soviet Government would say the same today as its Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, said in 1962.

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1 Disarmament Commission Official Records; 90th Meeting, pp. 1–2.
3 Ante, pp. 206–207.
4 Ante, pp. 207–208.
On 15 March 1962 he told the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee:

Our country does not intend to take anyone at his word, . . . Nor do we expect others to take us at our word. The Soviet Union is a firm advocate of strict control over disarmament.1

4. In drawing attention to the fact that the Soviet Union's own proposals share the very characteristics on account of which the Soviet Union has criticized so many Western proposals, I do not by any means intend to endorse the opinion that measures which do not directly involve a degree of physical disarmament are necessarily valueless. This is obviously not so, and it is plain from the draft resolutions before us that the Soviet delegation admits that it is not so. Every proposal of this kind must be examined on its merits.

5. If we may now look at the substance of the two draft resolutions submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union, we shall find that one principal objective is common to both of them—the objective of modifying the existing balance of power. An attempt has been made to obscure this purpose, in the preamble to the draft resolution dealing with foreign bases, by means of a reference to Asia, Africa and Latin America. And the alleged derivation of the draft resolution from the situation in those three continents was emphasized further in Mr. Fedorenko's speech yesterday.2 But the representative of the United Kingdom is obliged, as I am sure the Disarmament Commission will understand, to look at these draft resolutions from the point of view of Europe. And the Disarmament Commission will not be surprised if he suspects that the Soviet delegation, too, has approached this problem primarily in terms of the relationship between the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. If Europe and Western Asia could be isolated from the United States, it is clear that the Soviet Union would be overwhelmingly the preponderant Power in the whole of this area. I do not wish or need to speculate about the consequences that might follow from that preponderance. The simple fact is that it does not exist today, and it would exist if the two proposals before us were ever to be put into effect.

6. It will be said that the balance of power is an outdated concept; and Ambassador Fedorenko referred to it as a "... fetish on the part of the United States and those who support it which is put into practice in order to undermine a possible agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament".3 This is a strange statement; first, because it is quite obvious that the main attraction—for the

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2 Disarmament Commission Official Records; 89th Meeting, pp. 5–8.
3 Ante, p. 190.
Soviet Union—of its two draft resolutions, is the effect they are designed to have in attracting support for measures which, if they were ever taken, would overthrow the balance of power which now exists and which is one of the guarantees of peace and security for all nations; secondly, because the Soviet Union is one of the authors of the 1961 statement of agreed principles which is in effect the charter of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. The joint statement, as is well known, provides that at no stage of progress towards general and complete disarmament should “any State or group of States gain military advantage”. The Soviet draft resolutions are inconsistent with that principle.

7. Lastly, I would like to say a few words of a more general kind about these two draft resolutions. I have a great respect for the knowledge and experience of the representative of the Soviet Union. Few men understand as well as he does the problems of disarmament and arms control, or know as much as he does about the history of disarmament negotiations. He knows as well as anyone in this room that the two drafts which have been tabled by his delegation are totally unacceptable to the Western alliance, and that they will remain so whether they obtain a majority here or not. Progress in disarmament is not made by declarations and resolutions alone; it requires close and detailed negotiations, at every stage of which the agreement of the States principally concerned is necessary. Humanity needs disarmament, and it therefore needs negotiations of this kind. My Government is ready and anxious to resume such negotiations, and in London now studies are being made which we hope will lead to new and hopeful initiatives. In these circumstances it is discouraging, to say the least, to be confronted with proposals which are blatantly diversionary in character.

8. When we turn to consider the draft resolution put forward by the United States delegation, who can fail to be struck by the contrast? This draft resolution does not put forward proposals which it is known the other side cannot accept and which offer no prospect, therefore, of serious negotiations. On the contrary, reflecting the broad identity of views disclosed in the statements of the great majority of representatives who have spoken in this session of the Commission, the draft resolution sets out a positive programme of future work in disarmament negotiations. This surely is the task of the Disarmament Commission—to map out the way in which future progress can best be made. I am sure there will be general agreement with the emphasis laid in the United States draft on the vital importance of continuing constructive work on disarmament and on the danger of any further

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1 Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 439-442.
2 Ante, p. 209.
delay in concluding agreements to halt nuclear proliferation and to stop and turn back the nuclear arms race. This is clear from many statements made in the course of our general debate. It is also generally recognized that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee is the best machinery available for this purpose. Our aim therefore must be to give fresh impetus to constructive discussions in Geneva by singling out clearly those subjects on which there is the most urgent need to reach agreement.

9. Many proposals that have been made here are worthy of further detailed study, but there can be no doubt that certain questions need to be examined as a matter of priority. One of these—and it is also the one on which there is perhaps most hope of progress—is the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Another is a non-proliferation agreement. Many speakers in our general debate clearly demonstrated the need for agreements on these questions, as did my own Minister, Lord Chalfont, and I will not take the time of the Commission to repeat their arguments since they have so evidently found general acceptance. I would say merely that it seems strange to me that the Soviet Union should ignore the views so frequently and eloquently expressed in this Commission and should entirely neglect these two vital matters in their proposals for draft resolutions to be adopted by the Commission.

10. The remaining two measures referred to in the United States draft resolution are ones which the Soviet Union has been most ready to criticize on the ground that they are not measures of disarmament. As I said earlier, this is not apparently an argument against proposals which the Soviet Union favours and which would be to the Soviet Union's advantage. Nor does it in fact apply to the measures in the United States draft resolution. We have to halt the arms race before we can turn it back. And it is important to remember that if we could agree to stabilize now the level of nuclear delivery vehicles we would be achieving the same results as if at some future date we were to agree on the destruction of all nuclear delivery vehicles produced between the present and that future date.

11. Now that we have had our general debate, which has proved to be of considerable value in highlighting the key issues of disarmament, the question before us is how we can best profit by it to prepare for future urgent action. We have before us draft resolutions submitted by two of the States whose co-operation in any significant progress towards disarmament is of particular importance. The Soviet Union is fond of claiming that it is the West which is negative in its attitude towards disarmament negotiations. But, looking at the two sets of proposals before us, one is bound to ask which of these holds out the

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1 See Disarmament Commission Official Records; 74th Meeting, pp. 1-6.
better prospect of making the world safer by limiting the arms race itself and achieving an actual reduction of armaments. It seems to me incontestable that, viewed in this light, it is the United States draft which contains the seeds of real advance towards our common goal. For we are not here to seek individual advantage for one State over another or one group of States over another; we are here to hasten urgently needed agreements for the good of all.

12. I have commented briefly on the three draft resolutions which are at this time before the Commission. I understand that one, two or perhaps more draft resolutions are anticipated, and I will ask your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, to intervene in the discussion again in order to present the views of my delegation on those additional draft resolutions when they are presented.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Tsarapkin) to the Disarmament Commission, June 2, 1965

My delegation would like to speak to only one question today, namely, the draft resolution submitted yesterday by the United States delegation.2

16. Let me begin with the preamble. It expresses deep concern because the continuing nuclear arms race poses a threat to the security of mankind. Everyone, of course, can agree with that.

17. Further along, in the third preambular paragraph, the reader is led to believe that the operative part will set forth measures "which would increase international security and contribute to the lessening of tension".

18. However, there is nothing in the operative part of the United United States draft resolution to echo the note sounded in the preamble.

19. Let us examine the proposals in the operative part of the text in the order in which they appear, beginning with sub-paragraph (a).

20. In it the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is urged to "resume negotiations as a matter of priority on a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests". It will be noted that the wording is very general and does not reveal the actual plans of the United States regarding the solution of this problem or the nature of the agreements the United States has in mind. We can obtain some guidance in this matter from the United States memorandum submitted to the Disarmament Commission on 29 April 1965.3

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1 Ibid., 90th Meeting, pp. 3-5.
2 Ante, p. 209.
3 Ante, pp. 102-111.
21. Sub-paragraph (c) in section A of that memorandum repeats President Johnson's proposal to the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and reads as follows: "on the banning of all nuclear weapons tests under effective verification and control".

22. Further at the end of section A of the memorandum we find a somewhat more extensive explanation of the United States position, that is: ". . . the requirement for on-site inspection to verify compliance with a ban on underground nuclear tests still exists".

23. The fact that in the question of underground tests the United States insists on special control measures, on the introduction of foreign inspection, that is, on a requirement which, as the Soviet Union has stated definitely and often, is entirely unacceptable, simply shows that those in the United States who are engaged in developing nuclear weapons still have the upper hand.

24. It is obvious that these circles in the United States Administration want to continue to hold on to their last remaining opportunity for nuclear testing, namely, testing underground.

25. With this in mind they raise obstacles to an understanding to ban underground tests on the same conditions as are prescribed in the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. They insist on the establishment of foreign inspection for underground tests of nuclear weapons, thus blocking every approach to agreement.

26. Thus, in the matter of underground nuclear testing the United States adheres to its old position, a position it has held for many years. And yet, two years ago in Moscow a treaty was concluded banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, based on the use of national means of detection for controlling the ban, that is, without foreign inspection.¹

27. The Soviet Union is prepared to agree forthwith to the prohibition of underground tests of nuclear weapons on the same conditions—let me emphasize, on the same conditions—as are prescribed in the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the other three environments—the atmosphere, outer space and under water.

28. As anyone can see, the matter depends entirely on the United States position. What the United States must do is to take a political decision on a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear tests, including underground tests, and not revert to the course of barren technical disputes.

29. That is the position as regards sub-paragraph (a) in the operative part of the United States draft resolution. Let me repeat once again. It is not now a question of priority, of further technical studies on the conditions for banning underground nuclear weapon

¹ Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291-293.
tests. The question is far simpler than that. The United States must at long last take a decision at the political level; in other words, it must consent to extend the conditions of the Moscow Treaty to underground nuclear tests. Then the way to agreement will be open.

30. Let me turn now to operative sub-paragraph (b) of the United States draft resolution. This paragraph proposes that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should "undertake without further delay drafting of an international non-proliferation agreement as called for in General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI)". The reference to this General Assembly resolution should not mislead Members, however, for it is clear from the memorandum which the United States delegation submitted to our Commission on 29 April 1965 that the United States does not have in mind a comprehensive treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but merely an agreement prohibiting the placement of nuclear weapons under the national control of States which do not at present control such weapons.

31. But could Mr. Foster tell us what would happen to the plans for multilateral control of the use of nuclear weapons, the plans to provide access to nuclear weapons within military alliances? I am referring to the United States plan for the creation of the so-called multilateral nuclear force of NATO with the participation of the West German Bundeswehr, that is, with the Bonn revanchists being given access to nuclear weapons. I am referring, further, to the British plan for the creation of the so-called Atlantic nuclear force of NATO, under which the West German armed forces would also have access to nuclear weapons. Lastly, I am referring to the new plan announced in Paris only the day before yesterday, 31 May, by Mr. McNamara, the United States Secretary of Defense. This is a most interesting notion, even more dangerous than the others, and I think that it deserves special attention.

32. Speaking at a meeting of the Defence Ministers of the countries members of NATO—a meeting attended by the representatives of a total of fifteen countries—Mr. McNamara proposed the establishment of a NATO committee of representatives of four or five countries empowered to improve strategic nuclear planning and consultation on the use of nuclear weapons. Mr. McNamara suggested that the committee should be composed of the Defence Ministers of the Governments represented. Among authoritative persons at the NATO meeting in Paris it is taken for granted that this committee would naturally include the United States and the United Kingdom, which possess nuclear weapons, and also West Germany. One of the committee's basic functions would be to raise the efficiency of strategic

1 Ibid., 1961, p. 694.
2 Ante, pp. 102-111.
planning as regards the use of nuclear weapons and to extend the participation of the NATO allies in any use of strategic nuclear forces.

33. I draw the Commission’s attention to this particular aspect of the matter. Under this new plan, the strategic nuclear forces of the United States, which as we all know includes the entire arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons and means of delivery, together with the United States Strategic Air Command, would come within the competence of the proposed committee. And one of the members of the committee, as I have already said, would be the West German Minister of Defence.

34. Here, then, is the third, the latest, and I would say the most dangerous proposal for placing nuclear weapons within the grasp of West Germany, for allowing West Germany to have a hand in working out the strategy of their use and to participate in their control.

35. As members of the Commission will observe, the United States comes before us in the role of Janus. It is openly pursuing a two-faced policy in a matter of such vital importance for peace and world security. The United States synchronizes all its moves in this question. On 31 May in Paris Mr. McNamara announces a new and sensational plan for placing nuclear weapons at the disposal of the West German revanchists, while here in New York on 1 June, that is, the day after Mr. McNamara’s statement was made in Paris, Mr. Foster submits to the Disarmament Commission a proposal on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.¹

36. Presumably, Mr. Foster would have made his proposal on the same day as Mr. McNamara, i.e., on 31 May, but the Disarmament Commission did not meet on that day since it was a United States holiday.

37. We cannot understand the policy of the United States. But in the light of the facts, which are indicative of the unceasing efforts of the United States to bring nuclear weapons within West Germany’s reach through various schemes within NATO, watchfulness is essential.

38. A treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be comprehensive. It must bar any access to nuclear weapons by States which do not possess them. This means that no possibility must be left open for access to nuclear weapons either directly, that is, through the acquisition of national control over nuclear weapons, or indirectly, that is, through participation in their control or disposition through military alliances, including the access of West Germany to nuclear weapons through the so-called multilateral nuclear force, the Atlantic nuclear force, the NATO committee proposed by Mr. McNamara the day before yesterday in Paris, or by any other means.

39. Any non-proliferation proposal which fails to meet these conditions will, as far as the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact countries and

all other neighbours of the Federal Republic of Germany are concerned, be not merely valueless but dangerous.

40. In the light of these facts, the formula proposed in the United States draft resolution for the elaboration of a non-proliferation agreement cannot be said to meet the situation. Far from leading to solution of the problem, it would in effect have us close our eyes to the West German revanchists being given access to nuclear weapons within NATO. That is something to which the Soviet Union is categorically opposed. This, then, is the position with respect to operative sub-paragraph (b) of the United States draft resolution.

41. I turn now to operative sub-paragraph (c) of the draft resolution. It urges the Eighteen-Nation Committee to “conclude as soon as possible an agreement to halt all production of fissionable material for weapons use and to transfer to non-weapons use sizable, agreed quantities of such material”.

42. We have explained the defects of this proposal to our United States colleagues many times. Mr. Foster has tried to convince us that a halt to the production of fissionable material for use in the manufacture of nuclear weapons would slow down the pace of the arms-race. In the first place that is not so, and in the second place it is not the key element in eliminating, or at least lessening, the threat of nuclear war.

43. In saying that it is not so, I have in mind the obvious fact, as reported by highly placed representatives of the United States, that such vast amounts of fissionable material have been stockpiled that, even if the production of such materials were now to be halted, the nuclear industry would continue for years to manufacture nuclear weapons from the accumulated fissionable material.

44. Consequently, this United States proposal would not have the effect of lessening the threat of nuclear annihilation. But today even that is not the main issue, for we know from statements by United States officials that the United States arsenal contains thousands, even tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads ready for use and a corresponding number of delivery vehicles. Mr. McNamara and other United States officials have repeatedly threatened the world with the ability of the United States to “overkill” what they regard as their potential enemy four or even five times.

45. Three or four years ago it began to be said in the United States that there was an over-production of fissionable material for military use. In general the United States has reached a saturation point, so to speak, in nuclear weapons and fissionable material.

46. I put it to the Commission: if all nuclear weapons and all delivery vehicles are retained, what possible significance can there be from the standpoint of eliminating the threat of nuclear war in such measures as stopping the production of fissionable material
for military purposes, or transferring a given quantity of such ma-
terial to non-military use? None at all. Moreover, the proposal
to halt the production of fissionable material for weapons use is
altogether unworkable in the existing circumstances, for it involves
the establishment within a country of foreign control over one of
the principal sectors of military production, without disarmament.
This part of the United States proposal implies control without
disarmament, control over armaments—in other words, military
intelligence.

47. Thus we see that the proposals set out in operative sub-para-
graph (c) of the United States draft also do not lead to the elimina-
tion or even a lessening of the danger of nuclear war, an ever present
danger which stems from the nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles
in the arsenals of the nuclear Powers.

48. Lastly, I come to the proposal in operative sub-paragraph
(d) of the United States draft resolution. The essence of it is that
the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should explore
a freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic vehicles
for the delivery of nuclear weapons.

49. What I have said with regard to operative sub-paragraph (c)
applies equally to this sub-paragraph. The United States proposals
for a freeze on strategic delivery vehicles and a halt to the production
of fissionable material for weapons use are dictated by two main
considerations. One of them is that delivery vehicles and fissionable
material have already been stockpiled in the United States in quan-
tities that satisfy even the most demanding United States generals.
The second is that these generals feel that it might not be a bad
idea to arrange for the international collection of intelligence on
key sectors of State defence.

50. It is for this reason that these United States proposals provide,
as was explained by the United States delegation in the Eighteen-
Nation Committee, for the full disclosure of the major components of
defence systems, for control of the atomic, missile and aviation indus-
tries, for examination of nuclear weapon stockpiles, and for inspection
of military depots—indeed of any building or area—and all this while
the present level of armaments, the existing stockpiles of nuclear
weapons and delivery vehicles, remain untouched.

51. The United States also suggests that parties to the relevant
agreements should retain the right of unilaterally renouncing further
compliance with them. In other words, once it has obtained the
information it was interested in, a party with aggressive designs could
withdraw from the agreement and proceed to carry its designs into
execution.
52. It is obvious that these proposals of the United States are
directed not towards disarmament but towards the establishment of
control without disarmament, and hence they are in blatant contradic-
tion with the agreed principles for disarmament negotiations to which
Sir Harold Beeley, the United Kingdom representative, referred
earlier this morning.¹

53. The implementation of these proposals, far from lessening the
threat of nuclear war, could actually increase it. No peace-loving
State concerned with its own security and not harbouring any aggres-
sive designs on another party could accept the agreement proposed
by the United States.

54. We have the impression that this United States draft resolution
is a diversionary tactic aimed at ensuring, under the cloak of the
preambular phrases, that the Commission should settle nothing and
that all the problems before it, still unresolved, should be shifted to
the Eighteen-Nation Committee, being further weighed down by
questions which either cannot be acted upon because of the conditions
set by the United States—the United States proposals regarding
underground nuclear tests and the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons fall into this category—or cannot help to eliminate the nuclear
threat to mankind constituted by the vast stockpiles of nuclear weap-
onss and delivery vehicles, among which questions belong the United
States proposals in sub-paragraphs (c) and (d).

55. On the basis of these various considerations, we think that there
is an irreconcilable contradiction between, on the one hand, the pas-
sages in the preamble of the United States text about the need to conclude
agreements to stop and turn back the arms race, the danger of the
arms race and desirability of lessening the threat of nuclear war, and
on the other hand, the programme which the United States proposes
in the operative part of its text and which cannot possibly lead to the
solution of the problems with which the Commission is confronted.

56. The USSR delegation accordingly considers the United States
draft resolution to be completely unacceptable and will vote against
it if it is put to the vote.

¹ Supra.
Thirty-six Power Draft Resolution Submitted to the Disarmament Commission, June 3, 1965

The Disarmament Commission,

Recognizing the paramount importance of disarmament as one of the basic problems of the contemporary world and that its solution should be sought in a world-wide framework,

Convinced that a world disarmament conference would provide powerful support to the efforts which are being made to set in motion the process of disarmament and for securing the further and steady development of this process by formulating proposals and guidelines in the spirit of the Declaration adopted at the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, with a view to speeding up general and complete disarmament under effective international control and thus contributing to the relaxation of international tension;

1. Affirms the proposal adopted at the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in October 1964 for the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited;

2. Recommends that the General Assembly give urgent consideration to the above-mentioned proposal at its twentieth session.

Statement by the Yugoslav Representative (Lekic) to the Disarmament Commission, June 4, 1965

2. It is a great honour for me to introduce the draft resolution on the convening of a world disarmament conference, issued as document DC/221 and sponsored by Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia,  

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1 DC/221, June 3, 1965. This resolution was sponsored by the following countries: Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Uganda, UAR, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. These 33 countries were joined on June 7 by Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, and Yemen. A revised version of the resolution was approved by the Disarmament Commission on June 11, 1965 (post, p. 253).

2 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 445.

Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia.¹

3. As is well known, at the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cairo in October 1964, forty-seven Heads of State or Government, with the concurrence of eleven observers, expressed their conviction that a world disarmament conference "... would provide powerful support to the efforts which are being made to set in motion the process of disarmament and for securing the further and steady development of this process".²

4. The Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries came to the conclusion that the state of international relations, particularly in the field of disarmament, was such that extraordinary efforts were necessary on the part of all countries of the world to halt the armaments race and to begin the process of real disarmament. It is understandable that for the first time in history the need for world-wide action was stressed at that Conference. The entire course of post-war development, and, in particular, the continuing expansion of the nuclear arms race, has reached a point at which the international community is confronted with two most serious alternatives: self-destruction, or peaceful and active co-existence among all States and peoples of the world. Furthermore, not only is there an imperative need to unite the efforts of all the countries of the world in undertaking speedy measures towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control, but the time is also ripe to do so. A universal forum where all participating countries would be equal, such as was proposed by the Cairo Conference, would lead to the formulation of proposals and the guidelines which would speed up the solution of this problem. Such measures are pre-requisites not only for freeing mankind from the constant danger of self-destruction, but also for contributing to the speedy and unhindered political, social and economic progress of the world.

5. This Commission in the course of the debate has recognized the importance of this initiative. It can, in fact, be stated with satisfaction that the entire debate had shown that the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference is not a controversial question. The proposal of the Cairo Conference on the convening of a world disarmament conference has, quite naturally, met with the wholehearted support of the non-aligned countries in this Commission. The Cairo proposal has also been welcomed and endorsed by socialist countries: the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR and Mongolia. The proposal has also met with support or understanding on the part of a number of other delegations.

¹ Supra.
² Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 445.
6. The representative of Chile, Mr. Illanes, speaking on the universal responsibility for the solution of the problem of disarmament, said:

We think it is necessary to seek new directions and examine new methods that might make progress possible. . . . The Chilean delegation accordingly takes a sympathetic view of the proposals in the Declaration of the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cairo, for a world disarmament conference in which all nations would participate. . . . Such a conference would . . . unquestionably serve to give tremendous moral backing to the efforts made towards disarmament.1

7. The representative of Pakistan, Mr. Ali, said on 21 May:

We endorse the view expressed at the Cairo Conference that the proposed convocation would provide powerful support to the efforts which are being made to set in motion the process of disarmament and for seeking the steady development of this process.2

8. Mr. Fanfani, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, said, among other things, on 25 May: "... it must also be said that a world disarmament conference would be an event without precedent and could be of historic significance . . ." 3

9. Mr. Nielsen, the representative of Norway, emphasized that his Government felt "... that negotiations with the object of achieving far-reaching and worldwide disarmament cannot be fully realistic without the active participation of all the great Powers, including the People's Republic of China".4

10. It is not necessary to spend time quoting other delegations on this matter since we have all followed the deliberations of each delegation carefully. I must, of course, mention that there have also been certain reservations concerning the timing and the thorough preparation which the convening of such a major international gathering would entail to ensure its success. This is quite understandable. A world disarmament conference requires adequate preparation for which a certain period of time is necessary. It is precisely for this reason that the present draft resolution does not seek to settle this matter, but refers it to the twentieth session of the General Assembly for its consideration.

11. During the debate, some delegations mentioned the useful role which could be played by the ENDC in the preparation of a world disarmament conference. We also see in this an indication of the interest which the proposal of the Cairo Conference has aroused so far. Any suggestion as to how to facilitate the solution of the manifold questions involved in the convening of the conference is most welcome and, at the proper time, should be thoroughly considered.

1 Disarmament Commission Official Records; 82nd Meeting, p. 3.
2 Ibid., 86th Meeting, p. 7.
3 Ibid., 88th Meeting, p. 2.
4 Ibid., 83rd Meeting, p. 16.
The sponsors of the draft resolution, however, in approaching the General Assembly directly, base their position primarily on the Cairo Conference resolution urging the participating countries to take, at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, all the necessary steps for the holding of such a conference.

12. The participants in the Cairo Conference, furthermore, considered that a direct approach to the General Assembly, with the proposal which forty-seven Heads of State or Government had adopted unanimously, would be the most logical way of speeding up the solution of the problem. Naturally, this does not exclude any other assistance which might be lent to these efforts.

13. In conclusion, I should like to say a few words concerning the text of the draft resolution. This text was evolved during numerous consultations with regional and other groups, as well as with a number of individual delegations. The draft is composed of two preambular and two operative paragraphs.

14. In the first paragraph of the preamble the paramount importance and the universal character of the problem of disarmament are emphasized; this has been recognized unequivocally in the course of the debate in this Commission.

15. The second paragraph of the preamble stresses the importance that a world disarmament conference would have for setting in motion the process of disarmament, and it expresses the conviction that the guidelines and the proposals which the conference would adopt would hasten the completion of general and complete disarmament.

16. The first operative paragraph, in pointing out that the Disarmament Commission:

Affirms the proposal adopted at the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in October 1964 for the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited in effect reflects the support given to this proposal in the course of the Commission's debate.

17. Finally, in the second operative paragraph, the Disarmament Commission:

Recommendsthat the General Assembly give urgent consideration to the above-mentioned proposal at its twentieth session.

18. The submission of the draft resolution by such a large number of delegations demonstrates the readiness of the Member States of the United Nations to take steps to overcome gradually the serious crisis with which the Organization is faced. The adoption of this draft resolution would contribute to the strengthening of the prestige of the United Nations and would confirm once again that it is an irreplaceable instrument of peace and international co-operation.
Furthermore, we are convinced that in the light of the aggravation of the world situation, the adoption of the draft resolution and the mobilization of the entire international community to seek ways to initiate the process of disarmament would have positive implications for the future development of international relations and for the peaceful solution of major international problems.

19. Bearing all this in mind, the sponsors of the draft resolution expect that it will be adopted unanimously. This would be the clearest possible expression of the readiness of every country to contribute to the solution of the problem of disarmament.

Maltese Amendments to the Thirty-six Power Draft Resolution, June 4, 1965

1. Second preambular paragraph: After the words “a world disarmament conference” replace the existing text by the following:

might provide a valuable forum in which to seek agreement on steps to facilitate the adoption of specific measures of disarmament in accordance with the agreed principles for multilateral negotiations on disarmament issued jointly by the USSR and by the United States on 20 September 1961.

2. First operative paragraph: Replace the word “Affirms” by the word “Welcomes”.

3. Second operative paragraph: Add at the end thereof the words “in the light of the discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee”.

Address by ACDA Director Foster Before the Commonwealth Club at San Francisco, June 4, 1965

My appearance before you today is the culmination of negotiations which, I believe, began about a year and a half ago. During that time exigencies in Washington, my attendance at the United Nations Gen-

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1 DC/223, June 4, 1965. The original 36-power draft resolution appears ante, p. 226. On June 11 the sponsors introduced a revised draft resolution (DC/221/Rev. 1), which was approved by the Disarmament Commission on the same date (post, p. 253). The Maltese representative withdrew his amendments before the revised 36-power resolution was put to a vote (see Disarmament Commission Official Records; 97th Meeting, p. 11).

2 Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 439-442.

3 Department of State Bulletin, July 12, 1965, pp. 77-84.
eral Assembly in New York, and reconvenings of the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, have forced me reluctantly more than once to postpone planned appearances before your distinguished group.

And at this moment the United Nations Disarmament Commission is in session in New York. Although the Commission is now in perhaps the most important phase of its deliberations, I felt that I could not again deprive myself of the pleasure of being with you.

I am not unaware of the possibility that when I have concluded my remarks you might ask, "Why not?"

The patience shown by the Commonwealth Club in booking me for this occasion is a most necessary ingredient in my business, too. Patience has never been more important than at this moment of time in our efforts to negotiate arms control and disarmament agreements with the Soviet Union.

It was just 2 years ago to the week, and 5 years after the opening of negotiations, that the then-Chairman Khrushchev acceded to the late President Kennedy's urgent requests that the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States sit down together once again to attempt to reach agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty. You may recall that the President announced Soviet acceptance for discussions on this possibility in his memorable speech at American University in Washington on June 10, 1963.1

During the following month, the limited nuclear test ban treaty was negotiated in Moscow. It was signed in that city by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union on August 5, 1963.2

I have delved briefly into history because, significant as the limited nuclear test ban treaty is to arms control and disarmament, what was even more significant was the basic decision by the Soviet leadership which led to the successful conclusion of those negotiations.

It seems to me that the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis led the Soviet Union to an important shift in its international policies, bringing about a decided letup in the cold war and a major thrust forward of the policy of peaceful coexistence. That shift, of course, made possible the agreement on the limited nuclear test ban treaty.

There have been other steps, too, which I would define as progress in arms control as a result of this shift in policy. I refer to the so-called "hot line" between Moscow and Washington;3 the United Nations resolution expressing the intention of all members to refrain from placing weapons of mass destruction in space;4 and the simultaneous

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2 Ibid., pp. 291–293.
3 Ibid., pp. 236–238.
4 Ibid., p. 538.
announcements of planned cutbacks in the production of fissionable materials for weapons use.¹

The Soviet Union’s shift in its international policies, I would suggest, was long-range in scope, designed for at least limited accommodation with the West without compromising its goal of eventual world domination. The new approach appeared also to represent a strategic move, in the face of Communist China’s challenge to Soviet leadership of the Communist world, to prove that useful results can be attained from what the Soviet Union calls the policy of “peaceful coexistence” with the West.

Finally, it probably represented recognition of the need to pay greater attention to pressures for faster, increased internal development.

The Problem of the Kremlin Leaders

The Soviet Union is not on a smooth course, obviously. The contradictions in ideology between East and West, the struggle to maintain Communist world leadership against Communist China’s open challenge, and other international situations—such as the one in Viet-Nam—all tend to make more difficult the efforts gradually to establish a relationship that would promote further progress in arms control and disarmament.

The Soviet policy shift of 1963 may not have changed in 1965, but I would suggest that the course of history in the meantime has created problems of considerable magnitude for the Soviet Union, and also for the United States and the rest of the world, in the area of arms control and disarmament.

You probably are aware that the United States and the Soviet Union act as cochairmen of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. This is a good arrangement because, in addition to the plenary sessions of the conference, the cochairmen have the opportunity to discuss privately, free from public limelight, arms control and disarmament proposals of either side. We have considered this a valuable opportunity for both sides.

But it is precisely this function, shared in by the United States and the Soviet Union, that presently creates a worrisome problem for the Kremlin leaders at a time when they are being attacked by the Chinese Communists for collaborating with the United States. Therefore, the Soviet Union has found need to be as strident in tone as Communist China in attacking the United States’ actions in Viet-Nam, the Congo, and lately the Dominican Republic.

I suspect this is one of the reasons why the Soviet Union, on March 31, called for the reconvening of the United Nations Disarmament

¹ Ibid., 1964, pp. 165–171.
Commission, rather than the ENDC, as we call the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee. The Commission is made up of 114 nations, the full membership of the General Assembly.

Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States is a cochairman of the Commission, and therefore the Soviets cannot be charged with collaboration with the United States. Also, the meetings of the Commission are public, with full opportunity for sounding the propaganda drums, particularly on its alleged distress at so-called "U.S. imperialist aggression" around the globe.

Finally, perhaps the Soviet Union sought to preempt a world stage from Communist China through a meeting of the Disarmament Commission. You see, Communist China has no voice in the Commission. But on June 29 the mainland Chinese will attend the Bandung II Conference in Algiers, and the Soviet Union, so far as is presently known, has not been invited. Arms control and disarmament discussions almost certainly will occur at Algiers, but they are apt to be anticlimactic—or so the Soviets may hope—in light of the various presentations of those subjects in New York.

The United States frankly was skeptical that a meeting of a large body, such as the UNDC, would produce any concrete results. We wanted to go back to the ENDC at Geneva last February. We much prefer the smaller ENDC forum because, among other things, the delegates there, over the years, have become the foremost experts in the world in this highly complex field.

However, since many nations accepted the invitation to convene the Disarmament Commission, the United States determined to participate in as constructive a manner as possible.

Soviet Proposals Unrealistic

The Soviet Union and its allies have performed in the forum as we expected. They have all, in orchestrated fashion, seized the opportunity to attack the United States' presence in Viet-Nam, the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere, distorting facts and maligning our motives with complete abandon.

The Soviet Union came up with its shopworn, unrealistic, and non-negotiable proposals. It was obvious from the start that the Soviet Union was flatly refusing even to discuss meaningful arrangements to halt the arms race at this time. On the other hand, the United States was—and is—prepared and willing to participate in the search for a mutually acceptable basis for progress in this most important field.

1 See ante, pp. 30-31.
2 The Algiers conference was postponed after the Algerian revolution of June 19, 1965.
3 Ante, p. 31.
In the light of present Soviet attitudes, it was not unexpected when, a week ago today, the Soviet Union submitted two draft resolutions of a purely propagandistic nature. One of them called upon “all States maintaining military bases in other countries to liquidate them forthwith and refrain henceforth from establishing such bases”; and further called upon “the States concerned to conclude an agreement providing for the withdrawal of all foreign troops within their national frontiers.”¹ The other called upon “all States to take steps to bring about the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons as soon as possible, convening for this purpose a special conference of all States in the world not later than the first half of 1966,” and it went on to invite “States possessing nuclear weapons to declare, pending the conclusion of such a convention, that they will not use them first.”²

These are not realistic resolutions, and I so declared in my statement at the Disarmament Commission last Tuesday.³ The political environment in which we have lived since World War II, in which nations have been threatened with Communist aggression—in fact, sometimes have experienced Communist aggression—has forced nations to establish alliances for defensive purposes. Our alliances are in keeping with the United Nations Charter. When and if the Soviet Union, Communist China, and their satellites decide to refrain from aggressive bent, then perhaps it will no longer be necessary to maintain our bases or troops on foreign soil. The United States has a wholehearted desire to see that time come.

The ban-the-bomb proposal is just as unrealistic. The United States has already pledged itself in the Charter of the United Nations not to use any kind of force to commit aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. We have, on many occasions, offered full assurance never to use any weapon, large or small, with aggressive intent. What we have attempted to do is to reach meaningful, verified agreements whereby these weapons, nuclear and conventional, could be reduced and ultimately eliminated.

Declaratory statements of good intention are dangerous because they create false illusions. I believe we all remember that, although the Soviet Union and the United States at one time had an understanding on what some referred to as a “moratorium” on nuclear testing in the atmosphere, the Russians breached that understanding in September 1961. In that series of tests, deplored by the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet Union tested the biggest bomb ever exploded in the history of mankind.

¹ See ante, pp. 206–207.
² Ante, pp. 207–208.
The Soviet Union has refused to consider a nonproliferation agreement without a prior commitment from the West to abandon plans for a NATO multilateral force or for the British-proposed Allied nuclear force. Negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, according to the Soviet representative, can take place only on Russian terms—which are no on-site inspections. Other proposals were shrugged off as demands for control and espionage—without disarmament.

U.S. Proposals

The United States, on the other hand, has again offered to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty, taking account of modifications in its on-site inspection requirements. This has been made possible by a research program in which the United States has now invested about $300 million since 1959. Nevertheless, we believe some on-site inspections still are necessary. Although the Soviet Union insists that unilateral means are adequate to detect possible violations, it has refused, despite our many invitations, to give any scientific proof of such a capability or agree to scientific exchanges in this regard.

The United States considers it a matter of great urgency that a nondissemination/nonacquisition agreement be attained to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviet objection to the MLF and ANF proposals is largely aimed at weakening and dividing NATO, a policy they have never ceased to follow. The Russians insist that the MLF/ANF proposals would constitute proliferation and would give control of nuclear weapons to nations—particularly the Federal Republic of Germany—which do not now have them.

The suggested Western ideas for nuclear arrangements within the alliance actually support nonproliferation, since no single participant would gain control of the weapons or, under the safeguards we propose, increase the ability to develop its own nuclear weapons.

We have, therefore, urged the Soviet Union not to delay longer in reaching agreement with us, since we believe such an agreement should remove any genuine concern they may have regarding the MLF. The Soviet Union would then have further assurance that we mean what we say in proclaiming that we are opposed to the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

We also have urged that the Soviet Union join with us in stopping further production of fissionable materials for weapons use.1 Coupled with this proposal of ours is another, suggesting that the two nuclear powers transfer a combined total of 100,000 kilograms of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes. The U.S. share would be 60,000 kilograms, reflecting our superiority in this field.

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1 See ante, pp. 106–107.
This is a more significant proposal than many people realize. Not only would it put the lid on all further production of fissionable materials for weapons use, but it would, of course, automatically limit general increases in nuclear arsenals. I might add that the transfer of 100,000 kilograms of fissionable material would represent, in terms of electric energy potential, about two-thirds as much as the entire electrical production of the United States in 1963.

The Soviets show no interest. They say this is not disarmament but that it is control for the purpose of espionage.

Another important measure, introduced both in Geneva and again in New York, is President Johnson's proposal to explore a verified freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive delivery vehicles. An agreement on this measure would enable us to halt the most potentially destructive segment of the arms race and would prove to the world that the two major nuclear powers were indeed serious in their intentions to halt and reduce the arms race.

Agreement on the proposal would significantly reduce military expenditures. I leave to your imagination the constructive purposes to which these released funds might be put for the benefit of our people and of mankind generally.

The United States is concerned that, as more power reactors are developed around the world, the byproducts of peaceful nuclear activities could be diverted to weapons development. We consider it vital that such activities be under international safeguards. Accordingly, the United States has proposed and given its strongest support to the development of an international system of safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities by the International Atomic Energy Agency. We have offered some of our reactors for inspection by the IAEA in the hope that the Soviet Union will do the same. We also are gradually transferring to the IAEA the administration of safeguards under our existing bilateral agreements throughout the world.

You will note that the United States proposals I have set forth in the foregoing represent a carefully developed program of related measures, designed to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons. Any one, or all, would contribute to this vital goal.

Usefulness of Commission Sessions

Skeptical as we were regarding the Soviet Union's motives for requesting the reconvening of the Commission, and despite our doubt concerning a constructive outcome, I do not believe that the sessions have been a complete waste. Not only did we have the opportunity to present our views and suggestions before every member nation of

the United Nations General Assembly, but all other member nations, as well, had the opportunity to be heard.

Aside from the Communist orchestration, many of the other participants, both large and small, presented intelligent, constructive views. It provided us the opportunity to assess at firsthand those issues to which they gave greatest priority. And we found consensus on a number of issues.

I have studied carefully the remarks made by the many delegations which spoke, and I believe that the following matters were given the widest area of support:

Nearly every nation said that the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee should resume deliberations in Geneva as soon as possible. None, not even the Communist countries, openly opposed resumption of the ENDC.

Many wanted a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Many wanted a nondissemination/nonacquisition agreement.

Many wanted an agreement to halt the further production of fissionable materials for weapons use and the conversion of such materials to peaceful purposes.

Many of the nations supported the verified freeze proposal.

We were heartened by the serious interest shown in our proposals and by the awareness of the need to curb proliferation of nuclear weapons now.

One proposal which has been pressed by the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia is that of convening a world disarmament conference. The idea of convening a world conference appears to stem from the feeling on the part of many that Communist China, as a militarily significant state, would have to be a party to arms control and disarmament agreements.

However, it is also our view that further consideration should be given to the advisability and timeliness of a world conference. Consideration should also be given to the motives of Communist China if it were to attend such a meeting. Would that nation participate in an obstructive or constructive manner? Would Communist China seriously consider forgoing its present militarily aggressive posture to conduct itself within the framework of the United Nations Charter?

These are indeed important considerations. There is no doubt but that at some stage in disarmament Communist China must enter as a party to agreements, or there can be no further disarmament. But until the Chinese exhibit a more constructive interest in world peace and stability, I would suggest that such important first steps as can be taken now should not be deferred pending a change in the Chinese attitude.

Present arms control requirements, without question, center around the imperative need to stop the further spread of nuclear weapons.
Communist China's second nuclear weapons test, conducted at the very time the Disarmament Commission was in session in New York, highlighted the immediacy of this problem.

As I mentioned earlier in my remarks, the Soviet Union, following the Cuban missile crisis, apparently decided that its long-term interests might best be served by a relaxation of the cold war and a more positive interest in its policy of peaceful coexistence.

But during the past year, and reaching a climactic pitch during the present session of the Disarmament Commission, another change of attitude among nations has become markedly apparent. That change is the drastically increased feeling of the urgency in dealing with this problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities.

The United States has long been aware of this and, in fact, first attempted to put the atom under peaceful control through the Baruch Plan of June 1946.\(^1\) Today, however, with a fifth country having tested nuclear devices and a number of others weighing decisions to develop a nuclear weapons capability, the urgency of the problem has become crystal clear to almost all nations.

And where time might be a factor in favor of improved Soviet-American relations, time definitely is not on humanity's side in our efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities.

Concern About Communist China's Tests

While two tests have not made Communist China a nuclear power—and she will not be one of any significance for years to come—those tests had an unsettling effect throughout Asia, and particularly in India.

There was obvious concern regarding the military threat implicit in the tests, but perhaps even greater concern that the prestige and influence of such countries as India and Japan would suffer. Indian prestige had already suffered as a consequence of the military attack by China in 1962. There is the other factor that India is well advanced in the development of the peaceful uses of the atom—indeed further advanced than Communist China—and Japan is not far behind. But the psychological impact of China's test magnified her nuclear achievements beyond proper proportion. Furthermore, the success of the Chinese program was largely due to the considerable assistance supplied by the Soviet Union in the late 1950's.

Fortunately, the Governments of India and of Japan have made the decision not to go nuclear in the weapons field. They are to be commended for making the decision. We believe it is wise on both political and military grounds. A reversal of this decision could

start an unfortunate chain reaction, leading to similar decisions by other governments.

It would be a fearful world, indeed, that housed not 5 but 10, 15, or 20 nuclear powers in the next decade or so. And among them, there might well be the unstable as well as the stable, the irresponsible as well as the responsible.

The rapidly expanding peaceful uses of the atom program contributes to the dangers of proliferation. Significant quantities of plutonium are being produced in peaceful nuclear power reactors around the world. Those quantities, of course, will be increased as more power reactors are built. It is essential that international safeguards be applied to the operation of such reactors.

I hope that you will agree that the problem of proliferation is urgent. The steps that can be taken in this area must be taken now if the spread of nuclear weapons is to be stopped. The dreadful consequences of delay are all too obvious.

The United States has proposed such steps. Our proposals are simple, easily verified, widely supported.

Our proposals are embraced in a resolution, tabled with the UNDC last Monday. That resolution urges the ENDC to reconvene as soon as possible, and to:

A. Resume negotiations as a matter of priority on a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests;
B. Undertake without further delay drafting of an international non-proliferation agreement as called for in General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI) . . .;
C. Conclude as soon as possible an agreement to halt all production of fissionable material for weapons use and to transfer to non-weapons use sizable, agreed quantities of such material; and
D. Explore with a sense of urgency a freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles which would open the path to early reductions in such vehicles.¹

This draft resolution was tabled because—and I would like to reemphasize:

1. The ENDC represents the most skilled body of disarmament experts in the world today;
2. The problem of proliferation is the most urgent one we face;
3. Nearly all the nations represented at the UNDC have given recognition both to the competency of the ENDC and to the urgency of negotiating the proposals set forth in our resolution; and
4. These are proposals possible of agreement. Not only do they serve the mutual interests of the Soviet Union and ourselves, but they are in the interest of all other nations as well.

We would like to get back to Geneva and renew negotiations.

¹ Ante, p. 209.
Responsibility of Great Nuclear Powers

It is to be regretted that the struggle for leadership of the Communist world going on now between Communist China and the Soviet Union is injected into important world affairs, such as the deliberations of the UNDC.

It would be most regrettable if the struggle between these two nations should have a serious inhibiting effect when time is running out on the possible solution of the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The overwhelming desire of nearly all the nations of the world to reach agreements on arms control and disarmament measures must not be subordinated by them to that struggle.

Last night the President told the world that,

The common interests of the peoples of Russia and the peoples of the United States are many, and this I would say to the people of the Soviet Union tonight: There is no American interest in conflict with the Soviet people anywhere. . . . We of the United States of America stand ready tonight as always to go with you onto the fields of peace, to plow new furrows, to plant new seed, to tend new growth, so that we and so that all mankind may some day share together a new and a bountiful harvest of happiness and hope on this earth.1

The Soviet Union is a powerful nation. It is one of the two great nuclear powers. It must then share with us the same responsibility to meet the just desires of our own people and those of other nations to reach balanced, verified arms control and disarmament agreement, by which all can benefit and none will suffer.

Instead of a world conference as a platform for further Soviet Union vilification of the United States and its allies, we need to get back to the smaller, expert forum of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee for concentrated work on the many problems of arms control and disarmament.

For our part, we are prepared to study seriously any proposals which will curb the spread of nuclear weapons. Our own proposals are worthy of closest attention.

Time is against us in this struggle. These matters demand urgent attention now. We think that the Soviet Union knows this. What is needed now is a decision on their part to act on that knowledge so that we may yet utilize the little time remaining to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The nations of the world have a right to demand this of the great nuclear powers.

I should first like to express our sincere thanks to those who have offered kind congratulations on the Gemini IV achievement which has just been concluded.

70. I should now like to comment on the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference—the proposal contained in document DC/221 and Add.1.2

71. In his statement of 4 June, the representative of Yugoslavia said that the entire debate in this Commission showed "that the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference was not a controversial question". He added that the sponsors of the draft resolution that he was introducing "expect that it will be adopted unanimously".3

72. I know how assiduously the representative of Yugoslavia has laboured to produce the document now before the Commission. However, with all due respect for his conviction on this matter, I must say that neither the record of our discussions nor what we know of the effort that went into the shaping of this draft resolution supports the view that there is nothing controversial about it.

73. In my earlier statements I observed that there were a number of considerations to be taken into account in examining the advisability of a world disarmament conference. So far as the United States is concerned, the primary consideration is whether the convening of such a conference in foreseeable circumstances will, in fact, facilitate negotiations on arms limitation and reduction agreements. I must say that we are far from convinced that this would be the result. On the contrary, we are concerned that, in the absence of positive indications that such a conference would produce useful results, it might only delay the negotiations that are now possible—and indeed essential—in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

74. Although the progress we had all desired has not been made in the eighteen-nation forum, it is nevertheless the most promising forum created since the Second World War for disarmament negotiations. Its discussions paved the way for several existing agreements, and they have served to lay the groundwork for future agreements which would be instrumental in reversing the arms race. As I have already stated, we are not aware that the participants in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament feel that their inability to achieve agreements is due to the absence of one or more Governments, or that the difficulties they have encountered will disappear if the forum is modified.

1 Disarmament Commission Official Records; 95th Meeting, pp. 8–9.
2 Ante, p. 226.
75. We believe, accordingly, that nothing should be allowed to interrupt the negotiations under way in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. We also believe that those negotiations and the views of those engaged in them cannot be ignored in considering any new disarmament initiative.

76. We do recognize that some Governments hope that a world disarmament conference might improve the international atmosphere even if it did not result in concrete agreements. But if it were to meet in unpropitious circumstances it would do no more than reflect discord and serve as a propaganda forum for those whose interest is not in promoting disarmament but in propagating an aggressive point of view wholly out of keeping with the hopes and aspirations of a large majority of nations. Thus, it could serve to worsen the atmosphere for the disarmament negotiations now in progress; it could result in a hardening of positions rather than in a wider measure of agreement. As a result, the difficulties that have hampered the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee might be greatly increased.

77. That would be particularly true if the conference were to call into question the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, which is not just a “resolution made by two Powers”, as was suggested here the other day. That resolution was unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly as a guide to disarmament negotiations. In our view, one of the principal defects of the draft resolution contained in document DC/221 and Add.1 is that it does not refer to the Agreed Principles, but it does express the view, in the second paragraph of the preamble, that the conference would formulate proposals and guidelines “in the spirit of the Declaration adopted at the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries”. Now, that Declaration expresses many sentiments which we whole-heartedly endorse; but it also contains several recommendations to which my Government and many other Governments are opposed. To suggest that the conference should proceed in the spirit of that Declaration could, therefore, be construed as suggesting a new and controversial set of guidelines, notwithstanding the Agreed Principles which were unanimously approved by the General Assembly. If that were the result, it would represent a backward step and might disrupt the course of disarmament negotiations for years to come.

78. In his statement the other day, the representative of India offered an explanation of the second paragraph of the preamble which we found helpful as far as it went. But we cannot understand why it

2 Ibid., pp. 741–742.
3 Ibid., 1964, p. 445.
4 Disarmament Commission *Official Records; 92nd Meeting*, p. 3.
is not possible to mention the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles if, in fact, it is not excluded by the text before us.

79. We are aware that many of the proponents of this draft resolution see it as a means of associating militarily significant States with future disarmament negotiations. But I must in all frankness ask whether the proposal now before us is appropriately designed to that end, and, if so, whether it is likely to succeed. Moreover, it by no means exhausts the possibilities for associating other States with disarmament negotiations. In any event, we have already seen that Governments cannot be compelled to join in disarmament negotiations no matter how often or by what majority they are invited to do so.

80. We are all agreed that sooner or later every militarily significant State must participate in disarmament negotiations if we are to go far down the road to disarmament. But until the time comes when such participation can be achieved on a constructive basis, our primary task is to make sure that we avoid any action which would delay or otherwise increase the difficulty of achieving such agreements as are urgently necessary now, and are possible even on a more limited basis.

81. I know that some representatives feel that a world conference might be useful even if not all Governments chose to attend. But is this really so? How would such a conference differ from the meeting now in progress here?

82. This is not to say that our discussions here and the annual debates in the General Assembly are without value. On the contrary, these discussions offer a valuable opportunity to give fresh impetus to the negotiations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by clarifying points of view and by enabling all participants to add their weight to any consensus that may emerge to guide future negotiations. But the question is whether a world conference would add anything to these discussions.

83. For all these reasons the draft resolution set out in document DC/221 presents serious problems for progress in the field of arms control and disarmament. It cannot be supported simply as an effort to achieve unanimity here, because it is clearly designed to have us all affirm a proposal based on the point of view of certain Governments which is obviously not shared by all.

84. We regret that the text now before us does not take into account the concerns I have mentioned which I know are shared by many here. By referring to the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles and to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the amendments proposed by the representative of Malta¹ would meet some of our concerns and, we understand, those of many other delegations. We therefore believe they deserve widespread support.

¹ Ante, p. 230.
85. We, the United States, are now, and always will be, ready to participate in any effort which is genuinely directed toward the solution of the many and difficult problems facing the world in seeking meaningful agreements in the field of arms control and disarmament. However, our experience, and that of many other nations which have in the past sought such arrangements, teaches us that there is no shortcut to agreement, no panacea which will cure this ill from which the world suffers and no easy device which will open the door to agreement. Magic will not help us, but unremitting labour can; in the past it has produced some fruit.

86. In the present circumstances, we believe that such progress as is now possible can best be made in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. With goodwill on all sides and bearing in mind the widespread desire for agreement on certain measures expressed in this Commission, we believe progress can be achieved in the near future.

Revised United States Resolution Submitted to the Disarmament Commission, June 10, 1965

The Disarmament Commission,

Deeply concerned that the continuing arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race, poses a threat to the security of mankind while consuming resources that could otherwise be employed to enhance the welfare of peoples everywhere,

Convinced that any further delay in concluding agreements to halt nuclear proliferation and to stop and turn back the nuclear arms race cannot be justified,

Believing that there must be no interruption in constructive discussions and negotiations designed to achieve, in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for disarmament negotiations, the goal of general and complete disarmament and agreements on limitation and reduction of armaments which would increase international security, contribute to the lessening of tensions, and facilitate the attainment of that goal,

Noting the widespread support for the measures listed below,

Convinced that those measures would contribute significantly to halting and turning back the nuclear arms race, thus lessening the danger of nuclear war,

1 DC/220/Rev. 1, June 10, 1965. The original version appears ante, p. 209. The revised resolution was not put to a vote.

2 Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 439-442.
Urge the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to reconvene as soon as possible and, *inter alia*, to:

A. Resume negotiations as a matter of priority on a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests;

B. Undertake without further delay drafting of an international non-proliferation agreement as called for in General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI)\(^1\) and bearing in mind the suggestions made on that issue during the present session of the Disarmament Commission;

C. Conclude as soon as possible an agreement to halt all production of fissionable material for weapons use and to transfer to non-weapons use sizable, agreed quantities of such material; and

D. Explore with a sense of urgency a freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles which would open the path to early reductions in such vehicles.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Tsarapkin) to the Disarmament Commission, June 11, 1965 \(^2\)

5. The Soviet delegation intends today to discuss the draft resolution submitted by the delegations of Yugoslavia and thirty-five other non-aligned countries.\(^3\)

6. The representatives of a number of States which co-sponsored this draft resolution have, here in the Commission, set out in sufficient detail and with ample clarity the considerations which led them to submit their proposal. The main concern of the sponsors is to facilitate the solution of the problem of disarmament and to hasten agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control and on other measures conducive to checking the arms race and improving the international situation. In other words, this proposal by the non-aligned countries goes to the root of the problem facing us and the United Nations as a whole. It calls for the mobilization of the efforts of all States to solve the most important problem of our times—disarmament. There are grounds for hoping that such a broad and universal approach may prove successful where all the other approaches of lesser scope have so far failed to produce the required results.

7. In its very first statement, on 26 April,\(^4\) the Soviet delegation drew the Commission’s attention to the proposal put forward by the


\(^2\) *Disarmament Commission Official Records; 97th Meeting*, pp. 1–4.

\(^3\) *Ante*, p. 226.

\(^4\) *Ante*, pp. 37–58.
Cairo Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries\(^1\) and the proposal by the People's Republic of China for the convening of a world disarmament conference.\( ^2\) The Soviet delegation spoke out clearly in support of these proposals and subsequently appealed to the United Nations Disarmament Commission on various occasions to support the idea of convening such a conference. We naturally experience a feeling of satisfaction at the widespread support which the proposal for convening a world disarmament conference has received in the Commission, and we welcome the non-aligned countries' initiative in putting forward a draft resolution on this matter.

8. Several speakers have commented upon certain parts of the draft resolution submitted by the thirty-six non-aligned countries and have spoken of the possibility of amending them. The representative of Malta has even gone so far as to submit amendments\(^3\) which have been supported by the Western bloc in general and by the representative of the United States of America in particular. I think, therefore, that it will be quite in order if I deal in my statement with the views expressed by the honourable representative of the United States, Mr. Foster.

9. He started off by attacking head-on the draft resolution for the convening of a world disarmament conference. He declared that he was far from convinced of the advisability of convening such a conference and that it was essential, in his view, to take a number of other considerations into account before coming to a decision on this aspect of the question.\(^4\)

10. Having expressed these views, he then indulged in various kinds of speculations and in groundless guesses and assumptions. He began by asking whether the convening of such a conference in the foreseeable circumstances would, in fact, facilitate negotiations on arms limitation and reduction agreements. Having asked this question, he then proceeded to answer it, and in so doing took it upon himself to appear before us in the role of a prophet by declaring that "we are far from convinced that this would be the result". In using the word "we", he obviously had in mind the United States delegation and those who share its views. We, however, and I think the overwhelming majority of delegations, do not agree with this prophecy of his. It is, after all, not an argument but a mere conjecture which cannot be taken seriously.

11. His further assertion that a world disarmament conference could only delay the negotiations on disarmament in the Eighteen-Nation Committee distorts the very substance of the matter.

\(^1\) Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 445.
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 455.
\(^3\) Ante, p. 230.
\(^4\) See ante, p. 241.
12. First of all, it should be noted that this world conference would be a definite and extremely valuable form of negotiations and would obviously take place at a very high level where effective discussions could be held and responsible decisions taken on the important questions of disarmament, the curbing of the arms race and the relaxation of international tension.

13. Secondly, a decision by this Commission to convene a world disarmament conference could bring a breath of fresh air into the atmosphere of stagnation in which the Eighteen-Nation Committee has unfortunately languished since its very inception. Up to the present, moreover, the representatives of the Western Powers in the Eighteen-Nation Committee have not given us any grounds for expecting or considering that that Committee is or may become the most promising forum for disarmament negotiations.

14. Also absolutely unfounded is the United States representative's assertion that the decision to convene a world disarmament conference could serve to worsen the atmosphere for disarmament negotiations now in progress and could result in a hardening of positions rather than in a wider measure of agreement, and that, as a result, the difficulties that have hampered the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee might be greatly increased. All these fears have been conjured up by him merely because the question of convening a world conference is not being linked with or made dependent upon the preliminary adoption by the participants of the Agreed Principles as guidelines for the work of the conference.1

15. The United States representative also said that the disarmament negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and the views of those engaged in them "cannot be ignored in considering any new disarmament initiative". This remark is likewise unjustified, as no one has any intention of ignoring the views of the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. It must be emphasized, however, that if we do not want our own views to be ignored, then we must not ignore the views of others. I have in mind Mr. Foster's reference to what he calls the particular danger that the world disarmament conference might "call into question the . . . Agreed Principles" for disarmament negotiations. It is not clear to us why the representative of the United States assumes that the world conference would necessarily devote itself to considering the Agreed Principles. This conference would deal with the problem of curbing the arms race and the question of releasing international tension.

16. We do not see what grounds there are for the United States representative's fears, nor what grounds there are for making the

1 For the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 439-442.
acknowledgement of the Agreed Principles a necessary condition for any State's participation in the world disarmament conference, especially as there are States which did not take part in formulating those principles but which must take part in the world conference. Those States may possibly espouse those Principles, but no one has the right to force them to do so.

17. The Soviet delegation would like to point out in this connexion that in the present case we are talking about a world conference, and not an ordinary international conference of States whose participants frequently agree among themselves on certain principles in advance. A world disarmament conference is far from being the sort of conference referred to by the United States representative when he spoke of the desirability of forcing such a conference into a Procrustean bed of fixed conditions and of presenting prospective participants with the ultimatum that if they wanted to take part in a world disarmament conference then they must first of all declare that they accepted the demands put forward here by the delegation of the United States of America.

18. The United States representative would like the world conference to be convened on conditions previously approved by him, but this is manifestly a groundless pretension on his part. He has no grounds or convincing arguments in support of this position, to say nothing of the fact that it is out of order to put forward any demands in advance. Such an approach may be conceivable in negotiations between victor and vanquished, but it can have no place where a world conference of sovereign States is convened to consider the problem of disarmament.

19. As we understand the United States representative, however, the real issue is not the conditions for or the approach to the disarmament conference; the real issue is something else. In actual fact, the question he is raising does not so much concern the conditions in which, in his opinion, a world disarmament conference should be convened; it concerns rather—as I have already said—the advisability of convening such a conference at all. In his statement of 9 June, the United States representative expressed the fear that "in the absence of positive indications that such a conference would produce useful results" it might delay negotiations on disarmament.1 We may ask him what kind of "positive indications" are meant. Does he already know for certain what positions all the participants will adopt at the conference, and does he know in advance that there will be nothing positive in any of those positions? Is not it possible that in this case he is thinking of the position of the United States of America? We will readily believe that. Perhaps his words should

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1 _Ante_, p. 241.
be understood to mean that all the participants in the conference must first of all come to a behind-the-scenes agreement on its results before it is even convened, so that the role of the conference itself would be reduced to that of a world carnival at which, in a setting of brilliance and splendour, some previously prepared text would be thrown open to signature or put to a vote.

20. But this is not at all what is intended by the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference. What is meant are negotiations carried on at the conference itself in a spirit of constructive discussion and with a genuine desire to reach agreement. This is what lies behind it all. Everyone sees how arbitrarily and, I would even say, unceremoniously the United States of America and its NATO allies treat these agreed principles for disarmament negotiations and how they distort their real meaning. The purpose of these principles was, of course, to promote the rapid progress of disarmament while maintaining during the process of disarmament—I repeat, during the process of disarmament—a situation in which no country could obtain any military advantage at any stage of disarmament. The United States and its NATO allies, however, decided to use these principles to slow down disarmament and to put obstacles in the way of disarmament negotiations. The Western Powers, by invoking these principles, have carried on disarmament negotiations in such a way that not even the slightest progress in disarmament has so far been made.

21. Let us look at what is really going on and see how the Western Powers are interpreting, construing and juggling with these principles. They declare that they cannot go so far as to eliminate nuclear weapons in the first or even the second stage of disarmament, as that would violate the Agreed Principles. They cannot agree to the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons in the first stage of disarmament, as that, too, would be a violation of those principles. For the same reasons, they refuse to accept the Soviet proposal for a “nuclear umbrella”, declaring that that would also violate the Agreed Principles. They reject the proposals for the elimination of United States military bases on foreign territory on the grounds that to accept them would not be in accordance with the Agreed Principles. The withdrawal of military forces from the territory of other countries would also, so they claim, violate those principles. Even the gradual reduction of the number of foreign troops of the territory of other countries is rejected by them for the same reasons.

22. The prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, regarding which the General Assembly adopted a special

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1 See Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 515-516.
Declaration in 1961,\(^1\) would constitute yet another violation of the Agreed Principles, and the United States cannot therefore agree to it. The United States opposes the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe on the same grounds that it would allegedly constitute a violation of the Agreed Principles.\(^2\) The same things are said regarding the establishment of denuclearized zones in Northern Europe, in the Baltic area, in the Balkans, and in the Mediterranean area. The reason the United States gives for opposing the proposals made by the Polish People's Republic for the "freezing" of nuclear armaments in Central Europe is likewise that those proposals would violate the Agreed Principles.

23. It is on the same pretext that the United States opposes the Soviet proposal for the destruction of bomber aircraft.\(^3\) Taking shelter behind the claim that the Agreed Principles would be violated, the United States also opposes the proposals for reducing the total number of armed forces, for signing a nonaggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, and so on and so forth.

24. Thus it is that whatever measure aimed at securing real disarmament, whatever measure to curb the arms race or to reduce international tension may be proposed to them, the representatives of the United States and its NATO allies unfailingly reject them all on the pretext that none of them are in accordance with the Agreed Principles. That is how the representatives of the United States understand those principles, how they use them, and how they use pretexts based on the Agreed Principles in disarmament negotiations.

25. In the light of these facts it is abundantly clear that the United States would like to extend this practice, which is, so to speak, so promising in its fruitlessness, to the world disarmament conference also.

26. It was with no less fervour that the United States representative expressed his opposition the day before yesterday to any consideration being given by the world disarmament conference in the course of its work to the Declaration adopted at the Cairo Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries. He frankly stated that his Government was opposed to several recommendations in that Declaration and viewed it as a backward step compared with the Agreed Principles already mentioned. The Soviet delegation does not see any contradiction between those Principles and the provisions of the Cairo Declaration of non-aligned countries, and it therefore cannot agree with the views expressed by the honourable representative of the United States.

\(^3\) See *ibid.*, 1964, pp. 16, 104.
27. In our opinion, the United States representative’s remarks regarding the draft resolution submitted by the thirty-six non-aligned countries are all dictated by the single aim of preventing, or doing everything possible to hinder, the convening of a world conference in which all the States of the world really could take part. Mr. Foster himself shed some light on this in his statement the day before yesterday in treating of the question that “sooner or later every militarily significant State must participate in disarmament negotiations if we are to go far down the road to disarmament”\(^1\). The method proposed by him for tackling this problem, however, was that of not inviting such States to disarmament negotiations “until the time comes when such participation can be achieved on a constructive basis”. In other words, the United States representative apparently believes that the participation of some States in disarmament negotiations would not be constructive at the present stage and that such States must wait until he or his Government deign to change their minds about this matter. It is this determination of the United States delegation not to allow other sovereign States to take part in disarmament negotiations which is also at the basis of the United States representative’s remarks regarding the draft resolution submitted by the thirty-six non-aligned countries—including the extremely curious statement that this draft “represents serious problems for progress in the field of arms control and disarmament”\(^2\).

28. The best answer to the United States representative’s criticism of the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference is perhaps to be found in the following statement by Ambassador Gebre-Egzy, the representative of Ethiopia:

... it seems to us that it would be better for those who are in disagreement with this draft resolution to say: ‘We do not want other States to participate and therefore we are against the Conference’, rather than to propose that all kinds of proposals should be mentioned in the draft resolution\(^3\).

29. As to the amendments proposed to the draft resolution of the thirty-six non-aligned countries by the delegation of Malta,\(^4\) they in essence reproduce word for word what was said here by the representative of the United States of America. The Soviet delegation considers that these amendments are aimed at substantially weakening the draft resolution. There can be no doubt that these amendments would raise serious obstacles to the convening of a truly universal disarmament conference or might even make it totally impossible to convene such a conference, and we will unreservedly vote against them if they are put to the vote.

\(^1\) *Ante*, p. 243.
\(^3\) Disarmament Commission *Official Records; 93rd Meeting*, pp. 5–6.
\(^4\) *Ante*, p. 230.
30. It is impossible not to see that those delegations which are disposed to support these amendments are, by taking such a position, disrupting the efforts aimed at convening a world disarmament conference. Hence, if as a result of such a combination of forces the convening of the conference proves impossible, the responsibility will lie on the supporters of these amendments.

31. Just before this meeting started we heard unofficially that the amendments of the Maltese delegation had purportedly already been withdrawn.1 If this is so, then it will undoubtedly have a beneficial influence on the further discussion of this question. The Soviet delegation, for its part, considers that the draft resolution of the thirty-six non-aligned countries, which calls for the convening of a world disarmament conference, can play a significant and positive role. In the search for solutions to the problems of achieving disarmament, curbing the arms race and reducing international tension, it will vote in favour of this draft.

Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the Disarmament Commission, June 11, 1965

18. For the reasons stated in my intervention at our 95th meeting3 my delegation will abstain in the vote on the thirty-six-power draft resolution.4

19. We have always been ready to participate in any effort which held reasonable hope for a solution to the complex problem of disarmament; but we believe that the Eighteen-Nation Committee holds greater promise for progress than a world conference. We believe that a world conference may not be the only or best means of associating all militarily significant States in disarmament discussions, and we believe that such a conference might compound rather than solve the problems of disarmament. However, with the revision now before us, the main operative paragraph calls for General Assembly consideration of the problem. My delegation has never objected to that. We regret that the draft resolution, as revised, does not refer to the discus-

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1 The Maltese amendments were withdrawn at the same meeting (Disarmament Commission Official Records; 97th Meeting, p. 11).
2 Ibid., 98th Meeting, pp. 2-3.
3 Ante, pp. 241-244.
4 The resolution appears infra.
sions of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. We also regret that it does not refer to the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, which was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly to guide disarmament negotiations in whatever forum they might meet.

20. We recognize that the draft resolution no longer calls for a new set of guidelines for disarmament negotiations. We find helpful the statements by the sponsors of the draft resolution indicating that they support the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles; but a reaffirmation of these principles would have made their point clearer.

21. Taking all these factors into consideration, my delegation, therefore, will, as I indicated a moment ago, abstain on the draft resolution contained in document DC/221/Rev.1, which is before us today.

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Disarmament Commission Resolution on World Disarmament Conference, June 11, 1965

_The Disarmament Commission,_

_Renouncing_ the paramount importance of disarmament as one of the basic problems of the contemporary world and that its solution should be sought in a world-wide framework,

_Convinced_ that a world disarmament conference as proposed by the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries would provide powerful support to the efforts which are being made to set in motion the process of disarmament and for securing the further and steady development of this process, with a view to speeding up general and complete disarmament under effective international control and thus contributing to the relaxation of international tension,

1. _Welcomes_ the proposal adopted at the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in October 1964 for the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited;

2. _Recommends_ that the General Assembly give urgent consideration to the above-mentioned proposal at its twentieth session.

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2 DC/224, June 15, 1965. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 89 to 0, with 18 abstentions. The following countries abstained: Congo (Léopoldville), Costa Rica, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland, Israel, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Portugal, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, U.S. The Republic of China did not participate in the voting and dissociated itself from the resolution.

3 _Documents on Disarmament_, 1964, p. 445.
Statement by the Soviet Representative (Tsarapkin) to the Disarmament Commission, June 14, 1965

Today the USSR delegation intends to speak mainly about draft resolution DC/222 dated 3 June 1965.  

62. Now, in the concluding stages of our work at this session, it is particularly important for us to look at least into the immediate future and to show both foresight and discretion as well as a broader approach, in order to create a clearer and more favourable outlook for further disarmament negotiations. It is from this standpoint that we should like to consider the draft to which I have referred.  

63. It should be noted that the draft resolution contains a number of provisions, such as the first two preambular paragraphs, which no one can dispute. With some reservations, we could also agree with the third, sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs. Of the operative part of the draft resolution, we could accept sub-paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) and the final sub-paragraph. Our attitude towards this draft resolution is not determined by these unexceptionable provisions, however, but by those which give rise to definite objections.  

64. This draft resolution seems to us a complex document, a combination of aims, intentions and plans of different categories, which shows the influence of the different interests of some of its authors. If we consider carefully the draft resolution before us, we shall readily see that the authors set themselves two tasks, two aims. The first is to introduce into the text of the resolution a definite, specifically directed element of censure. The second is to convey, on behalf of the Disarmament Commission, instructions to the Eighteen-Nation Committee as to how to conduct further negotiations on disarmament.  

65. When we speak of the desire to introduce into the draft resolution an element of censure, we have in mind primarily the first part of the fourth preambular paragraph. It is not hard to guess that the censure obtained in that phrase is directed against the People's Republic of China which, as we know, is not a party to the Moscow Treaty.  

66. In this connexion, the USSR delegation has repeatedly stated that it is not for the Disarmament Commission or of any other United Nations organ either directly or indirectly, openly or in a veiled manner, to comment on the position of, and even less to condemn a State which is not represented in the United Nations and whose legitimate rights in the United Nations are most crudely violated as a result of the hostile and illegal position taken up by the United States of America.

1 Disarmament Commission Official Records; 89th Meeting, pp. 7–10.  
2 I.e., the resolution of June 15, 1965 (infra).  
3 Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291–293.
67. Let me now turn to operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, which also relates to the question of nuclear weapon tests. In this paragraph, the United Nations Disarmament Commission suddenly decides to reaffirm the call of the General Assembly upon all States to adhere to the Moscow Treaty.

68. It will be evident even to the inexperienced that the Disarmament Commission, which is an organ subordinate to the General Assembly, is here suddenly deciding to pose as a higher organ, an organ above the General Assembly, and to confirm a decision taken by the General Assembly.

69. It is obvious that the Disarmament Commission, which does not rank higher than the General Assembly but is a lower organ, subordinate and accountable to the General Assembly, would not be within its rights in confirming a decision of the higher organ, the General Assembly. We think that it must be clear to everyone that operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution DC/222 is inappropriate. We believe that the sponsors of the resolution understand that too. Each of us is therefore entitled to ask: why has this inappropriate paragraph been included in the draft resolution? The answer is still the same: to ensure that the resolution is specifically directed against the People's Republic of China, which is not a party to the Moscow Treaty.

70. It seems to us that we should refrain from the temptation to use the Disarmament Commission, in which the People's Republic of China is not represented, as an arena for a political struggle to condemn or rebuke that State. To put forward such proposals in the Commission is all the more inappropriate and inconsistent in view of the almost unanimous adoption of the resolution on the convening of a world disarmament conference.

71. The USSR delegation urges the Commission to reject this far from constructive approach because such schemes can lead to no good and will only create additional difficulties on the already thorny road to disarmament.

72. I shall now turn to the second aspect of the draft resolution.

73. The second aim of this draft resolution is to give the Eighteen-Nation Committee guidelines for its future work.

74. I have already mentioned those provisions in the preamble and in the operative part of the draft resolution which appear to be beyond dispute or with which we could agree. I shall now touch upon those provisions which occasion criticism on our part and which we consider inadequate, unsatisfactory and unacceptable.

75. Let us start with the question of the banning of underground nuclear weapon tests, since that is the order in which the question appears in the draft.

76. In this connexion, we should like to point out that in the draft
resolution, the memorandum of 14 September 1964, submitted by eight non-aligned countries, is described as "a fair and sound basis for the conduct of negotiations towards removing the remaining differences" concerning the banning of all tests.

77. In essence, this memorandum is yet another attempt to reduce the solution of the question to technical negotiations, and this can in no way contribute towards the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty on the cessation of testing. The USSR delegation has pointed out many a time that the method of technical negotiations, which the Western Powers favour, is calculated to confuse the whole issue and delay its settlement. This question now requires a political solution, not technical discussions. Its solution depends on the United States of America. As regards the USSR, as we have repeatedly stated, it is ready to conclude an agreement banning underground nuclear weapon tests on the same conditions as provided by the Moscow Treaty for the banning of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space.

78. I now come to the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as presented in sub-paragraph 2(c). This is the most important question for us in the resolution. I should point out, by the way, that the wording of this paragraph in the present draft actually differs little from the wording used in relation to the same question in the United States draft resolution, contained in document DC/220/Rev. 1, which, at the 90th meeting of the Commission on 2 June 1965, was subjected by us to very searching criticism, in the course of which we explained why we could not accept that wording in the United States text.

79. I do not intend to repeat all our arguments on that point, and will merely say the following. A treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be comprehensive. Our United States colleagues are not afraid to use the word "comprehensive" when describing the kind of treaty we should have on the banning of nuclear weapon tests. A treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should also be comprehensive, denying all access to nuclear weapons to States not already possessing them. That means that it must be made impossible for non-nuclear States to gain access to nuclear weapons either directly, that is by the acquisition of national control over nuclear weapons, or indirectly, that is by participation in the control and disposal of nuclear weapons through military alliances. This includes not giving West Germany access to nuclear weapons through the so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force, or through the NATO Atlantic force, or through the NATO Committee proposed by

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1 Ibid., 1964, pp. 428-429.
2 Ante, pp. 244-245.
3 Ante, pp. 219-225.
Mr. McNamara at the NATO Conference in Paris on 31 May,¹ or in any other way. This position should be accurately and clearly stated in the resolution if its sponsors wish to achieve progress in the solution of this question instead of a continuation of the present deadlock.

80. On the whole, the wording relating to this question, as proposed in operative sub-paragraph 2(c), like the United States text, fails to ensure the necessary solution of the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This wording, in fact, invites us to shut our eyes to the granting of access to nuclear weapons to the West German militarists and revanchists within the framework of NATO.

81. We, in all the socialist countries, cannot be indifferent in this matter. We are constantly receiving new warnings. Two days ago, at Stuttgart, Western Germany, the German revanchists once again held a meeting at which, exactly as in the days of Hitler, predatory claims to the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia were voiced.

82. That is the heart of the matter. We cannot agree, we cannot accept any formulation of the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which fails to take into account and totally ignores the important considerations put forward by the USSR and the other socialist countries.

83. I should like to add one further observation. The wording of the paragraph dealing with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as given in the draft resolution contained in document DC/222 not only evades the question of denying the West German revanchists access to nuclear weapons, but complicates it further by making the solution of this question, which is highly important in itself, dependent upon the solution of a whole series of other complex problems. The draft resolution also has a number of other shortcomings, both major and minor, but I shall not dwell on those now.

84. To sum up my analysis of the draft resolution, I must state that we do not, of course, cast any doubt on the sincerity of its authors. Nor have we any doubt that they had excellent intentions and wanted to make a constructive contribution. With all respect to them, however, we are compelled to state that, in the light of the observations I have made, this draft resolution cannot remotely be considered a common denominator, as Mr. Obi, the representative of Nigeria, has described it. The adoption of such a draft resolution would not, of course, make the prospects of future disarmament negotiations any brighter or more favourable.

85. If the draft resolution contained in document DC/222 is put to the vote, the USSR delegation will vote against those preambular and operative paragraphs which I have mentioned as being unacceptable to us. Similarly, we cannot support the draft resolution

as a whole if it is put to the vote in its present form. Frankly, we see no merits in this draft resolution which would warrant giving it priority.

86. With regard to the United States draft resolution [DC/220/Rev. 1], I must point out that its substance has in no way been changed by the introduction of a few amendments. All the criticisms of and objections to operative paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the United States draft resolution which we expressed at the 90th meeting of the Commission on 2 June still remain valid. Consequently, even in its revised form, the United States draft resolution is totally unacceptable to us.

87. There now remain the two USSR draft resolutions: one concerning the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries and the liquidation of foreign military bases [DC/218], and the other concerning the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons [DC/219]. Both these problems are extremely pressing and it is becoming increasingly important to find a solution to them without delay.

88. The attempts by representatives of the Western Powers to brush these proposals aside by claiming that their implementation would disturb the balance of military power are now being refuted by the military authorities of these same Western Powers who understand a question such as the balance of military power much better than those representatives who have misused this term to block any progress in the disarmament negotiations.

89. In this connexion, I should like to quote from a recent statement made by the well-known British military leader, Field Marshal Montgomery. A few days ago, Field Marshal Montgomery stated that he was firmly convinced that the main step towards improving the international situation must be the withdrawal of all foreign troops, whomever they may belong to, to the territory of their own country, for good

He went on to say:

All these soldiers must be brought home. That should have been done long ago.

In this connexion, Field Marshal Montgomery stressed that United Kingdom troops, too, should be withdrawn from Western Germany and returned within their national frontiers. In other words, Field-Marshal Montgomery, who is unquestionably a military authority among the Western Powers, declared himself in favour of withdrawing foreign troops from wherever they may be stationed, including Europe, where, as the United States representatives have tried to make us believe, this cannot be done for military reasons, since it would disturb the balance of military power.

1 Ante, pp. 206–207.
2 Ante, pp. 207–208.
90. We have already drawn attention to the fact that the United States delegation has not advanced a single serious argument against prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons—nothing but the unsubstantiated and unsupported assertion that a declaration prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would not be observed. That is no argument.

91. Positive solutions of the questions which we have raised would be of enormous significance in normalizing the international situation and would certainly make a most effective contribution to progress in the solution of questions of disarmament. As we all realize, however, the liquidation of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories, as also the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, require the consent of the United States. Without the agreement of the United States, without its consent, these measures cannot be implemented. We must therefore take into account the fact that the adoption of these draft resolutions in the face of United States opposition would doom them to remaining a dead letter.

92. Naturally, no great good would come of the mere adoption of such resolutions if the United States refused to implement them. In such circumstances, these resolutions would promote neither the withdrawal of foreign troops, nor the liquidation of military bases in foreign territories, nor the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

93. The situation which has arisen in the Commission has caused concern to many of its members. The USSR delegation has carefully studied the statement made by Mr. Pazhwak, the representative of Afghanistan, at our 96th meeting. Mr. Pazhwak expressed the hope that efforts will be made to enable us to adhere to an almost traditional way of approaching the disarmament question in the United Nations.

Mr. Pazhwak went on to say that in deciding what should be done and what measures should be taken in the future, unanimity in decisions . . . is of particular importance. After examining the different draft resolutions, my delegation—he stated—does not think that this will be impossible at this stage.¹

This optimistic remark by the representative of Afghanistan shows that there is still a ray of hope.

94. We, for our part, hope that the United States will reconsider its position and, in a show of good will, agree to the measures we have proposed, which are in the interests of all nations. Then we shall be able to conclude the present session of the Disarmament Commission having achieved important positive results. If the United States fails to respond to this appeal, then the members of the Commission must continue to look for a solution which would be supported by all

¹ Disarmament Commission Official Records; 96th Meeting, p. 4.
and not one which would harden the differences of opinion. The idea advanced at today’s meeting by Mr. Lekic, the Yugoslav representative, could be helpful in this regard.

95. I should like to say a few words on this point. Mr. Lekic has just made a number of observations on the possibility of drafting a resolution which would receive general support. The USSR delegation shares Mr. Lekic’s view that we should secure a unanimous recommendation concerning future disarmament negotiations. The Yugoslav delegation’s proposal that the co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document DC/222 should make further efforts to improve it is consistent with this approach. If we are indeed seeking to ensure the adoption of a resolution which might meet with general support, we must first eliminate from this draft all those provisions which give rise to serious differences of opinion. And, if we can manage it, we should add other provisions which can command unanimous support.¹

Disarmament Commission “Omnibus” Resolution, June 15, 1965 ²

The Disarmament Commission,
Having considered the report dated 17 September 1964 of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee submitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the nineteenth session of the General Assembly,
Reaffirming the ultimate and continuing responsibility of the United Nations for disarmament,
Noting with regret that during 1964 despite the efforts made by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee no specific agreements were reached either on general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension, or halting and reversing the arms race,
Deploiring that, notwithstanding General Assembly resolutions 1762 (XVII) ³ and 1910 (XVIII), nuclear weapon tests have taken place

¹ No revisions were made in the resolution (infra).
² DC/225, June 15, 1965. The resolution as a whole was adopted by a vote of 83 to 1, with 18 abstentions. Albania voted against the resolution, and the following countries abstained: Algeria, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian S.S.R., Cambodia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Guinea, Hungary, Mali, Mongolia, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian S.S.R., USSR, Yemen. The separate votes on preambular par. 4 and operative par. 2 (c) are noted below.
⁴ Ibid., 1963, p. 627.
and also that no agreement has been reached on the "discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time", which is one of the stated objectives of the partial test-ban treaty, ¹

*Considering* that the memorandum of 14 September 1964 submitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee by the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, represents a fair and sound basis for the conduct of negotiations towards removing the remaining differences for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty,

*Convinced* that failure to conclude a universal treaty or agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons leads to the most serious consequences,

*Deeply conscious* of the urgency of making early progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and of reaching agreement on measures which would facilitate the attainment of that goal,

*Bearing in mind* the proposals made at its present session for measures to reduce international tension and halt and reverse the arms race, and also at the meeting of the Organization of African Unity and the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries,

*Recalling* the principle that a substantial part of the resources that will be released through disarmament should be devoted to the economic and social development of the developing countries, thus contributing to the evolution of a safer and better world,

1. *Reaffirms* the call of the General Assembly upon all States to become parties to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and to abide by its spirit and provisions;

¹ This par. was approved by a vote of 71 to 12, with 18 abstentions:

*For*: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, U.A.R., U.K., United Republic of Tanzania, U.S., Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

*Against*: Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Cambodia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Pakistan, Poland, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.

*Abstaining*: Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Burundi, France, Guinea, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Mali, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen.
2. Recommends that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should:

(a) reconvene as early as possible to resume as a matter of urgency its efforts to develop a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and to consider all proposals for measures to relax international tension and halt and reverse the arms race, including those submitted to the Disarmament Commission at its present session;

(b) consider as a matter of priority the question of extending the scope of the partial test-ban treaty to cover underground tests;

(c) also accord special priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons giving close attention to the various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures; ¹

(d) keep in mind the principle of converting to programmes of economic and social development of the developing countries a substantial part of the resources gradually released by the reduction of military expenditures;

Requests the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to report to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly during its twentieth session on the progress made in respect of the above recommendations.

Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the Disarmament Commission, June 15, 1965 ²

I should like to explain the United States vote on the draft resolution contained in document DC/222.³ I should also like to echo the commendation which the representative of Her Majesty's Government gave to the twenty-nine sponsors of this resolution.

While we need to comment on certain portions of this resolution, we believe that the hard work, patience and moderation which led to the successful passage of this resolution is something of which each of the sponsors should be extremely proud.

Of course, we support the first, second and third preambular paragraphs. With respect to the third, we believe that most of us would

¹ Par. 2 (c) was approved by a vote of 71 to 1, with 25 abstentions.
² Disarmament Commission Official Records; 102nd Meeting (Rev. 2, prov.), pp. 41-46.
³ I.e., the resolution of June 15, 1965 (supra).
agree that last year's discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, despite the fact that nonspecific agreements were reached, did contribute to the process of elaboration and clarification of the various proposals before that Committee. Several of these were first presented in 1964. When the Committee recessed in September of last year, all participants had a clearer understanding of both the opportunities and the difficulties in the way of further progress.

We share the view expressed in the fourth preambular paragraph, deploring the fact that no agreement has been reached on discontinuing all nuclear weapons tests. Without such agreement, the United States finds it necessary, in the interests of its security, to continue underground tests as permitted by the Partial Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union is also conducting such tests.

We also agree with the fourth preambular paragraph in so far as it deplors the nuclear weapons tests conducted in the atmosphere by a Power which has not adhered to the Partial Test Ban Treaty. We strongly endorse the reiteration in the first operative paragraph of the General Assembly's call on all States to become parties to the Partial Treaty and to abide by its provisions, and we wholeheartedly agree with the priority accorded, in operative paragraph 2(b), to the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests.

The United States is prepared to engage in negotiations on this most important problem without any preconditions, and certainly without demanding that the other side a priori accept our position.

We agree that the memorandum of 14 September 1964, submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee by the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, can assist us materially in getting the negotiations under way.

We fully endorse the sixth preambular paragraph, which expresses the conviction that absence of a treaty or agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is fraught with the most serious consequences. The United States has stated on a number of occasions, as a matter of basic policy, that it would not take any action inconsistent with the spirit and purposes of General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI). My Government sincerely welcomes the stated intention of the Government of India not to acquire nuclear weapons, and we express the hope that other Governments will follow India's example in making this wise and statesmanlike decision.

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1 Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291-293.
2 Ibid., 1964, pp. 428-429.
3 Ibid., 1961, p. 694.
4 Ibid., 1964, p. 376.
We therefore welcome the stress given in operative paragraph 2(c), to the question of a non-proliferation agreement, although we would have preferred to see mention made in this paragraph of General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI).

Paragraph 2(c) draws attention to "suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures". It is our understanding that this does not in any way imply that such measures form part of a single programme, nor do we understand that it suggests delay in the implementation of those measures which are possible now until we can implement others as well. That surely would be a backward step which could only increase the danger of nuclear proliferation. We had hoped, however, that given the amount of effort that we understand went into the drafting of this paragraph, all members of this Commission would be able to support it, notwithstanding the improvements which some of us thought desirable from our own respective standpoints.

My delegation believes that no one here can disagree with the seventh and eighth preambular paragraphs. We hope that all of us are in agreement on the urgency of making early progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and reaching agreement on measures which would facilitate the attainment of that goal. We trust that the omission of reference to the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, on which any such progress or agreement must be based, does not imply that some of the sponsors of the resolution are seeking to detract from the validity of those principles.

Likewise, we are confident that reference to the proposals made at the present session of the Disarmament Commission, at the Organization of African Unity and at the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, does not imply exclusion from further discussion in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Commission of other proposals which have been, or may yet be, made.

The resolution refers both in preambular paragraph 9 and operative paragraph 2(d) to the utilization of resources expected to be released as progress is made in disarmament. Over the years, the United States has given ample proof of its desire to assist developing nations in their efforts at economic and social development. Our massive assistance programmes were initiated in times of huge defence expenditures and have continued regardless of changes in the levels of our defence budget. Naturally we look forward to the day when savings resulting from the implementation of disarmament agreements can be utilized to enhance the welfare of peoples everywhere.

The resolution, however, attempts to establish a principle regarding the utilization of savings from defence expenditures. In

1 Ibid., 1961, pp. 439-442.
preambular paragraph 9, reference is made to resources released through disarmament. This appears to be in keeping with the view embodied in many resolutions of the General Assembly and the specialized agencies that part of the savings resulting from the achievement of general and complete disarmament should be utilized for the economic and social development of developing countries. But we would have preferred a formulation closer to the spirit of those resolutions, and we therefore would have abstained had it been voted on separately.

In operative paragraph 2(d) reference is made only to "resources gradually released by the reduction of military expenditures". We would also have abstained on this paragraph because we do not believe assistance to developing countries should be related to fluctuations in national military expenditures rather than to progress made in achieving disarmament agreements.

We assume that the sponsors did not intend to depart from the guidelines set by the recommendations adopted by the General Assembly and the specialized agencies in this regard. I am sure that they did not wish to imply that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should in any way infringe upon the activities of those United Nations bodies properly concerned with the utilization of economic resources. Surely we all agree that the task of the ENDC is to seek agreement on measures of arms limitation and reduction, the implementation of which could release funds for use to enhance the welfare of all peoples.

We welcome the recommendations in operative paragraph 2(a) that the Eighteen-Nation Committee "reconvene as early as possible", since as I have previously stated the United States attaches the greatest importance to the continuation of disarmament negotiations without interruption and believes that the Eighteen-Nation Committee offers the best hope of achieving progress in actual negotiation. For our part, we are prepared to resume the Geneva discussions at the earliest possible date.

*Foreign Affairs* Article by ACDA Director Foster: New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament, July 1965

Three and a half years ago when John J. McCloy gave an accounting in this journal of where we stood in efforts for disarmament the pic-
ture which he presented was understandably somber. In the previous September there had been some progress in the negotiation of a "Joint Statement of Agreed Principles," an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on certain criteria that would have to be met if progress was to be made on substantive measures. But that one hopeful development had to be balanced against a record of discouragingly little progress in any other negotiations, growing difficulties over Berlin culminating in the erection of the Wall, and the termination, also in September 1961, of the understanding on the nuclear-test cessation.

Since then significant changes have occurred in Soviet-American relations and these have substantially affected the prospects for arms control and disarmament. The resolution of the Cuban missile crisis appears to have been a major turning point in this difficult search. Since that time, the Soviet Union appears to have appreciated to a degree not apparent before that its long-term interests might best be served by increased emphasis on internal development and a relaxation of the cold war. In the field of arms control and disarmament, this has been reflected in increased interest in small steps which, though they lack some of the popular appeal of general and complete disarmament, are more realistically attainable in the foreseeable future. There has been some real progress: creation of the so-called hot line between Washington and Moscow; the United Nations resolution banning the placement in space of weapons of mass destruction; some evidence of progress through mutual example in the simultaneous announcement of cutbacks in planned production of fissionable materials and in apparent reductions in military budgets; and, most notable, the treaty prohibiting nuclear tests except underground.

But as we consider the future, another change in attitudes is likely to be at least as significant as that in Soviet-American relations—namely, a greatly increased sense of urgency in dealing with the problem of proliferation of nuclear-weapons capabilities among nations. This is not, of course, a new interest—United States concern about control of the atom was reflected as early as in the Baruch plan of 1946—but it is a matter that has commanded far more attention lately. Three major factors probably have led to this reassessment of priorities: an increasingly realistic appreciation that agreement on general and complete disarmament will not be achieved early enough.
so that we can count on it to control the atom; a realization in the
last few years that very significant quantities of plutonium were likely
to be produced in nuclear power plants in many countries in the very
near future; and, very importantly, and perhaps somewhat belatedly,
an appreciation of the full implications of the Chinese nuclear tests.

It is clear that the Chinese tests have had an unsettling effect
throughout much of Asia and particularly in India. The reaction
there, and to a lesser degree in Japan, seems to have developed out of
fear of the nascent military threat implicit in the tests and out of
concern that Indian (and Japanese) prestige and influence would
suffer. The degree of India's concern is due in part, of course, to
the impression that she had been dealt a severe blow as a consequence
of the Chinese attack in late 1962. Undoubtedly the test explosions
have further enhanced Peking's prestige, particularly because they
were the first nuclear tests by a non-white nation. However, the
magnitude of the accomplishment has been exaggerated. The success
of China's program is in large measure due to the very substantial
assistance provided by the Soviet Union during the 1950s. In other
respects the Indian program for exploitation of the atom is almost
certainly more impressive than that of China; and so is Japan's.
But despite the fact that the progress being made by these countries
in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, and in other areas,
dwarfs in many respects the progress of the Chinese, in the contest for
leadership among the Asian powers China's status has been enhanced
as a result of its nuclear tests.

Fortunately, political leaders in India and Japan as well as in other
countries such as Israel or Sweden appear to be convinced that it
would be a mistake to engage in a nuclear-weapons program, despite
pressure to do so. Whether they will be able to hold out against
pressure to "go nuclear" will depend substantially on whether or not
measures to prevent nuclear proliferation are negotiated in the
months ahead, and whether or not there is other evidence that the
great powers are really prepared to deal with the problem.

We continue, of course, to be concerned about the Soviet threat; and
the Soviets are no doubt worried about what they must regard as a
threat to them implicit in our large stock of nuclear weapons and inter-
continental delivery systems. Both of us must regard it as important
that we continue to seek ways to reduce the probability of a Soviet-
American conflict, and also to mitigate the consequences should it
occur. But whereas a few years ago these were our major concerns, it
is no exaggeration to argue that we should now be at least as concerned
about the problem of nuclear proliferation; and that in evaluating the
implications of agreements which might affect the Soviet-American
confrontation, we must give at least as much weight to the effect of
such agreements on the proliferation problem as to their effect on the
Soviet-American balance per se. In considering this reassessment of priorities, it is important to recognize that despite occasional backward steps (of which the present controversy over Viet Nam is a worrisome example) the trend in Soviet-American relations since the death of Stalin and particularly since the Cuban crisis has been in a generally favorable direction, whereas the trend in nuclear proliferation seems decidedly unfavorable. And there is a difference in the time scale for action in the two areas. For a decade and a half the Soviet Union has had nuclear weapons; hence the prospect of a delay of, say, a year or two in reducing the capabilities of the Soviet Union and the United States to damage each other may not seem terribly critical in itself. But a delay of a year or so, or perhaps even of months, in the implementation of measures bearing on the nuclear-proliferation problem could well mean the difference between failure and success.

III

Clearly implicit here is the view that further nuclear proliferation would have very undesirable effects on our security interests. Though this is the view of the U.S. Government, there is a contrary argument that might be made to the effect that in some selected instances the further spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities may actually be desirable. For example, it might be argued that, in the absence of any realistic possibility of inducing Communist China to give up her nuclear aspirations, it would be desirable that other selected countries in Asia have nuclear weapons to offset potential Chinese threats. In support of this, one might speculate that, if other Asian nations were to acquire nuclear capabilities, our burdens in defending the Asian periphery against China would be lessened, and that in the event of war there it might be less necessary for the United States to involve itself. This line might be further supported with the argument that the spread of nuclear weapons probably cannot be prevented anyway, or that if it can be, the political and other costs to the United States would be unacceptably great.

The case for "limited" proliferation seems to me to be based on two premises that are both implausible and inconsistent with the attitude we have taken with respect to Europe: first, that proliferation could be controlled as selectively as we might like; and second, that a country with the world-wide commitments of the United States could avoid involving itself in any conflict on a scale where nuclear capabilities would be significant.

That the first assumption is dubious becomes apparent when one considers what are almost certainly the most immediate cases in point, India and Israel. With the present unsettled state of affairs between Pakistan and India, it seems extremely improbable that either would be prepared to forego indefinitely the acquisition of a
nuclear-weapons capability once it had become apparent that the other had decided to obtain one. The same is true of Israel and the United Arab Republic—a point which it is to be hoped will be fully appreciated by all elements in these countries whenever the question of acquiring nuclear weapons arises. Having five nations with nuclear weapons is bad enough, and if the number is to be limited, the prospects are almost certainly better at five than at six or any higher number.

In the short run we might successfully avoid involvement in, say, an Asian conflict in which nuclear weapons had a role. But any such success would, I believe, be short-lived and bought at a price that would prove unacceptable in the long run. That price would be a renunciation of our commitments and involvement all over the world—an attempt to return to isolationism at a time when the world is shrinking so rapidly as to make any such policy at best wishful thinking and quite possibly a blueprint for disaster. Despite the gloomy prospects implicit in such a policy, it is highly likely that, in a world of many nuclear powers, considerable pressure would develop—and perhaps it would prove sufficient—to force the United States in just such an isolationist direction. This possibility must surely be considered a major argument for our attempting to stop the spread of nuclear capabilities. There are two others.

Very advanced nuclear capabilities are demanding in their requirements for scientific and technical manpower, as well as in material resources, but they are relatively cheap, and getting cheaper, in terms of the destructive power involved. With improvements in technology, the initial cost of nuclear weapons has been greatly reduced. Moreover, in many cases much of the development cost might be written off as chargeable to peaceful nuclear-power programs. Depending somewhat on whether or not defensive weapons are deployed, delivery systems may also become less costly. In our own case, the Minuteman systems are much less costly to build and particularly to operate and maintain than the B-52 and the first-generation I.C.B.M. All of which means that strategic nuclear-weapons systems could prove to be the great equalizer in international affairs that guns were in the case of individual combat. When we consider the costs to us of trying to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, we should not lose sight of the fact that widespread nuclear proliferation would mean a substantial erosion in the margin of power which our great wealth and industrial base have long given us relative to much of the rest of the world.

Finally, there is the simple fact that the probability of nuclear weapons being used will almost certainly increase as the number of fingers on the trigger increases. Moreover, the increase in probability will be more than proportional to the increase in numbers, particularly as, in a world of many nuclear powers, there may well be some who,
unlike the United States and the Soviet Union, have relatively little to lose if nuclear weapons are used. Of course, the use of a few nuclear weapons by any power—even of one such weapon and even with an intent to localize the effect—might lead to their use in large numbers by other powers, with cataclysmic consequences.

In the light of such consequences of proliferation, we would seem justified in accepting rather large costs in an effort to prevent it. Of course, even our best efforts may not lead to success. Considering the lateness of the hour, the incentives that presently exist for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the prospect that they may be acquired with increasing ease, one is forced to conclude that a really major effort involving many kinds of actions will be required if there is to be any reasonable prospect of stemming the tide. These must include actions both to make the acquisition of nuclear capabilities more difficult and to reduce the incentives to acquire them.

IV

One of the central facts with which we have to deal is the very great overlap between the technology for the peaceful exploitation of the atom and that needed for weapons programs. In the enthusiasm of the late 1940s and early 1950s we and others were perhaps oversold on the potentialities of the peaceful atom and in particular on its application to the production of power. In consequence, a number of countries have been enabled to acquire nuclear reactors and technically trained people perhaps somewhat more rapidly than economics and other considerations could have realistically justified, and certainly under controls that are in some instances less rigid than would be desirable. Actually, the American record with respect to controls has been very good. The Baruch proposals, our Atomic Energy Act of 1946, our efforts, particularly in recent years, to get applied to nuclear programs throughout the world safeguards of the type established by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and our willingness to go further than any of the other nuclear powers have done in opening our reactors to international inspection—all are evidence of this. One reason we must be as concerned as we are today about the possibility of certain nations deciding to “go nuclear” is partly because the U.S. example has not, unfortunately, been emulated as widely as we might have hoped.

We are of course now at the point where the use of nuclear power is becoming economically advantageous in many situations. As a result, we must expect that within the next few years a number of countries will each be producing enough by-product plutonium to sustain a modest weapons program. Hence it is increasingly important that there be a more widespread, and stricter, application of controls to the traffic in fissionable materials and to the technology
which may be useful either for peaceful or military purposes. Particularly important are international agreements on uniform standards to prevent critical materials and equipment from being offered for sale with inadequate controls, in order to realize economic or political advantage.

The most noteworthy direct efforts to make acquisition of nuclear weapons difficult has been, of course, the negotiation of a test-ban treaty which achieved at least partial success in 1963. Those efforts have been documented in great detail elsewhere. Nevertheless, in view of the importance of the present test ban as an anti-proliferation measure and its value as a precedent, it may be useful to comment further here, particularly regarding the possible risks and advantages of the treaty.

Those supporting the treaty offered varying appraisals of the relative importance of the objectives: the prevention of fallout; the directly inhibiting effect on those governments which might otherwise wish to test but which, having been forced to accede to the treaty by public and world opinion, would be reluctant to violate its terms; and the indication to the world of a willingness on the part of the great powers at least to begin to bring the nuclear-arms race under control. The last point is perhaps as important as the second in inhibiting other nations from going ahead with nuclear-weapons programs.

The extent to which these objectives could be realized by the treaty was carefully weighed within the U.S. Government. The military advantages to us were balanced against such risks and disadvantages as there may be in the treaty, including, of course, consideration of the military advantages that the Soviet Union might realize. The possibility of faithful compliance with its terms had to be borne in mind no less than the possibility of evasion, with some small risk that this would go undetected.

As might have been expected, this balancing of risks and advantages proved to be exceedingly difficult, particularly since the effects on nuclear proliferation, on international relations generally, and on further progress in arms control and disarmament were not susceptible to technical analysis as were other elements in the problem. The latter included fallout, the probability of successful evasion, the implications for weapons technology and the consequent impact of the agreement on the Soviet-American military balance under various assumptions regarding compliance.

These latter elements of the problem were the ones to which greatest attention was paid during the debate, in part simply because they were susceptible to orderly technical analysis. But the emphasis accorded them was at least as much due to the fact that by coincidence they were also matters of great general concern at that time. There was seemingly a relative lack of concern about nuclear proliferation
and the less predictable relationship of the test ban to international affairs in general.

As we consider other significant arms-control or disarmament agreements—or even unilateral policy decisions—we shall have to go through a comparably difficult analysis, forcing us to weigh risks that are relatively easy to define against nebulous advantages (and vice versa), and the probability (generally not the certainty) of long-range gains against short-term costs.

The question of balancing long-term against short-term consequences is worth stressing. We sometimes have great difficulty in getting the right perspective on the time factors involved, often seeming far too concerned about the immediate effects of suggested measures on international affairs. Similarly, but at the other extreme, we seem at times to be unduly concerned about long-term risks which, while admittedly real, may be quite over-rated because we discount the probability that conditions will change; what might be risky today may not seem so in a different international environment some years hence. For example, we may do ourselves a disservice if we discount the possibility of changes in the international environment and give too much weight to such factors as whether or not the Soviet-American strategic balance might be upset 15 years hence by weapons systems that the Soviet Union might develop as a result of successful evasion of some agreement under consideration today. There are, of course, some changes of which we can be reasonably certain. We can be sure that technology will spread and advance at least as rapidly in the next decade as in the last, and we can probably state with confidence that there will be substantial political realignments. We can be reasonably sure that nuclear capabilities will spread unless we take action very promptly to stem the tide. Weighing the relative risks is extremely difficult; but we do not minimize the over-all risk to us if we take too myopic a view of particular risks rather than facing up to the totality of dangers in all their complexity.

We are of course continuing our efforts to extend the nuclear test-ban treaty to prohibit testing underground as well as in the other environments. In this we face a somewhat different problem in balancing risks and advantages than when we contemplated a comprehensive test-ban agreement in 1962 or the partial test ban which we achieved in 1963. There is certainly less to be gained from extending the test ban to include underground explosions than there was when we had no agreement at all. Fallout is no longer an issue and much of the debate about military implications of weapons tests is not relevant; nor is there the possibility, for example, of very high-yield tests and of weapons-effects tests at high altitudes. Further, much of the possible inhibiting effect which a full test-ban treaty would have on nuclear proliferation has been achieved with the partial test ban. Nevertheless, extension of the treaty does seem desirable as an anti-
proliferation measure. Though none of the nuclear powers began its weapons program with underground tests, it would not be difficult for others to do so while still complying with the treaty; and it does seem desirable to foreclose that possibility. Those elements, particularly in democratic states, which oppose their countries' acquiring nuclear weapons would be in a much stronger position if a treaty existed prohibiting all such tests than if the option of legitimate underground testing still remained open. Finally, extension of the treaty would be evidence of willingness on the part of the great powers to take further steps to control the arms race.

Fortunately, technical improvements may make it easier to discriminate between earthquakes and possible underground explosions. While all present scientific evidence indicates that a number of inspections continue to be necessary to provide verification, the United States continues to be willing to explore what would constitute an adequate verification system in the light of these recent and prospective developments in our capabilities for detection. If such exploration indicates that verification requirements can be satisfied by a different number and type of inspections from those previously discussed, the United States will certainly take those facts into account. Whether we can thus close the gap between the American and Soviet positions remains to be seen in further discussions.

There are other multilateral measures that may be of direct value as components of a program to stop the spread of nuclear capabilities; for example, agreements on nuclear-free zones and agreements restricting the sale or transfer of strategic aircraft and missiles, the means for delivering nuclear weapons.

But probably most important would be negotiation of a non-proliferation agreement—that is, an agreement on the part of the nuclear powers not to transfer control of nuclear weapons to other countries and an agreement on the part of the non-nuclear powers not to acquire them. Such a measure seems so overwhelmingly in the interest of both the Soviet Union and the United States that it may seem surprising that they have been unable to reach agreement; but such is so far the case.

The principal problem appears to be the Soviet refusal to go along with an agreement permitting the NATO Multilateral or Atlantic Nuclear Force (M.L.F. and A.N.F., respectively) and the Western refusal to renounce these projects. In part, of course, they sprang from the belief that any incipient desire for independent control of nuclear weapons by Europeans, particularly in Germany, could be most safely dealt with by giving them a role in a collective enterprise. But the Soviet Union has refused to concede that the M.L.F./A.N.F. idea may have value as an antiproliferation measure, and indeed has argued the contrary. It insists that the implementation of such a concept would lead to control of nuclear capabilities by the German
Federal Republic. To a certain extent this argument may reflect genuine concern, but it also seems clear that the Soviets have been using the M.L.F./A.N.F., and its connection with a non-proliferation agreement, for propaganda value and for whatever divisive effect it may have in NATO.

Whether we will be able to overcome this impasse will depend in large measure on the Soviet assessment of the relative advantages of actually getting a proliferation agreement or of continuing to use the M.L.F./A.N.F. issue for its political effect. In making this balance, the Soviets could assume that they could include in any non-proliferation agreement that might be negotiated a withdrawal clause similar to that found in the limited test-ban treaty.

For the near and medium term, the incentives for others to acquire nuclear weapons can undoubtedly be reduced, if not controlled, by adequate security assurances or guarantees—a point of particular importance since the Chinese nuclear test. The United States has already gone some distance toward assuring non-nuclear powers of our support in the event of nuclear attack, but we may have to go further if our assurances are to be considered truly adequate. This could mean either an increase or a decrease in the risks of our involvement in actual conflict, depending on the appraisal of others as to our seriousness. In some cases, too, would-be nuclear powers may ask us to provide assurances against conventional attack. There is also the question of obtaining assurances from a number of nuclear powers—an arrangement that the Indians, for example, would feel was more adequate than a U.S. (or Soviet) assurance alone.

Whether any assurances or guarantees will be considered credible depends of course to a substantial degree on the relative strength of the powers involved. One of our difficulties in NATO—and in France in particular—has been the growing feeling, perhaps most clearly articulated by the Prime Minister of France, that our commitment to NATO was of diminishing credibility as Soviet capacity to damage the United States increased. With the passage of time a similar erosion of confidence might occur with respect to any assurances designed to counter the Chinese threat. But we probably do have a number of years during which Chinese nuclear capabilities will be so small relative to those of the United States (or of the U.S.S.R.) that American (and/or Soviet) assurances would be entirely credible, assuming of course at least some degree of American (and/or Soviet) concern about the viability of the country in question.

In the longer term we must deal with the problems of the growing Chinese nuclear capability and of the role of nuclear weapons in world affairs. In a sense, all of the measures discussed above ought to be

1 See Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 492-497.
considered primarily as a means of buying time in which to get at these more fundamental problems.

Unless the non-nuclear powers are persuaded that their interests are best served by not acquiring nuclear weapons they will ultimately acquire them. A necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, condition for so persuading them is to offer clear evidence that the Soviet Union and the United States are prepared to exercise leadership in the world on a basis of strength other than that inherent in their nuclear capabilities. It is for this reason that agreements to freeze production and to start reductions in fissionable materials and in nuclear delivery systems are so important.

Such measures appear to be in our mutual interest, for they would effect substantial savings and would reduce both the probability of war and the damage incurred if war were not avoided. One of the most hopeful signs is the growing appreciation of the fact that the kind of nuclear superiority which the United States enjoyed in the 1950s and to which the Soviets perhaps at one time aspired is a thing of the past. Secretary Robert McNamara made this especially clear in recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. He pointed out that only a portion of our strategic capabilities would be required to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union, but that the remainder, if used against Soviet offensive capabilities, would be effective only under the improbable contingency that the Soviets withheld the bulk of their force after the beginning of a thermonuclear exchange. Soviet forces in excess of what would be required to assure a high level of destruction against U.S. industry and population could be used even less effectively to reduce damage to the U.S.S.R. With these points in mind, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that we both would be well advised to stop the strategic nuclear-arms race and destroy some strategic capabilities on a reciprocal basis. It does not make good sense to continue the race in the hope that each may be able to use some of its capability to destroy the other's offensive strength, a task that is daily becoming more difficult.

In stressing that such measures as reductions in Soviet and American nuclear capabilities are important if we are to succeed in dealing with nuclear proliferation, it should be made clear that it is not a question of our setting a good example, a factor of regrettably little influence in international affairs, but rather the fact that we would, by negotiating such measures, be giving evidence of our determination to reverse the arms race and move toward a world order in which the role of nuclear weapons would be diminished. Lacking at least reason-

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1 Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 4016, To Authorize Appropriations During Fiscal Year 1966 for Procurement of Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessels, and Research Development, Test, and Evaluation, for the Armed Forces, and for Other Purposes Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Eighty-ninth Congress, First Session, pt. 7, pp. 174, 191, 204.
able prospects of movement in this direction, it is hard to see how, in the long run, we can hope to put any limits on the membership in the nuclear club.

Actually, the perceived utility of nuclear weapons has diminished to some extent in recent years. This is particularly true in the United States. Ten years ago there was little interest in the Department of Defense in any weapons other than nuclear. The situation is drastically changed today. In part this has occurred because we have come to understand the limited role which nuclear weapons can play. Somewhat belatedly there is also a broader appreciation of the fact that in many combat situations nuclear weapons would not be useful—even apart from the hazards of escalation and retaliation. With each succeeding day that their use is avoided, it is possible that the likelihood of future use will further diminish. Thus, in this one respect time seems in our favor. The world would do well to bear this in mind as crises develop which might lead to their use.

If through short-term measures we can succeed in buying time, there is no place where the need to use it effectively is more urgent than in our confrontation with Communist China. Yet we can now make progress in arms control and disarmament without Chinese participation. A comprehensive test-ban treaty to which China did not accede would be better than none at all and should be acceptable to us. With or without a treaty, our testing program would not be contingent on what China might do in the next few years. Similarly, a non-proliferation agreement to which China did not accede would be better than none at all. And we could negotiate a freeze—even a substantial reduction—of strategic delivery systems without fear that we were compromising whatever nuclear capability was needed to deal with China.

But a few years hence, none of these things will be true unless we make progress in bringing China into arms-control and disarmament agreements. Nor will U.S. or Soviet or even joint guarantees for China's neighbors be very credible. Clearly, progress in dealing with China is as essential a long-term requirement for success in a non-proliferation effort as Soviet-American cooperation is in the near term.

Over the next decade or two we cannot expect major changes in China's objectives, which are in so many respects antithetical to ours. But with changes in Chinese leadership, which are inevitable soon, and with economic growth, which will give China more to lose through war, it is at least possible that the Chinese may conclude—as apparently have the Soviets—that they have much to gain by accepting the concept of peaceful coexistence. While this hope is based on the optimistic belief that time may bring restraint and wisdom to the Chinese leaders, the alternative is bleak indeed.
Having dealt at some length with means and possibilities of stopping nuclear proliferation, and with the consequences should we fail, we need to appraise the costs of effective agreement. It would be irresponsible to suggest that they will not be substantial.

Some interference with the exploitation of the atom for peaceful purposes seems inevitable. A number of the newer nations, and the Soviet Union particularly, may view international controls as unacceptable infringements on sovereignty, though the voting record of the U.S.S.R. on the extension of controls by the International Atomic Energy Agency is encouraging in this respect. U.S. insistence on controls, and unwillingness to permit export of certain equipment and technology that might have application in weapons programs may be, as it has been, cause for some international friction. Fortunately, if nations and industry are willing to accept adequate controls, most socially and economically desirable applications of the atom, such as nuclear power and the use of radioisotopes for medical purposes, can go ahead with little actual impediment. This may not, however, be true in the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, of which the economics are, incidentally, still in doubt. Some such explosions are, of course, already precluded by the present test-ban treaty, but we may have to accept the cost of forgoing any such explosions. Alternatively, we might agree on provisions which permit them; none that has been so far considered, however, is without awkward features. For example, some people fear that information on weapons design might be compromised; others assert that the great powers might proceed with weapons development under the guise of peaceful explosions; and still others feel that it might be necessary to employ relatively primitive devices that would not be altogether suitable.

A heavier cost could be the erosion of alliances resulting from the high degree of U.S.-Soviet cooperation which will be required if a non-proliferation program is to be successful. Within NATO, there could be concern that the détente would lead to a weakening of our commitment to Western Europe. The problem will be particularly acute in Germany where there will be the added concern that the amelioration of the East-West confrontation could lead to an increased acceptance of the status quo in Central Europe. On the other side, it is to be expected that any move toward détente will lead to an exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet split and of the contest for influence within the Communist world. Finally, there is the simple fact that the strains inherent in any alliance are likely to become more prominent, and the cohesive forces less so, if the threat which was a major part of its rationale is perceived to be less worrisome. We should not
be surprised if a move toward East-West détente leads to some changes in both the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. What would be troublesome is if there were a weakening of NATO which proceeded at a more rapid rate than the actual diminution in the threat justified.

But proliferation of independent nuclear capabilities could also be expected to have a highly divisive effect on NATO, the Warsaw Pact and other alliances, for the reasons outlined earlier. In France’s relationship to NATO, we have already seen the divisive effects both of relaxation of tensions and of nuclear proliferation. While there are other factors involved, we can surmise that the independent attitude of France toward NATO is in large part a consequence of her perceiving the Soviet threat as less worrisome than a decade ago and in part a consequence of her acquisition of some nuclear capability. We must accept the fact, then, that either nuclear proliferation or its successful prevention is likely to weaken alliances.

I would suggest that, as regards NATO, the best we might hope, and strive for, would be movement toward a substantial measure of East-West détente—hopefully sufficient to enable us to hold the line on nuclear proliferation—with perhaps progress on European union offsetting at least in part the fact that the cement holding NATO together will weaken with any further erosion of the fear of attack.

Balancing the risks and costs of letting nuclear proliferation run its course against those that may be incurred in a determined effort to stop it is clearly one of the most difficult problems in international relations today—and far more complex than the one we faced in deciding upon the limited test-ban treaty. It is particularly trying because success in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons may elude us despite the best efforts and intentions of many nations.

But stopping nuclear proliferation is a problem from which the world cannot shrink, and one which requires very prompt action if there is to be any reasonable hope of success. May others conclude—as we have—that, all things considered, a most serious and urgent effort is justified!
Q. Are armaments control measures and steps towards disarmament in Europe likely in your opinion to contribute to reunification, or, on the contrary, to cement the status quo?

A. You are posing here a particularly important question since mankind is profoundly interested in the maintenance of peace. The German population is no exception in this respect. Our situation is, however, special in that the forcible division of Germany endangers the peace. We are not pursuing a policy of all or nothing. Much would be gained if we were able to take a step towards arms control and disarmament simultaneously with a suitable step towards German reunification. Security in Europe and the reunification of Germany would—at the end of such a synchronized process—lead to a new, happier era of peace in all of Europe. Were extensive measures of armaments control and disarmament undertaken without regard to the German question, east and west would be saddled with a false security. For real peace requires, as President Johnson solemnly stated in a message on May 5, 1965 to the Federal German President, "that Germany be reunified on the basis of self-determination." It is our task from the very start to make absolutely clear to the world the connection of armaments control and disarmament in Europe with Germany’s reunification.

Q. An international agreement has been under discussion for some time according to which the dissemination of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear powers or the acceptance of weapons from such powers would be prohibited. Under what conditions could the Federal Republic accede to such an agreement?

A. I would like first to interject one remark. The German Federal Republic in 1954 renounced the development of atomic, biological, and chemical weapons on her territory. This renunciation can legitimately be considered an initial step toward non-proliferation of atomic weapons. It is therefore hardly an unreasonable request for us to call upon other countries, which so lightly propose to us complete nuclear renunciation, first to get to this state themselves by proclaiming a similar renunciation to the one we undertook in 1954.

Many countries, in particular traditionally neutral countries, today ask how a non-nuclear-armed country can be defended against atomic extortion and aggression. As a member of the Atlantic Alliance,
Germany would like to see this terribly vital question settled within the Alliance and by the Alliance. Germany is geographically too exposed and too gravely threatened by the medium range ballistics missiles of the Soviet Union directed on western Europe to disinterest itself in this question.

I think that some form of nuclear organization must be found which satisfies the security requirements of the non-atomicly-armed NATO members in the face of the more than 700 Soviet medium range ballistic missiles aimed upon Europe. If this can be achieved by the establishment of a multilateral atomic deterrent force or something similar, Germany could abstain from the acquisition of her own nuclear weapons vis-a-vis her allies [... könnte Deutschland seinen Alliierten gegenüber auf den Erwerb eigener Atomwaffen verzichten].

Should the Soviet Union be prepared, as we wish and hope, to agree to substantial and irrevocable steps toward the reunification of Germany in freedom then the security question would be different. The accession of an all-Germany to a world-wide agreement would be possible.

Q. In Duesseldorf on March 30, 1965 you urged that the Federal Republic must be “included in a plausible way in the organization of the Western nuclear deterrence potential.” Is that, in your view, possible without the establishment of a joint nuclear force? Do you consider McNamara’s proposal as a useful basis?

A. The suggestion of the American Defense Minister McNamara is not to replace a multilateral Atlantic deterrent force. McNamara merely suggested the creation of a study committee on a higher level which should examine the different, very difficult problems of the nuclear structure of the Atlantic Alliance. He has stated that he was making his proposal as an addition to the MLF project.

My urging at the Duesseldorf [CDU] Party Conference that the Federal Republic must be included in a plausible way in the organization of the Western nuclear deterrent potential is at once flexible and precise. On the one hand we are not committed to a doctrine of how an atomic order within the Alliance must be worked out in detail, but we have on the other hand very clear concepts regarding the minimum technical and organizational requirements that must be fulfilled to be able, as far also as Germany is concerned, “in a credible way” to deter a possible opponent. Even one who is only slightly familiar with the complex issues of nuclear strategy knows that, in the end, the cohesion and future of the relationship between Europe and America depends upon the satisfactory solution of the atomic problem within the Alliance.
Message From President Johnson to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, July 27, 1965

I send my greetings to the members of the disarmament committee as they renew the most important task on earth. The bible describes "death" as the fourth horseman of the Apocalypse, saying: "And hell followed after him." Our genius has changed this from a parable to a possibility. For the wasting power of our weapons is beyond the reach of imagination and language alike. Hell alone can describe the consequences that await their full use.

Therefore, if we love man, nothing is more important than the effort to diminish danger—halt the spread of nuclear power—and bring the weapons of war under increasing control.

Many proposals to this end now sit on your conference table. My delegation, and others, will make new proposals as the conference continues.

I have instructed the American delegation to pursue the following objectives with all the determination and wisdom they can command:

First, to seek agreements that will limit the perilous spread of nuclear weapons, and make it possible for all countries to refrain without fear from entering the nuclear arms race.

Second, to work toward the effective limitation of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems, so that we can diminish present danger as well as prevent expanding peril.

Third, to work for a truly comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Many nations will, and should, share in these discussions.

No difference among any of us, on any other issue, can be allowed to bar agreement in this critical area. This is not in any single nation's interest, nor is it in the interest of the multitude of nations and peoples whose future is so tied to the good sense of those at this conference table.

My nation is ready. If others are equally prepared, then we can move, with growing confidence, toward the light.

Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, July 27, 1965

The business of this Conference is peace. Frankly, Mr. Chairman, I deplore the fact that you, as representative of the Soviet Union,

2 ENDC/PV. 218, pp. 9–15.
today took advantage of your privilege as Chairman to make an attack upon the foreign policy of my country in your statement in the public part of this meeting.1

This Committee is dedicated to the proposition that a lasting peace cannot be based on military strength and that the security of nations in the nuclear age requires co-operative international efforts to control and limit the production and spread of nuclear weapons. But as long as the world is plagued by aggression, as long as force is used or threatened against the territorial integrity and political independence of States in South-East Asia and elsewhere, countries must look to their own defences.

The many forms which this force has taken were described in President Johnson's letter of 18 January 1964 to Mr. Khrushchev.2 Force can be direct or indirect. It can be in the form of aggression, subversion or the clandestine supply of arms. In his message of 21 January 1964 to this Committee, the President pointed out the importance of making progress on means of prohibiting the threat or use of force for the purposes of aggression.3 This task, as events during the past year have emphasized, remains a fundamental endeavour for nations which wish to secure and preserve international peace and advance the pace of progress in disarmament. If we are to live in peace with each other we must do more than proclaim peace as our goal. We must develop the customs and rules for living together in peace.

We meet at a time of increased tension. As we sit here, troops, military supplies and subversive agents directed and provided by outside Powers are engaged in an effort to seize control of a country whose only offence is its determination to live in peace and freedom. My country and others have made repeated efforts to secure the peaceful settlement of all disputes as regards the Viet-Nam conflict. President Johnson proposed to negotiate towards a peaceful settlement without any pre-conditions, and we have attempted repeatedly to bring the other side to the negotiating table, but each overture has been rejected. Meanwhile, men and arms continue to infiltrate across the frontier and the other side continues its slaughter of thousands of civilians and in blowing-up of schools, hotels, hospitals and buses.

For all those reasons, we are determined to meet our commitments to collective defence of Viet-Nam. To do so, we will do what is necessary and only what is necessary. Let there be no mistake about the firmness of our purpose to resist this aggression until the aggressors agree to seek a solution around the conference table. But we are equally firm in our determination to make every reasonable effort to reach agreement on arms control and reduction measures. The dan-

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1 Ibid., pp. 7–8.
2 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 5–7.
3 Ibid., pp. 7–9.
gers posed by the arms race, and particularly the threatened proliferation of nuclear weapons, will not wait until the guns are stilled. We dare not lose contact with the work of peace while we strive to end the destruction of war.

The steadily-mounting nuclear stockpiles in the United States and the Soviet Union do not ensure the security of any nation, and the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries threatens the security of all. The United States therefore attaches supreme importance to the opportunity afforded here to undertake serious negotiations leading to the earliest possible accords on measures to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to begin to turn back the arms race. We have come here with this sole purpose in mind, and the world will be satisfied with nothing less than a supreme effort by every Government represented here to reach such accords.

It is in this spirit that President Johnson has addressed the following message to the Conference.1

The United States recommends that this session engage in a renewed and intensive effort to achieve a mutually-acceptable treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Such an agreement could follow and be consistent with the Irish resolution adopted unanimously by the 1961 General Assembly.2 A non-proliferation agreement could be the beginning of increased security for all States. Indeed, while turning our attention to the problem of proliferation we must also consider the security of nations that forgo nuclear weapons. The President of the United States indicated his awareness of this problem when in October 1964 he stated:

The nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that, if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it.3

The question of the security of non-nuclear States is an important one. It should be considered fully as part of the response of the international community to the danger of nuclear proliferation. As a further part of the international community's response to the dangers of proliferation we should make greater use of the International Atomic Energy Agency—the agency we have set up to facilitate the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes—and at the same time provide safeguards against diversion of such programmes to military purposes. For that reason we urge that, as a part of the non-proliferation effort, all governments undertake to accept IAEA or similar international safeguards in all their peaceful nuclear activities. This is an undertaking which should be assumed both by those countries

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1 Supra.
2 Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 694.
3 Ibid., 1964, p. 468.
which have developed nuclear weapons and by those which have kept their nuclear activities confined to the peaceful field.

Under its statute the International Atomic Energy Agency has two aims: to assist in promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and to ensure that this assistance does not further any military purpose. The work of the IAEA has long been an area of close co-operation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Their efforts together with those of other member countries have produced a comprehensive system of international safeguards designed to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials produced in peaceful reactors to military purposes. This system was extended last year to large reactors. The first such reactor to which the expanded safeguards were applied was in the United States—at Rowe, Massachusetts—and the United Kingdom has recently invited the IAEA to apply these safeguards to one of its large power reactors. These actions were consistent with President Johnson's proposal to this Committee last year that the nuclear Powers accept in an increasing number of their own peaceful nuclear activities the same inspection as recommended for other States.

The United States believes that the Agency's continuing efforts to ensure that peaceful atomic activities are not diverted to military purposes are of paramount importance in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. We suggest that all those interested in pursuing that objective give full support to the Agency's effective work. As I said earlier, we urge that all governments undertake to accept IAEA or similar international safeguards in all their peaceful nuclear activities.

President Johnson's second point is that we should work towards the effective limitation of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems. To this end we should seek agreement to halt and reduce mounting nuclear stockpiles. One way in which this could be done is by a cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapons use and a transfer to non-weapons use of agreed sizable quantities of such material. In making this proposal we have always taken into consideration the fact that we have been stockpiling nuclear materials longer than the Soviet Union. Therefore we are willing to transfer more from our weapons stocks to peaceful uses than we should ask of the Soviet Union. For example, we have proposed that the United States transfer 60,000 kilogrammes of weapons-grade U-235 to non-weapons use if

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1 Ibid., 1961, pp. 21-33.
2 Ibid., 1964, pp. 66-68.
3 Ibid., pp. 214-221.
4 U.K. Treaty Series No. 70, Cmnd. 2753.
5 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 8.
the Soviet Union would transfer 40,000 kilogrammes. These amounts, if completely fissioned in explosions, would be roughly equivalent to a one-ton TNT bomb for every three people on earth.

Another proposal within President Johnson's second point is the freeze on strategic nuclear bombers and missiles. Last year he suggested to the Committee the exploration of a verified freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. He stated:

... while we continue our efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, we must first endeavour to halt further increases in strategic armaments now.

After describing the freeze, he pointed out that agreement to it—

... will open the path to reductions in all types of forces from present levels.

The United States continues to believe that a way must be found to halt the production race in the most dangerous of all weapons systems. We urge the Soviet Union to join with us in exploring whatever possibilities may exist for agreement. Our position is flexible; we are willing to consider constructive suggestions from any source.

President Johnson's third point in his message today to the Committee is that we should work for a truly comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The United States strongly supported the language of the resolution adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission on 15 June 1965 reaffirming the call to all States to become party to the limited test-ban treaty and recommending that the Committee consider as a matter of priority the question of extending the scope of that treaty to cover underground tests. I believe that the partial test-ban treaty has been a major first step in controlling the nuclear arms race, and I only regret that all countries have not yet joined in and that it was necessary for the Disarmament Commission to reaffirm that call to some States. However, in the light of the increased urgency of the need to move forward in further steps to control the nuclear arms race and also to deal forcefully with the problem of nuclear proliferation, I believe it is a matter of priority for this Committee to address itself to the extension of that treaty to underground tests.

For many years the United States has been conducting a vigorous research programme, working co-operatively wherever possible with other nations of the world, to assist in solving the problems of adequately verifying compliance with the treaty which would cover

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1 Ibid., 1968, pp. 332-333.
2 Ante, pp. 260-262.
3 Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 291-293.
underground tests. That programme has achieved major progress. Scientific developments permit the detection of seismic events of much smaller size throughout the world and greatly improve the ability to discriminate between natural earthquakes and underground explosions. We have now reached the stage, in the development of very large seismic arrays and other new types of instrumentation, of being confident that they can provide still further improvements.

However, in spite of these improvements all present scientific evidence indicates that there will still be a significant number of natural events occurring each year which have signals which cannot be distinguished from those to be expected from an explosion. These events, therefore, cannot be identified by distant seismic devices. Thus all evidence at present indicates that a number of inspections continues to be necessary to provide verification of a comprehensive test ban. Unless reassurance could be provided by those inspections, such events would give rise to undesirable suspicions that they might have resulted from clandestine explosions in violation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The United States, however, continues to be willing to explore what would constitute an adequate verification system in the light of recent and prospective developments in our capabilities. If such exploration indicates that verification requirements can be satisfied by a different number and type of inspections than were previously proposed, we will take those facts into account. We invite other countries to submit any data or research results which may be helpful to this end. We are determined to make progress towards the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests at the earliest possible date.

This Conference in its previous deliberations produced a consensus on the ends to be achieved by each of the measures I have described today. I believe all of us agree that all nuclear weapon tests should be stopped. All agree that nuclear weapons should not be acquired by any non-nuclear nation by transfer or manufacture. All agree that stocks of nuclear weapon materials and carriers should not rise higher, and indeed should be reduced.

Let us build upon this consensus concerning the objectives to be sought. Let us agree upon concrete measures to accomplish these objectives. Let us proceed in a businesslike fashion to discuss these and similar measures which are realistically capable of agreement in the near future.
Message From Prime Minister Wilson to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, July 28, 1965

Great problems and great opportunities face this meeting of the Disarmament Committee, which now reassembles for the first time since last September. The delegations now assembled at Geneva may justly feel proud that their expert knowledge and competence to handle complicated disarmament issues was recognized by the great majority of States in the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

There is now, as the Disarmament Commission recognized, a wide measure of understanding of the dangers that would threaten us if the number of States possessing nuclear weapons is allowed to grow unchecked. The British Government believe therefore that the negotiation of a non-dissemination treaty is the most urgent problem facing us in the disarmament field. The British Government's approach is not based on any attempt to preserve exclusive nuclear privileges for a small group, but proceeds from recognition of the serious consequences that would follow if nuclear weapons were to pass into the hands of more and more States, with all the dangers that this would bring of nuclear war by mistake, miscalculation, accident or madness. It is the British Government's hope that a draft treaty will be put forward at an early meeting of this Committee, and that it will be given the most urgent and sympathetic consideration.

It remains as important as ever to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty. I hope also to see progress made towards the adoption of President Johnson's imaginative and far-seeing proposal for a freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The British Government believe it urgent to consider the limitation and, if possible, the reduction of existing nuclear armouries, without destroying or upsetting the present overall military balance.

The Disarmament Committee can make a priceless contribution to creating a better and safer world. I wish it all success, and pledge the full support of the British delegation in all your deliberations.

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1 ENDC/PV.219, pp. 6-7. Lord Chalfont read the message to the ENDC at its meeting of July 29.
2 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 8.
Statement by the Italian Foreign Minister (Fanfani) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee [Extract]: Nondissemination of Nuclear Weapons, July 29, 1965

The other problem the extreme urgency of which has been stressed by the United Nations is that of an agreement on non-dissemination. Those discussions have also indicated the difficulties which unfortunately await us, difficulties which, while they are not slight, ought not to be insurmountable. One of those obstacles is already well known. It is the Soviet objection to a possible Western nuclear collaboration which, while aimed at improving European security, would limit—as has been said many times—the danger of a future dissemination of nuclear weapons. Another kind of difficulty appeared for the first time during the recent discussions at the United Nations: some non-nuclear countries hesitate to renounce these weapons for ever without having certain safeguards against nuclear attack, and without some progress in the nuclear disarmament of the nuclear countries themselves.

Obviously, all these objections pose problems which cannot be ignored. In this regard, several solutions were considered during the discussions of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, such as: the establishment by the nuclear countries of the safeguards requested by the others; commitment by the nuclear countries to a certain programme of nuclear disarmament; the fixing of conditions or the inclusion of appropriate withdrawal clauses. These ideas deserve thorough consideration by the Eighteen-Nation Committee with a view to finding a formula acceptable to all as soon as possible. This Committee has just heard on this subject a very important statement by the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, who has put forward some very constructive ideas on these problems. I am sure that the Committee appreciates the valuable contribution which the United Kingdom delegation has just made to our task.

It has been rightly said that this Committee has the task of preparing a draft treaty during this session in order to submit it in due course to the United Nations Disarmament Commission for discussion and advice at its next session. But if it should not be possible to prepare within a reasonable time such a draft comprising obligations for both the nuclear and the non-nuclear countries, the Italian delegation would reserve the right to appeal to the non-nuclear countries to take an initiative which, without prejudice to their own points of

1 ENDC/PV.219, pp. 18-19.
view, would fix a certain period for a moratorium on the possible dissemination of nuclear weapons. It is quite conceivable that the non-nuclear countries might agree to renounce unilaterally equipping themselves with nuclear weapons for a specific length of time, it being understood of course that if their aforementioned demands were not complied with during that time-limit, they would resume their freedom of action.

In that way a respite would be given to the anxiety about nuclear dissemination and, moreover, a factor of pressure and persuasion would be created which could be brought to bear on the nuclear countries in order to spur them to conclude a general agreement, thus speeding up the process of nuclear disarmament. Thus a message of peace and good will could be given to the world, a message to which no one—it is to be hoped—could remain insensible. But we still hope that a comprehensive agreement including limitations for all nuclear and non-nuclear countries will be possible, and the Italian delegation will do its best to contribute to achieving it.

In concluding my statement on the future work of the Committee, I cannot fail to mention the appeal made by the United Nations Commission concerning the use of the savings that could be made as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures. This argument was put forward a few moments ago by the representative of the United Kingdom.

The Disarmament Commission, acting on the initiative of the Italian delegation and other delegations, adopted in substance and re-affirmed the idea underlying the message from Bombay in December 1964 in favour of humane and brotherly mutual assistance between all the peoples of the world. The Commission re-affirmed in particular the principle that a substantial part of the resources made available through disarmament should be devoted to the economic and social progress of the developing countries, and has recommended that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should in its work consider the allocation of these resources to programmes of co-operation and mutual assistance. I think that this Committee will have no difficulty in complying with this recommendation without departing from its essential task, that of negotiating and concluding agreements on disarmament. The constant awareness which we should always retain of the economic implications of disarmament measures decided upon here with one accord, and the possible use of those savings for the benefit of the developing countries, will be further incentives to encourage and stimulate us in our work.

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1 Ante, p. 262.
ECOSOC Resolution 1087 (XXXIX), July 30, 1965

The Economic and Social Council,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General on "Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament—Conversion to Peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament",  

1. Takes note of the Secretary-General's report;
2. Recommends that Member Governments, particularly of those countries significantly involved, continue and attempt to develop national studies regarding economic and social aspects of disarmament and transmit them to the Secretary-General as early as feasible;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to inform the Council of the national studies he receives concerning the economic and social consequences of disarmament, of the international studies carried out as part of a co-ordinated programme of the Inter-Agency Committee, and of such studies undertaken by non-governmental organizations as he deems appropriate;
4. Decides that the Council will consider this item at its summer session in 1966.

Report to the President by the Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament [Summary], July 30, 1965

The White House today [September 5] released a report to the President on the economic impact of defense and disarmament prepared by Gardner Ackley, chairman of a special committee on that subject, and Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.

The report to the President concludes that neither recent shifts in defense procurement nor those likely in the future now pose major problems for the national economy. It expresses confidence in the ability of existing Federal programs to sustain economic growth and to minimize any adverse effects of changes in defense procurement. It does recognize, however, that such shifts can create serious local economic problems which require special action—not only by local communities but also by the States and the Federal Government.

2 Ante, pp. 165-168.
3 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 27, 1965, pp. 515-518. The summary was released to the press by the White House on Sept. 5. The report, transmitted to the President on July 30, was published by the U.S. Government Printing Office as Report of the Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament, July 1965.
The report commends the programs of the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission to soften the adverse impact on communities of necessary changes in defense activities and to assist affected communities to find new productive uses for former Defense or AEC installations.

The report summarizes a year and a half of work by a committee established by President Johnson in December 1963 to review the problems then being experienced as a result of changing defense procurement. It was largely completed before the recently requested increase in defense appropriations and thus does not deal specifically with the impact of prospective changes in defense programs associated with Viet-Nam.

The Committee recommended that its work be continued and that efforts should go forward to learn more about the economic impact of defense changes and about ways to minimize their adverse effects.

In commenting on the report, Mr. Ackley noted that there have been marked shifts in the distribution of Department of Defense obligations among major programs in recent years. As the programmed buildup of strategic retaliatory force weapons approaches completion, procurement of strategic retaliatory items such as intercontinental ballistic missiles and Polaris submarines has fallen from nearly 18 percent of defense obligations in fiscal year 1962 to around 10 percent in fiscal year 1965. Firms and communities involved in production of these weapons have been and will be adversely affected by the reduced expenditures, although increased space programs have filled the gap for some of them. Moreover, there have been offsetting increases in expenditures on some other types of military hardware. In many affected communities, the rapid growth of nondefense business has cushioned any serious adverse impact.

Preliminary budget results show that military and military assistance expenditures in fiscal year 1965 were $3.86 billion below those of fiscal year 1964. While the extent of increased military expenses connected with Viet-Nam is still uncertain, defense expenditures in fiscal year 1966 would have to grow very considerably to equal those of fiscal year 1964 as a percentage of our rapidly expanding gross national product. Since GNP is currently increasing by about $40 billion a year, national resources available for nondefense purposes will continue to grow.

The principal recommendations of the Committee were that a permanently constituted Federal Task Force on Community Assistance be organized; that this task force and the existing agencies in the Department of Defense and AEC should quickly bring to communities affected by defense changes the whole array of Federal

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1 Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 649-651.
programs that can ease the economic impact and speed readjustment; that policies and procedures for advance notice of impending changes in defense programs be reviewed; that prime contractors be required to supply information on the impact of contract changes on subcontractors; that the Federal-State employment service be strengthened; that interarea recruiting services be rapidly expanded; that Federal agencies take more initiative in mortgage forbearance in emergencies created by changes in defense programs; that continued study be given to relocation assistance; that community needs continue to be given highest priority in disposal of surplus Federal property; that Federal agencies should review policies governing use of Government-owned, contractor-leased facilities.

The Committee noted that the Federal Government has a clear responsibility in connection with the economic impact of defense shifts. But the important responsibilities of defense firms, of private groups, and of State and local governments are increasingly being recognized and assumed. The Committee recommended that communities heavily dependent on defense activity should begin as soon as possible to minimize their vulnerability through economic diversification and that Federal procurement regulations should allow expenses of defense contractor's participation in community diversification planning.

In recent years the trend has been for defense-related purchases by the Federal Government (including for this purpose space and atomic energy) to be a shrinking percentage of GNP. From 10.1 percent of GNP in 1958, these purchases declined to something under 9 percent in 1964. Defense-related purchases in 1958 were $44.8 billion and $55.4 billion in 1964; but the rapid growth of GNP has meant that the impact of defense was relatively smaller in 1964 than in 1958.

The Committee noted that continued economic growth will in the future require larger adjustments in Government fiscal and monetary policies than would be required by any likely changes in defense budgets.

The fiscal policy adjustments necessary because of economic growth between now and 1970 were compared with the additional adjustments that would be made necessary by a hypothetical 25 percent reduction in defense expenditures.

1. Even with unchanging expenditures for defense, major fiscal action—involving adjustments on the order of $25-30 billion beyond "built-in" requirements—will be required to maintain full employment.

2. To the extent that defense outlays are reduced, the need for fiscal action will be increased. A hypothetical reduction of 25 percent in defense outlays would raise the required fiscal adjustment to the $38-43 billion range.¹

The Committee concluded that the magnitude of the shifts in defense procurement now occurring does not of itself justify any major intensification or redirection of existing Federal programs. It noted that special offices in the Department of Defense and Atomic Energy Commission, as well as the President's Task Force on Community Assistance, have been available to coordinate the services of Federal agencies for communities with serious local problems.

The report emphasizes the advantages to the Nation in transferring any research and development capability released from defense activity to urgent national problems such as improved transportation, control of pollution, better housing, and better health. It urged that greater efforts be directed to utilize the "systems" capabilities of defense industry on such problems and commended the recent efforts of the State of California to stimulate the interest of the aerospace firms in such problems.

The Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament, established by President Johnson on December 21, 1963, was given the assignment of providing information on the impact of changing defense programs, of describing existing policies and programs, of suggesting and analyzing additional program needs, and of stimulating Government and private thinking about productive uses of resources released from defense employment. The departments and agencies represented on the Committee and its membership in July 1965 are listed below:

Department of Defense: Joseph A. Califano, Jr., the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
Department of Commerce: Andrew F. Brimmer, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs
Department of Labor: Stanley H. Ruttenberg, Manpower Administrator
Atomic Energy Commission: James T. Ramey, Commissioner
National Aeronautics and Space Administration: Walter Sohier, General Counsel
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Archibald S. Alexander, Assistant Director
Office of Emergency Planning: G. Lyle Belsley, Director, Economic Affairs Office
Bureau of the Budget: William M. Capron, Assistant Director
Office of Science and Technology: Patrick Conley
General Services Administration: Howard Greenberg, Commissioner, Utilization and Disposal Service
Small Business Administration: Padraic P. Frucht, Assistant Administrator for Economics
Council of Economic Advisers: Gardner Ackley, Chairman
Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been much talk about priorities in the Geneva Disarmament Conference—priority for a non-proliferation treaty, priority for a NATO structure for nuclear defense, and so forth. Is there any American priority?

A. We have no priority on this matter because we attach very great importance to a nonproliferation agreement which will prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in the hands of—into the hands of additional national nuclear forces.

We also give high priority to the arrangements within NATO for an effective control of the nuclear power of the NATO alliance, and we have already taken a great many steps in that direction. The question of priority comes because there have been those, particularly the Soviet Union, who have claimed that what we were talking about in NATO had something to do with proliferation.

Well, we know this is not the case. They have objected to the MLF, to the ANF; they have objected to the special committee which Secretary McNamara has suggested. I have no doubt they object to NATO.

So we do not see this as a problem of priorities, because we are convinced that the arrangements within NATO, as they will be evolved, have nothing whatever to do with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and we do not see any basis on which others can claim that this very important matter of nonproliferation ought to be suspended in order to achieve some other object, which is not relevant to the question of proliferation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you look upon, Mr. Secretary, some suggestions which have been advanced recently that those nations who have an atomic capability—do not produce atomic weapons—may make sort of a unilateral declaration not to do so?

A. Nations which do have or do not have?

Q. Which have a capability but are not going to produce atomic weapons.

A. Well, I think it would be a very constructive development if all those nations who do not now have nuclear weapons would themselves undertake to renounce the development of nuclear weapons.

I noticed an important suggestion to that effect made at Geneva the other day by Mr. Fanfani. I think this is an important contribution.

We do believe that the proliferation problem has two elements: One is that those who have them agree not to spread them; and those who do not have them agree not to receive them. And if both sides will work on it from that point of view, I should think we might get somewhere, but time is running short, and we need to move fairly promptly on both aspects of this problem.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Tsarapkin) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, August 3, 1965

In casting an eye over the events of the past year which form a sombre background to the present session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, one cannot help recalling the message which the President of the United States, Mr. Johnson, addressed to our Committee on 21 January 1964. In that message he stated the following:

Today your search begins anew in a climate of hope. Last year's genuine gains have given us new momentum. . . . Let us pray that the tide has turned—that further and more far-reaching agreements lie ahead—and that future generations will mark 1964 as the year the world turned for all time away from the horrors of war and constructed new bulwarks of peace.

Excellent words, there can be no gainsaying.

But 1964 has passed and what have we seen? What is the situation in which the world finds itself? Yes, indeed, a new tide has turned, but not a tide of peaceful achievements; not a tide—to borrow the language of the aforesaid message—of "far-reaching agreements", not a tide whereon "the world turned for all time away from the horrors of war and constructed new bulwarks of peace". No, a dark tide of imperialistic aggression has swept upon the world, a tide of crude violence and of intervention in the internal affairs of other States. Everywhere we see violations of the territorial integrity and political independence of States. The United States has carried out an armed attack on Viet Nam. For the last six months it has been waging against the freedom-loving people of Viet Nam the most real kind of war—a ruthless, destructive and barbarous war. The United States

1 Ante, pp. 288–289.
2 ENDC/PV.220, pp. 5–19.
3 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 7.
has trampled the integrity, sovereignty and political independence of the Dominican Republic under the heavy boot of its invading army. The world has been eye-witness of the grossest violation by the United States of the United Nations Charter and the standards of international law.

Certain speakers who have made statements here have called upon us to talk only about disarmament and not to touch upon those events which have left their mark on international life and are poisoning international relations. But those sombre aspects of present-day international relations cannot be disregarded if we wish to consider and resolve the problems before us in the proper light. Of course, it is no pleasure for certain representatives to listen to bitter words concerning the policy of the Western Powers; but those representatives must realize that what is said here about the policy of the Western Powers, and above all about the policy of the United States, is a direct consequence of the aggressive, imperialistic policy of the Western Powers, of the policy of the United States. But for that policy there would be no war in Viet Nam, there would be no facts of aggression and intervention in the internal affairs of other States; and then, of course, there would be no grounds for any talk on that subject here.

The fact that disarmament negotiations, both in earlier days and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, have proved fruitless up to the present time fully and clearly confirms that the cause of disarmament is closely connected with and directly dependent on the policy pursued by States. During all this time the Western Powers, while paying lip-service to disarmament, have in fact taken a position which virtually blocks any progress whatsoever in the negotiations on the most important problem of our times. The position of the Western Powers in regard to disarmament, as is evident from their proposals and from the statements of their representatives in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, derives from their political concept, which is that in their opinion the armed forces of States will remain the decisive factor in international affairs right up to the last stage of disarmament. Of course, with such a concept no disarmament by the Western Powers is to be expected.

The whole gist of the matter is that the policy of the Western States members of NATO in the field of disarmament is far from being positive. That is the root of the evil, that is the cause of the failure of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee throughout the whole time of its existence. Anyone who has eyes to see will easily notice the existence of a close connexion between the lack of progress in disarmament negotiations and the aggressive imperialistic policy of the United States. If disarmament negotiations are to be successful, fundamental changes must be made in the policy of the United States. But the
policy of the United States, as we see, has become even more challenging, provocative and aggressive, and this is shown by the United States war in Viet Nam and the further increase of tension in other parts of South-East Asia, the violation of the sovereignty of the Dominican Republic and its occupation by United States troops, the armed interference of the United States in the affairs of the Congo, and other facts.

At our first meeting we pointed out that in the present troubled times, when there is a further worsening of the international situation, increased efforts would have to be made in every direction in order to prevent any imperialistic aggression and take the path of a policy of peaceful co-existence, and to reach agreement on real disarmament measures, and on measures aimed at halting the arms race and relaxing tension in international relations. Only such a policy can ensure the success of disarmament negotiations and bring lasting peace to mankind.

As for the Soviet Union, following the general line of its policy it has no intention of reducing its efforts in the struggle for peace, disarmament, the relaxation of international tension and the halting of the arms race. The more complex the situation in the world and the greater the danger of war, the more important it becomes to fight for disarmament and the relaxation of international tension, the greater are the efforts required in order to solve these urgent problems, the closer must be the union of all the anti-imperialist forces of the world. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin, said in his speech in Riga on 17 July 1965:

The Soviet Union is carrying out a consistent foreign policy; it is giving a setback to international aggressors and defending the principle of the peaceful co-existence of States with different social systems. The struggle for the implementation of the principle of peaceful co-existence is a many-sided and varied one. It includes activities in favour of disarmament and the relaxation of international tension, the firm defence of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of States large and small, and decisive actions against interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

In line with this, the Soviet Government deemed it necessary at the beginning of the year to take the initiative in the matter of convening the United Nations Disarmament Commission in order to discuss the disquieting state of the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and to lay down practical ways which would make it possible to achieve progress in solving the urgent problems of disarmament and the reduction of international tension.

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1 See ENDC/PV. 218, p. 8.
3 See ante, pp. 30–31.
As we know, for nearly two months the United Nations Disarmament Commission carefully studied the situation which had come about in the disarmament negotiations and discussed present-day problems of disarmament. It noted the extremely unsatisfactory state of the disarmament negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and many representatives of States who spoke in the Commission expressed legitimate concern and disappointment in this respect. Many representatives in the Commission pointed out that the cause of that intolerable state of affairs in the Committee was the unwillingness of the United States and its allies in the NATO aggressive military bloc to carry out disarmament, and their attempts, in their statements in the Committee on the subject of disarmament, to divert attention from the United States policy aimed at intensifying the arms race and preparing for the unleashing of aggressive wars. And that is fully confirmed by the facts.

Thus, whereas during the three years of its existence the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, owing to the fact that the United States and its NATO allies have blocked all possibilities of progress, has produced only piles of records containing speeches on disarmament, during the same time the United States itself, according to the testimony of such a competent person as the Defence Secretary of the United States, Robert McNamara, has produced something more substantial. At a Press conference on 14 July this year Mr. McNamara said that during the past four years the United States had increased by 200 per cent the numbers and weight in megatons of the nuclear weapons at the disposal of its strategic forces which were in a state of permanent readiness; it had increased its tactical nuclear strength in Western Europe by 67 per cent; it had increased the strength of its armed divisions ready for military action by 45 per cent; it had increased by 100 per cent the number of squadrons of tactical fighters; it had increased by 100 per cent the means of transporting troops by air; it had increased by 100 per cent the construction of new types of warships for the purpose of modernizing the Navy—and so on.1

The extensive exchange of views which took place in the United Nations Disarmament Commission showed very clearly once again that the peoples and the overwhelming majority of States throughout the world are vitally interested in Disarmament. The discussion in the Commission clearly confirmed the fact that the majority of countries are filled with determination to strive with all their might to put an end to the deadly arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament for the good of all mankind. In the course

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1 See Secretary McNamara's memorandum of July 12, 1965, for the President, "Department of Defense Cost Reduction Program—Third Annual Progress Report," p. 2. This was released to the press at the Secretary's July 14 news conference.
of the discussion on disarmament questions in the Commission, important priority measures aimed at curbing the arms race, reducing international tension and promoting general and complete disarmament were also made known and received wide support from many countries.

From the tribune of the United Nations Disarmament Commission a clear and convincing appeal was made by many States—socialist States as well as developing States of Africa, Asia and Latin America—for the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries. In addition to the delegations of the socialist countries, the delegations of the United Arab Republic, Ghana, Mali, Syria, Iraq, Uganda and other States spoke in the Commission in favour of carrying out this measure which, in the light of present-day events, is important and urgent. Besides the socialist countries, many non-aligned States, including Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mexico, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, Syria, Chile and Sweden, spoke in favour of the implementation of another important measure—the immediate prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

Growing concern was perceptible in the statements of many representatives in the Commission in connexion with the increasing danger of the dissemination of nuclear weapons, including the danger of the dissemination of nuclear weapons through a NATO multilateral nuclear force, to which attention was drawn both by socialist delegations and by the representatives of Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda, Nepal, Pakistan, Mexico, the United Arab Republic and others. An important result of the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission was its adoption of a resolution proposing the convening of a world disarmament conference, which would have an important role to play in co-ordinating the efforts of all States interested in achieving disarmament and eliminating the threat of war.¹

What, then, are the tasks before our Committee in the light of the present situation? It is essential to find as quickly as possible a solution to the fundamental questions of disarmament and thereby eliminate decisively, once and for all, the material and technical potentialities of States for unleashing war and aggressive actions. It is necessary to set about solving the key questions of the problems of general and complete disarmament; unless those questions are solved, it is impossible to secure the elimination of the threat of a devastating thermo-nuclear war which hangs over mankind. In this connexion we assume that success in this matter can be ensured only by bold and radical measures having for their main objective the speediest possible abolition of the types of armaments most dangerous to mankind, and in the first place, of course, nuclear armaments.

¹ Ante, p. 253.
It is a noteworthy fact, however, that in setting forth the position of his Government in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 27 July the United States representative, Mr. Foster, said nothing at all about the problem of general and complete disarmament, as though this problem were outside the purview of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Nor was anything said in support of the idea of general and complete disarmament in President Johnson's message which was read out by Mr. Foster in the Committee. One may well ask: what does this mean? Perhaps the United States Government no longer considers itself bound by the well-known resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly which proclaim that the main task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is to prepare an agreement on general and complete disarmament.2

The Soviet delegation is prepared, as in the past, to exert every effort required in order to achieve progress in the negotiations on the main disarmament questions. But in order that the negotiations may be successful it is of course necessary that good will and a desire for agreement should be manifested by all parties. If, however, the representatives of the United States and other Western Powers continue as before to oppose real disarmament measures, the implementation of which would ensure a real and not an imaginary reduction of the threat of a nuclear missile war, and if, instead of such measures, they insist on such an approach to disarmament as would in fact be conducive to maintaining the threat of a nuclear missile war, it is a foregone conclusion that the negotiations on general and complete disarmament in the Eighteen-Nation Committee will not get out of the impasse and that the hopes of the peoples for delivery from the burden of armaments and the threat of nuclear war will be disappointed.

In the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, an important place should be given to the consideration and adoption of measures aimed at curbing the arms race and reducing international tension. What have the representatives of the Western Powers brought with them to the Eighteen-Nation Committee in this respect? Have they put forward any measures whatsoever which would take into account the present international situation and would be designed to eliminate the new increased threat of a nuclear missile war? The statements made by the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster,3 and the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont,4 at previous meet-

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1 Ante, pp. 281-286.
3 Ante, pp. 281-286.
4 ENDC/PV. 219, pp. 5-15.
ings show that the Western Powers have sent their delegations to the Eighteen-Nation Committee with old proposals made several years ago which in substance do not provide for disarmament; they ignore all the urgent questions which are perturbing the peoples of the world today.

Once again we are asked to conduct negotiations on such an agreement concerning the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as would leave West Germany the possibility of gaining access to nuclear weapons through a multilateral, Atlantic or other NATO nuclear force; which is absolutely unacceptable to the Soviet Union, as the Western Powers are well aware. Once again we hear the old proposal for a cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. That proposal leaves out the question of eliminating the existing stockpiles of nuclear materials, although it is precisely those materials that constitute a threat. It is obvious that the implementation of that measure proposed by the United States would in no way reduce the existing danger of nuclear war. An attempt is again being made to bring to the attention of the participants in the negotiations the long-since discredited and rejected proposal for a freeze on strategic nuclear bombers and missiles. And the proposal for the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, which are being carried out intensively by the United States alone, is linked with a demand for international inspection, thus making agreement on this question also impossible.

Once again the United Kingdom delegation has proposed setting up technical and working groups within the Committee, although it is well-known that the establishment of such groups would merely lead to all disarmament questions being bogged down for many years within these technical groups.

What stands out most clearly in the proposals of the United States and the United Kingdom is the fact that all the measures proposed carefully bypass everything that is causing the present international tension. As everyone can see, the measures proposed by them in no way affect the ability of the United States to continue its aggression in Viet Nam and in other parts of the world. But the Committee cannot shut itself off with a blank wall from the outside world, from the events that are taking place in the world around us. Yet, to judge by the Western proposals, in the positions of the United States and the United Kingdom there shows through quite clearly an attempt at the very beginning of the present session to turn the work of the Committee back into the old rut, which could lead the present negotiations also into an impasse.

The Soviet delegation considers that, in selecting the measures with which the Eighteen-Nation Committee should deal, we should start out from the requirements of the present-day situation, take it into account, and proceed with the tasks of eliminating the threat of a
 thermo-nuclear war and reducing international tension. The Eighteen Nation Committee should make energetic and persistent efforts to achieve immediately the implementation of such measures, which would really be an important contribution to the strengthening of peace, the lessening of international tension and the reinforcement of international security.

At the present time, when the development of events is becoming ever more alarming, it is important to remove from the international situation everything in the way of inflammable material that can easily be set on fire, everything that is driving the world towards the brink of a thermo-nuclear war. If we want the Eighteen-Nation Committee to cope successfully with the tasks assigned to it, it is essential that the guns should be silent, that United States aggression in Viet Nam and in other parts of the world should cease, and that the United States and the other Western Powers should show their willingness to settle urgent questions by peaceful means and in a peaceful atmosphere.

A broad programme of measures the implementation of which would undoubtedly help to stop the dangerous development of events in the world and ensure a radical change for the better in the whole international situation is set forth in the Soviet Government's memorandum of 7 December 1964,1 which is well known to all the representatives here. In the conditions of today the interests of safeguarding peace and international security insistently bring to the fore the questions of the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries, prevention of the further dissemination of nuclear weapons in any form, whether directly or indirectly, and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. These measures are dictated by life itself, and it is precisely on them that the attention of the Committee should be concentrated and possibilities for a satisfactory agreement found.

Let each representative ask himself: in what areas of the world are the flames of war burning today? Where are hotbeds of military conflict flaring up which threaten peace and the sovereignty of peoples? The question is easily answered: the rumble of guns and explosion of bombs are reverberated from those areas of the world in which there are foreign military bases and foreign troops. Mr. Foster and Lord Chalfont—that is, the representatives of the countries which have a dense network of military bases on the territories of other countries—preferred not to deal with that question in their statements; but that is precisely where one of the reasons for the existing international tension is to be found today. It is precisely from there that the danger to the peace of the whole world stems.

How can we expect any improvement in the international situation or any progress in disarmament negotiations when the United States

1 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 509–517.
is perpetrating aggression against the people of Viet Nam, subjecting the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam to barbarous bombings and waging an extensive punitive war to suppress the national liberation movement in South Viet Nam? Here, in South-East Asia, the aggressive, imperialistic role of American and other military bases on the territories of other countries, their purpose as springboards of aggression and a means of combating national liberation movements, is exposed in its most naked form before the whole world. From its air bases in South Viet Nam and from its aircraft carriers of the 7th Fleet, the United States Air Force is carrying out raids against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, sowing death and destruction and torturing that young country.

The United States military bases situated in other nearby areas are also being actively used for aggressive purposes, for waging war against the Vietnamese people. A few days ago the newspapers reported that United States B-52 jet bombers based on the island of Okinawa were being used to strike at the South Vietnamese guerrillas. Reports are coming in about the increase in United States military strength in Thailand, where a number of United States military bases are also located. The whole system of United States bases aimed against the peoples of South-East Asia has been brought into a state of combat readiness.

The Eighteen-Nation Committee, which has been assigned the task of laying down the path to disarmament and the relaxation of international tension, cannot disregard the actions in Viet Nam of the United States, which is using its military bases and troops for waging an aggressive, imperialistic war.

The task of dismantling foreign military bases and withdrawing foreign troops from the territories of other countries will be seen in all its magnitude and significance if we take into account that the United States now possesses outside its own territory—that is, abroad—hundreds of military bases with a total of more than one million officers and men; that is, more than one-third of all the United States armed forces. What is happening today in South-East Asia may happen tomorrow in other areas of the world where imperialistic military bases and troops are situated on the territories of other countries. The existence of those troops and bases deepens mistrust and suspicion in international relations, increases tension, and creates a dangerously explosive situation.

That is why the question of dismantling foreign military bases and withdrawing foreign troops from the territories of other countries assumes particularly great significance in these troubled days. That is why we now find on our agenda the urgent question of the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from South Viet Nam, Taiwan, the Congo, South Korea, Malaysia and also, of course, from the territories
of European States and other areas of the world. All foreign military bases must be eliminated; that is the insistent, imperative demand of all those who are genuinely interested in safeguarding peace and in disarmament.

An important question calling insistently for solution is that of preventing the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force in any form and preventing access by the German revanchists to nuclear weapons. It is a question of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons in any form and of not allowing the threat of a nuclear war to grow.

In their statements the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Mr. Fanfani,1 devoted considerable attention to the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. However, they all of them dealt with only one side of the problem which causes concern: namely the question of the non-transfer of nuclear weapons directly to the national control of States. But what about the other side of the question, which is precisely the one that is now most urgent and acute: namely what is to be done about the question of the transfer of nuclear weapons or of access to nuclear weapons in one form or another through military blocs and alliances, or specifically through the NATO military bloc?

In his statement Lord Chalfont, reflecting the well-known point of view of the Western Powers, said that the creation of a NATO nuclear force would not mean the dissemination of nuclear weapons. In reality, however, the case is altogether different. Judge for yourselves: why, in the Western capitals, are plans being considered for the creation of a NATO nuclear force in one form or another if, as the Western representatives assert, everything will remain unchanged in the nuclear field? In fact, if we consider the gist of the problem it becomes perfectly clear that the creation of any kind of NATO nuclear force would give access to nuclear weapons in the first place to West Germany, and consequently would mean the dissemination of nuclear weapons, and dissemination precisely to that State which is pursuing a policy particularly hostile to peace.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany indeed makes no secret of the fact that it expects to obtain nuclear weapons for West Germany through a multilateral, Atlantic or other NATO nuclear force. The representatives here are no doubt aware that some weeks ago, shortly before the opening of our conference, the West German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Schroeder, in an interview he gave to the Düsseldorfer Nachrichten, raised the question of nuclear weapons being made available to West Germany. In that interview Dr. Schroeder openly stated the following:

1 For Mr. Fanfani's remarks, see ante, pp. 288–289.
If this question is decided by way of the creation of a multilateral Atlantic deterrent force or its equivalent, then Germany could tell its allies that it was prepared to renounce the acquisition of its own atomic weapons.¹

In that statement the West German Minister dotted all the i's, as the saying goes; Dr. Schroeder personally confirmed what has been pointed out many times by the Soviet Union. Indeed, if we single out the most important point in that interview, we find that the Federal Republic of Germany considers the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force and West German participation in that force as tantamount to having its own atomic weapons. It is perfectly clear from that interview that the statesmen of the Federal Republic of Germany make no distinction between obtaining atomic weapons through a NATO nuclear force and the acquisition by West Germany of its own atomic weapons. In other words; the establishment of a NATO multilateral or Atlantic nuclear force gives West Germany access to the nuclear arsenals of the West, as the Soviet Union Government has repeatedly pointed out; and this meets West Germany's persistent demands in regard to nuclear weapons.

The policy of the Federal Republic of Germany aimed at obtaining nuclear weapons can lead to a world thermo-nuclear war. It is perfectly clear that West Germany is attempting to obtain nuclear bombs in order to be able to advance its revanchist claims with still greater force, using for that purpose even the possibilities of nuclear blackmail. From the banks of the Rhine we hear incessant calls for the redrawing of the postwar frontiers of Europe, and demands for the forcible detachment from Poland and Czechoslovakia of territories rightfully held by them. Only a month ago, at a revanchist meeting in Stuttgart, a statement setting forth the claims of the West German revanchists to Czechoslovak territory was adopted and widely publicized. The danger is now becoming even more obvious that West German militarism by its policy may start the conflagration of a world thermo-nuclear war.

That is why the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries take so firm and resolute a stand against the militarization of the Federal Republic of Germany, and against giving the West German Bundeswehr access to nuclear weapons. That is why we utter warnings and declare our resolute opposition to plans for the creation of a multilateral, Atlantic, or any other kind of NATO nuclear force which would give the Federal Republic of Germany access to nuclear weapons.

The peace-loving States cannot but be alarmed by the benevolent attitude towards the claims of the Federal Republic of Germany to nuclear weapons which has been manifested in a number of Western countries, and particularly in the United Kingdom. Wide currency

¹ Translated from Russian in the ENDC records. For a different English version, see ante, p.280.
is given to arguments alleging that it is necessary to satisfy the “legitimate” demands of the militarists of the Federal Republic of Germany for “equal defence possibilities”, and to find ways to meet the insolent claims to atomic weapons made by the die-hard Nazi generals who are at the head of the Bundeswehr, etc. This attitude has been given in the Western Press the very apt name of an “atomic Munich”.

The new offensive of the revanchists of the Federal Republic of Germany for the purpose of obtaining access to nuclear weapons, and the connivance of the Western allies of Bonn, show that the Western Powers are indeed inclined to agree to satisfy the nuclear demands of the Bonn revanchists, sacrificing to that militarist plan agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. If the matter turns out in that way, then a situation will be created which will lead, in the words of Lord Chalfont, “to a world of nuclear anarchy”.¹

Another important measure towards eliminating the threat of a thermonuclear war and curbing the arms race would be the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. For a long time the Soviet Union has advocated the prohibition and complete destruction of nuclear weapons. That idea has now been approved and supported by many States which are genuinely perturbed by the growing threat of nuclear war. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Government supports the proposal to hold a conference for the purpose of concluding an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The situation calls for the earliest possible implementation of the declaration adopted on this question at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly.²

At its previous sessions the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has considered that question and has been unable to achieve constructive results solely because the United States and the United Kingdom are stubbornly opposed to reaching agreement on the question. Apparently the United States and the United Kingdom wish to retain a free hand in the matter of the use of nuclear weapons: they wish to retain the possibility of nuclear blackmail in regard to other States. But that is a dangerous position and, if it is maintained any longer, the threat of a thermonuclear war will continue to grow. The interests of the safeguarding of international security urgently require that the United States and the United Kingdom should abandon their negative position and agree with the majority of States of the world which are in favour of prohibiting nuclear weapons.

Twenty years have passed since the day the United States dropped the first atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The memory of the victims of that atomic bombing serves today as a cruel reminder of the horrors involved in the use of nuclear weapons. At the present time enormous stockpiles of atomic weapons have been accumulated in the world. Bombs have been manufactured which are several thousand times more powerful than the first atomic bombs dropped twenty years ago on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nuclear war in present-day conditions would have catastrophic, irremediable consequences. That is why it is so important now, in the interests of all mankind, to agree on the absolute prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and thereby fulfill the will of all peoples who are in favour of eliminating the threat of nuclear war.

The Soviet Government also proposes that, even before an agreement banning the use of nuclear weapons is concluded, those Powers which possess nuclear weapons should make a declaration to the effect that they will not be the first to use such weapons. The Soviet Union for its part is prepared to assume such an undertaking if the other nuclear Powers will do likewise. The Soviet delegation, of course, is also prepared to consider other proposals which would really lead to a reduction of international tension and to the strengthening of peace.

An important and serious task confronts the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at this time of strain. The peoples of the world expect us, not to hold endless discussions about disarmament, not just to look at each other's proposals but to take rapid and decisive action and to adopt concrete decisions aimed at diminishing the threat of war, reducing international tension and putting an end to the arms race. The Soviet Union has made such concrete proposals. Only one thing is required for effective action by the Committee: the Western participants in our negotiations—and in the first place the United States—must abandon the policy directed towards aggression, the policy directed towards continuing the arms race, the policy directed towards war. Otherwise the words of the United States representative here in the Committee will be drowned in the rumble coming from the explosions of American bombs, shells and mines in Viet Nam, the Dominican Republic and other areas of the world.

The peoples of all countries are yearning for a lasting peace and for disarmament. It is our duty here to work out expeditiously concrete and effective measures for the fulfilment of those hopes of the peoples throughout the world. A heavy responsibility will fall on those who, through their aggressive acts, continue to oppose this.
I do not propose to comment today on all the alleged points made by the Soviet representative, particularly those aspects which are relevant to our discussion here and which I should like to study in the verbatim record. I must say that, while I find very little encouragement in his remarks, I can endorse one view expressed by him—that the international situation makes it all the more important that we here make progress in our work. As I pointed out in the discussions of the Disarmament Commission, that is also the view of the United States. Much as I am accustomed to hear distorted, intemperate and unsupported remarks from the representative of the Soviet Union, I can only deplore those statements made here today. I think most of us came here hopefully after the non-aligned resolution was so broadly supported at New York; and I find that today's opening remarks by our Soviet colleague certainly hold disappointment for most of us.

I regret that the Soviet representative has chosen once more to use a disarmament forum to make false accusations regarding United States policies and actions in Viet Nam. I regret it particularly because the business of this Committee is disarmament and no useful purpose is served by attempts to divert us from that purpose. I regret it also because the views expressed by the Soviet representative this morning are tendentious and compel me to take up more of our time here to set the record straight. Regardless of any attempt to portray the communist aggression in Viet Nam as a just war of national liberation, the world knows that what is taking place there is an effort on the part of the North to seize control of a country whose only offence is its determination to live in peace and freedom.

During the past six months there has been a great increase in the effort being made by Hanoi. As the infiltration and terror directed from the North have increased, the United States has had to increase its assistance in resisting this aggression. Make no mistake: we are determined to fulfill our commitment to help South Viet Nam to resist this aggression, but we have not lost sight of the goal of a peaceful settlement. The United States remains determined to keep searching for a political solution to this problem. Even as we provide the Vietnamese with the help they need to resist the aggression from Hanoi, we are equally prepared to undertake unconditional discussions whenever Hanoi is ready. Starting in the spring, we initiated

1 END C/PV.220, pp. 19-22.
2 Supra.
3 Ante, pp. 260-262.
some actions ourselves and supported some initiated by others which probed in many ways the possibility of engaging in discussion with Hanoi or Peking looking towards a settlement. Fifteen efforts have already been made to start these discussions with the help of some forty nations throughout the world. In the light of these initiatives, we have satisfied ourselves that the channels to the other side are open even if nothing but abuse comes back.

We shall therefore persevere in our search for a peaceful solution. At the moment it seems clear that the other side is not prepared to negotiate. At present, therefore, we have no choice but to continue to impress on the other side by military means that its aggression will be more costly than any benefit it can derive. This may take time, but the United States will persevere.

The record today is clear: on the one side, a willingness to undertake discussions over a wide variety of ideas and methods, and without pre-conditions; on the other side, intransigence and an unabating output of harsh propaganda. We will never cease our efforts to find a workable solution to this problem, a solution that will enable the people of Viet Nam to live in peace. As President Johnson said last Wednesday:

... we welcome and we ask for the concern and the assistance of any nation and all nations. If the United Nations and its officials or any one of its 114 Members can by deed or word, private initiative or public action, bring us nearer an honourable peace, then they will have the support and gratitude of the United States of America.1

In a letter to the President of the Security Council which he asked be circulated to all members of the Council, Ambassador Goldberg followed up the President's statement, making these four points:

First, the United States will continue to provide, in whatever measure and for whatever period is necessary, assistance to the people of the Republic of Viet Nam in defending their independence, their sovereignty, and their right to choose their own government and make their own decisions.

Second, the United States will continue to assist in the economic and social advancement of South-East Asia, under the leadership of Asian countries and the United Nations, and will continue to explore all additional possibilities, especially in connexion with the great projects taking shape in the lower Mekong basin.

Third, the United States will continue to explore, independently and in conjunction with others, all possible routes to an honourable and durable peace in South-East Asia.

Fourth, the United States stands ready, as it has in the past, to collaborate unconditionally with members of the Security Council in the search for an acceptable formula to restore peace and security to that area of the world.2

Our objective in Viet Nam is not military conquest but peaceful settlement. Let me quote again from President Johnson's statement of last week to make this absolutely clear. He said:

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2 Ibid., pp. 279–280.
... we do not seek the destruction of any government, nor do we covet a foot of any territory, but we insist and we will always insist that the people of South Viet Nam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the south or throughout all Viet Nam, under international supervision, and that they shall not have any government imposed upon them by force and terror so long as we can prevent it.¹

May I express the hope also that I shall not be compelled to take up our valuable time in the future to set the record straight on matters such as this? My country's record in defence of peace and freedom, not only for ourselves but for all those who ask our help against aggression, speaks for itself. Repetition of attacks and charges such as we have heard here will not change the facts. Moreover, the debate on such issues is not the proper concern of this Conference. We are charged with the urgent responsibility of making progress towards disarmament. Let us all bend our energies towards that goal.

We had thought that the Soviet Union had had ample opportunity during the two months last spring when the United Nations Disarmament Commission was in session to press its propaganda campaign, but it seems that it is not yet satisfied. We came here to negotiate, not to indulge in an exchange of polemics. We believe that progress in disarmament and arms control is urgent and essential. We have made a number of concrete and practical proposals. The Soviet Union has ignored them. It has simply entered its old, tired horses in the disarmament field. Must we continue to be deluged with invective, or can we hope that we can get on with the real business of this Conference? I sincerely hope so, and I pledge that my delegation intends to do exactly that.

I reserve my right to comment at greater length as opportunity provides in later meetings.

Statement by the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee on the Second Anniversary of the Limited Test-Ban Treaty, August 5, 1965²

Two years ago today the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water ³ was signed by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Since that time more than a hundred nations have joined the original signatories.

¹ Ibid., p. 264.
² ENDC/PV.221, p. 24.
³ Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 291-293.
On the second anniversary of that achievement we consider more urgent than ever further progress on disarmament measures.

Statement by the Swedish Representative (Myrdal) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, August 10, 1965

In my statement today I intend to follow closely resolution DC/225 of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. In its mandate to this Committee it recommends that we should concentrate our attention on three problem fields where measures are urgently required: First, that of general and complete disarmament. Secondly, among the collateral measures priority is to be accorded both to the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and to the consideration of an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.

While all our delegations are deeply concerned with a fulfilment of that mandate, as we want to live up to that pledge of honour we have given ourselves to build a road leading to disarmament, we must nevertheless be aware that the time at our disposal during this session is probably extremely short and that it is fast running out—for we also have a time-restricted duty laid upon the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee: namely, to report "on the progress made in respect of the above recommendations" to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the United Nations General Assembly at its forthcoming session. In view of the risk of overloading our agenda and scattering our efforts, I would at this stage of our work defer discussing substantively general and complete disarmament, without in any way belittling the need to proceed as soon as possible and as vigorously as possible with a systematic blue-printing of substantial disarmament.

If we single out for concentrated attention the two collateral measures mentioned in the resolution, this should be understood, however, as a choice made on purely practical grounds; these are by consent the very measures that stand the best chance of resulting in early agreement. I want to stress this, particularly with reference to suggestions proffered on earlier occasions by the Soviet delegation on a different list of priority items and again emphasized by its distinguished representative, Mr. Tsarapkin, at our meeting last Tuesday. If I, and

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1 ENDC/PV.222, pp. 11-22.
2 Ante, pp. 260-262.
others, do not propose to enter now into a substantive discussion on certain of these matters—although they are undoubtedly closer to the political actualities of today—it is not to be interpreted as if we wanted to minimize the importance of the problems they refer to. Nor, of course, do the measures listed lie outside our field of competence; the resolution itself asks us to “consider all proposals”. But the Government and the people of my country have ample opportunities to pronounce themselves on the most urgent political matters, including questions about wars on foreign continents, in other contexts.

In this forum we want to narrow our attention and dedicate our efforts to those measures in the disarmament field which seem to us to be the most tractable ones in the multilateral negotiations for which the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee is the chosen instrument. According to those criteria, therefore, both non-dissemination measures and a comprehensive test ban are certainly most profitable to discuss, as on them the gap between great-Power positions has proved to be least wide. We must proceed with both of them. I am also, in this statement of mine, going to deal with them side by side, as they are more tightly intertwined than is usually explicitly acknowledged. Also, they happen to be matters on which comments by countries which are non-great, non-nuclear and non-aligned might have a certain relevance.

Both these measures are subservient to a very noble aim: namely that of reducing the threat of nuclear war and also of nuclear blackmail. My Government is wholeheartedly dedicated to that aim: it wants to contribute to international regulations which minimize the risks of what has been called “nuclear anarchy”. When we met in the United Nations Disarmament Commission I quoted a passage of the Speech from the Throne at the opening of this year’s session of the Swedish Parliament in support of our conviction that spread of nuclear weapons was a danger to be met by concerted international action.¹ Today, to provide a variation on the same theme, I would quote the reply which the Speaker of the Upper House gave to His Majesty the King on that occasion. He said:

The risk of a further spreading of nuclear weapons rather has increased, and measures to counteract this tendency seem more necessary than ever.

The imperative question now facing us here in Geneva is: what would be the shortest and surest route to this goal? The representatives of the great Powers, particularly of the West, have so far seemingly placed consideration of a non-dissemination treaty—that is, an agreement to prevent the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons from increasing beyond the present five—as the primordial of the two considerations indicated in our guide. Parenthetically I may observe that these five nuclear countries are obviously now

¹ See ante, p. 163.
accepted not only as *faits accomplis* but as belonging in a special category. This could only be based on their being precisely those States which have the right to occupy the permanent seats in the Security Council and which thus, as "great Powers", carry a special responsibility for the maintenance of peace, and are for that reason expected to act in harmony between themselves. Otherwise there could be no specific circumstance justifying a categorical cleavage between these five and all others. Nobody could assert that they are the ones whose possession of nuclear fire-power poses the minimal danger; in other words, that all is quiet on the nuclear front as it is drawn today.

It follows from the position of principle I have just indicated that the Swedish delegation would welcome progress in relation to non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. As soon as a draft for such an international agreement is forthcoming we shall be able to find out whether what have hitherto been regarded as political hurdles in the way of a joining of stands between the nuclear Powers are about to be overcome, and thus be able to judge how bright the prospects are of their clinching the issue in the near future. We shall then be able also to scrutinize the terms of an eventual treaty in realistic detail and judge its clauses on the merits they will carry for the international community as a whole and also for our individual countries. However, before we know exactly on what we are supposed to negotiate our comments can only be tentative.

The very first point I wish to make in these circumstances—that is, in the absence of a great-Power concord—is to recall once more the close relationship between the two collateral measures mentioned in our mandatory resolution, as both aim at curtailing nuclear capabilities. There is nevertheless a difference—to our mind an important one—namely that a non-dissemination treaty would, in reality curtail only the freedom of action of the hitherto non-nuclear nations, as the nuclear Powers already, in intelligent self-interest, evidently observe the rules to which a treaty would commit them. A comprehensive test ban, on the other hand, would have an impeding effect not only on the nuclear have-nots but also on the nuclear haves.

As for the efficiency of the measures envisaged to prevent nations presently non-nuclear from "going nuclear", the value of a comprehensive test ban seems to be at a fair par with a non-proliferation treaty, at least as far as non-aligned countries are concerned. It may be surmised that a first primitive nuclear device that an aspiring nuclear State could fabricate might probably work. But the great sophistication of delivery and defence systems utilized today will make it almost impossible, without a series of several tests, to set up military forces equipped with usable nuclear warheads of specified effects. This, of course, presupposes that the nuclear Powers continue to keep secret their knowledge in nuclear weapons technology.
I will not conceal that, as the positions now stand in regard to these two collateral measures, my delegation definitely prefers an early agreement on a comprehensive ban against nuclear test explosions. We do that for the reason which we have repeatedly stated, and which we know is entertained by most non-nuclear nations: namely, that a test ban would entail some sharing of sacrifices of nuclear potentials. In the debates of the United Nations Disarmament Commission a mighty choir of delegations voiced this concern. I could quote them in a long row, all expressing the same basic philosophy, although differing on the emphasis employed and on the specific proposals of how to link non-dissemination measures with some definitive nuclear disarmament measures.

Thus, besides ourselves, spoke India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Ghana, the United Arab Republic, Syria, Japan, Poland, Yugoslavia, the Philippines, Brazil, Chile, Australia and New Zealand, while Italy expressed the "legitimate hope" that restrictions accepted by the non-nuclear countries would lead to the nuclear Powers embarking "on a gradual and practical process of general nuclear disarmament". 1 Here I will restrict myself to quoting a carefully-balanced statement of the need to harmonize national interests of nuclear and non-nuclear countries: namely, one by our colleague from Canada, Mr. Burns, nations which are at present not nuclear Powers but have the capability of manufacturing nuclear weapons should not be expected to agree to abstain forever from becoming nuclear Powers unless the existing nuclear Powers within a reasonable period of time take some concrete steps towards divesting themselves of this most dangerous weapon.

And further, the Canadian representative said there should be in any treaty on nondissemination—

... a reaffirmation of the intention of the nuclear Powers to reduce and eventually eliminate the stocks of these weapons and the means for their delivery... 2

Within parentheses I might recall that the practical conclusion of the Canadian delegation was that of a time-limit for the commitment of the non-nuclear Powers, a suggestion reiterated in New York, and most distinctly here by His Excellency the Italian Foreign Minister. 3 This idea of a voluntary moratorium may become a minimum programme in the non-dissemination field, since to accomplish it we do not need to wait for concurrence by the nuclear Powers.

Also, during our present negotiations the basic philosophy of a double-sided surrender of nuclear growth possibilities seems to have been at least indirectly acknowledged. Thus on the first day of our session the leader of the United States delegation, Mr. Foster, said,

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1 Disarmament Commission Official Records; 88th Meeting, p. 2.
2 Ibid., 76th Meeting, p. 14.
although addressing himself to a specific aspect of our problem, that as a part of the non-proliferation effort all governments should —

... undertake to accept IAEA or similar international safeguards in all their peaceful nuclear activities. This is an undertaking which should be assumed both by those countries which have developed nuclear weapons and by those which have kept their nuclear activities confined to the peaceful field.¹

I am not quite clear if that was intended as a proposal that a sub­mission to Agency control be made part of the non-dissemination agreement. The point I want to register today is that Mr. Foster recognized this need for a symmetric acceptance of restrictions on the part of nuclear and non-nuclear nations alike. I am confining myself here to statements which have been made as part of our negotiations, although I could have culled more far-reaching expres­sions from, for instance, Mr. Foster's recent and very interesting article in Foreign Affairs.²

For my country the belief in the necessity to reduce already­existing nuclear capabilities, or at least to stifle their growth in strength, amounts to a fundamental principle in all our efforts to promote disarmament. That is the reason we have so often repeated it. We are bound to continue to plead consistently for it. In the context of our present negotiations on the issue of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons our main concern remains that of demanding some corresponding sacrifices on the part of nuclear and non-nuclear countries alike. This requirement of some kind of “compensation” does not amount, however, to any claim to obtain an “inducement” for our adhering to a treaty in the form of any guarantees, any promises, of protection by the nuclear Powers against nuclear attacks or even against “nuclear blackmail”. Sweden is willing in principle to play its part, when a non-dissemination agreement is reached, without raising demands for any such guarantees—being, as a matter of fact, doubtful as to their desirability.

These statements of mine are intended to strike not a note of negativism, or even of pessimism, but just one of caution. My delegation stands prepared to welcome news that the difficulties besetting a non-dissemination treaty have been surmounted. But even in the absence of such news we continue to be dedicated to straining our own efforts in search of a positive approach to the supreme aim of reducing nuclear potentialities.

I turn again, therefore, to the other collateral measures given priority on our agenda, and as a matter of fact preceding in order of presentation that of non-proliferation: namely, the conclusion of an agreement to stop nuclear test explosions completely. As I have said already, as far as the non-nuclear Powers are concerned

¹ Ante, pp. 283–284.
² Ante, pp. 265–278.
this would achieve the same result *de facto* as a non-dissemination treaty. A comprehensive test ban is a non-proliferation measure, and an effective one. This was acknowledged, by the way, by the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, when he said that the extension of the partial test-ban Treaty to underground tests would "deal forcefully with the problem of nuclear proliferation".1

As for the nuclear Powers, a complete test ban might only deprive them of some prospects of further perfecting their nuclear weapons—that is, make more static a situation which is at present dangerously dynamic and which would continue to be dynamic even under a non-proliferation treaty. To use the words of the Secretary-General:

Those who have already embarked upon nuclear weapons development continue to perfect and increase their stockpile of nuclear weapons.2

It is this dynamic aspect of the present gap that weighs heavily with the non-nuclear Powers.

At this juncture in our negotiations we are presented with some especially cogent reasons for devoting immediate constructive attention to measures for completing the Committee's work on banning nuclear tests. Advantage number one is that the test-ban issue is probably the most tractable politically both as between the different nuclear Powers and as between them and the non-nuclear ones. Advantage number two is that such an agreement, thanks to our earlier efforts in the Committee and within our national institutions, has reached such an advanced stage of studied preparedness that only a couple of points, minor in comparison with the situation a few years ago, relating to control are still outstanding, while the control issue as regards a non-dissemination treaty has not yet even been prised open for negotiation.

I do not intend today to proceed to discuss the substance of the knotty residual problems which have to be resolved before our protracted test-ban negotiations can be crowned by a settlement. They are all *per se* of a technical nature, although some—such as the question of control—have come so far into the political limelight that it would be difficult to settle them by recourse to reason alone. However, we are all now so blissfully aware of the fact that considerable scientific progress has recently been made, more specifically in seismological techniques of detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions, that these can now be quoted in support of proposals to simplify the verification process. The moot point still seems to be that of inspection although, to quote the good news carried by Lord Chalfont in the message from the Prime Minister of the United

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1 Mr. Foster's statement appears ante, p. 285. For the test-ban treaty, see Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291-293.

2 ENDC/PV.218, p. 6.
Kingdom, "We are not tied to a particular figure".¹ Lord Chalfont also intimated that British scientists "still believe that some on-site inspection is necessary, but they are ready to be convinced that it is not."²

As was recognised already at the time of signing the partial test-ban Treaty, 100 per-cent certainty can never be achieved that every shot violating the treaty could be discovered. And now we must continue to reason in the same terms of probabilities and risks. There now only remain (a) the question whether inspections—and if so what kind of inspections—are really the best way to narrow the margin of uncertainty, and (b) the question as to what margin of uncertainty is tolerable when weighed against the gain of obtaining an agreement.

In this connexion I would only take the liberty of reminding us all that just prior to the signing of the Moscow partial test ban some interesting suggestions had been offered by various non-aligned members of the Committee with a view to facilitating a comprehensive treaty.³ These might now be revived for discussion, placed in the context of new knowledge, and elaborated further to meet the needs of a workable compromise. An important suggestion might be the participation of non-nuclear Powers in the process of detection and identification.

Another suggestion was tendered in case on-site inspections should still be wanted—and I do not pronounce any view on the need for these, but just assume for the sake of argument that they would figure as an element of a verification system. It was suggested that a much better formula than an annual quota for them would be one referring to longer periods, possibly made to overlap each other. The purpose would be to get effective deterrence with a lower inspection rate by decreasing the boundary effects and making the selection process more efficient. By way of example—and this is a theoretical example only—six inspections over three years might have as much worth as three a year; this because I believe nobody expects the quota ever to be fully utilized.

There is a particular reason prompting us today to re-examine the need for verification and to search for more flexible procedures for any such verification. For when we discuss this problem in the context of stopping the further spread of nuclear capabilities, it becomes glaringly evident that it is no longer one that can be dealt with in terms of adversaries, as they have been called, implying the Soviet Union on one side and the United Kingdom/United States on the other. Any contemplated system, be it with or without inspections, must be built up so as to cover all the countries which are to comply with the obligations.

² ENDC/PV.219, p. 10.  
The zest for achieving a true reduction of military might through all the steps taken has guided my Government to ask for combined, package, measures. We did so in relation to the so-called Undén Plan several years ago when we presented some considerations for our adhering to a nuclear-free zone. In the United Nations last winter our Foreign Minister proposed a three-fold package—non-dissemination plus comprehensive test ban plus cut-off of production of fissionable material—believing that this represented a fair measure of balance and counter-balance. I do not now want to load our agenda with consideration of the cut-off of production of fissionable material as an additional item, especially as it is not among the measures explicitly enumerated by the Disarmament Commission for priority consideration at this stage in our work. But of course—and I must stress this—any progress on any disarmament measure, any offer of reduction of the nuclear strength of the present nuclear Powers, would serve as an inducement to the non-nuclear ones to forgo temptations to enter the nuclear race.

What I have been saying today has been motivated by a desire to help us to focus our agenda at this session so as to maximize the chance to obtain some positive decision. We in the Committee enjoy a capital of confidence from all the United Nations Members and from world public opinion in general. We must be aware that this capital may be eroded—yes, forfeited—if once more we just turn up our empty hands for the world to see.

Even if a major result at this session is not in the offing, we should at least be able to take a few strides forward. One such minimum programme has been offered to us in the field of non-dissemination. I refer to the proposal made by the Italian Foreign Minister that the non-nuclear Powers take the initiative by accepting a moratorium—its duration obviously will have to be discussed—during which period they would “agree to renounce unilaterally equipping themselves with nuclear weapons”. During that period further negotiations would proceed with and between the nuclear Powers. To quote Mr. Fanfani, “In that way . . . a factor of pressure and persuasion would be created which could be brought to bear on the nuclear countries”. But, of course, it would also serve to relieve this whole issue of the sharp sense of urgency.

It is possible that this proposal may prove valuable. I imagine that the time-limit for the proposed moratorium on the part of the non-nuclear States would have to be relatively short. Moreover, a decision on such a moratorium ought to be accompanied by pledges on the part of the nuclear nations that they would do everything in

1 Ibid., 1961, p. 693.
2 A/8319, p. 27.
3 Ante, pp. 288-289
their power to negotiate so as to achieve definitive results in relation to a comprehensive test ban and a non-proliferation treaty.

Even under these conditions, however, a decision to participate in a moratorium such as that envisaged might be difficult to take for many non-nuclear countries. As far as my own country is concerned, I can say that if such a decision seemed to rally support on the part of non-nuclear nations, we would be ready to give it positive consideration. The atomic energy programme on which Sweden is working is in any case a purely civilian one. Press reports which make assertions to the contrary are consequently entirely misleading.

To return to those steps forward which can be taken in this session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament: we might also have to conceive a minimum programme relating to a comprehensive test ban. In this field there is perhaps nothing decisive that the non-nuclear, non-aligned countries can institute of their own accord. I have already alluded to the contributions which may be forthcoming in regard to the seismological detection of underground tests. This was also obviously in the mind of the Italian Foreign Minister when he said on 29 July:

In this regard it must not be forgotten that we can count upon the co-operation of the non-aligned countries, which are ready to offer their territories and the help of their own personnel to facilitate the conclusion of an agreement, and they are willing to do so.¹

Some preliminary and private exploration has also been going on as to a voluntary co-operation on a scientific basis between seismological stations in different countries, creating a so-called “detection club”. It would of course be preferable if such co-operation at the outset were not restricted to the non-nuclear countries but were worldwide. The demand that there must be a scientific, open, international co-operation in the seismic field as a basis for confidence in a test ban which is also to cover underground nuclear explosions, has been and remains the praeterea censeo of the Swedish delegation. Why should not some planning for this co-operation be initiated now? And why could it not continue even if the major work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament entered into a period of recess during the time of the United Nations General Assembly?

I am fully aware of the misgiving of several delegations as soon as the question of some more technical exploration is as much as hinted at. But I assure representatives that the Swedish delegation is as concerned as anybody could be to reserve the discussion of principles and politics for this body. To ensure that no inroads are made on the political issues, I would suggest that technical talks between our delegations should not even deal with verification problems but merely with one or two items, narrowly circumscribed, belonging to

¹ ENDC/PV.219, p. 17.
sheer "mechanics". We should select items in areas where we already have agreement in principle, as is the case in regard to the basic reliance to be placed on national observation posts for the gathering of data. Some of our experts might ponder, for instance, by what means an international flow of such seismological data can be arranged, what channels of rapid communication can be utilized—whether through the co-operation of the World Meteorological Organization or by some other network.

Similarly, as there is already in existence a fairly extensive international exchange of seismological data, the question remains how to widen its scope to include smaller earthquakes and how to encourage the development of scientific programmes and co-operation between them. An increase in the relevant data should facilitate the endeavours of those who are trying to find a basis for a lower inspection rate. We in Sweden would be prepared—in the event such a step would facilitate the reaching of general agreement of a complete test-ban treaty—to consider seriously establishing and operating an advanced seismic station on our soil; and we would be ready to have its data made available to the international data flow.

On the other hand, all problems to which a political element has been imputed should decidedly be left to be tackled by us at the resumption of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament during the winter session. In the meantime, it would have to constitute our "homework". If certain tasks were explicitly stated as duties for us, even if we had not reached any major decisions in the weeks still before us, that would at least serve as a sign to the world outside this Geneva enclave that we do take our dedication to disarmament seriously. It goes without saying that it would be so much the better if we were to have some more triumphant news to announce.

There are also challenges to be met beyond the confines of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament if the foundations for disarmament are to be secured. The most crucial one of these is to enlist China and France in a constructive dialogue with the rest of the world. As the Swedish Government has persistently urged throughout the years that China should be represented in the United Nations, we cannot pass over this matter in silence but must express regret that propitious opportunities have hitherto been lost. There is now a new chance given us by this problem's having been coupled with that of a world disarmament conference which was recommended in the United Nations Disarmament Commission resolution.\(^1\) Sweden voted for this as a matter of principle, but we also realize that such a conference would be of insignificant value if China were not to participate.

\(^1\) *Ante*, p. 253.
Surely we have to carry a heavy load of responsibility for what we do or do not do in the coming weeks and months, in order to set in motion a noble race towards disarmament. Let us now begin in earnest to discuss concrete next steps.

Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, August 10, 1965

I listened with interest to the speech of the representative of Sweden, who unfortunately has now left. As usual, her remarks were very thoughtful and, I believe, give all of us here the opportunity for a careful analysis of those thoughts. Certainly we in the United States will approach them in that spirit and will, I am sure, have some comments to make on them later on.

On a different note, I must reserve the right to reply at a later meeting to the distorted charges and the hackneyed accusations which have been made concerning the policies of my country, and also similar distortions concerning the policies of the Federal Republic of Germany. Apart from their unfortunate polemics, the statements we have heard so far from the representatives of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Poland and Czechoslovakia are notable for the manner in which they have ignored resolution DC/225 adopted on 15 June 1965 by the United Nations Disarmament Commission. That resolution was adopted by a vote of 83 to 1, with 18 abstentions. The Soviet Union and its allies were among those who abstained.

The United States certainly does not believe that this Committee or any delegation is in any way limited by the terms of that resolution. But, as Mr. Cavalletti pointed out, it was the Soviet Union which requested the meeting of the Disarmament Commission in order to seek guidance for our work. It seems rather strange, therefore, that the Soviet representative had nothing to say about the only resolution adopted by the Commission which is addressed to this Committee, but had a lot to say about his own two resolutions which were not put to a vote. I hope this does not mean that the resolution which was passed has already been relegated to the Soviet limbo of non-history.

We cannot ignore that resolution, because it expresses in a general way the most recent views of the vast majority of the United Nations.

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1 ENDC/PV.222, pp. 45-51.
2 Supra.
3 Ante, pp. 260-262.
4 ENDC/PV.221, p. 21.
5 See ante, pp. 30-31.
6 Ante, pp. 206-208.
In so far as the United States is concerned, we endorse the priority recommended by that resolution for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban agreement and a non-proliferation agreement. We also welcome its recognition of the need for a programme of certain related measures, some of which are dealt with in United States proposals before this Committee. Clearly this resolution marks the direction in which we must move if we are to be responsive to the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of mankind.

If, as the Soviet representative observed in his statement on 3 August, I did not refer in my previous statements at this session to the need for continued efforts towards general and complete disarmament, it was because I was discussing the priorities dictated by the danger of nuclear proliferation. However, let me assure the Soviet representative that, even while giving priority attention to the imminent threat of nuclear proliferation, the United States is determined to work for general and complete disarmament as part of our continuing effort to achieve a better and safer world through the application of the principles of the United Nations Charter.

I hope, however, that the Soviet representative is prepared to agree with me that, at this moment, the most effective contribution we could make towards preparing the way for general and complete disarmament would be agreement on measures to halt and turn back the nuclear arms race. That is what is stressed in the resolution contained in document DC/225 of the Disarmament Commission; and that is precisely what the United States has urged for discussion and negotiation in its proposals over the past year.

Frankly, I cannot take very seriously Mr. Tsarapkin's description of these "old proposals". If the age of proposals were a significant factor, most of those included in his Government's memorandum of December 1964 should long since have been retired from active service. What matters is not the age of proposals, but whether they are responsive to the threat that faces us and offer some prospect for agreement. I propose to evaluate the three Soviet proposals suggested for action at this session in terms of these criteria. I will ignore the fact that two of them are among the most ancient contenders in the disarmament lists.

One of these is the question of withdrawing troops and military bases situated in foreign countries. Despite what happened in the recent session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the Soviet representative in his statement on 3 August again sought to link this Soviet proposal with the unfortunate situation in Vietnam.

During the debates in the Disarmament Commission a considerable number of the 114 members of the Commission expressed their

1 See ante, p. 300.
2 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 509–517.
opinions on the subject of troops and bases abroad. Although the Soviet representative implied that a majority supported the Soviet Union's views on this matter, I suggest that available evidence indicates that a contrary interpretation is probably more accurate. I cannot refer to a vote on the matter, since the Soviet Union did not press to a vote its draft resolution on the subject. But I can say that, having made our own private assessment of the estimated vote for that Soviet proposal, we were not surprised that it was not put to a vote.

The record of the debate in the Disarmament Commission shows that many representatives noted in their statements that the Soviet proposal to get rid of all troops and bases in other countries failed completely to acknowledge the right of States to provide for their own defence by entering into agreements for accepting troops and bases of friendly countries on their territories. Mutual defence arrangements, which are essential in today's interdependent world, are expressly safeguarded by the United Nations Charter. This omission in the Soviet proposal is by no means inadvertent; rather, it favours Soviet interests in two ways.

First, by forbidding smaller or weaker countries to protect themselves through arrangements with other nations, the Soviet proposal would leave them vulnerable to the form of aggression which communists now call "wars of national liberation". What is the essence of this doctrine? As Secretary Rusk observed in a speech to the American Society of International Law on 23 April of this year, a so-called "war of national liberation" is any war which furthers communist aims. As he said then:

> It is used to denote any effort led by communists to overthrow by force any non-communist government. Thus the war in South Vietnam is called a "war of national liberation". And those who would overthrow various other non-communist governments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are called the "forces of national liberation".

Secretary Rusk further stated:

> It is plain that acceptance of the doctrine of "wars of national liberation" would amount to scuttling the modern international law of peace which the [United Nations] Charter prescribes, and acceptance of the practice of "wars of liberation", as defined by the communists, would mean the breakdown of peace itself.

We hope for a world free from aggression, a world in which there would be no need to maintain troops and bases abroad. However, so long as aggression persists, its victims and potential victims have a right to seek protection. As our late Ambassador Adlai Stevenson remarked in an address in Toronto only last May: "Until the interna-

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1 *Ante*, pp. 206-207.
tional community is ready to rescue the victims, there is no alternative but national power to fill the peacekeeping vacuum".¹

The second way in which the Soviet proposal is inequitable lies in the fact that it would tend to upset the existing military balance to the detriment of my country and its allies. A look at the map will illustrate this fact. Moreover, in upsetting the balance, this proposal would violate the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles.² I would only add—and I wish to emphasize this—that the Soviet proposal on troops and bases as viewed in relation to the unfortunate events in South-East Asia amounts to propaganda which cannot help to bring about a peaceful solution there. As my Government has repeatedly stated, we seek no bases in Vietnam and our troops will be withdrawn once the aggression ceases and a settlement is achieved by negotiation.

As usual, the Soviet representative presented his now familiar upside-down version of the origin of the present situation in Vietnam. The Canadian representative corrected this version of history in his statement to the Disarmament Commission in New York on 7 May when he quoted from an address made on 26 March of this year by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs. On that occasion the Canadian Secretary of State pointed out that, as a member of the International Control Commission, his country has closely observed the situation in Vietnam over the past eleven years. He added:

Almost from the beginning of that period the authorities in North Vietnam have engaged in inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities in South Vietnam. That support has taken the form of armed and unarmed personnel, of arms and munitions, of direction and guidance.

He went on to state:

This is a judgement fully supported by evidence, including evidence presented by the [International Control] Commission.³ I leave it to this Committee to judge the facts.

In his statement of 3 August the Soviet representative also revived his Government's proposal for a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons and, pending such an agreement, for a non-first-use pledge by the nuclear Powers.⁴ My Government has offered assurance that it will not use any weapons, nuclear or otherwise, with aggressive intent. As Secretary Rusk pointed out in a letter of 30 June 1962 to the Secretary-General, however, the Charter of the United Nations makes a distinction, not between one weapon and another, but between the use of force for aggression and for defence.

He went on to say:

It is the firm belief of the United States that the only sure way to eliminate the

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² Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 439–442.
³ Disarmament Commission Official Records; 76th Meeting, p. 17.
⁴ See ante, pp. 306–307.
threat to mankind posed by nuclear weapons is to remove them from the arsenals of the nations through a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.¹

The Soviet approach to this matter offers no basis for a useful discussion.

In short, these two Soviet proposals hold no prospect for agreement, nor are they addressed to the really critical problem of nuclear proliferation. I do welcome, however, the inclusion of a non-proliferation agreement among the items which the Soviet Union has suggested for action now. Here indeed is an urgent item and one on which we must strive for early agreement.

I expect to discuss this matter at some length in the coming days but I would like at this stage to comment on only one aspect. The threat of nuclear proliferation is world-wide. Potentially it affects the security of every nation. It is not the kind of threat that can be averted by the actions of any one country; nor can it be averted by focussing our attention on any single country. This must be as clear to the Soviet Union as it is to my Government.

Yet the Soviet representative and his colleagues from Poland and Czechoslovakia today, and previously his colleague from Bulgaria, once again approached it from the standpoint of an unwarranted polemic against the Federal Republic of Germany and NATO. Once again the Soviet representative has sought to impose a Soviet condition on the very discussion of a possible non-proliferation agreement. I am compelled once more to appeal to him to co-operate with us in examining this matter in all its aspects and from the point of view of all countries anxious to prevent nuclear proliferation. The Soviet preoccupation with one aspect of this problem is by now fully understood by us all. I suggest that the Soviet representative should now permit us at least to examine the matter from the point of view of the preoccupation we all share regarding the world-wide dangers of nuclear proliferation.

Similarly, I hope the Soviet representative will not continue to reject out of hand any consideration of means of moving towards agreement on a comprehensive test-ban unless we accept his Government's view on inspections. Such a position could be justified only as a device to prevent any search for agreement. I sincerely hope that is not the intent of the Soviet Union.

On this question, as on the United States proposals for a cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons and to explore a freeze on nuclear delivery vehicles,² we wish to exchange views and search for areas of agreement. These measures are related to the problem of preventing nuclear proliferation. They are thus responsive to the resolution strongly supported by the Disarmament Commission.

² See ante, pp. 106–109.
I would hope that the Soviet response to the desire expressed by so many nations for progress in these areas would not be a flat *nyet* or rigid insistence on unilateral conditions before the matter can even be discussed.

Although he did it in a distorted context, the Soviet representative in his earlier statement himself took note of the importance of curbing the nuclear arms race. He cited statistics presented by Secretary of Defense McNamara on 14 July regarding the status of United States strategic and conventional forces. As the late Ambassador Stevenson and I stated in the Disarmament Commission debate, the United States has initiated a number of self-restraining actions to limit and in some areas cut back its present and planned nuclear deterrent forces. But the Soviet Union's refusal even to discuss seriously such measures as a cut-off of fissionable material production for weapons and a freeze on strategic nuclear vehicles seems to be an indication of its unwillingness to go along with a mutually-acceptable programme for halting the nuclear arms race. While the Soviet representative has chosen to present only some carefully-selected statistics regarding the United States, I can assure this Committee that the build-up in strategic and other armaments continues on the Soviet side as well. Even if published Soviet statistics are hard to find, there have been a number of recent public statements by Soviet leaders confirming and even boasting about their build-up.

Let me conclude by stressing that, regardless of the bitter needs arising from the situation in Vietnam, we have come here anxious and prepared to engage in serious discussions looking towards concrete means of preventing nuclear proliferation and halting and turning back the arms race. If the Soviet Union will show an equal desire to make concrete progress, then we shall achieve it. If not, it will not be the United States nor even the situation in Vietnam that can be blamed.

Statement by the Indian Representative (Trivedi) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, August 12, 1965

It is a matter of considerable gratification to the Indian delegation that our Committee has reconvened this summer after a long recess. All of us are convinced of the earnest desire of the peace-loving peoples

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1 See ante, p. 298, n. 1.
2 See ante, pp. 59-77.
3 ENDC/PV.223, pp. 5-21.
of the world for the continuance of patient but purposeful negotiations on the issues of disarmament and we are happy to have once again resumed our negotiations in this Committee. Personally, I am also proud of the privilege of joining my colleagues on the Committee after a long absence.

In this context the Indian delegation would like to place on record its appreciation of the agreement of the two co-Chairmen, representing the United States and the Soviet-Union, to reconvene the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. We have always believed that all of us, countries large and small, have a significant role to play in humanity's quest for peace and security. At the same time we are aware that international progress in that direction depends in large measure on the co-operative effort of the leaders of those two great and powerful countries. This is particularly valid with regard to the issues that we negotiate in this Committee. The two super-Powers have at their disposal an awesome panoply of destructive power, and it is to them primarily that the nations of the world look to bring the world back to the path of stability and sanity. It is therefore a matter of great satisfaction to us that, thanks to the agreement between the co-Chairmen, we are once again engaged in the most urgent and vital task facing humanity today: namely, negotiations on the issues of disarmament as well as the reduction of tensions and the building of mutual confidence.

It was in that spirit that we welcomed the initiative of the Soviet Union to convene the Disarmament Commission in April of this year. That initiative led to a fruitful and constructive debate on the basic problems arising in any consideration of disarmament, and eventually the Commission was able to adopt two resolutions with overwhelming majorities.1 Those two resolutions represent the combined will and the common aspirations of the international community as a whole. The deliberations of the Disarmament Commission, which lasted for nearly two months, had a message which is aptly contained in them. It is therefore necessary to devote some attention to those resolutions, which received the massive support of the membership of the United Nations. As it happened, both were tabled by large groups of non-aligned delegations, and we of the Indian delegation were highly gratified at the part we were privileged to play in their success.

The first of them dealt with the convening of a world disarmament conference. Following the proposal made by the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries in Cairo in October 1964,2 it recommended the General Assembly of the United Nations to give urgent consideration to that proposal. We have no doubt that the General Assembly will devote its full attention to that recommendation.

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1 Ante, pp. 253, 260–262.
2 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 445.
and examine the various issues related to the successful holding of a fruitful conference.

References have been made to this resolution in our debate and I think it is useful to clarify some of its aspects. As we all know, the international community had devoted attention to questions of disarmament long before the United Nations came into existence. Again, the very first resolution of the United Nations related to an aspect of disarmament. Recently, however, and particularly since the establishment of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, these issues have been debated, studied and negotiated more exhaustively and comprehensively than ever before.

International consideration of the problems of disarmament has all along followed two courses. First, as disarmament is a matter of vital concern to the whole of mankind and reflects the hopes and aspirations of all peoples of the world, it has been discussed in various bodies representing the nations of the world. The Disarmament Commission, the First Committee of the General Assembly and the Assembly in its plenary sessions have deliberated fruitfully, and adopted appropriate resolutions, on questions of disarmament. The representatives of the non-aligned nations who assembled first in Belgrade in September 1961 and then in Cairo in October 1964 believed it was also desirable to have another and more representative gathering to deliberate on this issue. The Disarmament Commission agreed to that recommendation, and we have no doubt that the United Nations General Assembly also will agree to it and adopt appropriate preparatory steps towards an early convocation of the proposed conference.

I spoke of two courses or methods. The first method is that of considering questions of disarmament in deliberative bodies or ad hoc gatherings such as the Disarmament Commission, the General Assembly, regional and other conferences and the world disarmament conference. The second course is that of negotiation as distinct from deliberation. It is realized by all persons who have thought seriously about disarmament that it is not possible to negotiate details of disarmament—either of a treaty on general and complete disarmament or of agreements on collateral measures—in a large body, ad hoc or permanent, of 114 or 120 or so representatives meeting for comparatively short periods. Such negotiations need long, patient and technical consideration and scrutiny by a smaller group. Negotiations on disarmament have therefore been conducted in smaller committees of experts, whether consisting of five representatives or ten or seventeen. As has been generally appreciated, after a period of trial and error we have now established an appropriate body—the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament—to deal with the task of negotia-

1 See ibid., 1961, pp. 374-383.
tion as distinct from the task of debate, deliberation and adoption of resolutions on broad issues of disarmament.

Speaking on behalf of the sponsors of resolution DC/224 in the Disarmament Commission, I emphasized therefore this point in some detail. In fact, this resolution of the Commission on the world disarmament conference recognized the importance of the efforts being made in the fields of both deliberation and negotiation, and emphasized that a debate in a forum such as the world disarmament conference would give powerful support to the praiseworthy efforts which were being made all the time. That, in fact, was what the Cairo Conference felt, and it was what the Disarmament Commission approved. What was needed, the Commission said, was that the process set in motion by United Nations bodies and by our Committee should be developed further. It cannot be the function of the world disarmament conference to undertake any detailed negotiations on disarmament, nor should it equally be the task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to devote its attention to the deliberative or debating aspect of disarmament.

I have spoken at some length on this matter as I wish to emphasize unequivocally that the task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament still remains, and will continue to remain, as essential as it is urgent. The great contribution that the Cairo concept made in that respect was to support the continuing international efforts on disarmament, as fully reflected in the preamble of the Commission's resolution. The membership of the Disarmament Commission, of course, was already conscious of this two-course approach. Appropriately, therefore, it passed two resolutions, the first dealing with the proposal of a more representative deliberative conference,¹ and the second dealing with the question of negotiations.²

The second resolution is thus of direct concern to our work in this Committee. In this connexion I think it is useful to devote some attention to the relevance of the various provisions of the resolution to the question of our programme of work. It has been suggested that this second resolution requires that we devote our discussions mainly to two issues: namely, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and a comprehensive test-ban treaty. To our mind, that is not its import. In fact, its operative paragraph 2 has several sub-paragraphs, and the very first sub-paragraph clearly refers to the urgency to develop a treaty on general and complete disarmament and to consider the various proposals made during the debate in the Commission. The Soviet Union and many other countries made some pertinent proposals, particularly with regard to the reduction and eventual removal of foreign troops and bases, and to a conference to consider the question of

¹ Ante, p. 253.
² Ante, pp. 260–262.
a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, in fact, advanced those ideas in the form of two draft resolutions.1 Similarly, the United States and other countries put forward some promising ideas, including a freeze on production of certain nuclear delivery vehicles and a freeze on production and transference of fissile material to peaceful purposes. The United States also put its ideas down in the form of a draft resolution.2

What I wish to emphasize is that the Disarmament Commission certainly did not, even if it was in a position to do so, preclude discussion in our Committee on any of those subjects. That was certainly not the intention of the sponsors of the draft resolution; nor was it, as I have said, the final view of the Commission. We have therefore seriously to consider these issues particularly those raised by the big Powers.

Operative sub-paragraph 2(a) of resolution DC/225 is thus of as much importance as other sub-paragraphs, and we hope that we shall be able to devote attention to the question of general and complete disarmament and to other collateral measures "to relax international tension and halt and reverse the arms race."3 I appreciate, of course, that time is the crucial factor and that we shall need to organize our programme of work bearing in mind the limited time at our disposal.

Operative sub-paragraph 2(b) referred to the question of extending the scope of the present partial test-ban Treaty to cover underground tests, and desired that this be considered as a matter of priority.4 To our mind and to the minds of many non-aligned delegations this is easily the most urgent and the most important task facing the Committee at this stage. We do not have much time before the General Assembly takes up items on disarmament, and we believe that this is one field in which it is possible to report at least some progress. The Commission also gave special priority to the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and a programme of certain related measures. On consideration of the requirements of time, ripeness for solution, urgency and the political and disarmament value of the measure, however, we believe that it is essential for us to devote particular and primary attention to the question of reaching agreement on a comprehensive test ban.

The Indian position on this issue is well known. We have maintained that all nuclear tests are basically evil; they encourage evil, and the sooner this evil is dealt with the better. We raised our voice against these explosions right from their unfortunate inception, and over eleven years ago we addressed an appeal to the Disarmament

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1 Ante, pp. 206-208.
2 Ante, p. 209.
3 Ante, p. 262.
4 Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291-293.
Commission and the Sub-Committee on Disarmament to consider immediately the question of a “stand-still” agreement in respect of these test explosions pending progress towards some solution, full or partial, in respect of the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.1

We have throughout consistently advanced this view and have particularly emphasized the deleterious genetic and somatic effects of test explosions. We said this again a couple of months ago when the People’s Republic of China exploded a second nuclear weapon device in the atmosphere—a direct and callous affront to all humanity—even when the Disarmament Commission was actually in session. It is a sad commentary on the state of the world when a country flouts with impunity the combined will of the rest of the world and wages a blatant attack on the health of humanity.

I appreciate that we in this Committee can only express our anguish and our regret that this has happened. As a negotiating forum the Committee should look forward, and the step that we look forward to is the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty or, to use the language of the Disarmament Commission resolution, extension of “the scope of the partial test-ban Treaty to cover underground tests.” 2 This was also the message of our Committee at the conclusion of its meeting of 5 August.3

The Indian delegation had already formulated its views at the last session of the Committee in the memorandum appended to the Committee’s report. We said:

We consider it imperative . . . that all underground tests should be discontinued immediately, either by unilateral decisions based on the policy of mutual example, or in some other appropriate way, while negotiations are going on for reconciling the differences between the nuclear Powers.4

We put forward a further suggestion for the consideration of the nuclear Powers. We said that they might enter into another partial treaty for the cessation of tests above a limited threshold and that this threshold could be lowered subsequently as a result of the exchange of scientific and other data and of appropriate negotiations. Lest there be any misunderstanding, we should like to clarify that such scientific exchanges were suggested for the specific purpose of lowering the initially-agreed threshold.

It was nearly a year ago that we presented that memorandum. Since then there has been further technological progress in the fields of detection and identification and if anything our conviction has grown stronger that it is desirable for the nuclear Powers to take a bold decision and, for the sake of argument, some theoretical risks

2 Ante, p. 262.
3 Ante, pp. 310–311.
4 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 411.
in order to achieve one more significant landmark in our path of progress towards disarmament.

The nuclear Powers have taken such decisions in the past, and the peoples of the world owe a debt of gratitude to the wisdom and the vision of the leaders of those powerful and peace-loving nations. Humanity continues to hope that the big Powers will once again institute a measure like the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles,\(^1\) the partial test-ban Treaty,\(^2\) the prohibition on the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction in outer space,\(^3\) and the reduction in production of fissile material for weapons purposes.\(^4\) These were bold decisions and theoretically there were some risks involved. We trust that the nuclear Powers will follow the same high-minded pattern and achieve a satisfactory agreement in our Committee so that the evil of underground explosions may be eliminated for ever from the earth. Delay only gives false excuses to the chauvinists among us who glorify war and to whom peaceful coexistence is a crime.

Then there was operative paragraph 2(c) of that resolution of the Disarmament Commission, which recommended that special priority be accorded also

... to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons giving close attention to the various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures.\(^5\)

The Indian delegation expressed its considered views on the subject in the debate in the Disarmament Commission.\(^6\) Although there were variations in emphasis or detail, these views received the support of a large number of speakers. They were in agreement with the basic thesis that it was unrealistic to ask countries to forswear for ever a programme of nuclear weapons production when the existing nuclear Powers continued to hold on to their awesome arsenals.

It is not only the non-aligned delegations who support this thesis. In his message to the Committee on its resumption the Secretary-General said—

Those who have already embarked upon nuclear weapons development continue to perfect and increase their stockpile of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, a growing number of States capable of nuclear weapons development will be faced with extremely grave decisions in this area which will have profound repercussions. Responsibility and restraint are needed on the part of both the nuclear and non-nuclear States. Decisions in the field of nuclear weapons development have a contagious and cumulative effect whether in the curbing or in the broadening of the nuclear arms race.\(^7\)

\(^1\) Ibid., 1961, pp. 439-442.
\(^2\) Ibid., 1963, pp. 291-293.
\(^3\) Ibid., p. 538.
\(^4\) Ibid., 1964, pp. 165-171.
\(^5\) Ante, p. 262.
\(^6\) Ante, pp. 147-151.
\(^7\) ENDC/PV.218, p. 6.
Countries belonging to the two Power blocs have also appreciated the logic and rationality of this approach. In his statement at the meeting on 3 August, Mr. Tsarapkin referred to the question of elimination of already-accumulated nuclear materials, saying that “it is precisely those materials that constitute a threat.”¹ A long time ago the Soviet Union put forward the Gromyko proposal designed to reduce the existing nuclear delivery vehicles to the lowest minimum level in the first stage of disarmament.² We have had occasion to commend to this Committee the principle underlying that thesis. Philosophers tell us that it is wrong to talk of what might have been; but we venture to think that, if our suggestion had found favour at that time, the international community would not have been facing today what our friends call a prospect of nuclear anarchy.

I spoke of both the Power blocs. In the Disarmament Commission Lord Chalfont said:

there is an imperative need to make a start here and now down the long road we have to travel. The first priority is to halt and reverse the direction of the present uncontrolled arms race, and particularly the mounting production of these ever-costlier weapons of mass destruction. That is the central problem which poses a growing danger for all of us. It lies right at the heart of any discussion about disarmament. We believe that even now, at this moment, the order and stability of the world could be assured by a reduction of nuclear weapons to lower, safer and less costly levels.³

Again, referring to the perverse and incomprehensible notion of nuclear clubs and monopolies, he said:

Much of this, it must be said quite bluntly, is the fault of the existing nuclear Powers.⁴

In a recent debate in the House of Commons the United Kingdom Prime Minister referred to the draft of a non-proliferation treaty on which the United Kingdom was working and said:

This treaty is not based on any exclusive attempt to preserve nuclear privileges for a small group of Powers.⁵

In the July issue of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Foster contributed one of the most thought-provoking articles ever written on disarmament. One may not agree with everything that Mr. Foster has said in that article, but we note that in his excellent survey of the situation, he said:

In stressing that such measures as reductions in Soviet and American nuclear capabilities are important if we are to succeed in dealing with nuclear proliferation, it should be made clear that it is not a question of our setting a good example, a factor of regrettably little influence in international affairs, but rather the fact that we would, by negotiating such measures, be giving evidence of our determina-

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¹ Ante, p. 301.
³ Disarmament Commission Official Records; 74th Meeting, p. 2.
⁴ Ibid., p. 3.
tion to reverse the arms race and move towards a world order in which the role of nuclear weapons would be diminished. Lacking at least reasonable prospects of movement in this direction, it is hard to see how, in the long run, we can hope to put any limits on the membership in the nuclear club.1

The Foreign Minister of Italy spoke to us only a few days ago and suggested that a thorough consideration be given by the Committee to the idea of a "commitment by the nuclear countries to a certain programme of nuclear disarmament" in the context of an agreement on non-proliferation.2

I do not wish to burden the Committee with more quotations. The non-aligned delegations have indeed spoken on many occasions on this central theme: the unrealistic and irrational proposition that a non-proliferation treaty should impose obligations only on non-nuclear countries, while the nuclear Powers continue to hold on to their privileged status or club membership by retaining and even increasing their deadly stockpiles. The Heads of State or Government who assembled in Cairo in October 1964 particularly asked the nuclear Powers to conclude non-dissemination agreements and to agree on measures providing for the gradual liquidation of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. They said that it was as part of these efforts that the non-nuclear countries would declare their readiness not to produce or to acquire these weapons.3

Here we must make a clear and unambiguous distinction between the national decisions of countries on the one hand and the obligations to be assumed by them as signatories to an international instrument on the other. As the Committee is aware, India is the only country besides the four nuclear Powers which has a chemical separation plant in operation producing kilogramme quantities of plutonium. If any country wishes to embark on a nuclear weapons programme, it must have a chemical separation plant or a gaseous diffusion plant. India is the only one of the countries not in possession of nuclear weapons which has this facility. And yet our Prime Minister has repeatedly declared that India does not intend to enter the nuclear weapons race. India believes that nuclear energy must be used only for peaceful purposes. This is our national decision, a decision which we have taken on a thorough examination of relevant political, economic and strategic factors, and we are determined to stand firm on it.

An international treaty is, however, a different proposition. What we are discussing in this Committee is not the national decisions of countries but the international requirements of a rational, realistic and non-discriminatory agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. What we are examining is the needs of the international

3 *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, p. 444.
community, not those of individual nations. It is in that context that we put forward our five-point integrated approach in the Disarmament Commission, and it is in that context that we are dealing with that problem in this Committee.

Therefore, when we are talking of non-proliferation the fundamental problem we have to consider is that of the proliferation that has already taken place. The Oxford Dictionary defines the word "proliferate" as follows: "Reproduce itself, grow by multiplication of elementary parts". We are talking about proliferation of nuclear weapons, not about the proliferation of a so-called closed club. The relevant paragraph of the preamble of the Disarmament Commission’s resolution thus says:

Convinced that failure to conclude a universal treaty or agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons leads to the most serious consequences.

A non-proliferation agreement, therefore, is basically an agreement to be entered into by the nuclear Powers not to proliferate nuclear weapons. Other provisions are consequential and subsidiary. A prohibition to proliferate applies first to those who are in a position to proliferate or reproduce nuclear weapons themselves, and only secondarily to those who may subsequently be in such a position.

No international treaty can, therefore, be acceptable which issues dictates only to non-nuclear countries not to do this or that, particularly when the countries possessing nuclear weapons do not assume any prior commitments themselves. In India we have a word in our language derived from the name of an emperor who lived at the beginning of the seventeenth century. He himself was a drunkard, but he prohibited drinking in the empire and his name has for ever been associated with such unjust riots.

We have all been talking of the desperate urgency of a non-proliferation agreement; but it appears to me that the basis of such urgency differs with different speakers. There is urgency in everything connected with disarmament; but, relatively speaking, the urgency of stopping non-nuclear countries from producing nuclear weapons in the future is so minor compared with that of stopping the existing nuclear menace. As we said in the Disarmament Commission:

Unless the nuclear Powers and would-be nuclear Powers undertake from now on not to produce any nuclear weapons or weapons delivery vehicles and, in addition, agree to reduce their existing stockpile of nuclear weapons, there is no way of doing away with the proliferation that has already taken place or of preventing further proliferation.  

1 See ante, p. 148.
2 Ante, p. 261.
3 Ante, p. 149.
In this connexion I should like to say a word on the use of the word “further” with regard to proliferation. We are unable to understand the relevance of this word in the present stage. There was no doubt a time when the use of this word had some meaning. That is no longer the position. The question that we ask is “How much further is further?” The world has gone beyond the days of two nuclear Powers, who further became three, who further became four; and now further a fifth country wants to force itself into this dangerous club. How long, then, shall we be using the word “further”? What shall we say after ten or twenty countries have thought fit to indulge in this deadly game? Shall we still use the word “further”? Or is there any sacred number or sacred date beyond which proliferation becomes further proliferation?

It is essential, therefore, that we deal with the fundamental problem of the existing proliferation. Further proliferation is in fact a consequence of existing proliferation, and unless we deal with the disease itself we can effect no cure. By ignoring the disease and trying to deal with vague symptoms and unreal lists of probable nuclear countries, we shall only make the disease more intractable.

I referred to the five-point proposal put forward by us in the Disarmament Commission. We said that this was an integrated programme and that adoption of one or two isolated measures within that programme was not adequate. We particularly referred in this context to the question of an undertaking through the United Nations to safeguard the security of non-nuclear nations. There seems to be a feeling in some quarters that an attempt to meet this requirement in some measure or other would be adequate. As far as we are concerned, that is not a correct or complete reading of our proposal.

I do not wish at this stage to go into the credibility or otherwise of such an undertaking, nor into its difficult mechanics. All I wish to say is that this particular point is not the basic feature of our proposal. What we wished to do was to present a comprehensive proposal, and we included certain peripheral elements for the sake of comprehensiveness. Those peripheral elements have a certain moral and psychological value, but that is all. The basic feature of the proposal is, however, the one relating to—

Tangible progress towards disarmament, including a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a complete freeze on production of nuclear weapons and means of delivery as well as a substantial reduction in the existing stocks.\(^1\)

For a rational and acceptable treaty on non-dissemination this is the essential requirement. The others are peripheral.

At this stage it is necessary to remove a misunderstanding. We are not trying to embrace a wide field of disarmament in our approach on non-proliferation. There are scores of measures of disarmament,

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\(^1\) *Ante*, p. 148.
and we all know, particularly in this Committee, that the draft treaties on disarmament presented by the two sides cover numerous aspects of the process of achievement of a disarmed world. What we suggest namely, a stoppage of production of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles and reduction in their stockpiles—is only a small part of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, and we refer to this small part in the context of non-proliferation because that is the real essence of non-proliferation.

In this context I should like to refer again to the important statement made by the Foreign Minister of Italy. He referred to the obstacles facing agreement on an acceptable treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and mentioned the misgivings of non-nuclear nations about renouncing these weapons for ever without some progress in nuclear disarmament by the nuclear countries themselves. Mr. Fanfani then went on to say:

But if it should not be possible to prepare within a reasonable time such a draft comprising obligations for both the nuclear and for the non-nuclear countries, the Italian delegation would reserve the right to appeal to the non-nuclear countries to take an initiative which, without prejudice to their own points of view, would fix a certain period for a moratorium on the possible dissemination of nuclear weapons. It is quite conceivable that the non-nuclear countries, particularly those close to nuclear capability, might agree to renounce unilaterally equipping themselves with nuclear weapons for a specific length of time, it being understood of course that if their aforementioned demands were not complied with during that time-limit, they would resume their freedom of action.¹

That is certainly a fine sentiment, and it deserves respect not only because it is expressed by the Foreign Minister of a great country, but also because it can perhaps be dovetailed into a satisfactory and rational arrangement.

As we have said, the fundamental issue of non-proliferation is the halting and reversing of the existing proliferation. It is on this central theme that we have formulated our five-point programme. Comments have been made that this integrated programme, though rational, is not capable of immediate implementation. We ourselves do not think that a programme of this nature is beyond the wisdom and the capacity of nations. At the same time, I appreciate that it is possible to conceive of a staggered programme of action, bearing in mind of course the integral nature of the programme as a whole.

The problem of proliferation admittedly relates to nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, primarily to the former and secondarily to the latter. In view of this I wonder if it is possible to envisage a treaty or convention in two stages, the first relating to nuclear Powers and the second relating to non-nuclear Powers, the transition from the first stage to the second stage being regulated by the Fanfani appeal.

¹ _Ante_, pp. 288–289.
What I would therefore like to suggest for the consideration of the Committee is a programme of the following nature. The first stage of the treaty—or call it the partial treaty like the one on nuclear tests, for example—should incorporate provisions which are the obligations of the nuclear Powers. Under this partial treaty the nuclear Powers would first undertake, under a formula acceptable to the two Power blocs, not to pass on weapons or technology to others. Secondly, they would cease all production of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles and agree to begin a programme of reduction of their existing stocks. Thirdly, they might also agree to incorporate in this partial treaty the other measures suggested by us in our five-point programme, as they have a certain moral and psychological value.

That would be the first stage of the treaty, or a partial non-proliferation treaty. After this treaty had come into force and steps had been taken by the nuclear Powers to stop all production and embark on reduction of stocks, there would be the second stage of the treaty or the comprehensive treaty, which would provide for an undertaking by non-nuclear Powers not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. The transition between the first stage and the second stage of the treaty, or between the partial treaty and the comprehensive treaty, might be regulated by the formula suggested by Mr. Fanfani.

It appears to me that this may be another way of dealing with the question of non-proliferation if it is not possible to agree immediately on a comprehensive treaty based on our five-point proposal. The basic fact remains, however; and it is that the present unstable and dangerous state of affairs has resulted from the proliferation that has already taken place, and that an early removal of that state of affairs is what will make a comprehensive non-proliferation treaty realistic and abiding. As long as we are clear about the diagnosis of the disease it is not difficult to find appropriate remedies.

Our ultimate objective is clear. In the economic field the “have-nots” have adopted for themselves programmes of economic development so that eventually, with international co-operation, they increase their national wealth and become “haves”. Conversely, in the disarmament field our objective is to achieve, in a spirit of mutual compromise and accommodation, a situation under which the “haves” reduce their war arsenals and eventually become “have-nots”.

Opposition to the concept of nuclear monopoly or privileged club-membership is thus our fundamental response in any examination of a draft treaty or convention on non-proliferation. It is pertinent to note in this connexion that references are being made in various places to an extraneous matter, which has only marginal relevance to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or to that of disarmament as such. I am referring to the suggestion with regard to the institution of International Atomic Energy Agency or similar inter-
national safeguards over the peaceful nuclear activities of nations.\\(^1\) Of course the question of safeguards against diversion of nuclear materials to weapons purposes as a separate issue deserves our earnest consideration, and we have welcomed the decision of the United States Government and others to place some of their reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency control.

I am referring here only to the question of a treaty on non-proliferation, and the relevance to that question of this idea on safeguards. The Government of India has had occasion to express its views on this subject in many forums, including the International Atomic Energy Agency, and I made a statement in this Committee itself last year.\\(^2\) I do not, therefore, wish to go into this issue in any detail at this stage.

Institution of international controls on peaceful reactors and power stations is like an attempt to maintain law and order in a society by placing all its law-abiding citizens in custody while leaving its law-breaking elements free to roam the streets. I suppose one can say that this is one way of keeping the peace; but surely it is more rational to keep the law-breaking elements under restraint rather than the law-abiding citizens. Reactors engaged in peaceful pursuits, and atomic power stations of the developing countries, do not in themselves pose any threat to the security of the international society. It is the chemical separation plants and the gaseous diffusion plants which produce the fissile material used in bombs; and it is these facilities which need to be controlled in any system of controlled disarmament. If one wishes to control swords one need impose control, not on pig-iron plants, but only on factories which manufacture steel for swords. Any proposal, therefore, which contemplates international control on only the peaceful activities of reactors and power plants while leaving free the vast weapon-producing facilities of nuclear Powers—their gaseous diffusion plants—does not attempt to tackle the real problem.

Here again I must emphasize that I am referring to international treaties and conventions as distinct from national decisions. We in India, for example, have with our friends who have assisted us in the past perfectly satisfactory arrangements for safeguards, and we are determined to observe and implement them. But that is entirely different from entering into an international instrument providing for International Atomic Energy Agency or other international safeguards over the reactors and power stations of the developing countries.

Before I end I should like to refer to operative paragraph 2(d) of the Disarmament Commission's second resolution. All that this recommended was that we should keep in mind the principle of

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1 *Ante*, pp. 283–284.
2 ENDC/PV.174, pp. 19 ff.
converting to a programme of economic and social development of the developing countries a substantial part of the resources gradually released by the reduction of military expenditure. The Committee was not asked to negotiate on this matter. It was only a kind of background which we had to keep in mind in our negotiations on actual measures of disarmament and reduction of tensions.

In his statement before the Disarmament Commission, Lord Chalfont spoke of the philosophy of the British Government on the close link between defence and disarmament, and of the need of its defence policy to contain within itself the seeds of future progress towards disarmament. Similarly there is a link between disarmament and the availability of capital and technological resources for the development of developing countries. All that the resolution says, therefore, is that we should bear this link in mind when we talk of disarmament and negotiate measures of disarmament.

I mention that at this stage because it has some relevance to the question of safeguards on atomic reactors. In the developing countries these reactors are instruments of economic development, and we should give careful thought before considering any proposal which, without achieving anything really worthwhile in the field of genuine disarmament, only hinders the economic development of developing countries.

I should like to conclude with the stirring appeal made by His Holiness the Pope only last Sunday, 8 August. He denounced nuclear weapons as "disastrous and dishonourable weapons" and said:

We pray that all shall ban the awful technique which creates these weapons, multiplies and stores them for the terror of mankind, and we pray that such death-dealing weapons have not killed world peace even in attempting to achieve it, not impaired for ever the honour of science nor extinguished the serenity of life on earth.

Statement by the U.A.R. Representative (Hassan) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, August 17, 1965

Before beginning my statement, in which I intend to express my delegation's point of view on the state of disarmament negotiations after a ten-month recess, to assess the task before this session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in the light of the

1 Ante, p. 262.
4 ENDC/PV.224, pp. 5–12.
work achieved by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York and to state the general attitude of the United Arab Republic on a non-dissemination treaty, I should like first to thank Mr. Foster, the United States representative, for his kind gesture in ceding to me his place on the list of speakers.

Once again, the delicate and difficult problem of disarmament is thrust upon the members of this Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It is true that discussions and negotiations on disarmament have been going on almost continuously since the end of the Second World War. It cannot be denied that some progress has been made as a result of this process, nor can it be denied that the degree of such progress leaves much to be desired.

Arms and armaments systems are not created for their own sake: they are the result of existing conflicts among nations. That is why we deplore the deteriorating international atmosphere plagued by sources of tension, violence and aggression. This worsening political climate is no doubt delaying our negotiations, and that in its turn has an adverse impact on the prospects of peace which the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has been trying to promote during the last three years. This difficulty could be surmounted if we were to advance simultaneously on both lines—the gradual settlement of political disputes, and the technical negotiations of disarmament. Any progress in one sphere would without doubt facilitate and initiate progress in the other and, moreover, would lead to the growth of international confidence.

The United Arab Republic, as a non-aligned country which believes in peace based on justice, considers that a realistic approach to the promotion of the cause of disarmament should be based on the solution of pending international crises which threaten to engulf us and the rest of the world in a devastating war. Therefore the United Arab Republic would like to appeal to all parties concerned to heed the call of sanity and spare the small nations the sufferings and sacrifices they are enduring. Inasmuch as we cannot remain indifferent to the dangers to which this deteriorating situation is exposing the whole world, it should stimulate us to redouble the efforts made here to promote peace. We are encouraged in this respect by the fact that that is also what we understood from the declarations made by the two co-Chairmen at the opening meeting of this session.1

The deliberations of our Committee in Geneva in 1964 came to an end on 17 September after sixty-one plenary meetings without in fact bringing the results expected by us all after the initial progress achieved the year before. The Conference had to break up without being able to present any concrete agreements to a world in which the arms race

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1 The U.S. statement appears ante, p. 281. For the Soviet statement, see ENDC/PV.218, pp. 7–8.
was still speeding up amid further uncertainties and increasing dangers.

During the Conference’s first session of last year the Committee, in so far as general and complete disarmament was concerned, focussed its attention and held lengthy discussions on the problem of reducing and eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and conventional armaments—items 5(b) and 5(c) of the agreed agenda 1—in the light of the Soviet Government’s amended and revised proposal providing for a nuclear umbrella to be kept as a deterrent until the end of the third stage of the disarmament process.2 During its second session there was a long and unsuccessful discussion about establishing a special working group whose task would be precisely to discuss the implications of a nuclear umbrella and the conditions under which it should be set up.

As the negotiations evolved in our Committee, it became more and more apparent that the problem of nuclear delivery vehicles had rightly become the very key to the deliberations on general and complete disarmament and a crucial element in the whole structure of the problem. Therefore the setting up of an appropriate working group with mutually-agreed terms of reference would seem to be the first practical step in launching a frontal attack on this vital and complex problem. It was on this point, unfortunately, that the negotiations got into a blind alley.

If I have taken the time of the Committee in touching briefly upon the development of our deliberations vis-à-vis general and complete disarmament, it is because we still believe that the main mandate assigned to us by the General Assembly is to draft a treaty on general and complete disarmament under international control.

It was to our regret that, despite the encouraging atmosphere which prevailed in 1963, we were unable to register any kind of substantial result last year in the field of collateral measures. That was all the more regrettable since both the United States Government and the Soviet Government submitted to the Conference substantive proposals—numbering fourteen altogether—for collateral measures. All of them were amply discussed, but nevertheless at the end of the Conference last year no rapprochement or particular progress was recorded. In fact, the Committee’s debate again left no doubt that the fundamental difference of opinion between East and West lies in the field of verification and control on the one side, and the geographical scope and political objective of the main disarmament proposals on the other.

Far from being deterred by these differences or difficulties, the non-aligned delegations brought to light and stressed the points of simi-

2 Ibid., 1964, p. 22.
larity in the proposals of both sides and the common objectives pursued by them. In response to the general directives of the General Assembly in this respect, the non-aligned delegations presented compromise solutions and suggestions to narrow the gap between the two parties' positions.

We had hoped that the debate within the framework of the General Assembly would provide us with fresh directives and open up new possibilities for agreement. Unfortunately our hopes for support and new stimulus from the larger forum soon disappeared when it became obvious that the General Assembly would not engage in effective work last session. In addition to the inherent difficulty of disarmament negotiations, critical political developments in the world affecting especially the small nations aggravated the situation, and the hopes of the peoples for a better understanding and a more secure world faded greatly because of the paralysis of the United Nations General Assembly and its inability to tackle the major international problems facing the world today, and in particular the disarmament problem.

Fortunately, this sombre situation was brightened somewhat by the reconvening of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York. The reconvening of the United Nations Disarmament Commission at this particular time shows beyond any doubt that the disarmament effort should continue without interruption until agreement on general and complete disarmament is reached.

After its two-month session, the United Nations Disarmament Commission adopted two resolutions. Resolution DC/224 concerns the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited, as proposed by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Cairo in October 1964. We hope that the General Assembly at its twentieth session will give its support to that proposal. As we have stated on various occasions, it is our firm belief that more successful and useful deliberations on the vital problem of disarmament would undoubtedly be achieved through the participation of all States and in particular all the nuclear Powers, including the People's Republic of China and France.

The second resolution, DC/225, adopted by the Disarmament Commission urged an early reconvening of our Committee to continue its task both in the field of general and complete disarmament and in the field of collateral measures. My delegation has noted with satisfaction that this resolution, by including the principle that a substantial part of the resources that will be released through disarmament should be devoted to the economic and social development

3 *Ante*, pp. 260–262.
of the developing countries, reflects the necessity of narrowing the gap between the developing and the developed nations.

Before the adoption of these two resolutions a useful and thorough exchange of views was held in the United Nations Disarmament Commission and important aspects of disarmament were raised, among them the problems of demilitarized zones, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and the elimination of foreign bases. With regard to the problem of foreign bases, the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries has noted with concern that foreign military bases are 

... in practice a means of bringing pressure on nations and retarding their emancipation and development, based on their own ideological, political, economic and cultural ideas. 

The Conference regarded further

... the maintenance or future establishment of foreign military bases and the stationing of foreign troops on the territories of other countries ... as a gross violation of the sovereignty of States, and as a threat to freedom and international peace.\(^1\)

As far as my delegation is concerned we are ready to discuss one or all of the collateral measures presented by both parties in order to continue to explore the possibility of reaching agreement on any of them. But since the importance and the urgency of reaching further agreement on specific issues collateral to disarmament varies in priority according to the development in the international situation, and since there are some specific collateral measures which hold out some prospects for agreement—and it is for this reason that resolution DC/225 has recommended that we consider them as a matter of priority and report to the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly on the progress made in our work—my delegation should like to deal with the two specific issues mentioned in resolution DC/225, which are underground tests and the problem of non-dissemination.

The question of extending the scope of the partial test-ban Treaty \(^2\) to cover underground tests occupies an important part of our minds. It is quite obvious that unless underground tests are banned and halted completely we shall be undermining the partial test-ban Treaty; and the more we delay our action in this respect the more difficult it will become in the future to maintain the momentum gained so far by the disarmament cause. That is a situation which, I trust, no State represented here wishes to see arise.

We have listened with great attention to what both sides have had to say with regard to this problem in their speeches during this session. It is rather encouraging to notice that the gap between the

\(^1\) *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, p. 446.
two sides tends to narrow. I would refrain from elaborating the position of the United Arab Republic in this connexion, as it has been stated in this Committee and elsewhere in other forums of the United Nations.\(^1\) I should like to say at this stage that whatever the remaining differences are, political or technical, the Committee has before it various suggestions presented to it by the non-aligned delegations around this table, such as that for the extension of the Moscow Treaty to cover underground tests above seismic magnitude of 4.75, which the admitted capacities and capabilities of the existing national equipments are able to detect and identify, as a further step towards the total banning of all underground tests.\(^2\) As a complementary measure to the preceding one, we again proposed that there should be a voluntary moratorium by nuclear Powers under which they would refrain from any further testing pending agreement on the decision needed for a comprehensive test-ban treaty.\(^3\)

As we have already mentioned, whatever the real obstacles may be, political or technical, we still believe as we have believed in the past that exchanging scientific and other information between the nuclear Powers, or continued improvement of detection and identification techniques, might help us to reach finally an agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

I should like to turn now to the question of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. It is quite obvious that recent developments in the world have pushed to the forefront the problem of the further spread of nuclear weapons and the danger of an increase in the number of countries which could produce or otherwise acquire them. The dangers inherent in this problem signify the necessity and urgency of reaching an agreement to prevent the possibility of enlarging the membership of the atomic club, and therefore of increasing the dangers of nuclear war which would lead to universal disaster.

It was with this sense of responsibility that the heads of African States and Governments who assembled in Cairo in July 1964 adopted their resolution on this issue\(^4\) which later was unanimously confirmed at the Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries when they convened for their second conference last October. As the Committee is aware, the Heads of State or Government declared their "readiness not to produce, acquire or test any nuclear weapons". They furthermore expressed their readiness to have this solemn undertaking made the subject of a treaty to be concluded in an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations, and open to accession by all States.

\(^1\) See ENDC/PV.161, p. 12; *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 148-150; A/C.1/PV.1310 (prov.), pp. 28-30; *ante*, pp. 151-158.
\(^2\) *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, p. 427.
\(^3\) *Ante*, p. 156.
\(^4\) *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 294-295.
They also called upon the nuclear Powers to observe and respect the spirit of this declaration.

Furthermore, the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, in their Programme for Peace and International Co-operation, requested

... the Great Powers to abstain from all policies conducive to the dissemination of nuclear weapons and their by-products among those States which do not at present possess them.

They also underlined "the great danger in the dissemination of nuclear weapons" and urged "all States, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons, to conclude non-dissemination agreements ...".¹

We are ready, therefore, to discuss with great attention and interest any draft treaty on non-dissemination which will take into consideration in this respect the wishes and aspirations expressed by the Heads of the Non-Aligned States at their summit meeting held in Cairo last year.

We have expressed our views on the question of non-dissemination on many occasions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. In general, our basic conception of a non-dissemination treaty is not of a mere instrument in which the non-nuclear Powers would gladly renounce their rights to acquire nuclear weapons in order just to perpetuate the monopoly or the privileged position of the present five nuclear Powers; we see the treaty as an important measure to curb and to reverse the nuclear arms race in order to facilitate the actual reduction and final destruction of the existing stocks of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Therefore we should like to see the treaty reflect this consideration in an appropriate way, and we sincerely hope it will do so.

I should like to refer to the message sent by President Nasser to the World Conference against Nuclear and Thermo-nuclear Bombs held recently in Tokyo. In his message the President emphasized the threat of nuclear annihilation to which all peoples of the world are exposed. He further called upon all nations of the world to insist on the prohibition of all nuclear tests and of the possession of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. The President added that the United Arab Republic, for its part, strongly supported all endeavours directed against nuclear armaments. He voiced the hope that agreement would be reached on the destruction of all nuclear weapons.

We in the United Arab Republic have diligently worked for consolidation of the policy of peaceful coexistence and the promotion of the cause of peace based on justice. That is why we have always shown a keen interest in the cause of disarmament. Up to very recently the disarmament problem, and the question of non-dissemination in particular, has been among the main topics discussed by the United

¹ Ibid., p. 444.
Arab Republic in the series of meetings which we have had with the Heads of African, Asian and other non-aligned countries who visited Cairo recently. As a result of these meetings we came to the conclusion that it was imperative now to conclude a non-dissemination agreement. We therefore hope that discussion at this session will enable us to arrive at an acceptable non-dissemination agreement, and that all of us here will be able to sign the first draft of such a treaty and to submit it to the General Assembly at its forthcoming session.

United States Proposal Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft Treaty To Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, August 17, 1965

The Parties to this Treaty,
Desiring to promote international peace and security,
Desiring in particular to refrain from taking steps which will extend and intensify the arms race,
Believing that the further spread of nuclear weapons will jeopardize these ends,
Recalling that Resolution 1665 (XVI) of the General Assembly of the United Nations urges all States to cooperate for these purposes,
Desiring to achieve effective agreements to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce armaments, including particularly nuclear arsenals,
Reaffirming their determination to achieve agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control,
Have agreed as follows:

**ARTICLE I**

1. Each of the nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer any nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear State, either directly, or indirectly through a military alliance, and each undertakes not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons.

2. Each of the nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to assist any non-nuclear State in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

**ARTICLE II**

1. Each of the non-nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to manufacture nuclear weapons; each undertakes not to seek or to receive the transfer of such weapons into its national control, either

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2 Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 694.
directly, or indirectly through a military alliance; and each undertakes not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons.

2. Each of the non-nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes not to seek or to receive assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or itself to grant such assistance.

**Article III**

Each of the States Party to this Treaty undertakes to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities.

**Article IV**

In this Treaty

(a)—“nuclear State” means a State possessing independent power to use nuclear weapons as of __________ (date).

(b)—“non-nuclear State” means any State which is not a nuclear State.

**Article V**

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratification by __________ (a certain number of) governments, including those of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding states of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, and the date of its entry into force.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

**Article VI**

1. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the right of any Party to the Treaty to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other signatory and acceding States and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Two years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of parties may be held at a date and place to be fixed by agreement of two-thirds of the parties in order to review the operation of the Treaty.

**Article VII**

This Treaty, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in triplicate at the city of __________, the ___ day of __________, one thousand nine hundred and sixty five.

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**Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft Treaty To Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, August 17, 1965**

In my opening statement at this session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, I read a message from President Johnson in which he assigned the following objective to be pursued by the United States delegation:

First, to seek agreements that will limit the perilous spread of nuclear weapons, and make it possible for all countries to refrain without fear from entering the nuclear arms race.

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1 ENDC/PV.224, pp. 16-21.
2 Ante, pp. 281-286.
After referring to the need to work towards the effective limitation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and for a truly comprehensive test-ban treaty, the President said also:

No difference among any of us, on any other issue, can be allowed to bar agreement in this critical area. This is not in any single nation's interest, nor is it in the interest of the multitude of nations and peoples whose future is so tied to the good sense of those at this conference table.¹

It is in this spirit that I have the pleasure today of offering for discussion and negotiation in this Committee a draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.² This draft is the product of close collaboration among the NATO countries represented here. It embodies important contributions from Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom. Although the United States has the privilege and responsibility of sponsorship, our allies fully share our earnest desire that this text should be received by the Committee as a sincere and constructive basis for negotiation.

In the course of their intensive consultations the four Western delegations were motivated by the single desire to come to grips once and for all with the deadly peril of nuclear anarchy. We have been inspired by the spirit of General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI)³ whose unanimous call for an international agreement to bar the spread of nuclear weapons has gone too long unanswered. We have sought to respond as faithfully and as fully as now seems possible to the recommendation contained in document DC/225 of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, a resolution which enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations.⁴ Finally, we have sought to accommodate the differing and sometimes conflicting preoccupations of various governments in a manner which, while sensitive to their desires, gives the necessary emphasis to the need to halt proliferation.

Let me now offer a brief explanation of the provisions of the draft treaty.

Under article I countries having nuclear weapons would have the following obligations. First, they could not transfer nuclear weapons into the national control of any country not having nuclear weapons. They could not do this either directly, or indirectly through a military alliance. Secondly, they could not assist any such country in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Thirdly, they could not take any other action to increase the number of nuclear Powers in the world. By “nuclear Powers” I mean any entity having independent power to use nuclear weapons, whether it be a State, a régime or some other

¹ Ante, p. 281.
² Supra.
³ Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 694.
⁴ Ante, pp. 260–262.
kind of organization. As we all know, power to use nuclear weapons now rests only in national hands.

Article II of the treaty would impose corresponding obligations upon the countries not having nuclear weapons. First, these countries could not seek or receive the transfer of nuclear weapons into their national control. They could not do this either directly, or indirectly through a military alliance. Secondly, they could not manufacture nuclear weapons or seek, receive or grant assistance in such manufacture. Thirdly, they could not take any other action which would cause an increase in the number of nuclear entities in the world above the existing number. This simple draft would thus prevent any increase in the number of nuclear Powers. You will all remember President Kennedy's fear that there would be no rest for anyone, no stability, no real security and no chance for disarmament in a world with a growing number of nuclear Powers. This draft would ensure that there would be no increase in the number, even by one.

Under article III all parties would undertake to co-operate in facilitating the application to their peaceful nuclear activities of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or their equivalent. Unlike other provisions of this draft, this article does not set forth a precise or completely-formulated obligation; but it does clearly indicate a line of policy which all parties undertake to implement: namely, that they will help to bring about the application of such safeguards to their own peaceful nuclear activities and to those of other countries. It is implicit in their undertaking that they would work to see that this is done as rapidly as possible. A number of countries have begun to accept safeguards on their own peaceful reactors. We hope that this process can be expedited.

Moreover, countries which supply uranium and reactors can co-operate in facilitating the application of safeguards in other countries by insisting that this be done with respect to any material or equipment which they supply. I shall want to speak at greater length on this important question in a later intervention; but let me say now that the United States regards this as one of the key provisions which enunciates an important policy. And the application of adequate international safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities is not a matter which is of interest to the nuclear Powers alone. On the contrary, it is the non-nuclear Powers which should be especially interested in a system of safeguards to help assure each of them that their neighbours and others are in fact complying with the treaty.

1 Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 254–255.
We have drafted the provision in its present form to take account of the views of all countries; including those which are not prepared at this time to commit themselves to accept IAEA safeguards in all applicable circumstances. The United States will be especially interested to receive suggestions from the non-nuclear members of this Committee on means of strengthening this provision.

The next article, article IV, contains an important definition. It says that by using the phrase "nuclear State" in this draft treaty we mean a State possessing independent power to use nuclear weapons as of a particular date. Our view is that that date should be the day when the treaty is opened for signature. Our hope, of course, is that this would be very soon.

Article V is an accession clause quite similar to that in the limited nuclear test-ban Treaty. It provides that the treaty will be open to all States for signature. We have suggested this clause because of our belief that the treaty should have world-wide application. The clause would not of course affect the recognition or status of any unrecognized régime or entity which might decide to file an instrument of accession to the treaty.

Under international law and practice recognition of a government or acknowledgement of the existence of a State is brought about as the result of a deliberate decision and course of conduct on the part of a government intending to accord recognition. Recognition of a régime or acknowledgement of an entity cannot be inferred from signature or ratification of or accession to a multilateral agreement. We believe this viewpoint is generally accepted, and it is on that basis that we have suggested this clause.

One important change in this draft from the limited test-ban Treaty language is that paragraph 3 of article V explicitly recognizes the importance of obtaining wide adherence to the treaty if it is to be effective in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. It does this by requiring adherence by a certain number of governments before the treaty goes into effect. We have left a blank for that number. In our view the number should be sufficiently high so that the treaty will be a significant anti-proliferation measure, but not so high as unduly to delay its entry into force.

Article VI is a withdrawal clause fashioned after the provision in the limited test-ban Treaty. It contains two important additions to that provision. First, a party wishing to withdraw under the limited conditions set forth must give notice three months in advance to the Security Council of the United Nations as well as to other parties to and signatories of the treaty. This notice must include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. These requirements have been added because they

1 Ibid., pp. 291-293.
provide an additional brake on hasty withdrawal action without limiting the basic right of withdrawal. In addition, Security Council notification and explanation are clearly appropriate in view of the serious security ramifications of withdrawal.

The second addition to the limited test-ban Treaty formula is a provision calling for review of the treaty, after a specified period, with the agreement of two-thirds of the parties. This was included in part because of the wide concern recently expressed by many participants in the discussions here and in the Disarmament Commission that a treaty such as this should be accompanied by progress to halt and reduce rising nuclear stocks. One of the preambular paragraphs explicitly recognizes this concern. It calls attention to the desire of all of us—

... to achieve effective agreements to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce armaments, including particularly nuclear arsenals.

The United States has proposed a number of measures to stop the build-up of and to reduce nuclear stockpiles. We are prepared to agree to them even before a treaty such as we have tabled today is signed. But we do not believe they should wait on this treaty or that this treaty should wait on them. Let us proceed on all such proposals at the same time, making progress wherever we can.

The last article of the draft treaty, article VII, deals with the problem of authentic texts. It adds Chinese, French and Spanish to the languages set forth in the corresponding clause of the limited test-ban Treaty. This change has been made to signify once again our desire for world-wide adherence.

The draft treaty I have just described may not be a perfect instrument, nor is it necessarily complete in its coverage of pertinent issues. We earnestly hope, however, that our discussion will focus on such improvements as can be agreed upon and that we shall not be urged to incorporate elements which, however desirable in theory, are not now attainable. Insistence on such an approach would be a sure way to prevent agreement. We also hope that our discussions will not be rendered pointless by the imposition of unnecessary conditions or demands from any quarter.

As I said in an earlier intervention, the danger of proliferation is worldwide. It is not the special concern of any one country; nor can it be averted by concentrating our attention on any one country. Let us examine this draft, therefore, from the standpoint of our common goal. If our common goal is to halt the spread of nuclear weapons as a means of enhancing the security of all nations, then that and that alone must govern our arguments. Any other approach would be a monumental folly for which we and future generations would pay dearly and for which we should deserve the condemnation of mankind.
Statement by President Johnson on the United States Draft Treaty To Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, August 17, 1965

This morning, on my instructions, the United States delegate to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, Mr. William C. Foster, has presented a draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. President Kennedy gave voice to international concern over this gravest of all unresolved human issues. He urged the disarmament conference to find ways to both the understanding of urgent needs, and the undertaking of prompt action. For he knew, as each individual citizen senses, the time to halt nuclear spread is before its contagion takes root.

It was in that spirit that he constructed the nuclear test ban treaty, the first hopeful, helpful step in the long journey toward peace. Now we continue that journey today in Geneva.

This draft treaty would bind its signers in a pledge to refrain from actions which would lead to any further increase in the number of nations having the power to unleash nuclear devastation on the world. This United States draft is an important step forward. It plainly demonstrates that a treaty can be drawn which meets the legitimate interests of nuclear and non-nuclear powers alike.

Our draft treaty is now open for discussion and negotiation. The United States is prepared to move forward with promptness and determination to make this proposal a reality. We call upon all those at Geneva to join in this effort.

I speak for all my countrymen in reaffirming our conviction that the peace of the world requires firm limits upon the spread of nuclear weapons.

This has been the policy of the United States for 20 years. The policy is still as right as ever.

In this great issue the interests of the people of the United States are at one with the interests of all people everywhere. The threat to peace—and to human life itself—is universal. If the response is universal, the threat can be met.

President Eisenhower and President Kennedy sought, as I seek now, the pathway to a world in which serenity may one day endure. There is no sane description of a nuclear war. There is only the blinding light of man's failure to reason with his fellow man, and then silence.

The time is now. The hour is late. The fate of generations yet unborn is in our hands. And humanity with all its fears, with all the hopes of future years, is hanging breathless on that fate.

2 Ante, pp. 347-349.
Statement by the British Disarmament Minister (Chalfont) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nondissemination of Nuclear Weapons, August 19, 1965

If it were the custom in this Committee to assign distinctive titles to our statements, I would call mine today "Shallows and Miseries". Those of you who are, like our distinguished Soviet colleague, students of Shakespeare will realize at once that the title is not as sombre or as pessimistic as it may sound. It comes, of course, from one of the most familiar speeches in the Shakespearean canon—the prophetic words of Brutus in *Julius Caesar*:

There is a tide in the affairs of men
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries. (*Act IV, Sc. 3*)

I believe, quite simply and without any wish to over-dramatize the dangers, that unless we can stop and set back the nuclear arms race before many more months have passed, we may have little to look forward to but shallows and miseries.

And I believe that the first thing we must do is stop nuclear weapons spreading from country to country. To me one of the most distressing aspects of present public debate on this issue has been the suggestion in some quarters that this is a false problem, devised by the nuclear Powers to preserve the exclusive nature of their club. The popularity of this theory contains a note of warning that we should not ignore. It means that, we are passing, quickly and perhaps irrevocably, beyond the point at which the spread of nuclear weapons can be stopped. If the non-nuclear Powers of the world, and especially those that are non-aligned, cease to look upon nuclear weapons as an evil and begin to look upon them instead as a symbol of prestige and power, to be acquired or renounced simply on grounds of narrow national expediency, then we shall be lost.

I need hardly remind the Committee that the United Nations has been concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons since before this Committee first assembled in its present form. Six years ago the General Assembly had already recognized in its resolution 1380 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 that:

...the danger now exists that an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons may occur, aggravating international tension and the difficulty of maintaining world peace, and thus rendering more difficult the attainment of general disarmament agreement.\(^1\)

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1 ENDC/PV.225, pp. 5–12.
Two years later the resolution introduced in the General Assembly by the representative of Ireland called for—

... the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons.1

Two years later—last summer, in fact—the same warnings were being sounded here in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Mr. Zorin said on 2 July 1964:

Today we begin discussion of the problem of preventing a further spread of nuclear weapons. The imperative necessity and urgency of solving this problem are so obvious that at the present time, the overwhelming majority of States are in favour of an appropriate international agreement being concluded as quickly as possible.2

and Mr. Lukanov said on 23 July:

But if we fail to achieve progress now or in the immediate future on the question of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, we shall risk setting back the prospects of successful negotiations not only on this question but also on the question of disarmament in general.3

Only three months after this China exploded a nuclear device, and another step had been taken along this miserable road.

It would be a strange comment on all the solemn statements of the past six years if it were now to be suggested that, because we could not stop the spread of nuclear weapons to China, we should despair of trying to stop it at all. Nothing that China has done, or can do in the future, will alter the facts. The spread of nuclear weapons is an unmitigated evil. Each new country that acquires nuclear weapons adds to the danger that we shall be brought face to face with the prospect of nuclear war—and sooner rather than later.

It is surely no longer thinkable that decisions of this sort should be left in the field of purely national policy—that the acquisition or renunciation of nuclear weapons should be simply a matter of moves in the game of power politics among sovereign States and military alliances. This pathetic Clausewitzian view of military power has no place in the age of the nuclear missile—it has already led to the sort of mistakes that have brought us to our present perilous stage in the arms race. As I have already acknowledged in New York, the idea that nuclear weapons are status symbols or tickets of admission to some powerful and exclusive cabal is largely the fault of the existing nuclear Powers, my country amongst them. But that is no reason for repeating such mistakes now or in the future.

1 Ibid., 1961, p. 694.
2 Ibid., 1964, p. 241.
3 ENDC/PV.201, p. 5.
I should like in this context to take a few minutes to comment upon the argument of the representative of India in his statement of 12 August.\textsuperscript{1} As I said at the time, his was a most thoughtful contribution. Indeed, its persuasive clarity makes it all the more necessary that I should take this opportunity to say that there were important implications in his statement which I found profoundly disturbing, and attitudes with which I must, without any equivocation, disagree.

Mr. Trivedi was quite right to ask the rather metaphysical question "'How much further is further?'" The answer quite simply is "No further". It is quite pointless and indeed dangerous, in my opinion, to imply that there may have been a point of no return in the past or, alternatively, that it has not yet been reached. What we have to do is to stop, now, the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. It is only by doing so that we can create a situation in which existing nuclear armaments can be reduced.

I do not think I shall be giving away any secrets if I say that additions to Russian or to United States nuclear weapon strength, although they may not be welcome, are not of themselves likely to present any immediate danger to world peace. On the other hand, as the representative of Mexico pointed out at our last meeting, it needs only one more country to acquire nuclear weapons for the whole situation to change.\textsuperscript{2} Once that happens there will be pressures on other countries that can do so to produce their own nuclear weapons. But, more important, those that cannot do so will seek by every possible means to acquire them from the nuclear countries. The pressures on the nuclear Powers to transfer weapons or control of weapons in pursuit of some illusory balance of power might become irresistible. And if nuclear Powers are tempted to hand over their nuclear weapons in this way they will almost certainly be unable to do so without compensating increases in their own nuclear armoury. And so we shall be in a new and terrifying dimension of the arms race.

The answer, surely, is a non-dissemination agreement. It is simply not enough for the nuclear Powers to undertake obligations on their own. It is, I believe, misleading to talk as Mr. Trivedi talked of law-abiders and potential law-breakers; we are all potential law-breakers. Most analogies tend to be misleading, and on this particular reasoning we are asked to assume that once a country acquires nuclear weapons it switches from being a law-abider to being a potential law-breaker. The overtones of this are the same as the overtones of the "nuclear club" phrase: that is, that there are the select, if wicked, few on the one side of the fence and the countless but spotless many on the other.

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Ante}, pp. 326–340.
\textsuperscript{2} ENDC/PV.224, p. 30.
Although this is a misconception it is not, I suggest, widely shared. This was, I think, well borne out at the Cairo Conference of October 1964. The Heads of State or Government at that Conference, after calling upon the great Powers to abstain from all policies that might lead to the spread of nuclear weapons, declared their own readiness not to produce, acquire or test nuclear weapons, and called on all countries, including those which had not subscribed to the Moscow Treaty, to enter into a similar undertaking. They considered that this undertaking should be the subject of a treaty to be concluded in an international conference convened under the auspices of the United Nations and open to accession by all States.¹

Nothing has happened since then that seems to me to change the situation or to make the need for action less urgent. I am sure that no one in this room can truthfully maintain that the dangers have become less than they were in October 1964. I do, therefore, most seriously suggest to all members of this Committee that it is better to have a treaty now, even if it has, in the eyes of some of my colleagues, some flaws, rather than to set our sights too high and fail to get anything. The Moscow partial test ban Treaty was indeed, on any reckoning, a practical demonstration of this.²

The Committee has until now confined itself to discussing the desirability of a non-dissemination treaty or, at a further advance, the procedural preliminaries to drafting one. The missing element has been a clearly-formulated draft treaty. As the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, pointed out on 10 August:

As soon as a draft for such an international agreement is forthcoming we shall be able to find out whether what have hitherto been regarded as political hurdles in the way of a joining of stands between the nuclear Powers are about to be overcome, and thus be able to judge how bright the prospects are of their clinching the issue in the near future. We shall then also be able to scrutinize the terms of an eventual treaty in realistic detail and judge its clauses on the merits they will carry for the international community as a whole and also for our individual countries.³

The United States has now provided a draft text,⁴ and with it has come a most valuable opportunity to see whether all of us in this Conference can achieve a sufficient measure of agreement to enable a treaty to be negotiated. I was glad to hear the United States representative point out that the draft before us was, indeed, being offered as a sincere and constructive basis for negotiation.⁵ I agree with him that this is exactly what it provides, and on behalf of the United Kingdom I welcome this contribution. The last proposal of

² Ibid., 1963, pp. 291–293.
³ ante, p. 313.
⁴ ante, pp. 347–349.
⁵ ante, p. 350.
comparable importance to come before the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was that for the partial test-ban Treaty. This was put forward three years ago this month and met with agreement a year later.

I hope that this is a good augury, and I trust that the draft will open the way to serious negotiations. It directly reflects resolution DC/225 of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which recommended that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should accord special priority to the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and recommended also giving close attention to suggestions for facilitating agreement by adopting a programme of related measures.¹

As Mr. Foster has said, the draft as it stands incorporates important contributions from Canada, Italy and ourselves. Our over-all preoccupation throughout has been to draft a treaty that will halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Mr. Tsarapkin asked on 17 August whether, in the opinion of the United States, the draft treaty would exclude both direct access by means of national ownership, control and operation and also indirect access by means of the MLF or any similar body.² He went on to ask, if I understood him aright, whether on this latter point the treaty would preclude the creation of an MLF in which West German military or non-military personnel would participate.

I shall not anticipate Mr. Foster’s answers to these questions, but, on behalf of the United Kingdom, I would point out that the draft before us is concerned with non-dissemination. It is no part of its purpose to place an embargo on all arrangements for sharing the control of nuclear weapons within NATO or any other alliance so far as they are not disseminatory—and I would emphasize these words, so far as they are not disseminatory.

It is precisely because we, like others, are concerned about this matter that my Government is anxious to eliminate any possibility of dissemination, however theoretical it may seem. Indeed, it is our view that the present draft of articles I and II of the treaty does leave open one possibility, which may well have more theoretical than practical importance but which we would prefer to see closed. Although fairly tightly drafted, these two articles, as we read them, do not rule out the possibility that an association of States might be set up with the capacity to make use of nuclear weapons by the decision of a majority of its members: in other words, without the veto of an existing nuclear Power. It is true that such an association could not, under this draft, come into existence unless one of the existing nuclear Powers had at the same time, or previously, aban-

¹ Ante, pp. 260–262.
² ENDC/PV.224, p. 40.
doned its independent nuclear capability, so that in any event the total number of nuclear entities would not be increased.

And I am bound to add that my Government is, and will continue to be, irrevocably opposed to any formulation for the Western alliance which might have the effect of making the use of nuclear weapons subject to a majority vote as distinct from a unanimous vote, or at least a vote in which existing nuclear countries have the power of veto. As for the actual form of words, we would prefer to see the treaty conform with our actual policy as it was stated, for example, by my Prime Minister in the House of Commons last December.\(^1\) In other words, we should like to see dissemination interpreted in the strictest possible way.

I should like to go on, after making these points, to say that the tabling of this text has our full support. For our part we hope that there will be other constructive comments and suggestions on the draft treaty. It would indeed be a miracle if it were flawless and covered the requirements and preoccupations of everyone from the beginning. I do not for one moment believe that what I have suggested is a weakness in the wording of the text as it now stands would justify a refusal by any delegation in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to enter into negotiations on the basis of this draft. It is both natural and desirable that differing points of view should be expressed and that these should be taken into account with a view to improving the draft where this is possible; and the United Kingdom delegation intends to do its utmost to help forward these negotiations. The Western Powers are resolved to examine, objectively and without prejudice, any suggestions or proposals that might be put forward here by any of the delegations around this table.

I know, for example, that some representatives are concerned about the need for including certain related measures in a non-dissemination treaty. My own view, which I have advanced before, is that we should not attempt too much at one point of attack on the problems of disarmament. Of course the nuclear Powers must demonstrate their sincere resolve to reduce their own nuclear armouries and remove the suspicion of any desire for exclusive club membership. Of course we must examine the implications of guarantees and of safeguards for non-nuclear Powers who enter into a solemn undertaking not to acquire or make nuclear weapons of their own. But I believe we should attack all these problems separately and concurrently; we should not fall into the trap of trying to construct elaborate packages or of making

a step forward in one aspect of disarmament await success in another. But if there are countries which still genuinely believe that we can achieve a treaty in which all those related measures are included, then let us talk about it. That, after all, is what negotiation among equals means.

Finally, I should like to make one more sincere attempt to clarify in my own mind exactly what the fears of Mr. Tsarapkin really are about the MLF and the ANF. He talks of non-nuclear Powers—especially West Germany—being given “access” to nuclear weapons. What does this mean? It cannot mean the right to fire nuclear weapons, since this is no part of the plans for any nuclear sharing arrangement within the Western alliance. Does it mean the right to prevent them being fired? That I find very hard to believe. Does it mean the stationing of nuclear weapons on German soil? But they are already there—no MLF or ANF will change that position. Does it mean solely physical contact between German nationals and nuclear warheads? If so, how does Mr. Tsarapkin reconcile this with the attacks he has also made on Mr. McNamara’s proposals for a nuclear committee, which involves no form of physical contact whatsoever?

What does this mysterious imprecise word “access” really mean? I ask this in no spirit of trivial debate. I believe the Soviet Union is genuinely worried and concerned about this issue—I refuse to believe that it would stand in the way of a non-dissemination agreement for any other reason. I am anxious to know, exactly and without room for confusion, just what these fears are. It is only in this way that they can be met or allayed. We now have a draft treaty upon which we can begin to get down to the serious business of negotiation. In the last analysis, of course, negotiations on an issue of this importance can never be really serious unless the Soviet Union is serious about them. Speaking for Her Majesty’s Government, I am prepared to examine any proposal, any amendment, any idea so long as it is directed to the aim of this treaty—to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. I hope the Soviet delegation will do the same.

1 For the “select committee” proposal, see The New York Times, June 1, 1965, pp. 1, 11.
Statement by the Soviet Representative (Tsarapkin) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee [Extract]: Nondissemination of Nuclear Weapons, August 31, 1965

At the meeting of the Committee held on 17 August the Soviet delegation put the following question to the representative of the United States:

... does the draft treaty tabled [on 17 August] ... provide for the complete and unconditional prohibition of access to nuclear weapons, whether in a direct way, that is through national ownership, control or disposal, or in an indirect way, that is access to nuclear weapons through a so-called NATO multilateral force and such like? In other words, are we to understand the United States draft as precluding any possibility of the establishment of a NATO multilateral or similar force with the participation, in one form or another, of military or other personnel of the Federal Republic of Germany? 2

So far we have not received a reply to this question from the United States representative. However, on the very day that the United States draft was submitted Mr. Foster told Press correspondents that the draft did not preclude the establishment of a multilateral or Atlantic NATO nuclear force. Commenting on the United States draft on 19 August in the Committee the United Kingdom representative, Lord Chalfont, said:

It is no part of its purpose to place an embargo on all arrangements for sharing the control of nuclear weapons within NATO or any other alliance so far as they are not disseminatory ... 3

These statements of the United States and United Kingdom representatives confirm our fear that the Western Powers are sticking to their old position in this matter.

In general it has to be noted that the discussion which has so far taken place both within and outside the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on the question of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons shows that there is still no common basis for an agreement on this subject. It is obvious to everyone that in the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons there is a clash between two positions—or rather two approaches to the solution of the problem, two conceptions.

The Soviet Union sees in an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons a practical means of really stopping the process of the continuous extension of access to nuclear weapons, whether through

1 ENDC/PV.228, pp. 34–36.
2 For the Soviet statement, see ENDC/PV.224, p. 40. The U.S. draft treaty appears ante, pp. 347–349.
3 Supra.
the emergence of new nuclear Powers possessing their own nuclear weapons, or through access to them in the form of participation in collective ownership, collective use or collective control of them within the framework of a military alliance or in any other way. Only such a solution to the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons—one that does not allow of any loopholes or exceptions—is of any value for the cause of peace. We have insisted, we insist and we shall continue to insist on this.

However, the approach of the Western Powers to the solution of this problem is different. Their main concern is not so much to shut off access to nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States as to bring the Federal Republic of Germany into the nuclear club through a NATO multilateral force or in some other way. That is precisely where the great threat to the security of the peoples of Europe and the entire world lies.

That is the fundamental difference between the solution to the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as the Western Powers would have it, and the solution as it really should be in order to answer the purpose before us: namely, to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons in the interests of the security of all peoples.

Unfortunately it must be noted that our Western colleagues do not treat the solution of the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons conscientiously. They are concentrating all their abilities and energy on manoeuvring in this matter in such a way as “to have their cake and eat it”, as the saying goes; that is, to have an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and at the same time to give the West German Bundeswehr access to nuclear weapons through its participation in the planned NATO multilateral nuclear force. The United States draft treaty to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons is a reflection of this kind of manoeuvre. The Western Powers must stop their manoeuvring around this question.

We should also like to stress that the proper solution to the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons requires that an end be put to the spread of nuclear weapons in any form, whether directly through national ownership or indirectly—that is, through participation in a so-called NATO multilateral force and such like. National ownership of nuclear weapons and indirect access to them through participation in a so-called NATO multilateral force are two forms of one and the same peace-jeopardizing process—the process of the dissemination of nuclear weapons, which we are striving to stop. Both these ways of disseminating nuclear weapons must be closed. No other approach can give us an acceptable solution of the problem. This aspect of principle should not be ignored by the Western Powers if they really wish this question to be solved.

Those are the remarks we desired to make at today’s meeting.
I have asked for the right of reply in order to discuss the Soviet representative's remarks about, particularly, a non-proliferation treaty. With regard to Mr. Tsarapkin's questions of 17 August, we thought that the draft treaty was itself the best source for his answers. Since the Soviet delegation had no opportunity to study the text when it posed the questions, we thought that such an opportunity should be provided. We also thought it inappropriate for us to speak until the other delegations which had participated in drafting the text had each had a turn to make their positions clear; and, as you now know, the representatives of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Italy have each had that opportunity.

In the light of what has been said this morning, however, I think I ought to set the record straight as to what the United States draft treaty does say in answer to those questions asked by the representative of the Soviet Union on 17 August.

Mr. Tsarapkin asked, first, whether our draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons would ban access to such weapons both directly and indirectly. By "directly" he said he meant through national ownership, control and operation. By "indirectly" he said he intended to cover access by means of a multilateral force or any similar body. He also asked whether the Soviet Union should understand that this draft treaty excludes the possibility of establishing an MLF with participation of military or other personnel of the Federal Republic of Germany.

First, let me answer as to direct access. Articles I and II of the draft treaty would clearly prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear country. They would also prevent any non-nuclear country from itself acquiring ownership or operation of nuclear weapons through manufacture. This means that I can answer affirmatively that part of Mr. Tsarapkin's first question having to do with direct access.

The other part of his first question had to do with acquiring access to nuclear weapons indirectly. Articles I and II of our draft treaty...
would preclude the transfer of nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear country "indirectly through a military alliance". They would also prohibit—

any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons.

Thus no additional nuclear Powers could emerge, whether national or international. This much I can clearly answer affirmatively in response to that part of Mr. Tsarapkin's question having to do with indirect access.

The treaty would not, however, preclude the establishment of nuclear arrangements—such as a multilateral force within NATO—so long as such arrangements would not constitute an additional organization or entity having the power to use nuclear weapons independently of the participating nations presently possessing nuclear weapons. A new organization having such independent power could come into existence only if a present nuclear nation should voluntarily turn over its entire stockpile of nuclear weapons to a collective entity and should also voluntarily renounce its right of veto over the collective force. Even in the event of such a possibility however, no non-nuclear nation could acquire independent power to use nuclear weapons under the draft treaty. This would be barred by the provisions which preclude any transfer into the national control of a non-nuclear country.

I hope that every delegation here will understand why our draft treaty has gone to the trouble of including provisions to cover such a future possibility. We are not, after all, proposing a treaty meant for only a year or even a decade, but one which we hope will remain in force indefinitely as a barrier to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet, since we do have this long time span in mind, we are only being prudent when we take account of parallel developments that may occur in the political realm during the same time period.

We in the United States have watched with interest and profound satisfaction the revival of Western Europe from the ashes of the Second World War. A key factor in this revival has been the creation of new links of friendship and close co-operation among the countries of Western Europe, including those which before the war had a long history of enmity. This process of drawing together is still going on. As we all know, the West European States are themselves actively engaged in working out their mutual problems and in deciding on the nature and pace of their further progress towards greater unity. We here at this Conference cannot put ourselves in the position of impeding the political evolution of Western Europe when this has little to do with disarmament or, specifically, with preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. We therefore have every reason so to shape the language of our draft treaty that if at some
time in the future the nations of Western Europe, or a substantial number of them, come to form some sort of political union they will not be confronted with an unmanageable problem because of our inadvertence here in drafting the text of a treaty.

We would not want to preclude for all time any new collective political and defence entity which might, with great effort and patience, be created over an extended period in Western Europe. We would not want to preclude such an entity from possessing and controlling nuclear weapons if it should in fact develop the capability to assume the nuclear defence responsibilities of its formerly separate national components some of which are now nuclear Powers. Such a development could indeed reduce the number of nuclear power centres.

It is obvious that Western Europe is hardly likely to find itself reformed into this type of new entity except after a long course of development. Moreover, the new entity could not have independent power over nuclear weapons except with the approval of all—all—the participants, including the nuclear participants. In this sense the issue of the entity’s future internal nuclear arrangements is indeed of “more theoretical than practical importance”, as Lord Chalfont put it in his statement of 19 August.1

For all these reasons the contingency I have described is an unlikely one. However, this has little to do with the present problem of proliferation, that is, with an increase in the number of political entities in the world now having independent power over nuclear weapons. Moreover, it certainly does not and cannot justify any delegation on this Committee in invoking issues connected with Europe’s eventual political evolution as a pretext for refusing to negotiate now on the basis of the United States draft.

As to Mr. Tsarapkin’s second question, concerning participation by the Federal Republic of Germany in an MLF, this is not really a question before this Committee. Arrangements for the participation of interested NATO members in preparations for their own defence will obviously not be negotiated here. If the United States draft treaty should come into force, however, they will be fully compatible with its letter and spirit. This draft was arrived at after consultations with all NATO member countries including those interested in new nuclear arrangements within the alliance.

Any future decisions on nuclear matters by NATO members will take into account the fact that some of them are nuclear Powers while others are not. Personnel of the Federal Republic would participate on the same basis as those of, say, Italy or the Netherlands. No non-nuclear country would acquire nuclear weapons or be able to fire them on the basis of a national decision. Nor would any of them

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1 Ante, p. 359.
gain access to nuclear weapons design or manufacturing information either now or in the future. These provisions of the draft treaty reflect the collective decision of those NATO countries now exploring new nuclear arrangements within the alliance.

Therefore, if the Soviet concern about nuclear proliferation is genuine—and I hope it is—it should be allayed by the draft treaty and my explanation of its provisions. If, on the other hand, the real Soviet aim is to divide or weaken the NATO alliance, or to prevent the growth of political harmony and strength in Western Europe, then we can never satisfy the Soviet Union. The NATO countries will not permit the question of their collective nuclear defence arrangements to become the subject of negotiation with the Soviet Union. They will, however, make a commitment to the Soviet Union that, because any defence arrangements adopted will be entirely consistent with the terms of the United States draft treaty if it goes into force, these arrangements will not constitute therefore nuclear proliferation.

It should not be thought that our effort today to answer Mr. Tsarapkin’s questions implies that we have none of our own about the position of his country. On the contrary, the Soviet Union is also a mighty nuclear Power and it also participates in an alliance of States in Eastern Europe—the Warsaw Pact. More than this, we know that the Soviet Union has in recent years turned over to the armies of its East European allies various short-range missiles which are capable of firing nuclear warheads. Yet we have never been informed about the arrangements which have been made within the Warsaw Pact for consultation on or joint decisions about the possible use of nuclear weapons. No Soviet statement exists, that I know of, in which the Soviet Union explains its procedures for supplying nuclear warheads to its allies to fit the missiles already given to them.

This is a very important part of the non-proliferation problem. I think that this Committee has a right to learn just how compatible with a non-dissemination treaty the Soviet Union’s arrangements with its allies really are. Those members of the Committee who attended the recent session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission will recall that I put a similar question to Mr. Tsarapkin in New York. He has never given us an answer. I hope that we may soon be given his reply, and I hope that when it is given it will help us to move forward in our work.

Now, having given specific answers to Ambassador Tsarapkin’s questions, I should like to comment more generally on his statement today. The burden of his remarks was that allied nuclear defence arrangements under consideration by some NATO countries would be incompatible with a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and that the possibility of establishing any sort of allied nuclear force.

1 Ante, p. 201.
must be renounced before any treaty could be considered. Such a view simply does not accord with reality. In the light of the draft treaty which has been tabled it seems clear that the Soviet Union is placing political warfare ahead of the prevention of nuclear proliferation. By continuing even at this late date to advance such political preconditions, the Soviet Government would be assuming a great responsibility with respect to the welfare of the entire world.

And in this connexion let us be clear about the real problem of military security in Europe. By no stretch of the imagination can the Federal Republic of Germany be considered a threat to the security of the Soviet Union or its neighbours. Rather it is the Soviet Union, with its many ready divisions in East Germany and its hundreds of missiles aimed at the territory of the Federal Republic, that gives the Federal Republic legitimate concern about its security. It is this situation, caused by Soviet military dispositions and not an alleged German desire for revenge, which explains the efforts within the Atlantic Alliance to create some appropriate instrumentality by which the non-nuclear members can participate in their own nuclear defence.

As I have said before, the danger of nuclear spread is world-wide and not the special concern of any one country. Let us, therefore, return to the essential task of eliminating that threat on a world-wide basis. If we abandon polemics and concentrate our efforts on the elimination of the real obstacles to the goal we are all enjoined to seek, then all of us will gain. If we fail, we shall all be exposed to this grave threat. It will matter little how historians may assess the blame.

I regret that at this late stage in our work the Soviet representative felt called upon to deliver another diatribe against the Federal Republic of Germany. At the United Nations Disarmament Commission session last June Mr. Tsarapkin said it was inappropriate for that body—

... either directly or indirectly, openly or in a veiled manner, to comment on the position of, and even less to condemn, a State that is not represented in the United Nations...

Mr. Tsarapkin seemed anxious to protect the Chinese communists from any criticism, even if only implied. He wished to protect a régime which has openly denounced efforts towards disarmament, flouted the desires of mankind as expressed in the limited test-ban Treaty by exploding nuclear devices in the atmosphere, ridiculed peaceful coexistence and fostered acts of aggression; yet he still seems to feel free to continue his attacks on the Federal Republic of Germany. In this case the fact that the accused party is not represented in the United Nations or in our Committee and cannot itself reply to those attacks does not seem to bother the Soviet representative in the least.

1 *Ante*, p. 254.
One of the basic objectives of Western foreign policy since the Second World War has been to work for reconciliation and co-operation in Europe and to strengthen the community of peaceful nations. The Federal Republic of Germany has a freely-elected democratic Government, and it seeks to have this right of free self-determination available to Germans in East Germany as well. From the ruins of the Second World War, and in spite of the imposed division of Germany, the Federal Republic has emerged as a source of economic strength for Europe and a provider of economic assistance to many countries around the world. It is dedicated to European co-operation and unity; it has publicly renounced the use of force to achieve its national objectives; it has entered into a commitment to its allies not to manufacture nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons and to this extent has already made an important contribution towards the objective of non-proliferation; it has forsworn a nationalistic military policy by integrating all its military forces in NATO and by placing them under NATO command.

The draft non-proliferation treaty which my delegation has submitted should allay any Soviet fears if they are truly genuine. If, in spite of that, the Soviet Union continues to refuse to discuss a non-proliferation agreement unless all plans for allied nuclear arrangements are dropped, we can only conclude that its objective is not the conclusion of an effective non-proliferation treaty but merely to use the issue for its own political ends.

Final Act of the Second Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America [Extracts], September 2, 1965

The second session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America opened at Mexico City on 23 August 1965, in accordance with the provisions of section VI of resolution 1 adopted by the Commission during its first session on 19 March 1965, and closed on 2 September 1965.

At the 9th meeting, which was the 1st meeting of the second session, the Preparatory Commission welcomed the delegation of Guatemala to full membership, the Government of Guatemala having communicated its accession to resolution II of the Preliminary Meeting on the Denuclearization of Latin America.

At its 10th meeting the Commission decided to broaden the conditions for membership laid down in resolution II of the Preliminary Meeting so that, for purposes of admission, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago would be subject to the same conditions as the Latin American Republics.

In addition, the Commission welcomed the presence of observers from Canada, Denmark, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, who joined the observers from the Netherlands and Yugoslavia accredited at the previous session.

At its 10th meeting, the Preparatory Commission also decided to place inter-governmental organizations on the same footing as States Members of the United Nations for the purpose of the admission of observers. The Commission agreed that, as a general rule, the Chair would allow the accredited representatives of non-governmental organizations officially registered with the United Nations to attend the Commission's proceedings, and that the Commission would deal individually with any similar applications made by other organizations which did not meet that requirement.

At the request of the Co-ordinating Committee, Mr. William Epstein, Chief of the Disarmament Affairs Group of the United Nations Secretariat, lent his valuable assistance as Technical Adviser during the second session.

In order to attend to the matters before it with due care and expedition, the Commission decided to set up a Sub-Commission with the following instructions: (1) To prepare, for submission by the Commission to the Governments of member States, a working paper based on (a) the "preliminary draft articles for the Treaty on the Denuclearization of Latin America relating to verification, inspection and control", drawn up by Working Group B; (b) specific suggestions made during the Commission's proceedings, and (c) proposals submitted to the Sub-Commission by its members; and (2) To draw up recommendations to the Commission with respect to the relevant draft resolutions and agreements submitted by the Co-ordinating Committee. At the Sub-Commission's request, Working Group B also held a meeting at which it revised its preliminary draft articles on verification, inspection and control.

As a result of its discussions, the Preparatory Commission unanimously adopted the following resolutions:

Resolutions 7 (II)

Establishment of a Negotiating Committee

The Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America,

1 A/5985, p. 8; A/5912, p. 7; A/5824, pp. 6-7.
Having examined the reports of Working Groups A and C transmitted to it by the Co-ordinating Committee;

Bearing in mind that, as emphasized in the debates of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, the prevention of the dissemination or proliferation of nuclear weapons becomes a matter of greater urgency with every passing day;

Considering therefore that it would be highly desirable to take the opportunity afforded by the United Nations General Assembly's twentieth session for action towards the attainment of the objectives pursued by the said Working Groups, and

Noting that the work done by the two Working Groups demonstrates the close relationship in certain respects, between the questions with which they have to deal,

Decides

1. To establish a Negotiating Committee composed of the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission and the Chairmen—or, in their absence, the Vice-Chairmen—of Working Groups A and C;

2. To instruct the said Committee to endeavour while the United Nations General Assembly's twentieth session is in progress in New York City, to expedite to the utmost, through negotiations with authorized representatives of the States concerned, the fulfilment of the purposes defined in section II of resolution 1, adopted by the Preparatory Commission on 19 March 1965, and

3. To request the Negotiating Committee to consult Working Groups A and C whenever it deems this advisable, to keep them informed of the progress of its work, and to submit to the Preparatory Commission through the Co-ordinating Committee, at the appropriate time, a report on the progress and results of that work.

(Adopted at the 16th meeting, on 31 August 1965)

Resolution 8 (II)

Preamble of the preliminary draft of a Multilateral Treaty for the Denuclearization of Latin America

The Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America,

Having considered the working paper prepared by the Secretariat pursuant to the agreement reached by the Co-ordinating Committee and submitted to the Commission in document COPREDAL/S/DT/1, and

Taking into account the proposals submitted and the views expressed in the debate on the said working paper,

Decides

To approve the following text as a declaration of the principles
which shall serve as a basis for the Preamble of the preliminary draft
of a Multilateral Treaty for the Denuclearization of Latin America:

In the name of their peoples and faithfully interpreting their desires
and aspirations, the Governments represented at the Conference of
Plenipotentiaries for the Denuclearization of Latin America,

Desiring to contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending
the armaments race, especially in nuclear weapons, and towards
strengthening a world at peace, based on the sovereign equality of
States, mutual respect and good neighbourliness;

Recalling that the United Nations General Assembly, in its resolu-
tion 808 (IX), adopted unanimously as one of the three points of a co-
ordinated programme of disarmament “The total prohibition of the
use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass de-
struction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks
of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes”;

Recalling also United Nations General Assembly resolution 1911
(XVIII), which established that the measures that should be agreed
upon for the denuclearization of Latin America should be taken “in
the light of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of
regional agreements”;

Convinced:

That the incalculable destructive power of nuclear weapons has
made it imperative that the legal prohibition of war should be strictly
observed in practice if the survival of civilization and of mankind
itself is to be assured;

That nuclear weapons, whose terrible effects are suffered, without
distinction and without escape, by the armies and by the civilian popu-
lation alike, constitute, through the persistence of the radioactivity
they release, an attack on the integrity of the human species and ulti-
mately may even render the whole Earth uninhabitable;

That general and complete disarmament under effective interna-
tional control is a vital matter which all the peoples of the world
equally demand;

That the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which seems inevitable
unless States, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, use self-restraint
in order to prevent it, would make any agreement on disarmament
enormously more difficult and would increase the danger of the out-
break of a nuclear conflagration;

That the privileged situation of the States represented at the Con-
ference, whose territories are wholly free from nuclear weapons and
their launching devices, imposes upon them the inescapable duty, of
preserving that situation both in their own interests and for the good
of mankind;

That the existence of nuclear weapons in any country of Latin America would make it a target for possible nuclear attacks and would inevitably set off, throughout the region, a ruinous race in nuclear weapons which would involve the unjustifiable diversion, for warlike purposes, of the limited resources available for economic and social development;

That the foregoing factors, coupled with the traditional peace-loving outlook of their peoples make it essential that nuclear energy should be used in Latin America exclusively for peaceful purposes.

That the denuclearization of vast geographical areas, adopted by the sovereign decision of the States comprised therein, will exercise a beneficial influence on other regions;

Convinced, finally:

That the denuclearization of the States represented at the Conference—being understood to mean the undertaking entered into internationally in this Treaty to keep their territories free for ever, as they have been hitherto, from nuclear weapons and their launching devices—will constitute a measure of protection for their peoples against the squandering of their limited resources on nuclear armaments and against possible nuclear attacks upon their territories; a significant contribution towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and a powerful factor for general and complete disarmament; and

That Latin America, faithful to its deep-seated tradition of universality of outlook, must endeavour not only to banish from its homelands the scourge of a nuclear war and to strive for the well-being and advancement of its peoples, but also, at the same time, to co-operate in the fulfilment of the ideals of mankind, that is to say in the consolidation of a lasting peace based on equal rights, economic fairness and social justice for all, in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations,

Have agreed as follows:

(Adopted at the 16th meeting, on 31 August 1965)

RESOLUTION 9 (II)

Preliminary draft articles on verification, inspection and control

The Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America,

Having considered with especial appreciation the preliminary draft articles for the Treaty on the Denuclearization of Latin America relating to verification, inspection and control, drawn up by Working Group B and submitted to the Preparatory Commission by the Coordinating Committee, and

Taking into account the fact that the highly technical nature of some of the provisions of the said preliminary draft makes it necessary for them to be studied by the member States,
Decides:
1. To transmit to the Governments of the member States, for study, the preliminary draft articles for the Treaty on the Denuclearization of Latin America which appear as an annex to this resolution;
2. To recommend that the Governments shall transmit their observations on the said preliminary draft to the General Secretary as soon as possible and in any case no later than 15 January 1966; requesting them to arrange, so far as possible, for the said observations to be presented in a suitable form for direct use in the preparation of the articles of the Treaty;
3. To request the Co-ordinating Committee to prepare, on the basis of the preliminary draft articles annexed to this resolution and of such observations as the Governments may make, a working paper for use in drafting a new version of the preliminary draft;
4. To request the Co-ordinating Committee to transmit to the Governments, by 28 February 1966 at the latest, the working paper referred to in paragraph 3 of this resolution, and
5. To express its gratitude to the General Secretary and to the United Nations Technical Adviser for their contribution to the Commission's work.

ANNEX
TREATY FOR THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF LATIN AMERICA: PRELIMINARY DRAFT ARTICLES RELATING TO VERIFICATION, INSPECTION AND CONTROL

Introduction
The articles relating to verification, inspection and control prepared by Working Group B were drafted not with the aim of securing the Preparatory Commission's immediate approval but as a working document and starting-point for the study of this matter.

The objectives of the proposed system are as follows:
(a) to prohibit the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons by any country of Latin America;
(b) to prevent the introduction or deployment of nuclear weapons in any country of Latin America by any nuclear Power; and
(c) to ensure that the aforesaid prohibitions do not in any way impede the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The system of verification, inspection and control outlined in the preliminary draft articles for the Treaty is designed to be:
(a) as simple as possible to install and operate;

1 This document concentrates exclusively on the aspects of the treaty which are clearly related to the matters assigned to Working Group B (footnote in original).
(b) as inexpensive as possible; and
(c) as effective as possible in preventing any violation or evasion of the obligations of the Treaty. For this purpose, the proposed system is based mainly on the Revised Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency.¹

The aim of the preliminary draft articles is not to present the entire outline of the treaty but simply to set forth the minimum provisions for determining the nature of the control organization to be set up; consequently, other provisions will naturally have to be added in order to produce a treaty in its final form.

Preamble

Article A

Obligations

(1) The Contracting Parties hereby undertake, in regard to their respective territories, to prohibit and prevent:

(a) the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapon, by the Parties themselves or by anyone on their behalf; and

(b) the receipt, storage, installation, deployment, and any form of possession of any nuclear weapon, by the Parties themselves or by anyone on their behalf.

(2) The Parties also undertake to refrain from engaging in, promoting, encouraging, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or ownership of any nuclear weapon inside or outside their territory.

Commentary:

The main purpose of the obligations which the member States would assume, on the basis of this article, is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by banning them from the countries of Latin America. This same article establishes the prohibitions and limitations required to keep Latin America denuclearized.

Although the substance of the article is not directly concerned with the system of verification, inspection and control, its inclusion was considered necessary in order to clarify the obligations whose fulfilment would be verified.

It was considered that the obligations which the Parties would assume under this article would not affect or conflict with any obligations assumed by member States under the Charter of the United Nations or under regional agreements.

¹ Post, pp. 446–460.
ARTICLE B

Definition of "territory"

For the purposes of this Treaty, the term "territory" shall be understood to include the territorial sea and air space.

Commentary:

It was considered necessary to include this article in order to specify that the term "territory" includes the territorial sea and air space of each country, although no attempt has been made to define the scope of the term "territorial sea" because of the different positions of member States in this matter. This question could be left to the interpretation of each member State or some definition could be agreed on, for the purposes of the Treaty, by the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE C

Definition of "nuclear weapons"

(1) For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear weapon is defined as any weapon which contains, or is designed to utilize, nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes and which, by explosion or other uncontrolled nuclear transformation of the nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes, is capable of mass destruction, mass injury or mass poisoning;

(2) Furthermore, any part, device, assembly or material especially designed for, or primarily useful in, any weapon as set forth under paragraph (1) of this article or in any vehicle or system especially designed for the launching of such weapons shall be deemed to be a nuclear weapon;

(3) Nuclear fuel as used in the preceding definition includes plutonium, Uranium 233, Uranium 235. (including Uranium contained in Uranium enriched to over 2.1 per cent by weight of Uranium 235) and any other material capable of releasing substantial quantities of nuclear energy through fission, fusion or other nuclear reaction of the material. The foregoing materials shall be considered to be nuclear fuel regardless of the physical or chemical form in which they exist. Material which exceeds the limits set in article 24 of the Revised Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be considered to be material capable of releasing substantial quantities of nuclear energy.

Commentary:

The definition of a "nuclear weapon" includes both the nuclear explosive and the launching device. This definition was taken from the Protocol on the Control of Armaments of the Treaty of the Western European Union, signed in Paris on 23 October 1954, whereby the Federal Republic of Germany undertook not to manufacture in
Article D

Organization of control

(1) In order to ensure fulfilment of the obligations assumed under this Treaty, there is hereby established a Centre (hereinafter referred to as "the Centre"), which shall operate in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the annexes thereto.

(2) The Parties agree to extend to the Centre full and prompt co-operation in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, of any agreements they may conclude with the Centre, and of any agreements the Centre may conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency or with any other international organization.

Article E

Organs of control

The organs of the Centre shall be a Conference of the Parties (hereinafter referred to as "the Conference") and an administrative official (hereinafter referred to as "the Director"), assisted by the necessary technical and administrative staff.

Commentary:

The intention of these articles is to establish organs which will be small in size and easy to operate and whose principal functions will include supervision of the application of the system of verification, inspection and control.

Article F

The Conference

The Conference shall establish the procedures of the control system for the observance of this Treaty, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and of the annexes thereto.

Commentary:

The "Conference" of the member States, which would probably meet once a year, would be the principal body responsible for the functioning of the system as a whole. This article only mentions the Conference's duties with respect to the control system and does so in very general terms. The Treaty should, of course, include a series of constitutional and procedural provisions that would supplement the provisions in this article.

AR ricle G

The Director

(1) The Director shall be the chief administrative official of the Centre and head of the staff. He shall be responsible to the Conference and, under its supervision, shall execute its policy directives. He shall be responsible for the operation of the control system in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and with the procedures established by the Conference. He shall provide the Conference with whatever advice, reports and assistance it may require for the performance of its functions. He shall, if the Conference so requests, recommend rules for the approval of the Conference regarding the appointment, organization and operation of the staff of the Centre.

(2) The Director shall establish the procedures for distributing, to all Parties, all information materials the Centre may receive from governmental or nongovernmental sources.

(3) The Director shall submit to the Conference an annual report and such special reports as he may deem appropriate. From time to time, he shall submit to the Conference recommendations concerning the adoption of measures for improving the control system.

Commentary:

This article seems to be self-explanatory as regards the Director's relationship with the Conference and the powers that would enable the Director to discharge his duties as effectively as possible. In addition, it would make it possible to organize a relatively small staff, in the light of the nature of nuclear development in Latin America. It is understood that an Assistant Director would be appointed to assume the duties of the Director during his absence, and that the staff would have the status of international civil servants.

AR ricle H

The IAEA Safeguards System

(1) The Parties shall assume all the obligations and adopt all the procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Safeguards System, as revised on 25 February 1965, with regard to any nuclear facilities and activities in their respective territories, including any gaseous diffusion plant, centrifuge plant, chemical separation or reprocessing plant and any other plant for the production, refining or utilization of fissionable material. The said Safeguards System is annexed to this Treaty as annex . . .

(2) Any revision or subsequent amendment of the IAEA Safeguards System shall be equally binding upon and applicable to the Parties as if it were incorporated in the present text, when approved by the Conference.

Commentary:

This article establishes the fundamental system on which the
method of verification, inspection and control in question is based. The IAEA’s Revised Safeguards System, which was unanimously approved by that body’s Board of Governors on 25 February 1965 and the text of which is annexed hereto,¹ provides for a comprehensive reporting and inspection machinery, not only with regard to power and research reactors but also with regard to all the facilities for preparing or processing nuclear materials. Moreover, the possibility has been borne in mind that IAEA might share responsibility for the implementation and cost of this system.

**Article I**

*Reports of the Parties*

(1) The Parties shall simultaneously transmit to the Centre a copy of any report which they may submit to IAEA.

(2) The Parties shall submit to the Centre semi-annual reports stating that no activity prohibited under this Treaty has occurred in their respective territories or on their behalf in any other place.

*Commentary:*

This article would guarantee that the official information received, on a world-wide basis, by the IAEA from all signatory States is made available to the Contracting States.

**Article J**

*Special reports requested by the Director*

(1) Whenever he deems this desirable, the Director may request any of the Parties to provide the Centre with complementary or supplementary information, data or clarifications regarding any suspicious event or circumstance, and the Parties undertake to cooperate with him promptly and fully in complying with such requests.

(2) The Director shall inform all Parties forthwith of such requests and of the respective replies.

*Commentary:*

This article supplements the information procedures which IAEA has found necessary in order to ensure the effectiveness of the system.

**Article K**

*Special inspections*

(1) Special inspections may be carried out in the following circumstances:

(a) By the IAEA in accordance with the provisions of its Safeguards System;

(b) If so requested by any Party that suspects that some prohibited activity has taken place, is taking place or is about to take place, in

¹ Post, pp. 446-460.
the territory of any other Party or anywhere on such latter Party's behalf. The Director shall take immediate steps to arrange for the carrying out of such inspection;

(c) If so requested by any Party who is suspected or accused of having violated the Treaty. The Director shall take immediate steps to arrange for the carrying out of such inspection.

(2) The costs and expenses of any special inspection carried out under paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) or (c), of this article shall be borne by the requesting Party or Parties, except where the report on the special inspection concludes that, in view of the relevant circumstances, such costs and expenses should not be borne by the requesting Party or Parties.

(3) The Conference shall formulate the procedures for the organization and execution of any special inspections that may be carried out in accordance with paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of this article.

(4) The Parties shall undertake to grant the inspectors carrying out such special inspections full and free access to whatever places and information they may require for the performance of their duties. If so requested by the authorities of the Party in whose territory the inspection is carried out, the inspectors appointed by the Conference shall be accompanied by representatives of the said authorities, provided that this does not in any way delay or hinder the inspectors in the performance of their duties.

(5) The Director shall immediately transmit to all the Parties a copy of any report pursuant to any special inspection.

(6) Similarly, the Director shall immediately send to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for the information of the Security Council and the General Assembly, a copy of any report pursuant to any special inspection.

(7) The Director, or any of the Parties, may request a special session of the Conference for the purpose of considering the report pursuant to any special inspection. The Director shall convene a special session of the Conference when so requested by any Party to this Treaty.

(8) The Conference convened in special session under this article may make recommendations to the Parties and also submit reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the information of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Commentary:

An attempt has been made in this article to supplement the IAEA Safeguards System by providing for procedures deemed appropriate when the objective sought is not limited to preventing the diversion of nuclear materials to military use but covers the prohibition of
nuclear weapons in those territories covered by the Safeguards System.

To that end, the article includes elements designed to deter possible violation by providing for the possibility of carrying out special inspections and, moreover, by helping to ensure a full and timely clarification of the facts whenever deliberate or involuntary violations are suspected. Lastly, it should be stressed that there is ample reason to believe that the measures provided for under this article will need to be used only very rarely, in view of the special characteristics of Latin America.

Article L

Explosions for peaceful purposes

(1) The Parties agree not to explode nuclear devices for peaceful purposes or to give assistance to third parties to that end, except in accordance with the present article and the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963 and any amendments thereto. Explosions which are carried out in compliance with the present article shall not be deemed to constitute violations of article A of this Treaty.

(2) Parties intending to carry out or co-operate in the carrying out of such an explosion, shall first apply for and obtain authorization from the Centre. In its application such Party shall submit to the Centre, four months prior to the date of the proposed explosion, a plan containing the following information:

(a) the nature of the nuclear device and the source from which it was obtained;
(b) the date, place and purpose of the proposed explosion;
(c) the procedures which will be followed in order to comply with paragraph 4 of this article;
(d) the anticipated yield of the device; and
(e) the measures which will be taken to ensure that there will be no substantial radioactive fall-out outside the immediate vicinity.

(3) The Conference may authorize, at either a regular or a special session, explosions proposed in accordance with the present article.

(4) Members of the staff of the Centre and of IAEA shall be empowered to observe all the preparations for and the explosion of the device and shall have unrestricted access at all times to the vicinity of the explosion, in order to ascertain whether the device and the procedures followed during the explosion are in conformity with the information submitted in accordance with paragraph 2 of the present article.
Commentary:

The purposes of this article are to ensure: (a) that this Treaty in no way impedes operations for the peaceful use of nuclear energy; and (b) that no explosion for peaceful purposes is used to secure military advantages.

The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes would therefore not be affected by the prohibitions of the Treaty. This article refers only to nuclear explosions and all such explosions involve the use of devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons. By way of precedent, it should be pointed out that, at the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, held in 1960, it was considered necessary to include such an article, because, if it were omitted, all nuclear explosions would be prohibited.

ARTICLE M

Relations with other organizations

The Conference, in addition to its power to approve any agreements that may be concluded between the Centre and the International Atomic Energy Agency, shall take whatever steps are necessary for the Centre to enter into an appropriate relationship with any international organization which may be established in the future to supervise disarmament or measures for the control of armaments in any part of the world.

Commentary:

This article empowers the Conference to approve any agreement of association that may be concluded between the Centre and IAEA and to lay down guidelines with regard to the relations between the former and other organizations with similar aims, since the Conference is considered to be the most representative organ of the Centre.

ARTICLE N

Measures in the event of violation of the Treaty

Should the Conference determine that any Party is not complying fully with its obligations under this Treaty, the Conference shall report thereon to the Security Council and to the General Assembly through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and may consider the question of relieving any other Party or Parties of their obligations under this Treaty, on such conditions and for such period as the Conference may determine.

Commentary:

If, in the opinion of the Conference, there is a violation of the Treaty, there will, in fact, be no economic or military sanctions which the Centre itself could impose. This article accordingly prescribes two measures likely to have a decisive effect on the prevention of
violations: firstly, it provides that the question is to be reported to the Security Council and to the General Assembly of the United Nations as a matter which may endanger international peace and security; and, secondly, it provides that the Conference may consider the question of relieving of its or their obligations, on such conditions and for such period as the Conference itself may determine, the member State or States which feel themselves threatened. It is to be hoped that this article would be applied only on rare occasions and it has been included merely as a precaution.

(Approved at the 17th meeting, held on 31 August 1965)

Resolution 10 (II)

Third Session of the Preparatory Commission

The Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America,
Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations, in resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, recognized "the need to preserve, in Latin America, conditions which will prevent the countries of the region from becoming involved in a dangerous and ruinous nuclear arms race";

Noting that, as the deliberations of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee show, the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is daily becoming more urgent,

Reaffirming the recommendations made to the Preparatory Commission by the Preliminary Meeting on the Denuclearization of Latin America in paragraph 3 of its resolution II, which was adopted on 27 November 1964,¹

Considering that the Preparatory Commission, directly and through its subsidiary organs, has already made substantial progress towards completing the work assigned to it in the above-mentioned resolution II,

Bearing in mind that the principal nuclear Powers have publicly and repeatedly declared themselves in favour of regional denuclearization, as a means of facilitating universal denuclearization under a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Mindful that the peoples of Latin America earnestly desire the speedy and complete success of the work of the Preparatory Commission,

Decides

1. To set Tuesday, 19 April 1966, as the date of the first meeting of the Third Session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America;

2. To call upon the Governments of member States to redouble their efforts to enable the Preparatory Commission to draw up, during its Third Session, the preliminary draft of a treaty for the denuclearization of Latin America, in accordance with the instructions given to it by the Preliminary Meeting on the Denuclearization of Latin America in 1964;

3. To call upon those Governments to take such measures as they deem appropriate to achieve the purpose described in the preceding paragraph.

(Approved at the 17th meeting, held on 31 August 1965)

This Final Act was unanimously adopted by the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America at the closing meeting of its second session, held on Wednesday, 2 September 1965.

Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee [Extract]: Underground Test Ban, September 2, 1965

Before speaking on the matter for which I have inscribed my name, may I say that I reserve the right to reply later to the remarks made by the representative of Poland this morning? I must say now, however, that I find it discouraging to note that the representative of Poland, like the representative of the Soviet Union the other day has managed to discuss the question of non-proliferation without making a single substantive reference to the only proposal to halt nuclear spread that is before this Committee, the draft treaty tabled by the United States. Instead, he chose to join in the polemics against the Federal Republic of Germany which certain delegations seem determined to substitute for discussion of the world-wide problem of halting nuclear spread. In so doing he seems to make it clear that those delegations wish to give most attention here to the pursuit of political aims instead of giving priority to a serious effort to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. If that is indeed the case, the world will truly know who bears the responsibility for blocking progress toward this end.

1 ENDC/PV.229, pp. 18–24.
2 See ante, pp. 362–363.
3 Ante, pp. 347–349.
Before setting forth my major thesis for today, I should like first to thank the representative of Ethiopia for his comments on Gemini 5, as I thank the representative of Nigeria for his made the other day.\(^1\)

I should like to say also that I do share the view of the representative of Ethiopia that we should not let the limited nuclear test-ban Treaty\(^2\) remain an end in itself; and I hope to demonstrate in my statement today the continuing work in which my country is engaged towards an advance from the start made in 1963 by that Treaty.

In the history of disarmament efforts during this decade no subject has received more study and attention than the problem of a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. The adoption of the limited test-ban Treaty in 1963 cannot mean any abatement of those efforts. It is essential that the search go on for ways to make that treaty truly comprehensive. My delegation therefore welcomes the statement made by the representative of Ethiopia this morning, as it has welcomed at past meetings the statements made by the representatives of others of the eight—India, Burma, the United Arab Republic, Nigeria, Sweden, Brazil and Mexico. To contribute to the Committee's understanding of our position on this question, however, I plan to set forth today the current state of our knowledge about the means now available for verifying the observance by all signatories of any future ban on underground tests.

I must stress, of course, the essentiality of adequate verification. Without it there will be no reasonable assurance that all parties are living up to their obligations under any treaty which is achieved. This is especially important as a factor now. It is well established that both the United States and the Soviet Union have conducted underground nuclear tests and that both consider the results of such tests to have military significance.

We do not share the thought which Ambassador Tsarapkin expressed on 31 August when he touched on the issue of an underground test ban. He then urged the United States to follow the principle established by the limited nuclear test-ban Treaty. That principle was, he said, that only national control measures were to be used and that no inspection arrangements were required.\(^3\)

We suggest that the limited test-ban Treaty established a different principle. For us, that treaty vindicated the position that international obligations in the arms control and disarmament field should be accompanied by appropriate measures of verification. The nature of those measures will depend on what is to be controlled. It is possible that they may be national or that they may be international in form.

\(^1\) ENDC/PV.228, p. 20.
\(^2\) Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291–293.
\(^3\) ENDC/PV. 228, p. 34.
The important point, however, is that verification measures are necessary.

This is precisely the case with the limited test ban. It applies to those environments where the means of verification could be developed adequately on a national basis. It does not apply to the remaining environment where adequate national means were not available and where the Soviet Union would not concur in the international means we felt to be necessary.

The Soviet Union has not given us so far—I use the words "so far"—any sign that it may be prepared to adopt a more reasonable stand on inspections, which would be a feature of international control arrangements for an underground test ban. Therefore the question of the state of the technical art in regard to underground controls on a national basis becomes highly relevant to a consideration of the whole problem.

As all of you know, the United States has been allocating significant resources—I will not say "dollars", since they appear to have been questioned as a means of measurement, but will say simply "significant resources"—and scientific talent to its seismological research programme aimed at improving monitoring capabilities. In addition to American efforts, important research has been conducted by the scientists of many other nations. Some of the most significant results, for example, have been obtained from the programme carried out by the United Kingdom. Needless to say, all these recently-acquired data have been drawn on in arriving at our present evaluation of the so-called "state of the art".

The "art" about which we are talking here is, as we are all well aware, the ability to detect, locate and identify earth tremors or seismic events. Our problem remains the same as it was when the question was first taken up on an international technical level in 1958. That problem is: how to find out when underground events have occurred, where they have occurred and, finally, whether they were caused by an earthquake or a nuclear explosion. In this regard the chief difficulties have arisen in relation to earthquakes falling into the range of lower seismic magnitudes. Such magnitudes are those which correspond to the energy released underground by the detonation of a nuclear weapon having a yield of about twenty kilotons or less. As a consequence a great deal of our research programme has addressed itself to overcoming these difficulties.

Accordingly much effort has been directed at the determination of what, if any, differences might be observed in the seismic signals received at great distances from underground disturbances when on the one hand the signal emanated from a nuclear explosion and on the other the signal came from an earthquake. In order to be able to study these signals with precision so as to determine their characteristics, it became necessary first to get a good record of the desired
signals. This is much more complicated than it may sound, because seismic signals from a single source point are not registered on seismographs at great distances in a pure form. On the contrary, the lines on the seismogram are distorted by the effects of extraneous earth motion, called microseismic noise, which is also recorded by the instrument. Thus the task is to purify the record, so to speak, by getting rid of this background noise. If we could do so, the real seismic signal, which it is important to analyse in connexion with an underground test ban, would be available for study.

Research has shown that microseismic noise can be greatly reduced through the use of arrays—that is, groups of instruments arranged in a particular pattern. A prototype array containing 525 detectors distributed over an area of 200 kilometres in diameter is being constructed in the State of Montana in the United States. It is not yet in operation. Nevertheless we expect that this array will lead to a signal-to-noise ratio at least ten times greater than that heretofore available at the quietest single-instrument surface stations now in existence.

Other means of collecting more and better seismic data are also being investigated. For example, an ocean-bottom instrument has been developed which is capable of recording for a thirty-day period. After this period it is retrieved on to the surface, where its recorded data are examined. If such instruments were put into operational form it would be possible to place them permanently on the ocean floor and to use cables for obtaining their data by telemetry. Ocean-bottom seismometers of this kind would be especially significant in achieving an improved capability to locate events near ocean shorelines. Another example of improved data collection is the placement of instruments in deep wells on land. There is also a major programme to design improved detection instruments.

The prospects are good that in the future we shall have data available for analysis that will be in much purer and more usable form than in the past. We see that simultaneously we shall have much more of these data—in fact great quantities of data. Through the application of solid-state circuitry and the use of digital computers it will be possible to process and analyse these mounds of information.

All of this should allow us to bring about a substantial improvement in the means for detection, location and identification. However, before indicating the probable magnitude of this improvement I will mention that the United States has been anxious also to arrive at a better understanding of seismic wave patterns and the peculiarities of their travel through the earth. This has led us to carry out several underground nuclear detonations in areas other than the established test sites for such devices. The purpose of these experiments has been threefold: first, to observe how differences in the rock and geological conditions at the point of origin of the seismic event influence and cause
variations in the resulting seismic signal; second, to observe the patterns of seismic wave propagation from as many different points of origin as possible; and third, to learn what differences may exist between seismic signals from earthquakes and those from underground nuclear explosions originating in the same region.

To obtain these data the United States has carried out not only detonations at the Nevada test site but also the "Gnome" test in New Mexico, the "Shoal" test in northern Nevada, and the "Salmon" test in Mississippi. We expect to explode late in 1965 the so-called "Longshot" test in the Aleutian Islands. This will enable us for the first time to observe signals from an explosion in an area where there are many earthquakes. We already have many wave patterns from natural events which have taken place in that region. Comparison of them with the patterns from a nuclear explosion will then be possible. The United States will furnish to interested governments appropriate data about the Longshot test. We would appreciate receiving from others the seismic data which they may acquire from that explosion.

Let me now return to the results which research efforts have produced to date. The use of large arrays of detectors with their greater sensitivity in comparison with single-point detectors means that we should be able to detect smaller earth tremors than before. We hope to be able in due course to detect in most rock formations both earthquakes and explosions of a magnitude equivalent to nuclear detonations having yields in the hundreds of tons range—that is, equivalent to less than one kiloton of TNT. Even in dry porous materials such as alluvia deposits the detection minimum will be of the order of a kiloton. Deposits of this type of material, however, are limited.

An even more important feature of large arrays, however, is their capacity to obtain higher signal-to-noise ratios by filtering out background or microseismic noise. This will make possible more accurate readings of the characteristics of signals and will assist in identifying the original nature of those signals which are detected. The net result is that, if a world-wide system of large arrays is constructed in the future, it should be possible to detect seismic events in the range of a few hundred tons. It should also be possible to identify about 80 per cent of the events which produce seismic signals that correspond to yields above a few kilotons. Only about 20 per cent of events of a yield equivalent to above a few kilotons would remain unidentified.

In specific terms, we estimate that, given a world-wide system including large arrays, all natural seismic events of a seismic magnitude of 4.0 or greater could be detected. To apply this to the Soviet Union, it is our understanding that in an average year the number of seismic events of this size occurring in that country which could be detected but not identified as earthquakes by this world-wide system
would be about forty-five. Moreover, even then certain of those forty-five unidentified events which occurred near an ocean could be identified through the use of the ocean-bottom seismometers which I mentioned earlier.

I must stress that the foregoing major improvements would only result from a world-wide system of large arrays. Naturally such a system would take time to build, and its construction would require the co-operation of a number of countries. Once the system were installed, it would make it possible to use four primary methods of seismic signal identification. These would be: first, the determination that the direction of the first motion of the signal was compatible only with an earthquake; second, the observation that the wave pattern of the signal involved complexities greater than observed in the case of nuclear detonations; third, the finding that the location of the geographical point of origin of the event was in water; and fourth, evidence that the event took place at great depth below the surface.

The conclusion which the United States Government has drawn from the scientific state of affairs which I have set forth is that we believe we shall be able to determine the nature of a substantially greater proportion of seismic events than we now can. This has important consequences for the problem of verification, since our inability to identify a high fraction of events by means of instrumentation has always been the most serious obstacle to over-all technical advance. At the same time, however, it is still apparent that a significant fraction of underground events above a certain size—specifically 20 per cent above a few kilotons—will not be identified by seismic instruments. We shall still not find it possible to say in those instances whether the seismic signal originated in an earthquake or in a man-made nuclear explosion.

It follows, of course, that we shall want to be assured in other ways that these unidentified events in the Soviet Union are not nuclear explosions. We believe that the only method available for giving this reassurance—and for generating the international confidence which alone will guarantee the permanence of the treaty—is the use of on-site inspections. Up to now we have not heard any feasible suggestion for another means of verification which could fulfil that indispensable requirement. We call here on the Soviet Union to contribute its own data and to participate in technical discussions, either before this Committee or in a smaller forum. We would welcome the ideas of any and all delegations about such problems as the detection and identification of earth tremors.

We remember vividly that Soviet scientists had many ideas for improvements in the scientific methods of detection and identification when they talked over those matters with United Kingdom and United States scientists in Geneva in November and December of 1959 and in May of 1960. Surely work must have gone on and gone
forward in the Soviet Union on these problems in the intervening years. Judging by Soviet technical progress in other fields, I am sure that major steps forward must have resulted in this field as well. It is high time that the rest of us were allowed to share in the fruits of such efforts. They are of direct relevance to the early conclusion of an underground test ban.

There has never been anything immutable or sacred about specific details of verification. Our views on the adequacy of any given arrangement for verification will be influenced in the future, as in the past, by the technical situation which is known to confront us. Thus, most assuredly, we intend to take into account all of the potential improvements in the technical situation which I have noted to you here today. Moreover, we are certainly prepared to work out inspection arrangements which, though effective, are reasonable and which minimize intrusiveness. Our sole concern is to produce a comprehensive treaty which will give us every confidence that it is being observed by all parties. We ask the Soviet Union and all the nations represented here to cooperate with us in the search for such an agreement. I repeat, we are willing to discuss any proposal which can provide satisfactory assurance of compliance.

Swedish Memorandum Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: International Cooperation for the Detection of Underground Nuclear Explosions, September 2, 1965

In view of the efforts being made to extend the partial test ban to cover also underground nuclear tests, the question of improving existing facilities for monitoring seismic events has received increased attention. The scientific advisers, attached to the Swedish delegation at the ENDC, a few months ago presented a discussion paper on extended international co-operation in seismology for detection purposes ("detection club"). The Swedish delegation has the honour to present to the ENDC for information its views on this subject.

Underground nuclear explosions do not, as a rule, generate global distributions of easily detected radioactive debris. So far the seismic method seems to be the only technical way to detect them. Since the conclusion of the partial test ban considerable progress has been made in the fields of seismic detection. Problems, however, still remain in the fields of identification and inspection. These problems are not

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discussed in this paper which is confined to the problem of detection, i.e. questions related to the national systems of seismological detection.

The seismological stations are not yet optimally developed in all countries. It is surmised that if the means of detection were sufficiently developed, the problem of identification, i.e. of distinguishing between natural earthquakes and man-made explosions would be greatly facilitated.

Well equipped and well located stations can now detect events corresponding to yields of the order of one kiloton from distances up to 10,000 kilometres, covering half the globe. Hence no state has territories large enough to contain such seismic signals within its borders. The methods to record these signals seems now to be good enough to permit an adequate "national means only" solution of the detection part of the verification problem. If, however, the data emanating from the national systems were kept insulated within the national framework of each country, few of these, if any, would be large enough to monitor signals from the whole globe. To make it possible for all nations, interested in the compliance with a treaty banning nuclear test explosions, to follow and also seek to evaluate events, presupposes availability of data from several stations in widely distributed and suitably selected locations. Such co-operation by exchange of seismological data is already internationally instituted for the purpose of monitoring and studying earthquakes.

As new and technologically much more advanced seismic stations are now being established and data flowing from them are beginning to reach the community of scientists in this field, the time has come to consider which forms further collaboration should take. We think that states, interested on one hand in furthering seismological observations and research and on the other hand in the detection of underground explosions, will find it useful to co-operate in an exchange of pertinent seismological observations. Such a "detection club" would essentially be an international data service, giving access to first class data for independent analysis.

If such co-operation is started before an underground test ban enters into force, research on the remaining test ban verification problems will be facilitated.

The last mentioned aspect has led the Swedish Government to plan certain steps to establish in Sweden appropriate resources for seismological observation and analysis. The observation data will be made available to all interested parties, and Sweden expects to get corresponding information in return.

The detection club data should preferably come from good instruments on good sites, globally distributed in advantageous positions. Although a broad participation would be desirable, such a global net-
work could be based on seismological observations from selected stations in a rather small number of countries.

In order to broaden the uncertainty range of the absolute detection threshold facing a prospective test ban violator and thus increase the deterrence capability of seismological verification systems it is foreseen that some stations might remain outside the network of cooperating stations.

The data exchanged should comprise short messages—of the bulletin type currently used by seismologists—continuously circulated on a time scale appropriate to detection efforts. It would also be of great value if the results of calculations on bulletin data were included. The data co-operation should, furthermore, comprise the exchange, upon request, of copies of records.

Another essential element of the proposed co-operation would be the facilitation of the data exchange by the adoption of appropriate standards for instrumentation and data formats.

One will also have to consider that the existing and projected advanced seismological stations will extract a very large amount of information from the earth. To cope with this immense quantity of data it may prove necessary to establish some international co-ordinating body.

International data exchange is long since a well established practice in the geophysical sciences. The paramount importance of such co-operation for seismology has generated several national, regionally international and global schemes for the collection, analysis and exchange of data. Examples of regionally international schemes are the arrangements maintained in France, Japan, the USSR and the United States.

Indeed, much of the desiderata for the extended data exchange proposed in this paper is already met by the existing arrangements for scientific purposes. Thus, the specific needs of a “detection club” would in many cases require only adjustments of present national and international efforts.

The development of the science of geophysics and of the technique of test ban verification are closely connected. It would therefore be advantageous for all concerned to make the “detection club” data available to all scientists, to use such standards as might be sponsored by the International Council of Scientific Unions, to seek ways to achieve rapid circulation of bulletin data on some global telecommunication network accessible to scientists (e.g. the one used by the World Meteorological Organization for weather data and tapped in all countries) and to achieve co-ordination as far as possible, with existing global seismological co-operative efforts, such as the International Seismological Centre at Edinburgh.
The considerations in this paper have been formulated so as to help achieve more effective seismological detection as well as to allow science to benefit from resources allocated for detection purposes and vice versa, while avoiding to place an unwanted political burden upon scientists.

Letter From President Johnson to the Chairman of the Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament (Ackley), September 4, 1965

I want to thank you and your colleagues for the first report of the Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament. I established this committee at the end of my first month as President. It has devoted itself for a year and a half to studies which affect two of the greatest issues our Nation faces. The first is to provide for national defense in ways that bring no unnecessary hardship to any American community. The second is to keep every road open for rapid progress toward disarmament as soon as others will join with us.

Your report gives a comprehensive account of the extensive efforts which our government is making to ensure that changes in our defense needs are brought about in ways that are fair to all affected groups and individuals. You rightly note our achievements in community assistance, and you rightly conclude that our work in this field must be improved still further. I agree with you that we must strengthen our aids to workers. I agree also that this is a task for state and local agencies and for private groups working in harmony with the Federal government.

What I find most encouraging of all in the report is your conclusion that our heavy current commitment to defense is not a bar to rapid progress toward disarmament. All Americans will welcome your clear conclusion that "there is no economic reason for the Nation to undergo a major economic decline or a slow stagnation if and when defense outlays are reduced."

The American people will continue to be determined that our great industrial effort for national defense is their servant and not their master. This is the tradition of the armed forces themselves,

1 Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 27, 1965, p. 515.
2 Ante, pp. 290–293.
and it is the conviction, I am sure, of those who serve in the national defense industries, too.

This country will therefore go forward with renewed courage and conviction to provide the defenses that freedom demands and at the same time to press along the hard road toward the disarmament mankind must have.

Finally, your report gives eloquent restatement to the basic principle that sound decisions in a free society must be built on the best possible information. I strongly endorse your recommendation that your studies be continued, just as I strongly endorse your reaffirmation of the need for a constant growth in the basic research which can enlarge the opportunities for peaceful progress throughout our society.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Tsarapkin) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (Extract), September 7, 1965

The United States draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons provides for the banning of certain forms of dissemination: namely, the direct transfer of such weapons by nuclear to non-nuclear States, the transfer of such weapons through military alliances to the national control of non-nuclear States, and the creation by non-nuclear States of their own nuclear weapons. However, at the same time—and we wish to emphasize this aspect of the matter—the United States draft opens up possibilities of establishing a multilateral nuclear force and giving the Federal Republic of Germany and other non-nuclear countries members of NATO access to nuclear weapons within the framework of such a force. This is not simply our own interpretation of the United States draft—this was said distinctly and clearly by Mr. Foster himself at the meeting of 31 August this year, when, replying very tardily to our question, he stated: "The treaty would not, however, preclude the establishment of nuclear arrangements—such as a multilateral force within NATO . . ." 3

Thus the United States and its NATO allies, as we see from their practical actions both inside and outside this Committee, are not even

1 ENDC/PV.230, pp. 6–9.
3 Ante, p. 365.
thinking of really solving the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. The draft treaty submitted by the United States not only fails to eliminate the danger of the further spread of nuclear weapons but, as follows quite obviously from the text, is aimed at legalizing the establishment of a NATO multilateral nuclear force with the participation of the West German revanchists, and thus at leaving open one of the channels of the dissemination of nuclear weapons. This is also borne out by the fact that, upon the insistence of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, negotiations are continuing in NATO for the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force and for giving the Federal Republic of Germany access to nuclear weapons. In the light of that fact we have to note that the Draft Treaty to prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons submitted in our Committee by the United States pursues purely propaganda aims and not the aim of achieving the necessary agreement.

Since at the present time the main practical danger of the spread of nuclear weapons is connected with the plan to establish a NATO multilateral nuclear force, the United States draft is unsound from the standpoint of solving the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. On that basis it is impossible to arrive to an agreement. That is our attitude in regard to the United States draft treaty.

As the Soviet Government has already stated repeatedly, the Soviet Union favours the conclusion of an effective international agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons which would close all direct and indirect channels for dissemination, including through military blocs, in the form of the establishment of a NATO multilateral nuclear force. Such an agreement should provide for an undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to transfer nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever, directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States, into the ownership or control of States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons, and not to give such States or groups of States the right to participate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons. The agreement should also provide for a similar undertaking by the non-nuclear Powers.

That is our conception of the basis of an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

I will now turn to another matter.

At the meeting of the Committee held on 31 August this year we pointed out that—

The general spirit pervading the statements of the representatives of the non-aligned countries, the considerations they have put forward which testify to the further development of their views on the questions under discussion, and the concrete proposals of the non-aligned States—even though it may not be possible to agree with everything they said—deserve attention and careful study.¹

¹ ENDC/PV.228, p. 22.
We should like to note with satisfaction the constructive development of the views of the non-aligned States on the question of prohibiting underground nuclear weapon tests, to the discussion of which they have devoted considerable attention in the Committee and, what is more important, on which they have put forward constructive ideas and proposals. In contrast to the static position of the United States, which continues to put forward its old demands for international inspection and thereby makes agreement on the question of prohibiting underground nuclear weapon tests impossible to achieve, among the non-aligned States there have cropped up new ideas, considerations and proposals which contribute towards the solution of this problem.

In this connexion the Soviet delegation is of the opinion that the proposal made by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, deserves attention. The proposal, put forward on 17 August of this year, was that the scope of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water ¹ should be extended to cover underground nuclear weapon tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75, and that as an additional measure the nuclear Powers should agree to a moratorium on all other underground nuclear weapon tests pending the achievement of agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Mr. Hassan said:

...whatever the remaining differences are, political or technical, the Committee has before it various suggestions presented to it by the non-aligned delegations around this table, such as that for the extension of the Moscow Treaty to cover underground tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75, which the admitted capacities and capabilities of the existing national equipments are able to detect and identify ... As a complementary measure to the preceding one, we again proposed ... that there should be a voluntary moratorium by nuclear Powers under which they would refrain from any further testing pending agreement on the decision needed for a comprehensive test-ban treaty.²

This proposal by the Government of the United Arab Republic, reflecting a realistic approach to a question which is ripe for solution, namely the need to put an end to underground nuclear tests, was supported on 2 September by the representative of Ethiopia, Lij Imru, who said:

What is needed today is the political decision and the ability to accept minor risks in the expectation of making gains in the wider field of disarmament.

He went on:

The Ethiopian delegation supports the proposal made at our meeting of 17 August by the leader of the delegation of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, that there should be a voluntary moratorium by the nuclear Powers under which they would refrain from any further testing pending agreement on the decision needed for a comprehensive test-ban treaty.³

¹ Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291-293.
² Ante, p. 345.
³ ENDC/PV.229, p. 16.
In raising this question we should like to point out once again that the Soviet Union is ready, as in the past, to reach immediately an agreement banning all underground nuclear weapon tests, on the basis of the use of national means of detecting nuclear explosions, which are quite adequate for monitoring such a ban. As the proposal of the United Arab Republic relates to the banning of a part of under­ground nuclear tests precisely under such conditions, and to the establishment of a moratorium on all other underground nuclear tests, the Soviet Union is prepared to meet the position of the United Arab Republic and to agree to the halting of underground nuclear weapon tests in that way.

We call on all the States, nuclear and non-nuclear, represented in the Committee—and first and foremost, of course, on the United States—to support this proposal, which would enable us to put an end immediately to any further nuclear weapon tests and, by so doing to block that dangerous channel of the nuclear arms race.

Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Underground Test Ban and Nondissemination of Nuclear Weapons, September 7, 1965

I shall of course want to study the statement made today by the representative of the Soviet Union. However, at this point I must note with regret the lack of understanding of our draft treaty displayed in his statement. He obviously failed to study the responses to his questions which I had given, and he persisted in attempting to substitute his responses for mine.

We remain convinced that there is no problem inherent in the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty which cannot be resolved in the mutual interest of all of us. If we cannot find the basis for agreement here and now, we certainly hope that we shall not lack early opportunities to continue the discussions thereon. Having finally come to grips with the divergent points of view which various delegations have on this matter, we must pursue our efforts to reach an agreement until such a treaty becomes an actual fact.

We want, of course, to study not only Ambassador Tsarapkin's statement but also Minister Cernik's statement on the test ban. I am sure that all representatives are aware of the long-standing position of the United States in opposition to an unverified moratorium. As

1 ENDC/PV.230, pp. 18–24.
2 For the U.S. draft treaty, see ante, pp. 347–349.
I made clear on 2 September, our position is that we should seek an adequately-verified ban on all tests.\(^1\) We do not feel that half-measures, which may create suspicion throughout the world that violations might be occurring, could create good prospects for a stable agreement to ban all tests.

On another matter, our position with regard to the points made by the representative of Czechoslovakia is clear from earlier statements of my delegation; but with respect to troops and bases let me add one additional thought. The way to eliminate troops and bases is clearly to eliminate the threat which necessitates them. That is the purpose of our work in this Conference, and of the peaceful settlement which we seek for situations which create tensions around the world. We cannot put the cart before the horse. That would aggravate our problem, not solve it, and would actually add to the instability of a peace which is now so precariously preserved, for lack of a better way, through the balance of forces to which our colleague referred.

I propose today to speak on one aspect of the problem of concluding a non-proliferation agreement which appears to be of particular concern to some of the non-nuclear countries. I refer to the view that the obligations to be assumed by nuclear Powers should not be discriminatory and that they should match those assumed by non-nuclear countries. To assure this, it is suggested that it will be necessary for the nuclear Powers to undertake measures to reduce their nuclear arsenals.

There can be no question of the position of the United States on this proposition. My Government is prepared to halt the nuclear arms race and to halt it now. We gave proof of this last year in the emphasis we gave to our proposals to explore a freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. We also proposed to cease all production of fissionable materials for weapons, and to transfer agreed amounts of such materials to non-weapons use.\(^2\)

Let me review these measures briefly. Our proposal to explore a verified freeze on the number and characteristics of nuclear offensive and defensive strategic bombers and missiles is designed to halt the most destructive and expensive segment of the whole nuclear arms race. An agreement on this measure would be a major achievement in building confidence and in preparing the way for other steps. The production race having been halted, the door would then be open to actual reduction in such delivery vehicles.

We are ready to explore such a measure now. But whilst awaiting a constructive response from the Soviet Union we are attempting, in so far as is possible, to act in the spirit of this proposal. Thus, as I reported to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, we have

\(^1\) *Ante*, pp. 385-386.

\(^2\) *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 7-9.
given several examples of restraint on our part in the nuclear arms-
ments field. These examples include plans to reduce the numbers of
certain heavy bombers and to forego construction of certain missiles
which had been included in our production plans. But there are no
real limits to the actions that we can take alone. For one thing, we
have received no indications of similar self-restraint on the part of the
Soviet Union; but even more important is the fact that significant
progress in this area requires assurance of compliance, and for this a
verified agreement is absolutely essential. It is time, high time, for
the Soviet Union to respond more positively to this proposal. Our
position is not frozen; we should welcome constructive suggestions
from the Soviet Union or from any other countries.

Equally important is our long-standing proposal for a verified halt
in the production of fissionable materials for weapons use and, in
conjunction with such a halt, the transfer of sizeable, agreed quantities
of fissionable material to peaceful non-weapons uses. As the Com-
mittee is aware, we have offered as an illustrative suggestion to
transfer 60,000 kilogrammes of weapons-grade U-235 if the Soviet
Union would on its part transfer 40,000 kilogrammes to non-weapons
use.2

We are ready to negotiate such an agreement right now. Is it not
high time for the Soviet Union to match our readiness to implement
such a proposal? In our working paper on inspection of a fissionable
materials cut-off 3 we demonstrated that the verification of this meas-
ure would not involve onerous or excessively-intrusive inspection
procedures. Announcements by nuclear Powers regarding cut-backs,
such as those made last year,4 are welcome but are not likely to solve
the problem. We hope that the Soviet Union will see its way clear
before long to join us in an intensive examination of a cut-off agree-
ment. Again on this as on other proposals, we should welcome
Soviet and other suggestions.

We did not wait to table a non-proliferation agreement before
addressing ourselves to these means of halting the nuclear arms race;
nor do we intend to suspend further efforts to reach agreement on
them until we have concluded a non-proliferation treaty.

Indeed, the measures I have reviewed are by no means the sum total
of the West’s extensive efforts to halt the arms race. Through exten-
sive research programmes conducted under the auspices of the United
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, we are continually
examining existing positions and the possibilities of new proposals. In
addition, looking forward to the day when we shall come to agreement
on measures involving large-scale reductions in armament production,

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1 Ibid., pp. 101-105.
2 Ibid., 1963, pp. 332-333.
3 Ibid., 1964, pp. 235-238.
4 See ibid., pp. 165-171.
President Johnson, shortly after he assumed office, ordered an extensive examination of the possible economic problems that might accompany shifts in defence spending, or even general and complete disarmament.1

The report on this subject, prepared by a special committee headed by Mr. Gardner Ackley, Chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, was made public yesterday, 6 September.2 In welcoming the report President Johnson said that what he found most encouraging was its conclusion that the heavy current commitment of the United Nations to defence was not a bar to rapid progress towards disarmament.3 My delegation expects to have copies of this report available for those representatives who may be interested.

That is our answer to the question of priorities. We do not agree with the suggestion that nuclear disarmament must precede a non-proliferation agreement. We are prepared to act first on any measure on which agreement is possible. In this we are guided by our experience with the limited test-ban Treaty, which placed concrete inhibitions on the nuclear Powers and only theoretical ones on the non-nuclear countries.4 We welcome the wise and courageous statements made by the representatives of Mexico 5 and Ethiopia 6 with regard to priorities. We believe this Committee must deal simultaneously with proposals to halt the nuclear arms race and with proposals to prevent its spread.

It has been implied in some of the statements made here that, by consenting to a non-proliferation agreement, the non-nuclear countries would be surrendering some leverage on the nuclear countries to force them into accepting measures of nuclear disarmament. In point of fact, however, further proliferation would inhibit nuclear disarmament, rather than encourage it. The best statement of this conclusion remains the oft-quoted statement of President Kennedy:

I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons . . . in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered through the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security and no chance of effective disarmament.7

Let me be frank. The nuclear Powers cannot be forced into agreements, any more than can the non-nuclear Powers. We are dealing here with questions of security, where national interest is the primary guide to national action. But surely one thing is now amply clear:

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2 *See ante*, pp. 290-293.
3 *Ante*, p. 393.
4 *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.
5 ENDC/PV.224, p. 30.
6 ENDC/PV.229, pp. 13-14.
7 *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, p. 254.
the basic interests of every country and the maintenance of world peace demand an end to the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race. The United States has given unequivocal proof of its acceptance of that basic fact. What is needed now is evidence that the other side understands it too.

There is no question, therefore, of attempting to impose obligations on non-nuclear countries in return for maintaining the exclusive status of the nuclear Powers. In the first place, each of us must judge any proposed agreement, not by the standard of what someone else might or might not get out of it, but rather by whether the benefit to each of us in safeguarding world peace would exceed the cost. Secondly, and with specific regard to a non-proliferation agreement, it should be clear by now that we each stand to gain and that the so-called cost to any of us is hardly comparable.

I should like in this connexion to say something about the acceptance of international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities. I am referring now not primarily to safeguards applied to nuclear materials or equipment obtained through the International Atomic Energy Agency, for which the recipient State is required to accept IAEA safeguards. I am referring rather to the voluntary acceptance by a State of safeguards on its indigenous nuclear programme, including both materials and equipment, as is contemplated in article III of the United States Draft Treaty to prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.¹

There seems to be a misconception in some quarters that the IAEA actually has operational control of facilities and materials which are subject to the safeguards. That is not true. The IAEA safeguards system is designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information...are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.²

The system of safeguards has been specifically designed to avoid hampering a State’s economic or technological development. Moreover, the inspectors are under instructions to implement the system in a manner designed to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities. In large power reactors inspectors must, of course, have access at all times to the facilities, the equipment and the materials; but they must not interfere with the economic operation of the facilities. The recent experience of a private utility company in the United States with IAEA inspections has shown that they are not burdensome and that they in no way hamper economic operation of the reactor.

¹ Ante, p. 348.
² Art. III A. 5 of the IAEA Statute (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, p. 916). For the revised IAEA safeguards system, see post, pp. 446-460.
We know of no reason why any State which is willing to undertake not to manufacture nuclear weapons should not be willing also to accept IAEA or equivalent international safeguards, both to demonstrate its faithful compliance with its treaty commitments and to establish means of reassuring itself that other parties are also complying. Those international safeguards are not costly; they are not burdensome; they do not hamper the economic operation of reactors; they do not lead to the revelation of trade secrets. In short, they do not in any way interfere with a nation's peaceful nuclear activities.

The question has been raised by the distinguished representative of India of the need for safeguards on reactors, since the plutonium produced in a reactor is not useful for weapons until it has been processed through a chemical separation plant. The IAEA safeguards system is designed to cover the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication plants, reactors and chemical separation plants. The reason for that is that diversion to clandestine military activity could occur at any point in the cycle. The more parts of the cycle the inspectors can observe, the more difficult it would be to hide such diversion.

To be sure, specific procedures for safeguards on all of the various types of nuclear facilities have not yet been developed. The IAEA regards the development of a safeguards system as a step-by-step matter, and up to now the first major step has been taken by the development of procedures for reactors. Authority now exists for inspections of other types of facilities, and procedures for those inspections will be developed as need arises.

In our view, whatever may be the slight inconvenience occasioned by international nuclear safeguards, it is miniscule in comparison with the large contribution which their general acceptance would make to curbing nuclear proliferation. Given the practicability of these IAEA procedures and the fact that they are not really burdensome, it is difficult to understand why there should be any resistance to their application by any country. This is particularly true of non-nuclear countries, for whom the widespread application of safeguards would provide an assurance that other States were not making preparations to initiate a weapons programme.

Some have said that it is discriminatory to ask non-nuclear countries to accept safeguards on their peaceful activities as long as certain nuclear Powers do not do so. I might, of course, argue that this view misses the essential point: namely, that until a cut-off of production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons is accepted, the application of safeguards to the peaceful activities of nuclear Powers would still leave their most important nuclear production facilities unsafeguarded. But in any case our draft treaty would not discriminate.

1 Ante, p. 339.
In article III we have called on all parties, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, to co-operate in facilitating the application of such safeguards to peaceful activities. By inviting IAEA inspections of one of their large power reactors, the United States and the United Kingdom have both taken a lead in preparing the ground for the widespread, non-discriminatory application of those safeguards. Agreement on our proposal to halt the production of all fissionable material for weapons use would remove any remaining obstacles to the IAEA safeguards on peaceful activities in the nuclear States. Those who are as anxious as we are to further this process should address themselves to the Soviet Union.

But, in the meantime, many States are planning to build power reactors which will unavoidably produce significant quantities of plutonium. In the absence of IAEA or equivalent international safeguards on such reactors, suspicion is bound to arise that some diversion of plutonium to a future weapons programme is taking place. That is why a strong safeguards provision is necessary in a non-proliferation treaty. Rather than cast doubt on its necessity, therefore, non-nuclear States as well as nuclear Powers might question whether the provision we have suggested is strong enough to avert the threat which we already face and which may soon grow to dangerous proportions.

Concerns over priorities or possible discrimination are not, of course, purely illusory. They do have a psychological and political basis, even if they are not well grounded in fact. But let us be clear on our objective. If we are serious about our resolve to halt the nuclear arms race, to begin the process of reduction in nuclear arsenals and to prevent nuclear spread, we must move along a broad front and we must seize every opportunity to take such steps as now seem feasible. The national interests of which I spoke will assure that no country will be placed in a disadvantageous position. What really is in question is whether we have the wisdom to see to it that all countries are protected and that peace is secured.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Tsarapkin) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Underground Test Ban, September 9, 1965

At our last meeting, held on 7 September, the Soviet delegation made a statement informing the Committee of the readiness of the

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1 UK Treaty Series no. 70, Cmnd. 2753.
2 ENDC/PV.231, pp. 35–37.
3 Ante, pp. 394–397.

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Soviet Government to meet the position of the United Arab Republic and some other non-aligned States and to agree to a cessation of underground nuclear weapon tests on the conditions set out by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, on 17 August of this year.\(^1\) At that time the Soviet delegation called upon all other States represented in this Committee, and in particular the United States, also to support this proposal, which would make it possible to put an end immediately to any further nuclear weapon tests.

However, in his statement at our last meeting the representative of the United States, after dealing briefly with the substance of the question, saw fit to remind the Committee of the position of the United States in regard to a moratorium in general.\(^2\) What Mr. Foster said on that score was assessed as indicating the obvious unwillingness of the United States to adopt the aforesaid proposal of the United Arab Republic. He said that the United States did not agree with the proposed idea of a moratorium. He made it clear that he regarded the proposal for a moratorium as a half-measure which could not create good prospects for the banning of all nuclear weapon tests.

We cannot pass over in silence this statement by Mr. Foster, because it shows that at the present time the United States simply has no intention of agreeing to any ban on underground nuclear weapon tests. The statement about the unacceptability to the United States of an "unverified moratorium", as Mr. Foster put it, should not mislead anyone. First of all it should be pointed out that the idea of a moratorium has been proposed for the very reason that it is not as yet possible to reach agreement on the nature of the control over compliance with a ban on underground tests. Therefore to speak about a moratorium with inspection would in point of fact mean solving the problem in the United States way and accepting the United States position in regard to foreign inspection. We all know that no agreement can be reached on that basis. But obviously that is precisely what the United States is striving for.

It is common knowledge that, since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water,\(^3\) the United States has carried out many dozens of underground nuclear explosions. During this year alone, as reported by the Press, eighteen underground nuclear tests have been announced by the United States. The total number of underground nuclear weapon tests conducted by the United States has already long been in the three-figure bracket. It is quite obvious that all these numerous tests are being carried out by the United States not at all in order to

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\(^1\) _Ante_, pp. 340–347.

\(^2\) _Ante_, pp. 397–403.

\(^3\) _Documents on Disarmament, 1963_, pp. 291–293.
enrich seismic science, or merely to cause earth tremors. The United States—as Mr. Foster himself admitted on 2 September 1—attaches great military importance to underground nuclear tests.

In passing, Mr. Foster tried to ascribe a similar view to the Soviet Union—for which, however, we have given him no authority. We have a different approach to the matter. We consider that underground nuclear weapon tests should be banned immediately. But the position of the United States in this matter is altogether different. It stands for the continuation of underground nuclear weapon tests. That is the crux of the matter, and everyone in the world is fully aware of the purpose of the series of underground nuclear tests which are being carried out one after another in the United States. It is obvious to everyone that the United States is perfecting new types of nuclear weapons. Their specifications, however, were unknown.

Now we know the specifications of one type of nuclear weapon which has already been perfected in the United States in the course of these underground nuclear tests. Yesterday it became known in Washington, and it was announced in the press, that the United States army had a new nuclear weapon called "Code No. 207". This weapon is intended for use by divisions of the United States Army. Thus it has become known that the military arsenal of the United States has been supplied with a new tactical nuclear weapon "No. 207", while underground tests of nuclear weapons in the United States continue with unabated intensity.

What does this mean? It means that during the course of these continuing underground tests in the United States more and more new types of nuclear weapons are being perfected—"208", "209", "210", and so on. That is the real reason why the United States refuses to accept the extension of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, to cover underground tests as well. That is the only reason.

That explains also the objections which were so hurriedly voiced by the United States representative, Mr. Foster, to the proposal of the United Arab Republic for the halting of underground nuclear weapon tests. The question of foreign control and the need for foreign on-site inspection are put forward by the United States merely as a technical pretext, as a technical means of disguising its real intentions and blocking any possibility of reaching agreement on this question.

The same line was taken by the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, and the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, who in their statements today obviously tried to help the United States in its attempt to avoid a political solution of this question and to drive the question of banning underground nuclear weapon

1 Ante, p. 385.

tests into a quagmire of unending, fruitless technical disputes. Mr. Burns referred to a statement I made at a Press conference.¹ I must point out that what I said was not said at an official meeting of the Committee. But the reference by Mr. Burns to the fact that every day there occur thousands of large, medium, small, and very small underground tremors shows precisely the huge possibilities there are of leading any technical discussions on this subject into an endless deadlock. Precisely this fact emphasizes the need for a political approach to the solution of this problem, not a resumption of technical disputes.

The statements made by representatives of non-aligned countries in our Committee have shown how serious is the desire of the overwhelming majority of countries to bring about the earliest possible cessation of underground nuclear weapon tests. What the majority of the members of the Committee would like is that the United States, which is crammed to the limit with nuclear weapons of various types and for various purposes, should reconsider its negative position and agree to the proposal of the United Arab Republic, and thus it would be possible to put an end to nuclear tests for ever. To solve this long-drawn-out problem at the present time, all that is needed is good will on the part of the United States and nothing more.

Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Underground Test Ban, September 9, 1965²

The Soviet representative has again today repeated his support for an unverified moratorium on small underground tests accompanied by a treaty banning tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75. There can be no mistake about that proposal. It is an old Soviet proposal. It has been said by the Soviet representative that some of our proposals go back to 1958; I suspect that this Soviet proposal may even antedate 1958. It has a new label; Mr. Tsarapkin has again today urged adoption of a comprehensive test ban without on-site inspections just

¹ Referring to certain remarks to the press by Ambassador Tsarapkin, Gen. Burns said: "These were to the effect that some natural underground events cannot be distinguished from some nuclear tests, but that such nuclear tests would be so small as not to be significant from a military point of view. Is this indeed the position of the Soviet Union? If so, it is rather different from the claim that all nuclear tests can be detected by national means alone, a claim the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, has made from time to time. . . ." (ENDC/PV.231, pp. 30–31).
² Ibid., pp. 38–39.
as he has since 1963 at least. His position is that there should be no inspections, that adoption of an underground ban is a purely political question, and that there must be a political decision. That is, as I say, an old position.

We have attempted to point out and to prove, as science has proved, that in a substantial number of instances it is impossible to differentiate between earthquakes and nuclear explosions. That still continues to be the situation. As long as those unidentifiable incidents remain, then, in order to have a durable agreement, it is essential, as Mr. Burns said today, that there should be a means of verifying what has actually taken place. But the USSR refuses to agree. That means that today, as before, one nation and one nation alone—not the United States—stands in the position of preventing the achievement of a comprehensive test ban to stop all nuclear tests, with the contribution that this would make to limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. That cannot be concealed or avoided by statements about its being only a political decision. It must be political in a sense; but a good political decision—in order to achieve what we are all here to achieve—must be based also on the state of scientific knowledge in the world today about how a test ban can be monitored.

As we have said so frequently, we have devoted large resources to improving detection and identification capabilities; we are continuing to devote large resources to such improvement.

The United Kingdom representative said today that through its contributions the United Kingdom has improved this capability, making it possible—and I quote my friend from the Soviet Union—with "goodwill" to achieve what we all know should be achieved here and now. I am sorry that I have to point to this position taken by the Soviet Union as being one that stands in the way of what we all want, but that indeed is the situation.

The position of my delegation is clear: various types of arrangements for an unverified underground ban, regardless of the form which they take or the length of time to which they would apply, are unacceptable to my Government. I believe all delegations will still recall the most unfortunate experience the United States—and, I think it can be said, the whole world—had in the autumn of 1961 when, despite an understanding with the USSR, the greatest series of nuclear tests in history was suddenly undertaken by the Soviet Union. Since that time we have said consistently that a moratorium is not a safe and reliable means of securing a cessation of tests, and that is true today.

I shall quote something that was said in 1962:

It is of course a sad historical fact that the Soviet Union ended the last voluntary moratorium by resuming tests a year ago. But we also know that the Government of the United States itself was not free from strong pressure to resume testing. To its great credit it then resisted the pressure.
That was a quotation from a statement made at the plenary meeting of this Conference on 3 September 1962 by the representative of Burma, who then continued his discussion of the moratorium by saying:

... if an unconditional moratorium on underground tests were now to be declared, who could doubt that it would not be long before internal pressures built up again on both sides to a point where they would become irresistible; and, as we see today, a moratorium that fails adds greatly to the magnitude of our problem.¹

I think it is clear to all who are acquainted with United States policy over the years that a test ban cannot be concluded by my Government where there is no provision or effective arrangements to ensure the observance of agreements entered into. In the case of underground testing this still means that some on-site inspections are required.

British Paper Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Notes on United Kingdom Research on Techniques for Distinguishing Between Earthquakes and Underground Explosions, September 9, 1965 ²

The E.N.D.C. is familiar with the history of the Experts Conference here in Geneva in 1958 and its recommendations for monitoring possible violations of a nuclear test ban treaty in all environments.³ Then, as now, discussions about how to distinguish between earthquakes and man-made underground explosions proved most difficult of all. This continuing difficulty is reflected in the fact that while it is still not possible to obtain agreement on this problem, a treaty banning nuclear tests in all other environments has been concluded.

When it became clear that for various reasons the control system recommended at Geneva in 1958 was unlikely to be implemented, scientists in the United Kingdom took a new look at the possibilities of detecting underground events at much greater distances than the 1000 kilometre range required for the Geneva recommendations of 1958. The thought was that seismic waves generated at such distances as would enable them to travel through the earth's homogeneous deep mantle should be much freer from the complexities introduced at shorter ranges by heterogeneities along shallower

¹ ENDC/PV. 78, p. 7.
² ENDC/155, Sept. 9, 1965.
propagation paths through the earth's crust. With this concept in mind, U.K. scientists embarked on a seismic research programme to examine the possibilities of developing a detection system very different from that already recommended at Geneva.

The problem was seen as calling not only for research in all the usual seismic conditions but also as one where the seismic problem itself should be examined as one of exact measurement. The latter aspect immediately led to all recordings being made in such a way as would enable them to be processed electronically. By increasing the number of seismometers per station and deploying them in beam-forming arrays, by placing them in deep boreholes and by seeking lower noise sites than previously used, the possibility of great improvements in the signal to noise ratio soon became apparent with an essentially increased ability to see the first motions of the compressional or P waves arriving from a seismic source.

It was found that arrays of this particular type offered the greatest promise of advancement. As well as offering a signal to noise improvement in proportion to the square root of the number of seismometers used, they allowed the possibility of turning the array to more than one signal component velocity, thus improving the reception of later signal components, they offered an approximate determination of the direction of the source and they provided a body of data which enabled a method for determining depth of focus to be applied with considerable success. With such early encouragement scientists in the U.K. intensified their work with these arrays and established an experimental facility in U.K. to develop array techniques and prove instrumentation. At the same time, in close collaboration with their colleagues in the U.S., they established a similar experimental facility in the U.S. From this work it became apparent that a completely new concept of methods could be used to detect and identify earthquakes. The main facts then emerging may be summarised as follows:

(a) Application of data processing techniques to magnetic tape recordings increased the capability of determining first motion of the first wave.
(b) Estimation of the focal depth of events could be improved.
(c) Array type stations could be operated effectively beyond 3000 kilometres, as compared with the 1000 kilometres range for the previous Geneva system.
(d) Comparative differences in the characteristics of seismic waves from earthquakes and explosions were enhanced.

These advances suggested that the seismic detection and identification required to monitor a ban on underground tests could be carried out by a relatively small number of array stations at teleseismic distances. The reduced number of station sites in turn increased the
possibility of confining stations to the quietest seismic sites available and this in itself led to a significant improvement in attaining the signal to noise ratio necessary to detect the smallest events of interest.

The next stage in this research work obviously called for a specific study of explosions and earthquakes at teleseismic distances using large arrays. In the U.K. case these have varied from about 10 to 25 kilometres in length, are of a crossed linear geometry rather than triangular or radial and are carefully sited for noise, interference, and topographical characteristics. This phase of the work is a continuing part of the research programme still being pursued by U.K. scientists.

In the development and application of these array systems there are many variants to be examined. These include array geometry, site noise level, the number and characteristics of seismometers to be deployed. The results to be reported from the very large array experiment now being carried out in the United States will be of great interest. It is hoped that the approach taken by U.K. scientists will also contribute to resolving this difficult problem of distinguishing between natural seismic events and man-made underground explosions. A corresponding statement from any other delegation which has a contribution to report would be welcome. But behind all this, many detailed technical problems arise calling for detailed technical discussion. It would therefore be greatly preferable to have the scientists working on these problems brought together to discuss their work and assess the possibilities of creating an effective monitoring system for the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions. It may well be that an effective monitoring system will call not for one particular type of array but various types depending on local seismic and topographical characteristics, as well as costs.

In the meantime the U.K. has continually sought to exploit these new technical advances as they have come along. They made possible a new approach to an underground test ban in 1962 and the West have continued to modify their position as scientific evidence has accumulated. Some of this work has already been published and all the work carried out by U.K. scientists is now being prepared for publication. That work was the subject of a symposium sponsored by the Royal Society in January of this year and to which representatives from many countries, including the Soviet Union, were invited.

Nevertheless, with all these technical advances there still remains a residual number of seismic events at or above seismic magnitude 4.0 that would be unidentifiable by remote seismological observations alone, and which could be suspected as possible violations of a test ban, unless they could be eliminated by some supplementary means
such as on-site inspection being applied in some measure. This is the problem that still confronts us and that prevents an extension of the test ban treaty to cover the underground environment. It remains to be seen whether further research can provide any significant improvement on the position now reached but if there is such a possibility the U.K. believe that it could only be hastened in a detailed joint examination of the advances now achieved in the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom.

Italian Proposal Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Draft of Unilateral Nonacquisition Declaration, September 14, 1965

The Government of . . . . . . . . not having national control of nuclear weapons, desiring to promote international peace and security and to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, recalling General Assembly Resolution 1665 (XVI); 2 reaffirming the necessity of an international agreement to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, convinced that a unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear States may facilitate and encourage international agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce nuclear arsenals, leading to general and complete disarmament; hoping that such agreements will be achieved very soon,
declares that: from the date of the entry into force of the present declaration and for a period of . . . . . . . years, 1) it will not manufacture or otherwise acquire national control of nuclear weapons; 2) it will not seek or receive assistance from other States in the manufacture of any such weapons; 3) it will accept the application of IAEA or equivalent international safeguards on its nuclear activities;
declares further that: 1) the present undertakings are conditioned upon similar declarations, issued by at least . . . . . States within six months from the signature of the present declaration; 2) three months before the expiration of the above said period of . . . . years, it will consult other signatories of similar declarations, in order to prolong the said undertakings, considering the progress which has been made toward international agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, or to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce nuclear

2 Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 694.
arsenals; 3) it reserves all freedom of action if a non-nuclear State in any way acquires within the above-mentioned period of . . . . . years national control of nuclear weapons.

invites all States not having national control of nuclear weapons, and particularly those which are already approaching nuclear capability, to engage, as a matter of urgency, in the undertakings as set forth in the present declaration;

calls upon all States to respect and to observe the principles of this declaration and to encourage their observance by other States.

Statement by the Italian Representative (Cavalletti) to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Non-dissemination of Nuclear Weapons, September 14, 1965

Our Committee, after a month and a half of work, is today on the eve of adjourning, and the time has come to review what we have done and what we could envisage either in the immediate or the near future.

During this session we have had interesting and certainly useful discussions. Important problems of very great urgency have been examined. In particular, new efforts have been made to resolve the problem of non-proliferation. The Western delegations have not remained inactive, and the United States delegation, supported by the other Western delegations, has submitted to the Conference a draft treaty on non-dissemination.

That proposal, an important and serious one, has already been extensively debated, but unfortunately the delegations of the Soviet Union and its allies have not yet accepted it. We should like to cherish the hope that that is not their last word, and without being discouraged we shall continue to press, here or at the United Nations, for the conclusion of that treaty. In the meantime, however, as Lord Chalfont stated during his noteworthy statement of 9 September, our Committee runs the risk of adjourning in a state of deadlock. That is very regrettable, I would even say dangerous, in view of the ever-increasing urgency—stressed several times here—of the adoption of measures aimed at preventing dissemination of nuclear weapons.

1 ENDC/PV.232, pp. 5-12.
2 ante, pp. 347-349.
3 ENDC/PV.231, p. 5.
The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Fanfani, stated on 29 July:

But if it should not be possible to prepare within a reasonable time such a draft comprising obligations for both the nuclear and the non-nuclear countries, the Italian delegation would reserve the right to appeal to the non-nuclear countries to take an initiative which, without prejudice to their own points of view, would fix a certain period for a moratorium on the possible dissemination of nuclear weapons. It is quite conceivable that the non-nuclear countries, particularly those close to nuclear capability, might agree to renounce unilaterally equipping themselves with nuclear weapons for a specific length of time, it being understood of course that if their . . . demands were not complied with during that time-limit, they would resume their freedom of action.

In that way a respite would be given to the anxiety about nuclear dissemination and, moreover, a factor of pressure and persuasion would be created which could be brought to bear on the nuclear countries in order to spur them to conclude a general agreement, thus speeding up the process of nuclear disarmament. Thus a message of peace and good will could be given to the world, a message to which no one—it is to be hoped—could remain insensible.1

Those words have not remained without effect. They have met with a response, either in this Conference or elsewhere. The Swedish delegation was the first to express its favourable opinion. At our meeting of 10 August Mrs. Myrdal said:

Even if a major result at this session is not in the offing, we should at least be able to take a few strides forward. One such minimum programme has been offered us in the field of non-dissemination. I refer to the proposal made by the Italian Foreign Minister . . . .

After citing that proposal Mrs. Myrdal continued: “It is possible that this proposal may prove valuable”, and, referring to the moratorium, went on:

As far as my own country is concerned, I can say that if such a decision seemed to rally support on the part of non-nuclear nations, we would be ready to give it positive consideration.2

At our meeting of 12 August the representative of India, Mr. Trivedi, expressed his broad agreement with the Fanfani idea, which he quoted at length, commenting in this connexion:

That is certainly a fine sentiment, and it deserves respect not only because it is expressed by the Foreign Minister of a great country, but also because it can perhaps be dovetailed into a satisfactory and rational arrangement.3

At our meeting of 17 August the representative of Mexico, Mr. Gomez Robledo, dealt at length with the Fanfani proposal, which he was good enough to praise, calling it a “realistic” suggestion if it proved impossible to draw up within a reasonable time a draft treaty which would also include correlative obligations for the nuclear Powers. After quoting from Mr. Fanfani’s statement, he added:

1 Ante, pp. 288–289.
3 Ante, p. 337.
It is in a similar way . . . that we in Mexico and Latin America understand the stages of this regressive process—*sui venia verbo* . . . —of non-proliferation . . . 1

At the same meeting Mr. Correa do Lago, the representative of Brazil, after speaking about non-dissemination and referring to the Fanfani proposal, declared:

I am sure that the suggestion made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy . . . could prove to be a useful instrument . . . and merits careful study. 2

During our meeting of 31 August the head of the Nigerian delegation, Mr. Obi, indicated his approval of Mr. Fanfani's idea and promised his support, saying:

Because we feel strongly that no effort should be spared in the search for adequate measures to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, no matter how tentative and limited, we listened with rapt attention and interest to the Italian idea on this subject as enunciated by the Italian Foreign Minister, Mr. Fanfani . . . We not only warmly welcome this initiative but are also prepared to give it our support when . . . developed. 3

Moreover, while much support for the Italian idea was being received in Rome through diplomatic channels and during confidential contacts between chancelleries, the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Rusk, said to the Press on 2 August:

I believe that if the non-nuclear countries committed themselves not to have nuclear weapons that would be a very constructive development. I know that a very important proposal to this end has been made by Mr. Fanfani. I think that his idea represents an important contribution. That suggestion could prove very constructive and capable of wide development. 4

Recently the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in the Danish Parliament that, if the Fanfani proposal were transmitted to the United Nations by the Eighteen-Nation Committee,—

. . . it would be natural for us to vote in favour of the proposal, whether in the First Committee or in the General Assembly itself, and to endeavour to get it approved. If that proposal were accepted we should be prepared to participate in the suggested agreement.

Lastly, the international Press, through its most representative organs of various nationalities and particularly in the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany, also supported what has been called, rather prematurely, the "Fanfani non-dissemination plan".

All this convinced us that the idea of a controlled nuclear moratorium—on which for our part we reflected for a long time before submitting it to the Conference—was valid and answered to real

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1 ENDC/PV.224, p. 33.
3 ENDC/PV.228, pp. 18-19.
4 Ante, pp. 294-295.
needs, to widely-shared preoccupations and to possibilities of agreement.

That is why my delegation has now decided to submit to the Conference a draft declaration covering the renunciation of nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear countries for a specified period. Before giving a brief explanation of the contents of the text, which has been circulated to all members of the Committee, I should like to make the following preliminary remarks.

There are two reasons for the choice of today's date for the submission of our text: the desire not to limit the discussion of the draft treaty on non-dissemination by presenting our text earlier; and the desire not to let this session of the Conference go by without taking up again an idea which, until a treaty has been achieved, could open up immediate prospects of checking nuclear dissemination.

The Italian delegation realizes that, in view of the forthcoming adjournment of the Conference, the Committee cannot discuss immediately the proposal which we have put forward. We therefore request that the document submitted by the Italian delegation be transmitted to the United Nations as an annex to the report of this Committee and that it remain on the agenda of the Conference for future sessions. Naturally, if certain delegations wish to ask questions or give their views at once, we shall be happy to answer them and to take full account of their opinions.

As Mr. Fanfani himself clearly indicated at the outset, the draft declaration which we are submitting to the Committee is not an alternative to the non-dissemination treaty which we have proposed, nor should it hold up any progress that might be possible towards that end. The declaration is intended to gain time and facilitate progress. The declaration we are proposing is a unilateral one—a unilateral manifestation of good will; it does not have the character of a contractual commitment. Nevertheless, in our opinion it would have full force of law, committing to a certain line of conduct the countries subscribing to it in the conditions provided for by the declaration itself. If a country signing the declaration had already entered into contractual commitments with other countries in respect of the question forming the subject of the declaration, those commitments would obviously remain valid in accordance with the general rules of international law.

In regard to the way in which the draft declaration is worded, I should like to point out that our aim in presenting it is above all to give a first concrete draft form to an idea, to prepare an outline, guide or model. We believe that, for the declarations which we envisage to be generally effective, they should be convergent and should contain certain essential elements, and it is some of those

1 Supra.
elements which we have indicated in our draft. However, since the declarations would be unilateral manifestations of intention, they might also be differently worded or might take different forms, each country remaining free to choose the form or language best suited to it, provided that the essential point was maintained.

I shall now deal in more detail with the content of our text, but I do not think it calls for long explanations. In the preamble we have recalled certain principles or obligations which appear to us to be fundamental and which derive from the very concept of our initiative, in particular the conviction that during the moratorium period the nuclear countries should engage in a process of ceasing to build up and reducing their nuclear arsenals.

Then come two operative paragraphs indicating the undertakings into which the countries signatory to the declaration should enter. The obligations provided for in sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the first operative paragraph are in conformity with our well-known stand, which aims at preventing the creation of any new independent national nuclear centre while permitting possible forms of co-operation or nuclear integration which would not involve that danger. On the other hand it is laid down that, in order to provide reciprocal guarantees of the faithful implementation of the declaration, the signatory countries shall accept the application of International Atomic Energy Agency or similar safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities.

The second operative paragraph provides that the signatories to the declaration shall consult with each other before the expiration of the moratorium period in order to extend it, considering any progress made towards international agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, halt the arms race and reduce nuclear arsenals. The signatories could resume their freedom of action if they did not consider that there had been satisfactory progress.

The text of the declaration is as complete as possible at the present time; but it does not provide a solution to a number of problems which will have to be studied in depth later.

First, in the operative paragraphs there are two blanks. They concern the duration of the moratorium and the number of countries which would have to sign the declaration in order that it could enter into force. Those are two very delicate questions, with regard to which it may be premature to make specific proposals. That could be done later by common agreement.

Further, no procedure is specifically indicated in the draft declaration for making the declaration public once it has been signed. One might, for example, provide that the declarations, though unilateral, should be deposited with the United Nations Secretariat; but other appropriate procedures might also be devised.

Finally, the draft declaration does not contain any suggestion for the solution of a question of which I fully realize the great importance
and delicacy: namely the co-ordination and timing of the accession of the various countries. It might happen that a country, though desiring to sign the declaration, would not do so unless it were quite sure that a certain other country would do likewise. It is also possible that the two countries in question might have difficulties in reaching agreement or in entering into direct contact. That is a problem which could hardly be solved by a rigid procedure laid down in a text. It would have to be approached in a flexible manner, on the practical level, and dealt with through prudent arrangements and appropriate soundings carried out by carefully-chosen intermediaries. Possibly the Rome Government, which has taken the initiative of proposing this declaration, might if it proved useful co-operate to that end with those countries with which it maintained relations. I think also that the Eighteen-Nation Committee, thanks particularly to its composition, could play an extremely useful role in this matter.

That concludes my remarks on the text submitted by the Italian delegation. As can be seen, it is a preliminary text, devoid of all rigidity and intended merely as a basis—we hope a useful basis—for our future work. We hope that when the time comes we may count upon the suggestions and co-operation of all delegations in perfecting and developing the draft. I apologize for having taken up so much of the Committee's time, but I thought it was my duty to explain in fairly ample detail the reasons for and the scope of our initiative. Before concluding I should like to add a few words to reaffirm the intentions which inspired the action of the Italian delegation.

Though our text is not complete, we do not claim to put forward an integral solution to the problem of non-dissemination; that still lies, as I have stated, in the conclusion of a general treaty. However, if the conclusion of such a treaty were delayed, we believe that the accession of a large number of countries to the declaration which we propose, when it was duly completed and perfected, would effectively remove the immediate danger of dissemination while giving to the non-nuclear Powers, as a counterpart, a means of ensuring that the nuclear Powers should use the prescribed period to agree upon a process of ceasing to build up and reducing their nuclear armaments.

In this connexion, as we know, a number of proposals have been submitted to the Conference. Some of those proposals, such as those on the cut-off of production of nuclear material for military purposes and of certain types of nuclear vehicles, have already been debated at length, so they might be ripe for an agreement. The transfer to peaceful uses of large quantities of military fissile material, among other measures, associated with the cut-off, would very well come within the scope of the immediate advantages which could be given to the countries signatory to the declaration. The expiration of the

1 See ante, pp. 281–286.
moratorium and the possibility for the non-nuclear Powers to regain their freedom of action at that date should hasten and encourage the conclusion of such agreements.

The Italian delegation hopes that the appeal made by Mr. Fanfani in his statement of 29 July, which has today been given its first concrete form in draft, will meet with a broad positive response among countries sincerely desiring to limit the nuclear danger without delay. We hope that the United Nations General Assembly will show interest in our proposal and that later—if a non-dissemination treaty still proves impossible—our initiative may be further developed and made more specific.

Whatever the fate of our proposal, I wish to assure the Conference that it is submitted in a spirit of sincerity on our part and with faith in the good will of others. This proposal has been dictated by our desire for peace and by our earnest wish for greater reciprocal security. We are convinced that if the possible temptations for the non-nuclear countries were to be removed for a number of years, and if the nuclear Powers were to avail themselves of that respite to redouble their efforts to achieve disarmament, the world would enjoy a happy period of calm. During that period of calm much mistrust, many misunderstandings and a good deal of hostility might vanish and encouraging prospects of security, mutual understanding and enduring peace might arise and be strengthened.

Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, September 14, 1965

As we near the close of this session, I should like to discuss the progress that we in the United States believe has been made towards achieving a non-proliferation treaty and a comprehensive test ban. Those two subjects have commanded most of our attention at this session and they remain the most immediate problems before us.

First, let me describe the status of our efforts to secure a non-proliferation treaty. As you all know, my delegation tabled a draft non-proliferation treaty at our 224th meeting. It was the product of efforts by the Canadian, Italian, United Kingdom and United States delegations. It was offered in response to suggestions by many countries that discussions on this subject would be more fruitful if we had a draft before us. We are grateful for the welcome it has received from a number of countries including, particularly, Burma,

\[1\] ENDC/PV.232, pp. 16-22.
\[2\] *Ante*, pp. 347-349.
Ethiopia, Mexico and Nigeria. Nation after nation has proclaimed its dedication to the goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. But this simple document is the first concrete expression of the means to that end to be presented to this or any other Conference.

At long last, at our 230th meeting last week, the Soviet representative addressed himself—at least in a general way—to the text of this draft. What he had to say was not altogether discouraging. Judging by his statement—and he may correct me if I am wrong—his Government can accept most of the language of the United States treaty concerning the obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear States to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Ambassador Tsarapkin said that the United States draft treaty would ban—

... the direct transfer of such weapons by nuclear to non-nuclear States, the transfer of such weapons through military alliances to the national control of non-nuclear States, and the creation by non-nuclear States of their own nuclear weapons.

Certainly these prohibitions get at the heart of the proliferation problem. The Soviet representative's statement therefore means that we have come a long way towards concluding a non-proliferation agreement.

The Soviet representative of course went on to complain that the United States draft opened the door to the creation of multilateral nuclear forces. He said:

... the United States draft opens up possibilities of establishing a multilateral nuclear force and giving the Federal Republic of Germany and other non-nuclear countries members of NATO access to nuclear weapons within the framework of such a force.\(^1\)

Here we must say that we think that Mr. Tsarapkin misunderstands the various outstanding proposals for NATO nuclear defences. We also think that he has not fully analysed the United States draft treaty. No proposal for a NATO nuclear force that the United States has put forward would provide access to nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear country. No such country would gain access to nuclear weapons design or manufacturing information; and no such country would acquire nuclear weapons, national control over nuclear weapons, or the power itself to fire nuclear weapons. This is clear from the NATO nuclear defence proposals which the United States has put forward. It is clear from Articles I and II of our draft treaty. Indeed, it is clear from my country's atomic energy legislation, which is one of the basic laws of the United States.

The Soviet representative seems to be saying that the United States draft treaty permits of a NATO multilateral force, and that therefore it is inadequate no matter what restrictions it would impose on such

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\(^1\) *Ante*, p. 394.
a force and no matter what such a force would involve. He persists in saying that such a force would provide access to nuclear weapons by non-nuclear countries even though our statement and our basic legislation assure him to the contrary. If he continues to doubt us, let him sign our draft treaty, which would create an international obligation on our part to the Soviet Union to see that access would not occur. This should be more than adequate assurance to the Soviet Union if its concern about proliferation is genuine. If, on the other hand, its aim is to divide the Atlantic alliance and to interfere with the growth of political harmony in Western Europe, then there is nothing we can do to satisfy it.

My country is firm in its support for the alliance and for measures which will produce greater coherence among its members. Our institutions in the West are dynamic. They adjust to political, technological and military changes—including such changes as the deployment in the Western part of the Soviet Union of many hundreds of missiles aimed directly at Western Germany and Western Europe. Indeed, there is no point in trying to draft a treaty which would preclude any adjustment by existing institutions to the many changes in international relations and in scientific knowledge which will inevitably occur during the course of time.

We have still not heard from the Soviet Union about the changes taking place in the Warsaw Pact with respect to arrangements for consultation or joint decision concerning nuclear weapons. As I have pointed out several times before, we know that the Soviet Union has recently turned over to its East European allies certain short-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. We have not been informed about the procedures for equipping those missiles with nuclear warheads, or for consulting with other governments as to their use. We have described in some detail to this Committee the strict control procedures we have in mind for a multilateral force. But we have heard no similar explanation from the Soviet Union. We trust that Ambassador Tsarapkin will supply us with this information as soon as possible—during the next session of this Committee at the latest.

Nevertheless, my delegation hopes that his statement of last week concerning the United States draft treaty augurs well for our next session. If he can accept as much of the draft as that statement seems to indicate, then it should be possible to proceed with that draft as the basis for negotiations when we meet again. Let us not forget the Soviet representative’s harsh rejection of a United States draft in 1962 which eleven months later became the basis for the negotiation of the limited test-ban Treaty. The Soviet Government

2 Ibid., 1963, pp. 291-293.
also fiercely opposed the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty. Yet the Soviet Government later found that that accession did not preclude the improvement of German-Soviet relations. While the Soviet Union may never admit it, the inclusion of West Germany in NATO has clearly been a step towards stability and peace in Europe.

Leaving the discussion of the United States draft treaty on a hopeful note, let me welcome the imaginative Italian proposal to carry out the idea of Foreign Minister Fanfani.\(^1\) We endorse Ambassador Cavalletti’s view that a draft treaty which could be signed by both nuclear and non-nuclear States should and must remain our chief objective.\(^2\) We hope that the next session of this Committee will see truly fruitful negotiations on such a treaty. If those negotiations should become prolonged, however, the Italian declaration \(^3\) could form a useful interim measure to freeze the present number of nuclear nations until a treaty can be achieved. Having finally come to grips with the concrete issues involved in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, we must persist in our efforts until a lasting agreement is concluded which would avert this serious threat to the security of every nation.

I should like now to turn to our test-ban discussions.

The instructions to my delegation from President Johnson were made clear at our first meeting. They are—and I quote from President Johnson’s message to this Committee—“to work for a truly comprehensive test-ban treaty.”\(^4\)

Pursuant to the President’s instructions we presented at the 229th meeting a description of what we believe can be done on the problem of detection and identification, based on our continuing intensive research. We made it clear that the fundamental problem remains. Not all natural earthquakes can be positively identified—that is, distinguished from man-made explosions—by their seismic effects alone, but it would be possible to identify as earthquakes all but 20 per cent of those which cause seismic disturbances equivalent to explosions of a few kilotons of TNT if the world-wide system of large seismic arrays which I described at our meeting of 2 September\(^5\) were installed.

It has been made clear, I think, that when we speak of “identification” we mean identification of earthquakes. It is not possible by seismic means to identify explosions as explosions, since there is no way of distinguishing them from all earthquakes. That is because

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1 *Ante*, pp. 288–289.
2 See *supra*.
4 *Ante*, p. 281.
some earthquakes look like explosions on seismographs—or, conversely, explosions look just like some earthquakes.

It should also be clear that identification is the more important of the two steps, detection and identification. Detecting an earth tremor on a seismograph means only that something has happened to shake the earth. Identification of what that something is then becomes necessary. If the event can be identified as an earthquake, it can obviously not be an explosion.

With the world-wide system of large seismic arrays, it would be possible to show that many earthquakes could not be explosions—either by the nature of the seismic record or by the location of the event. But there would continue to be the troublesome remainder, those events which could not be distinguished as natural or man-made, and which therefore would have to be identified by some other means.

We would apply our knowledge of identification, and the information from the proposed world-wide system of large arrays outside the USSR, to the earthquakes which would be detected each year in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. Our estimate is that in the Soviet Union, for example, about forty-five underground events in an average year would still remain unidentified as earthquakes even if no underground tests occurred. If tests did occur, of course, they would be added to these forty-five unidentified events. And because the number of earthquakes varies from year to year, the mere addition of some unidentified events to the forty-five would not provide a significant clue as to their nature. On the other hand, the number forty-five could be reduced somewhat by using ocean-bottom seismometers to eliminate from the list some of the Soviet earthquakes which occur nearby in the Pacific Ocean. The system would have similar value in detecting and identifying events in the United States or elsewhere in the world.

There will still remain a significant number of events each year in the Soviet Union and elsewhere which cannot be identified and some on-site inspections will be required to provide assurance that these are not clandestine nuclear tests. There is no point in ignoring this fact. Up to now there has been no feasible suggestion for any other means of verification which would identify these unknown events and thereby assure everyone that no nuclear explosions were taking place.

I said at the opening of this session that if an exploration of all the recent and prospective developments showed that this requirement could be satisfied by a different number and type of inspections than previously proposed, we would take those facts into account.\(^1\) I also invited other countries to submit data or research results. There

\(^1\) Ante, p. 286.
have been helpful suggestions from Sweden and the United Kingdom, but the Soviet Union has given us no data and no research results. Its position remains one of obdurate refusal to consider any on-site inspections or to provide information showing how the need for such inspections could be overcome. Until there is some Soviet flexibility on this score, little progress seems possible.

That flexibility was clearly not present in the Soviet representative’s statement last week. He simply gave new labels to old Soviet proposals. He supported a treaty ban on tests above a certain size and a moratorium on those below that size. Neither the treaty nor the moratorium would be accompanied by any on-site inspections. The proposal thus amounts to the same old thing—an unverified ban on all tests.

It has become habitual for the Soviet representative to cite the need for a political decision to break the deadlock in achieving a comprehensive test ban. If any political decision is needed, it is on the part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union alone stands in the way of an agreement to extend the limited test ban to cover all underground tests. The United States is convinced that a comprehensive treaty can be achieved now and that the verification required to provide sufficient confidence in compliance by all parties would not be onerous, unnecessarily intrusive, or in any way prejudicial to the military security of any party. What is needed is a decision by the Soviet Union—which by definition must be a political decision—to abandon its outmoded preoccupation with total secrecy. In today’s world such a preoccupation is not justifiable on either scientific or military grounds. We are convinced that an exchange of recent scientific information would demonstrate the validity of this conclusion to reasonable people everywhere.

Although our test-ban discussions have not ended on a note of hope, those on the non-proliferation treaty have certainly been more encouraging. We hope that this treaty will receive continued study by the members of this Committee and by all others who are concerned about preventing nuclear spread. We have offered it as the basis for serious negotiations and we stand ready to negotiate at any time. As the first draft treaty on this subject to be presented to the world, it merits the attention of all.

This morning the representative of India again stressed the need for prior commitments by the nuclear Powers to halt and begin cutting back on their nuclear build-up. My country’s position on this is a matter of record. The measures we have proposed for a freeze on strategic nuclear vehicles and a cut-off and transfer agreement on fissionable materials remain here on this table. We are

1 Ante, pp. 403-404.
2 See ante, pp. 106-109.
ready to initiate detailed discussions and negotiations on those measures whenever the Soviet Union is ready.

When we return to Geneva, let us focus on the non-proliferation treaty again and on the test-ban problem. My delegation believes them to be the most urgent of all the further steps which can realistically be taken in the near future.

Eight Nation Joint Memorandum Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, September 15, 1965

The Disarmament Commission of the United Nations adopted Resolution DC/225 on 15 June, 1965, with an overwhelming majority and, inter alia, "convinced that failure to conclude a universal treaty or agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons leads to the most serious consequences", recommended that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should "also accord special priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, giving close attention to the various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures."  

The delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic have been deeply concerned with this problem. They have noted with satisfaction that the other members of the Committee also expressed their anxiety in regard to this problem. The delegations of the NATO countries represented in the Committee have submitted a draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The non-aligned delegations regret, however, that it has not yet been possible to reconcile the various approaches for an appropriate or adequate treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In these circumstances, the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic believe that it would be of advantage if they placed on record their basic approach to the question of non-proliferation. A treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but only a means to an end. That end is the achievement of General and

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1 ENDC/158, Sept. 15, 1965. The memorandum was submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, U.A.R.
2 Ante, pp. 260-262.
3 Ante, pp. 347-349.
Complete Disarmament, and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament. The eight delegations are convinced that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should, therefore, be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

The delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic express the hope that their basic approach concerning a non-proliferation treaty as put forward in the foregoing paragraphs will receive general acceptance so that a draft treaty on prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons receives the support of the entire international community.

Eight Nation Joint Memorandum Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, September 15, 1965

The international community has for many years urged upon all states, particularly the major powers, the imperative need to reach agreement on the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. The United Nations has adopted several resolutions on the subject, particularly Resolution 1762 (XVII) which condemned all tests.

The Moscow Test Ban Treaty, entered into on August 5, 1963, was a significant first step in this direction. The preamble to this Treaty expressed the determination of the nuclear powers to continue negotiations for achieving the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests. Unfortunately, no progress has yet been made towards this end, and test explosions continue to take place despite repeated calls by the United Nations for the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. In particular, the United Nations has called upon the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to continue with a sense of urgency its negotiations on that behalf.

The delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic noted that the Disarmament Commission, convened in April–June 1965, took special interest in the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, and made a

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1 ENDC/159, Sept. 15, 1965. The memorandum was submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, U.A.R.
3 Ibid., 1963, pp. 291-293.
4 Ibid., p. 627.
special mention of the initiative taken by the eight delegations as contained in the memorandum they jointly submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on 14 September 1964. Resolution DC/225 of June 15, 1965, especially recommended that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should consider as a matter of priority the question of extending the scope of the Partial Test Ban Treaty to cover underground tests.

In response to world public opinion and to the will of the United Nations as embodied in the various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, as well as in implementation of the Resolution 225 of the Disarmament Commission, the delegations of the eight non-aligned states have continued to pursue with urgency and determination, in the present session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. They have also elaborated various proposals and suggestions made by them in this respect.

The delegations of the eight non-aligned states are convinced that the discontinuance of the underground tests and the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will not only consolidate the Partial Test Ban Treaty but also in itself constitute a measure towards non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It will strengthen the efforts being made to reach agreement on an appropriate treaty about non-proliferation, and generally improve the international climate.

The delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic have noted with satisfaction the declarations made during the current session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee that there has been considerable improvement in the techniques of detection and identification of underground tests. They therefore urge the Nuclear Powers to take immediate steps to reach an agreement to ban all nuclear weapon tests. They still believe that agreement on a treaty banning underground tests could be facilitated by the exchange of scientific and other information between the Nuclear Powers or by the improvement of detection and identification techniques, if necessary. Meanwhile, they reiterate their appeal to the powers concerned to suspend forthwith nuclear weapon tests in all environments. In order to assist the Nuclear Powers in observing suspension of underground tests, the non-aligned delegations stress the advantages that would accrue from international cooperation in the work of seismic detection.

The eight delegations reaffirm their stand that all nuclear weapon tests should cease immediately.

1 Ibid., 1964, pp. 428-429.
2 Ante, pp. 260-262.
Sixth Interim Progress Report by the Eighteen Nation Committee to the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly, September 16, 1965

The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament transmits to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly, a report on the Committee's deliberations on all questions before it for the period 27 July 1965 to 16 September 1965.

Representatives of the following States continued their participation in the work of the Committee:

Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.

I. Procedural Arrangements

A. Upon recommendation of the Co-Chairmen, members of the Committee reconvened the Conference on 27 July 1965.

B. Seventeen plenary meetings took place between 27 July 1965 and 16 September 1965.

C. The Committee at its 234th meeting on 16 September 1965, having in view the convening of the Twentieth Session of the General Assembly on 21 September 1965, decided to adjourn this session of the Conference following its plenary meeting on 16 September 1965. The Committee decided to resume its meetings in Geneva as soon as possible after the termination of the consideration of disarmament at the Twentieth Session of the General Assembly, on a date to be decided by the two Co-Chairmen after consultation with the members of the Committee.

II. General and Complete Disarmament and Measures Aimed at the Lessening of International Tension, the Consolidation of Confidence Among States, and Facilitating General and Complete Disarmament

Members of the Committee have continued discussion of general and complete disarmament in meetings of the Committee. The Committee considers it to be a primary goal of its future work to continue efforts to develop a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. However, in view of present international developments, a number of members concen-

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trated their attention at this session of the Conference on collateral measures.

In its efforts to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date, the Committee continued consideration in its plenary meetings of such measures as could be agreed to prior to, and as would facilitate the achievement of, general and complete disarmament.

On 26 July 1965 the Co-Chairmen received a letter (ENDC/149) from the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission transmitting to the Committee document DC/224, addressed to the United Nations General Assembly and containing the text of the resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 12 June 1965 on the question of a world disarmament conference,¹ and document DC/225, containing the text of the resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 15 June 1965 which, inter-alia, made certain specific recommendations to the Committee.²

On 27 July 1965, at the 218th meeting, the United States submitted a message from President Lyndon B. Johnson to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/150).³

On 29 July 1965, at the 219th meeting, the United Kingdom representative read a message to the Conference from Prime Minister Harold Wilson.⁴

On 5 August 1965, at the 221st meeting, the Committee issued a statement on the second anniversary of the signing of the limited test ban treaty in Moscow which stated that the Committee considered more urgent than ever further progress on disarmament measures.⁵

On 10 August 1965 a letter was submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics representative to the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations (ENDC/151).⁶

On 17 August 1965, at the 224th meeting, the United States, supported by the delegations of Canada, Italy, and the United Kingdom, submitted a draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons (ENDC/152)⁷ and a statement by President Lyndon B. Johnson on this draft treaty (ENDC/153).⁸

On 2 September 1965, at the 229th meeting, Sweden submitted a memorandum on international co-operation for the detection of underground explosions (ENDC/154).⁹

¹ Ante, p. 253.
² Ante, pp. 260–262.
³ Ante, p. 281.
⁴ Ante, p. 287.
⁵ Ante, pp. 310–311.
⁶ Not printed here. The Soviet letter enclosed a communication from the so-called Foreign Minister of the German Democratic Republic.
⁷ Ante, pp. 347–349.
⁸ Ante, p. 354.
⁹ Ante, pp. 390–393.
On 9 September 1965, at the 231st meeting, the United Kingdom submitted notes on United Kingdom research on techniques for distinguishing between earthquakes and underground explosions (ENDC/155).1

On 14 September 1965, at the 232nd meeting, Italy submitted a draft unilateral non-acquisition declaration (ENDC/157).2

On 15 September 1965, at the 233rd meeting, a joint memorandum on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/158) was submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic.3

Also at the 233rd meeting on 15 September 1965, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic submitted a joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban (ENDC/159).*

As at past sessions, the questions before the Committee were in general discussed in a thorough manner. All the participants in the Committee took an active part in this discussion, and a number of interesting suggestions were put forward. The Soviet Union stated its readiness to meet the position taken by the United Arab Republic and to agree to its proposal that the implementation of the Moscow Treaty relating to the banning of tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water should be extended to cover underground nuclear tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75, and that as an additional measure the nuclear Powers should agree to a moratorium on all other forms of underground nuclear testing until such time as agreement had been reached on an overall ban on nuclear weapons tests.5 The United States reiterated its readiness to conclude an adequately verified comprehensive test ban treaty and in this regard emphasized the desirability of an exchange of scientific information among nuclear powers as suggested by the eight non-aligned states in document ENDC/145.6

The Committee did not reach any specific agreement at this session either on questions of general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension. However, the members of the Committee believe that the extensive discussions on major problems relating to certain collateral measures were particularly valuable in clarifying the respective points of views of member governments. The Committee believes that these discussions and

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1 *Ante*, pp. 408-411.
4 Supra.
5 See *ante*, pp. 396-397.
6 See *ante*, pp. 384-390. The eight nation memorandum may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 428-429.
exchanges of views may facilitate agreement in the further work of the Committee.

III. Meetings of the Co-chairmen

During the period covered by this report, the Representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America, in their capacity as Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, held meetings to discuss the schedule of and procedure for the work of the Conference and certain substantive questions before the Conference.

IV. Conference Documents

Transmitted as Annex II to this report is a list of all documents and verbatim records of the plenary meetings.¹

This report is submitted by the Co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

S. K. Tsarapkin

United States of America

William C. Foster

Address by President Johnson to the Conference on World Peace Through Law, September 16, 1965 ²

I need not here reaffirm my nation's continuing dedication to the rule of law. We will work to extend it to the relations between countries. For we believe that is the surest road to a fruitful and a secure peace.

Therefore, we who seek a world of law must labor to understand the foundation on which law can rest. We must set to work to build it. For if the rule of law is an ideal, the establishment of that rule is the practical work of practical men. We must not let the difficulties of this task lead us into the twin dangers of cynicism or unreasoning faith.

For the fact is that if law cannot yet solve the problems of a tormented earth, it is steadily growing in importance and in necessity.

The First Condition of Law: Justice

The first condition of law is justice. That law which oppresses the weak, or denies the fair claims of the poor, will prove a flimsy barrier against the rising storm of man's demand for justice.

Law must not be the prisoner of plunder or privilege.

¹ Not printed here.
Law is not the soothing keeper of the status quo. Law is an instrument in the battle for the hopes of man. And if it is not fashioned as such an instrument, then no matter how beautifully and logically framed, it will yield to violence and to terror.

So if we, the fortunate of the earth, would ask other people to submit to law, then we ourselves must assume some responsibility for peoples' liberty and peoples' well-being.

International law has been primarily concerned with relations between states. In pursuit of justice, it must now concern itself more than in the past with the welfare of people.

So I look forward to the day when the relief of hunger and misery and ignorance—in all parts of this world—will be fixed in legal obligation—as it now is in my own country.

When our world law embodies the right of the despairing to hope, and the responsibility of the fortunate to help, then it will be strengthened a thousandfold in the cause of peace.

If world conditions were largely satisfactory, it would not be difficult to evolve a rule of law. But we do not live in a satisfactory world. It is stained with evil and injustice, by ruthless ambition and passionate conflict. Only by fighting these forces do we help build a base on which the temple of law may rest.

THE SECOND CONDITION: INSTITUTIONS

The second condition of law is institutions. Through them law receives meaning and force. And institutions themselves, through their own actions, help to make new law. The United Nations General Assembly has done this in peacekeeping.

The past 20 years have seen an abundant flowering of new international structures. From the Common Market and NATO to the IBRD and the Asian Development Bank, order and legal process have been imposed upon spreading segments of the affairs of countries.

Some of these institutions have played a large role in the prosperity of the West and in the keeping of the peace. Others contribute to the progress of developing countries.

The United States has helped to build many of these organizations. Their strength represents a victory for the cause you represent—a legal order contributing to the prosperity of each and to the peace of all. My country intends to protect and strengthen those institutions, sharing the task with all who share our common purpose.

Central to the hope of world peace through law is the United Nations. Since its beginning, dozens of disputes, many laced with violence, have come before the world assembly. Some have remained unresolved. Many have found a settlement sufficient to allow mankind to move forward in peace. And in some places the United Nations was able to prevent conflict and bloodshed.
I hope we can strengthen the United Nations, not simply as a forum for debate but as an arena for the solution of disputes.

That is why I have asked a great Justice of our Supreme Court, Arthur Goldberg, to become our Ambassador to the world body. The life of Ambassador Goldberg has been devoted to resolving disputes between those who at first believed that they could not yield one iota from their positions and who came at last to sign a common agreement.

And my country will fully support the efforts of the Secretary-General to bring peace between the great nations of India and Pakistan.

And perhaps in the United Nations, and with the patient effort of individual countries, we can also halt the terrible arms race which threatens to engulf the earth. Perhaps we can succeed through an effective treaty preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, through extending the test ban treaty, by obtaining an agreement halting production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons and allocating substantial portions of this material to peaceful uses, by agreeing to reverse the arms race in strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, and by working toward general and complete disarmament under effective international controls, which must be the world's goal.

The Third Condition: Acceptance

The third condition of law is acceptance. World law, if it is to bring world order, must reflect the judgment and the felt desires of men and of nations. When law ignores this, as we have seen in our own history, it itself is ignored.

I think that we may be evolving a world consensus on which law can stand. The mass of mankind is slowly realizing the dangers of conflict and the futility of war. They are accepting their responsibility to relieve their own poverty and the misery of their fellow inhabitants of the earth. They are finding, in knowledge and fear and pain, that their common interest lies in common acceptance of their own obligations and the rights of others.

We can see this in a hundred small ways. During the past year the United States was present at 629 international conferences. In the short time since I became President the United States has participated in more such conferences than during the first 150 years of our history.

Of course, the great issues and the great dangers are not resolved. In the past 12 months there is not a single continent that has been spared violence. In the past 2,000 years there has hardly been a decade without war.

If this was all, the future would look dark indeed. But there is another and a brighter thread which runs through the history of the race. It is man's drive to create and to live in harmony with his fellows. And that is what we call civilization.
Law is the great civilizing machinery. It liberates the desires to build, and it subdues the desire to destroy. And if war can tear us apart, law can unite us—out of fear or love or reason, or all three.

World peace through world law will not come quickly. We must work, in a variety of ways, to create the vital conditions which may bring us to that day—to build the justice which forms it and the institutions which give it life, and to find the understanding acceptance which will make it work. This means we must be willing to accept small advances and limited goals. But the final objective is the largest and most elusive man has known: peace—peace, which is not simply the absence of conflict or even of fear but the framework for the fulfillment of human possibility.

How can we dare to hope for that which has always escaped mankind? Perhaps it is because our invention draws us together to the point where any war is civil war. Perhaps the vastness of our destructive power makes us shrink from conflict. And perhaps, under the horror and murder of this carnage-filled century, civilization has been slowly flowering—leading us toward victory in the endless battle between man's love for his fellow and man's desire to destroy him.

Law is the greatest human invention. All the rest give him mastery over his world, but law gives him mastery over himself.

There are those who say the rule of law is a fruitless and utopian dream. It is true, if it comes it will come slowly. It will come through the practical and the wise resolution of numberless problems. But to deny the possibility is to deny peace itself and to deny that flowering of the spirit which we must believe God meant for man.

I do not deny it. I believe in it. And so do you. And if others join us, then the time may yet come when you and your colleagues will be honored as pathfinders toward the final armistice in man's war against himself.

Address by Ambassador Goldberg to the General Assembly [Extract], September 23, 1965

Most of us, fortunately have already made our choice between a philosophy of violence and the philosophy of world order which underlies our Charter. Yet our search for world order is gravely threatened by a continuing arms race, a race which adds nothing to the world except insecurity and a drain of valuable resources. Prog-

1 A/PV.1334 (prov.), p. 33.
ress has, of course, been made. We have already agreed to cease nuclear testing in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space. We have established a direct communications link to help prevent war by accident or miscalculation. We have resolved not to place weapons of mass destruction in outer space, and today I reaffirm the commitment of the United States to that agreement.

Unfortunately, the goal of general and complete disarmament to which we are all committed remains elusive. But it is a necessary and indispensable goal, and we must work towards it vigorously, thoughtfully and with good-will, and not be deterred by what must be momentary setbacks. Most of all, we should concentrate on immediate practical steps to reverse the arms spiral.

The first priority—and I repeat, the first priority—in this effort must be given to halting the spread of nuclear weapons. If we do not face this problem squarely now, the opportunity may disappear forever. That is why the United States has tabled in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee the full draft of a treaty binding its signers from taking any action to increase the number of States and other organizations having the power to unleash nuclear weapons. My Government has fully committed itself to that underlying policy and urges that this draft become an actual treaty as soon as possible. We hope that other nuclear Powers will accept the same commitment as an international agreement. Nuclear proliferation can be stopped, but we must act now. Agreement on this issue clearly is of overriding importance to world peace and security.

We recognize, moreover, that as more and more nations face frankly up to this issue, they must make momentous decisions about their own security. And we understand their concern. As President Johnson has indicated, we believe assurances of support against threats of nuclear blackmail should be available to nations which have foresworn a nuclear capability of their own. Action by the Assembly may be a useful part of such assurances. The United States is prepared to work towards this end: action by this Assembly. Also of great aid in deterring the continuous proliferation of nuclear weapons will be agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Scientists cannot distinguish between all quakes and underground nuclear tests. But the science of detection is not static and our vigorous research programme indicates the possibility of a substantial improvement in seismic detection capabilities. Furthermore, the United States is also now establishing in the State of Montana a large-aperture seismic array which we hope will hasten major advances in the science of detection.

1 *Ante*, pp. 347-349.
2 *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, p. 468.
We stand ready to make the results of our experimental study available to scientists everywhere and to assist in the construction of similar facilities in other countries.

The United States will shortly issue invitations to a large number of Members of the United Nations to send qualified observers to visit our Montana detection site on 12 and 13 October. We want to let each of them see this installation for himself, and we hope that this invitation will be accepted.

Let me say clearly that we do not want inspection for the sake of inspection or for any ulterior motive. Let me also say that we are not inflexible. We do insist on the minimum amount of inspection necessary under the present state of science to give confidence to all that a comprehensive test ban treaty is actually being observed. But we will insist only on a number and type of inspection which are essential to the attainment of this objective.

While pressing ahead, then, on non-proliferation as our very first priority, we must also take steps to reduce the dangers stemming from the high level of nuclear capabilities. There is no reason to wait. We are prepared to take practical steps here and now.

First, we should take steps to halt the accumulation of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. We should continue to explore a freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles.

If progress is made in this field, the United States will also be willing to explore the possibility of significant reductions in the number of these carriers of mass destruction.

Secondly, the United States proposes a verified halt in production of fissionable material for weapons use and the transfer of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes. In connexion with such a halt in fissionable material production, we now propose the demonstrated destruction by the United States and the Soviet Union of a substantial number of nuclear weapons from their respective stocks.

The United States is ready to transfer 60,000 kilogrammes of weapons grade U-235 to non-weapon uses if the Soviet Union would be willing to transfer 40,000 kilogrammes. If the USSR accepts this proposal, each of us would destroy nuclear weapons of our own choice so as to make available for peaceful purposes such amount of fissionable material.

Moreover, the United States Government stands ready, if the Soviet Union will do likewise, to add to this transfer associated plutonium obtained from the destroyed weapons, in an agreed quantity or ratio, and to place the material thus transferred under the International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent safeguards.

We make these proposals in the interest of rapid and equitable progress in reducing the nuclear threat and as a practical demonstration of our dedication to this end.
A more rapid movement toward disarmament would unquestionably decrease anxiety throughout the world. But if we are to progress towards a just world community, we must also constantly improve our international machinery for curbing conflict and resolving disputes.

Address by Foreign Minister Gromyko to the General Assembly [Extract], September 24, 1965

As a European and at the same time an Asian Power, the Soviet Union is fully cognizant of its role and responsibility in matters affecting the security of Europe and Asia. Each useful initiative towards this end will always meet with the understanding and active support of the Soviet Government.

This session of the General Assembly must take an important decision on the convening of a world conference on disarmament to be attended by all the nations of the world. The idea of holding such a conference has been gaining ground for many years, and the Soviet Government is gratified to note that it is now close to fulfilment. We propose that this world conference should be convened in the middle of 1966 either in Geneva or in some other place acceptable to all the participants.

Such a conference will offer a chance to test new possibilities for the solution of the most important and difficult of present-day problems: that of disarmament. In this process it is essential to bend every effort to prevent a repetition of the mistakes and lapses of previous discussions of disarmament issues. This means that States which do not now participate in the work of the United Nations or are artificially kept out of disarmament talks must be invited to the conference. It is impossible endlessly to turn away from the immutable fact that the elaboration of effective and agreed disarmament measures which would be carried out by all States, including the nuclear Powers, calls for the participation of at least the biggest countries of the world, regardless of whether they are represented in this hall or not.

The World Conference is a serious test of the goodwill of States and of their readiness for practical steps, things in which some participants in disarmament talks have clearly been lacking hitherto.

Whether we address ourselves to what took place decades ago during the first discussions on disarmament or take a look at the latest meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in Geneva, we

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1 A/PV. 1335 (prov.), pp. 14-27.
will invariably come to the conclusion that in this matter two opposing lines confront each other. The advocates of one of them proceed from the fact that people have created armaments, and it is they who can destroy them. The proponents of the other line seem almost to have set themselves the goal of sowing pessimism and disbelief in the ability of people to put an end to the arms race. These are not merely arguments between optimists and pessimists. They reflect varying interests and fundamental radical differences in policy.

Special agencies and even ministries for disarmament may be established, but so long as there is no real desire to demobilize even a single soldier, let alone part with armies, talks on disarmament will not move forward. It is precisely the existence of opposing political goals, not the technical difficulty of implementing disarmament, that is paralyzing the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

In summarizing the results of the activities of the United Nations during these last two decades we are justified in accusing those who pile up one obstacle upon another in the way of disarmament; no manoeuvres will cover up their unwillingness to scrap the military machine of States. No arguments can conceal the chasm between the paltry interests of those who are in favour of the arms race and the interests of the peoples who crave peace and release from the burden of armaments and military expenditures.

The Soviet Government believes, as hitherto, that it is one of the paramount tasks of its foreign policy efforts to promote, in such measure as depends upon it, an agreement on disarmament under effective international control. We have no biased approach as to the starting point in the process of reducing and eliminating the armed forces of States, the stages into which it should be broken down and arrangements for control over disarmament—and we repeat: over disarmament, not over armaments. What is important is that genuine disarmament should be assured, and the removal of the danger of nuclear war, and that the measures being carried out should not offer any military advantages to either of the sides.

Difficult and complicated as the road to disarmament may be, the Soviet Union will not lessen its insistence and vigour in the achievement of appropriate international agreements. Stagnation in such a thing as disarmament is to the advantage solely of those who cling to a policy of positions of strength and to those upon whom the armaments race rains down a shower of gold.

Since the position of certain Western Powers does not allow of moving ahead with the elaboration of an agreement on general and complete disarmament, it is necessary, without breaking off this work, to strive towards the implementation of partial measures which would help limit the arms race, ease international tensions, and thereby prepare the ground for radical disarmament measures. The Memorandum of the Soviet Government presented to the States Members
of the United Nations on 7 December 1964 sets forth our proposals on this subject, such as the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories, the establishment of denuclearized zones, the reduction of military budgets—above all, those of the militarily big States—and the banning of underground nuclear tests. Several valuable considerations have been voiced by other countries as well, including the States of Asia and Africa. All these proposals must be carefully weighed so that no opportunity to erect a barrier in the way of the arms race, particularly the race of nuclear arms, is lost.

The signing of the Moscow Treaty, which the Soviet Government has favourably evaluated and continues to evaluate favourably, solved part of the task of ending tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and the most substantial one: the banning of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. It is quite natural for the peoples to wish also to ban underground nuclear tests. Recently, the United Arab Republic sponsored a proposal to end underground nuclear tests of a certain established capacity with a simultaneous moratorium on all other underground nuclear tests. The Soviet Government believes that this proposal of the United Arab Republic, supported by other non-aligned nations participating in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, merits the most serious attention.

An acute question in international affairs which is closely related to the disarmament problem is the question of eliminating foreign military bases.

In many instances foreign military bases on alien territories are leftovers of the war. But twenty years is a period that is more than sufficient to do away with these military bases.

More often than not, however, military bases are a heritage of colonialism, and they were established at a time when no one had any regard for the views of the indigenous populations. Possibly all this was dressed in a mantle of formal agreements, but to recognize their validity would be tantamount to recognizing the validity of the transactions of a usurer who binds his victim hand and foot with mortgages and holds him in bondage for life.

The Soviet Government fully shares the conclusion of the Cairo Conference of Non-Aligned Nations that foreign military bases in effect constitute an instrument for pressure on nations and for slowing down their liberation and their development on the basis of their own ideological, political, economic and cultural ideas.

We believe the General Assembly has grounds to demand that States which maintain military bases on foreign territories should immediately remove them.

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1 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 509-517.
2 Ibid., 1963, pp. 291-293.
3 See ante, pp. 340-347.
There is yet another important matter which merits a foremost place in the work of the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly. That is the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. The circumstances in which these weapons were created and the first mushroom clouds of nuclear explosions billowed over our planet and the reasons why it proved impossible immediately to outlaw the nuclear bomb are all well-known facts. For the Soviet Union the creation of its own nuclear weapon was something that it was forced to do; we had no other choice.

No matter how many words of condemnation and curses are uttered with respect to this weapon of mass destruction, it has appeared and it exists. But will the present nuclear arsenals breed new ones, and will nuclear weapons gradually proliferate as was the case with other kinds of weapons? This is what causes anxiety among the peoples and those statesmen who are alive to their responsibility to them. This concern is fully understandable and natural, for the risk of war with the use of nuclear weapons will but grow—and in geometric progression—if they spread through the world.

If, in addition to the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France and the People's Republic of China, which already possess nuclear weapons and are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, other States as well take the path of creating their own nuclear weapons or acquiring access to them, it will be already too late and, in effect, impossible to stop this process. There will then start an even more acute nuclear rivalry.

Actually, mankind is today faced with the alternative of either adopting a policy of laissez-faire or else of ensuring that nuclear weapons should at least not overstep the boundaries of where they already exist, by the conclusion of an appropriate international agreement. The Soviet Government advocates such an agreement since under present conditions it has not proved possible to find a more sensible solution.

It goes without saying that an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons cannot be an aim in itself. This is a step, and a major one, towards the banning and destruction of nuclear weapons, and not simply a method of restricting the number of nuclear Powers, or, as some people say, of formalizing the nuclear monopoly of the present five great Powers. This is how the Soviet Union sees the purport of such an agreement.

Thus the prevention of a further spread of nuclear weapons is inseparable from the struggle for the banning and elimination of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war, which is the unvarying aim of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The achievement of agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons would provide a gain both to the nuclear Powers and to
States not possessing such weapons. It is indeed by far more reliable to pin one's future not on weapons of mass destruction or on the ramifications of a military rivalry under conditions of a nuclear race, but rather on measures aimed at curbing the danger of nuclear war, and on disarmament.

Of course, an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons can have real value, not imaginary value, only when it completely blocks all the channels through which such weapons could leak. We speak of this because at every step we come up against attempts actually to legalize the proliferation of nuclear weapons under the guise of concluding an international agreement on their non-dissemination. Examples are not far to seek. Thus, the United States draft which was recently presented to the Eighteen-Nation Committee in Geneva,1 though it speaks of prohibiting certain forms of the dissemination of nuclear weapons, nonetheless leaves a tiny crack through which will pass unobstructed no less than a whole multilateral fleet equipped with hundreds of nuclear-tipped missiles. What all this is for is well known to everyone: behind such strategems lie the nuclear appetites of the West German militarists.

A treaty on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons that is worthy of its name must incorporate undertakings by States possessing nuclear weapons not to transfer such weapons in any form—directly or indirectly, through third States or groupings of States—to the ownership or disposal of States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons, and not to grant the aforesaid States or groups of States the right to participate in the ownership, disposal or use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons and the control over them and over their location and use must also not be granted to units of the armed forces or to individual members of the armed forces of States not possessing nuclear weapons, even if such units or servicemen have been placed under the command of a military alliance.

For their part, the parties to the treaty that do not possess nuclear weapons must undertake not to create, manufacture or prepare to manufacture nuclear weapons, independently or jointly with other States, either on their own territory or on the territory of other States, and must refuse to be associated with nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever, directly or indirectly, through third States or groupings of States.

The Soviet delegation has been instructed to inscribe on the agenda of the General Assembly, as an important and urgent question, an item entitled "On the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons". We are submitting the draft of an appropriate agreement, which will be

circulated among all delegations.\textsuperscript{1} The Soviet Union is prepared to sign such a treaty without delay. We should like to hope that the States Members of the United Nations will approach consideration of the question of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, and the draft we have submitted, in all seriousness and with a feeling of responsibility for the destinies of the world.

The Soviet Government has advocated and continues to advocate the development of co-operation among States in the interests of preserving peace, assuring security, and solving economic, cultural and other problems of an international nature.

\textbf{Soviet Memorandum on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, September 24, 1965} \textsuperscript{2}

1. Ever since nuclear weapons first appeared, the Soviet Union has supported, as it now supports, their unconditional prohibition and the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons accumulated by States. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons and of their means of delivery is the core of the plan for general and complete disarmament put forward by the Soviet Government, which represents a dependable guarantee of world peace.\textsuperscript{3}

2. Inasmuch as no agreement has yet been reached on general and complete disarmament, it is of special importance to take measures as soon as possible to limit the arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race. The achievement of agreement on prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons must occupy an important place among such measures.

3. At its fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth sessions, the General Assembly considered the problem of preventing the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons; the question was brought before the nineteenth session as well, but was not discussed for reasons which are well known. In the resolutions adopted on this question, the General Assembly expressed the conviction that an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons was growing more imminent and threatened not only to extend and intensify the arms race but also to increase the difficulties of avoiding war and of establishing international peace and security.\textsuperscript{4} The Assembly expressed the view that

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Infra.}

\textsuperscript{2} A/5976, Sept. 24, 1965. Foreign Minister Gromyko transmitted the memorandum to the President of the G.A. in a letter of Sept. 24 (\textit{ibid.}), along with a copy of the Soviet draft treaty on nonproliferation (\textit{infra}).

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ante,} pp. 77–102.

it was necessary to conclude an international agreement to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons and called upon all States—
nuclear States as well as those not possessing nuclear weapons—to
direct their efforts to that end.

4. The Soviet Government, in common with the Governments of
many other States, is concerned at the danger inherent in the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons and attaches great importance to meas­
ures to limit such proliferation. The growing capacity of a consid­
erable number of States to manufacture nuclear and thermonuclear
weapons makes it increasingly important to take measures along those
lines.

5. At the present time, the greatest danger as regards the prolif­
eration of nuclear weapons is presented by the plans for the creation
of a NATO multilateral or Atlantic nuclear force, within the frame­
work of which it is intended to give access to nuclear weapons to the
Federal Republic of Germany—a State which is demanding the
revision of European frontiers established as a result of the Second
World War. The Soviet Union and the other States members of
the Warsaw Treaty, as was stated in the communique of the meeting
of the Political Consultative Committee of 20 January 1965,1 con­
sider that the plans for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear
force, the formation of which is being urged by certain circles in the
United States and West Germany, are a serious threat to the cause
of peace in Europe and throughout the world. The creation of
such a force would increase imperialist and neo-colonialist pressure
on the liberated countries and on the countries which are fighting
for their independence.

6. If, in the present circumstances, other States besides the USSR,
the United States, the United Kingdom, France and China, which
already possess nuclear weapons and are permanent members of
the Security Council, set about making their own nuclear weapons
or acquire the means of owning, controlling and using such weapons,
it will no longer be possible to halt their further spread.

7. In view of the dangerous consequences of any further spread
of nuclear weapons, including their dissemination through the NATO
multilateral or Atlantic nuclear force, the Soviet Government pro­
poses the conclusion of an international agreement on the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons, which would completely deny to
non-nuclear States both direct and indirect access to such weapons—
in their own right or through military alliances. The attached draft
treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons answers this
purpose. The achievement of effective agreement on preventing
the further spread of nuclear weapons would be in the interests of

1 *Ante*, pp. 5–9.
all States, both nuclear and non-nuclear, which seek to maintain and strengthen peace.

8. The Soviet Government hopes that the General Assembly will again consider the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. By calling for the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Assembly would be taking a major step towards a practical solution of the important and urgent question of measures to combat the further spread of nuclear weapons. The vital interests of all peoples demand that agreement should be reached on this problem.

Soviet Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, September 24, 1965

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as "the Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

In conformity with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Desiring the earliest possible attainment of agreement on the complete prohibition and elimination of all types of nuclear weapons within the framework of general and complete disarmament under strict international control,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, thus facilitating the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Parties to the Treaty possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to transfer such weapons in any form—directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States—to the ownership or control of States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons and not

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1 A/5976, Sept. 24, 1965. Foreign Minister Gromyko transmitted the draft treaty to the President of the G.A. in a letter of Sept. 24 (ibid.), together with the Soviet memorandum of the same date (supra).
to accord to such States or groups of States the right to participate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons.

The said Parties to the Treaty shall not transfer nuclear weapons, or control over them or over their emplacement and use, to units of the armed forces or military personnel of States not possessing nuclear weapons, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance.

2. Parties to the Treaty possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to provide assistance—directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States—to States not at present possessing nuclear weapons in the manufacture, in preparations for the manufacture or in the testing of such weapons and not to transmit to them any kind of manufacturing, research or other information or documentation which can be employed for purposes of the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons.

**ARTICLE II**

1. Parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to create, manufacture or prepare for the manufacture of nuclear weapons either independently or together with other States, in their own territory or in the territory of other States. They also undertake to refrain from obtaining nuclear weapons in any form—directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States—for purposes of ownership, control or use and shall not participate in the ownership, control or use of such weapons or in testing them.

The said Parties to the Treaty shall not seek to acquire control over nuclear weapons or over their emplacement and use for units of their armed forces or personnel thereof, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance.

2. Parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons undertake not to obtain or seek to obtain, from States possessing nuclear weapons, assistance in the manufacture of such weapons or relevant manufacturing, research or other information or documentation which can be employed for purposes of the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons.

**ARTICLE III**

The Parties to this Treaty shall refrain from offering any support, encouragement or inducement to States seeking to own, manufacture or exercise control over nuclear weapons.

**ARTICLE IV**

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments, which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all Parties possessing nuclear weapons. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all Parties possessing nuclear weapons.

**Article V**

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of . . . . . , which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all Parties possessing nuclear weapons and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

**Article VI**

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.

**Article VII**

This Treaty, the Russian, English, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. The Purpose of This Document

1. Pursuant to Article II of its Statute the Agency has the task of seeking “to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world”. Inasmuch as the technology of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is closely coupled with that for the production of materials for nuclear weapons, the same Article of the Statute provides that the Agency “shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose”.

2. The principal purpose of the present document is to establish a system of controls to enable the Agency to comply with this statutory obligation with respect to the activities of Member States in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as provided in the Statute. The authority to establish such a system is provided by Article III.A.5 of the Statute, which authorizes the Agency to “establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose”. This Article further authorizes the Agency to “apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State’s activities in the field of atomic energy”. Article XII.A sets forth the rights and responsibilities that the Agency is to have, to the extent relevant, with respect to any project or arrangement which it is to safeguard.

3. The principles set forth in this document and the procedures for which it provides are established for the information of Member States, to enable them to determine in advance the circumstances and manner in which the Agency would administer safeguards, and

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2 For the IAEA Statute, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, pp. 915–933.
for the guidance of the organs of the Agency itself, to enable the Board and the Director General to determine readily what provisions should be included in agreements relating to safeguards and how to interpret such provisions.

4. Provisions of this document that are relevant to a particular project, arrangement or activity in the field of nuclear energy will only become legally binding upon the entry into force of a safeguards agreement and to the extent that they are incorporated therein. Such incorporation may be made by reference.

5. Appropriate provisions of this document may also be incorporated in bilateral or multilateral arrangements between Member States, including all those that provide for the transfer to the Agency of responsibility for administering safeguards. The Agency will not assume such responsibility unless the principles of the safeguards and the procedures to be used are essentially consistent with those set forth in this document.

6. Agreements incorporating provisions from the earlier version of the Agency's safeguards system will continue to be administered in accordance with such provisions, unless all States parties thereto request the Agency to substitute the provisions of the present document.

7. Provisions relating to types of principal nuclear facilities, other than reactors, which may produce, process or use safeguarded nuclear material will be developed as necessary.

8. The principles and procedures set forth in this document shall be subject to periodic review in the light of the further experience gained by the Agency as well as of technological developments.

B. General Principles of the Agency's Safeguards

The Agency's obligations

9. Bearing in mind Article II of the Statute, the Agency shall implement safeguards in a manner designed to avoid hampering a State's economic or technological development.

10. The safeguards procedures set forth in this document shall be implemented in a manner designed to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities.

11. In no case shall the Agency request a State to stop the construction or operation of any principal nuclear facility to which the Agency's safeguards procedures extend, except by explicit decision of the Board.

12. The State or States concerned and the Director General shall hold consultations regarding the application of the provisions of the present document.

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1 The use of italics indicates that a term has a specialized meaning in this document and is defined in pt. IV.

2 See Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 21–33; ibid., 1964, pp. 66–68.
13. In implementing safeguards, the Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets. No member of the Agency's staff shall disclose, except to the Director General and to such other members of the staff as the Director General may authorize to have such information by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, any commercial or industrial secret or any other confidential information coming to his knowledge by reason of the implementation of safeguards by the Agency.

14. The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or person any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of safeguards, except that:

(a) Specific information relating to such implementation in a State may be given to the Board and to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary for the Agency to fulfil its safeguards responsibilities;

(b) Summarized lists of items being safeguarded by the Agency may be published upon decision of the Board; and

(c) Additional information may be published upon decision of the Board and if all States directly concerned agree.

Principles of implementation

15. The Agency shall implement safeguards in a State if:

(a) The Agency has concluded with the State a project agreement under which materials, services, equipment, facilities or information are supplied, and such agreement provides for the application of safeguards; or

(b) The State is a party to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement under which materials, services, equipment, facilities or information are supplied or otherwise transferred, and:

   (i) All the parties to the arrangement have requested the Agency to administer safeguards; and

   (ii) The Agency has concluded the necessary safeguards agreement with the State; or

(c) The Agency has been requested by the State to safeguard certain nuclear activities under the latter's jurisdiction, and the Agency has concluded the necessary safeguards agreement with the State.

16. In the light of Article XII.A.5 of the Statute, it is desirable that safeguards agreements should provide for the continuation of safeguards, subject to the provisions of this document, with respect to produced special fissionable material and to any materials substituted therefor.
17. The principal factors to be considered by the Board in determining the relevance of particular provisions of this document to various types of materials and facilities shall be the form, scope and amount of the assistance supplied, the character of each individual project and the degree to which such assistance could further any military purpose. The related safeguards agreement shall take account of all pertinent circumstances at the time of its conclusion.

18. In the event of any non-compliance by a State with a safeguards agreement, the Agency may take the measures set forth in Articles XII.A.7 and XII.C of the Statute.

II. CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING SAFEGUARDS

A. Nuclear Materials Subject to Safeguards

19. Except as provided in paragraphs 21-28, nuclear material shall be subject to the Agency's safeguards if it is being or has been:

(a) Supplied under a project agreement; or
(b) Submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by the parties to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement; or
(c) Unilaterally submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement; or
(d) Produced, processed or used in a principal nuclear facility which has been:
   (i) Supplied wholly or substantially under a project agreement; or
   (ii) Submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by the parties to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement; or
   (iii) Unilaterally submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement; or
   (e) Produced in or by the use of safeguarded nuclear material; or
   (f) Substituted, pursuant to paragraph 26(d), for safeguarded nuclear material.

20. A principal nuclear facility shall be considered as substantially supplied under a project agreement if the Board has so determined.

B. Exemptions From Safeguards

General exemptions

21. Nuclear material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards shall be exempted from safeguards at the request of the State concerned, provided that the material so exempted in that State may not at any time exceed:

(a) 1 kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one or more of the following:
   (i) Plutonium;
(ii) Uranium with an enrichment of 0.2 (20%) and above, taken account of by multiplying its weight by its enrichment;

(iii) Uranium with an enrichment below 0.2 (20%) and above that of natural uranium, taken account of by multiplying its weight by five times the square of its enrichment;

(b) 10 metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment above 0.005 (0.5%);

(c) 20 metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below; and

(d) 20 metric tons of thorium.

Exemptions related to reactors

22. Produced or used nuclear material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards pursuant to paragraph 19 (d) or (e) shall be exempted from safeguards if:

(a) It is plutonium produced in the fuel of a reactor whose rate of production does not exceed 100 grams of plutonium per year; or

(b) It is produced in a reactor determined by the Agency to have a maximum calculated power for continuous operation of less than 3 thermal megawatts, or is used in such a reactor and would not be subject to safeguards except for such use, provided that the total power of the reactors with respect to which these exemptions apply in any State may not exceed 6 thermal megawatts.

23. Produced special fissionable material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards pursuant only to paragraph 19(e) shall in part be exempted from safeguards if it is produced in a reactor in which the ratio of fissionable isotopes within safeguarded nuclear material to all fissionable isotopes is less than 0.3 (calculated each time any change is made in the loading of the reactor and assumed to be maintained until the next such change). Such fraction of the produced material as corresponds to the calculated ratio shall be subject to safeguards.

C. Suspension of Safeguards

24. Safeguards with respect to nuclear material may be suspended while the material is transferred, under an arrangement or agreement approved by the Agency, for the purpose of processing, reprocessing, testing, research or development, within the State concerned or to any other Member State or to an international organization, provided that the quantities of nuclear material with respect to which safeguards are thus suspended in a State may not at any time exceed:

(a) 1 effective kilogram of special fissionable material;

(b) 10 metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment above 0.005 (0.5%);
(c) 20 metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below; and
(d) 20 metric tons of thorium.

25. Safeguards with respect to nuclear material in irradiated fuel which is transferred for the purpose of reprocessing may also be suspended if the State or States concerned have, with the agreement of the Agency, placed under safeguards substitute nuclear material in accordance with paragraph 26(d) for the period of suspension. In addition, safeguards with respect to plutonium contained in irradiated fuel which is transferred for the purpose of reprocessing may be suspended for a period not to exceed six months if the State or States concerned have, with the agreement of the Agency, placed under safeguards a quantity of uranium whose enrichment in the isotope uranium-235 is not less than 0.9(90%) and the uranium-235 content of which is equal in weight to such plutonium. Upon expiration of the said six months or the completion of reprocessing, whichever is earlier, safeguards shall, with the agreement of the Agency, be applied to such plutonium and shall cease to apply to the uranium substituted therefor.

D. Termination of Safeguards

26. Nuclear material shall no longer be subject to safeguards after:
(a) It has been returned to the State that originally supplied it (whether directly or through the Agency), if it was subject to safeguards only by reason of such supply and if:
   (i) It was not improved while under safeguards; or
   (ii) Any special fissionable material that was produced in it under safeguards has been separated out, or safeguards with respect to such produced material have been terminated; or
(b) The Agency has determined that:
   (i) It was subject to safeguards only by reason of its use in a principal nuclear facility specified in paragraph 19(d);
   (ii) It has been removed from such facility; and
   (iii) Any special fissionable material that was produced in it under safeguards has been separated out, or safeguards with respect to such produced material have been terminated; or
(c) The Agency has determined that it has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way that it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has become practicably irrecoverable; or
(d) The State or States concerned have, with the agreement of the Agency, placed under safeguards, as a substitute, such amount
of the same element, not otherwise subject to safeguards, as the Agency has determined contains fissionable isotopes:

(i) Whose weight (with due allowance for processing losses) is equal to or greater than the weight of the fissionable isotopes of the material with respect to which safeguards are to terminate; and

(ii) Whose ratio by weight to the total substituted element is similar to or greater than the ratio by weight of the fissionable isotopes of the material with respect to which safeguards are to terminate to the total weight of such material;

provided that the Agency may agree to the substitution of plutonium for uranium-235 contained in uranium whose enrichment is not greater than 0.05 (5.0%); or

(e) It has been transferred out of the State under paragraph 28(d), provided that such material shall again be subject to safeguards if it is returned to the State in which the Agency had safeguarded it; or

(f) The conditions specified in the safeguards agreement, pursuant to which it was subject to Agency safeguards, no longer apply, by expiration of the agreement or otherwise.

27. If a State wishes to use safeguarded source material for non-nuclear purposes, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, it shall agree with the Agency on the circumstances under which the safeguards on such material may be terminated.

E. TRANSFER OF SAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR MATERIAL OUT OF THE STATE

28. No safeguarded nuclear material shall be transferred outside the jurisdiction of the State in which it is being safeguarded until the Agency has satisfied itself that one or more of the following conditions apply:

(a) The material is being returned, under the conditions specified in paragraph 26(a), to the State that originally supplied it; or

(b) The material is being transferred subject to the provisions of paragraph 24 or 25; or

(c) Arrangements have been made by the Agency to safeguard the material in accordance with this document in the State to which it is being transferred; or

(d) The material was not subject to safeguards pursuant to a project agreement and will be subject, in the State to which it is being transferred, to safeguards other than those of the Agency but generally consistent with such safeguards and accepted by the Agency.
III. SAFEGUARDS PROCEDURES

A. General Procedures

Introduction

29. The safeguards procedures set forth below shall be followed, as far as relevant, with respect to safeguarded nuclear materials, whether they are being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or are outside any such facility. These procedures also extend to facilities containing or to contain such materials, including principal nuclear facilities to which the criteria in paragraph 19(d) apply.

Design review

30. The Agency shall review the design of principal nuclear facilities, for the sole purpose of satisfying itself that a facility will permit the effective application of safeguards.

31. The design review of a principal nuclear facility shall take place at as early a stage as possible. In particular, such review shall be carried out in the case of:

   (a) An Agency project, before the project is approved;
   (b) A bilateral or multilateral arrangement under which the responsibility for administering safeguards is to be transferred to the Agency, or an activity unilaterally submitted by a State, before the Agency assumes safeguards responsibilities with respect to the facility;
   (c) A transfer of safeguarded nuclear material to a principal nuclear facility whose design has not previously been reviewed, before such transfer takes place; and
   (d) A significant modification of a principal nuclear facility whose design has previously been reviewed, before such modification is undertaken.

32. To enable the Agency to perform the required design review, the State shall submit to it relevant design information sufficient for the purpose, including information on such basic characteristics of the principal nuclear facility as may bear on the Agency's safeguards procedures. The Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibility under this section. It shall complete the review promptly after the submission of this information by the State and shall notify the latter of its conclusions without delay.

Records

33. The State shall arrange for the keeping of records with respect to principal nuclear facilities and also with respect to all safeguarded nuclear material outside such facilities. For this purpose the State and the Agency shall agree on a system of records with respect to each
facility and also with respect to such material, on the basis of proposals to be submitted by the State in sufficient time to allow the Agency to review them before the records need to be kept.

34. If the records are not kept in one of the working languages of the Board, the State shall make arrangements to facilitate their examination by inspectors.

35. The records shall consist, as appropriate, of:

(a) Accounting records of all safeguarded nuclear material; and
(b) Operating records for principal nuclear facilities.

36. All records shall be retained for at least two years.

Reports

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

37. The State shall submit to the Agency reports with respect to the production, processing and use of safeguarded nuclear material in or outside principal nuclear facilities. For this purpose the State and the Agency shall agree on a system of reports with respect to each facility and also with respect to safeguarded nuclear material outside such facilities, on the basis of proposals to be submitted by the State in sufficient time to allow the Agency to review them before the reports need to be submitted. The reports need include only such information as is relevant for the purpose of safeguards.

38. Unless otherwise provided in the applicable safeguards agreement, reports shall be submitted in one of the working languages of the Board.

ROUTINE REPORTS

39. Routine reports shall be based on the records compiled in accordance with paragraphs 33-36 and shall consist, as appropriate, of:

(a) Accounting reports showing the receipt, transfer out, inventory and use of all safeguarded nuclear material. The inventory shall indicate the nuclear and chemical composition and physical form of all material and its location on the date of the report; and
(b) Operating reports showing the use that has been made of each principal nuclear facility since the last report and, as far as possible, the programme of future work in the period until the next routine report is expected to reach the Agency.

40. The first routine report shall be submitted as soon as:

(a) There is any safeguarded nuclear material to be accounted for; or
(b) The principal nuclear facility to which it relates is in a condition to operate.

PROGRESS IN CONSTRUCTION

41. The Agency may, if so provided in a safeguards agreement, request information as to when particular stages in the construction of a principal nuclear facility have been or are to be reached.
42. The State shall report to the Agency without delay:

(a) If any unusual incident occurs involving actual or potential loss or destruction of, or damage to, any safeguarded nuclear material or principal nuclear facility; or

(b) If there is good reason to believe that safeguarded nuclear material is lost or unaccounted for in quantities that exceed the normal operating and handling losses that have been accepted by the Agency as characteristic of the facility.

43. The State shall report to the Agency, as soon as possible, and in any case within two weeks, any transfer not requiring advance notification that will result in a significant change (to be defined by the Agency in agreement with the State) in the quantity of safeguarded nuclear material in a facility, or in a complex of facilities considered as a unit for this purpose by agreement with the Agency. Such report shall indicate the amount and nature of the material and its intended use.

AMPLIFICATION OF REPORTS

44. At the Agency's request the State shall submit amplifications or clarifications of any report, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards.

INSPECTIONS

GENERAL PROCEDURES

45. The Agency may inspect safeguarded nuclear materials and principal nuclear facilities.

46. The purpose of safeguards inspections shall be to verify compliance with safeguards agreements and to assist States in complying with such agreements and in resolving any questions arising out of the implementation of safeguards.

47. The number, duration and intensity of inspections actually carried out shall be kept to the minimum consistent with the effective implementation of safeguards, and if the Agency considers that the authorized inspections are not all required, fewer shall be carried out.

48. Inspectors shall neither operate any facility themselves nor direct the staff of a facility to carry out any particular operation.

ROUTINE INSPECTIONS

49. Routine inspections may include, as appropriate:

(a) Audit of records and reports;

(b) Verification of the amount of safeguarded nuclear material by physical inspection, measurement and sampling;

(c) Examination of principal nuclear facilities, including a check of their measuring instruments and operating characteristics; and

(d) Check of the operations carried out at principal nuclear facilities
and at *research and development facilities* containing safeguarded *nuclear material*.

50. Whenever the Agency has the right of access to a *principal nuclear facility* at all times, it may perform inspections of which notice as required by paragraph 4 of the *Inspectors Document* need not be given, in so far as this is necessary for the effective application of safeguards. The actual procedures to implement these provisions shall be agreed upon between the parties concerned in the *safeguards agreement*.

**INITIAL INSPECTIONS OF PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR FACILITIES**

51. To verify that the construction of a *principal nuclear facility* is in accordance with the design reviewed by the Agency, an initial inspection or inspections of the facility may be carried out, if so provided in a *safeguards agreement*:

(a) As soon as possible after the facility has come under Agency safeguards, in the case of a facility already in operation; or

(b) Before the facility starts to operate, in other cases.

52. The measuring instruments and operating characteristics of the facility shall be reviewed to the extent necessary for the purpose of implementing safeguards. Instruments that will be used to obtain data on the *nuclear materials* in the facility may be tested to determine their satisfactory functioning. Such testing may include the observation by inspectors of commissioning or routine tests by the staff of the facility, but shall not hamper or delay the construction, commissioning or normal operation of the facility.

**SPECIAL INSPECTIONS**

53. The Agency may carry out special inspections if:

(a) The study of a report indicates that such an inspection is desirable; or

(b) Any unforeseen circumstance requires immediate action.

The Board shall subsequently be informed of the reasons for and the results of each such inspection.

54. The Agency may also carry out special inspections of substantial amounts of safeguarded *nuclear material* that are to be transferred outside the jurisdiction of the State in which it is being safeguarded, for which purpose the State shall give the Agency sufficient advance notice of any such proposed transfer.
between the Agency and the State, taking into account the frequency established for routine inspections. However, at least two such reports shall be submitted each year and in no case shall more than 12 such reports be required in any year.

Inspections

56. One of the initial inspections of a reactor shall if possible be made just before the reactor first reaches criticality.

57. The maximum frequency of routine inspections of a reactor and of the safeguarded nuclear material in it shall be determined from the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Whichever is the largest of:</th>
<th>Maximum number of routine inspections annually</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Facility inventory (including loading);</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Annual throughput;</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>(c) Maximum potential annual production of special fissionable material (Effective kilograms of nuclear material)</td>
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<td>Up to 10</td>
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<td>More than 1 and up to 5</td>
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<td>Right of access at all times</td>
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58. The actual frequency of inspection of a reactor shall take account of:

(a) Whether the State possesses irradiated-fuel reprocessing facilities;

(b) The nature of the reactor; and

(c) The nature and amount of the nuclear material produced or used in the reactor.

C. SPECIAL PROCEDURES RELATING TO SAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR MATERIAL OUTSIDE PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR FACILITIES

Nuclear material in research and development facilities

ROUTINE REPORTS

59. Only accounting reports need be submitted in respect of nuclear material in research and development facilities. The frequency of submission of such routine reports shall be agreed between the Agency
DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1965

and the State, taking into account the frequency established for routine inspections; however, at least one such report shall be submitted each year and in no case shall more than 12 such reports be required in any year.

ROUTINE INSPECTIONS

60. The maximum frequency of routine inspections of safeguarded nuclear material in a research and development facility shall be that specified in the table in paragraph 57 for the total amount of material in the facility.

Source material in sealed storage

61. The following simplified procedures for safeguarding stockpiled source material shall be applied if a State undertakes to store such material in a sealed storage facility and not to remove it therefrom without previously informing the Agency.

DESIGN OF STORAGE FACILITIES

62. The State shall submit to the Agency information on the design of each sealed storage facility and agree with the Agency on the method and procedure for sealing it.

ROUTINE REPORTS

63. Two routine accounting reports in respect of source material in sealed storage shall be submitted each year.

ROUTINE INSPECTIONS

64. The Agency may perform one routine inspection of each sealed storage facility annually.

REMOVAL OF MATERIAL

65. The State may remove safeguarded source material from a sealed storage facility after informing the Agency of the amount, type and intended use of the material to be removed, and providing sufficient other data in time to enable the Agency to continue safeguarding the material after it has been removed.

Nuclear material in other locations

66. Except to the extent that safeguarded nuclear material outside of principal nuclear facilities is covered by any of the provisions set forth in paragraphs 59-65, the following procedures shall be applied with respect to such material (for example, source material stored elsewhere than in a sealed storage facility, or special fissionable material used in a sealed neutron source in the field).

ROUTINE REPORTS

67. Routine accounting reports in respect of all safeguarded nuclear material in this category shall be submitted periodically. The frequency of submission of such reports shall be agreed between the Agency and the State, taking into account the frequency established for routine inspections; however, at least one such report shall be
submitted each year and in no case shall more than 12 such reports be required in any year.

**ROUTINE INSPECTIONS**

68. The maximum frequency of routine inspections of safeguarded nuclear material in this category shall be one inspection annually if the total amount of such material does not exceed five effective kilograms, and shall be determined from the table in paragraph 57 if the amount is greater.

**IV. DEFINITIONS**


70. “Board” means the Board of Governors of the Agency.

71. “Director General” means the Director General of the Agency.

72. “Effective kilograms” means:

   (a) In the case of plutonium, its weight in kilograms;
   
   (b) In the case of uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (1%) and above, its weight in kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment;
   
   (c) In the case of uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (1%) and above 0.005 (0.5%), its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001; and
   
   (d) In the case of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below, and in the case of thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005.

73. “Enrichment” means the ratio of the combined weight of the isotopes uranium-233 and uranium-235 to that of the total uranium in question.

74. “Improved” means, with respect to nuclear material, that either:

   (a) The concentration of fissionable isotopes in it has been increased; or
   
   (b) The amount of chemically separable fissionable isotopes in it has been increased; or
   
   (c) Its chemical or physical form has been changed so as to facilitate further use or processing.

75. “Inspector” means an Agency official designated in accordance with the Inspectors Document.


77. “Nuclear material” means any source or special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute.

78. “Principal nuclear facility” means a reactor, a plant for processing nuclear material irradiated in a reactor, a plant for separating the isotopes of a nuclear material, a plant for processing or fabricating nuclear material (excepting a mine or ore-processing plant) or a facility or plant of such other type as may be designated by the Board from time to time, including associated storage facilities.
79. "Project agreement" means a safeguards agreement relating to an Agency project and containing provisions as foreseen in Article XI.F.4(b) of the Statute.

80. "Reactor" means any device in which a controlled, self-sustaining fission chain-reaction can be maintained.

81. "Research and development facility" means a facility, other than a principal nuclear facility, used for research or development in the field of nuclear energy.

82. "Safeguards agreement" means an agreement between the Agency and one or more Member States which contains an undertaking by one or more of those States not to use certain items in such a way as to further any military purpose and which gives the Agency the right to observe compliance with such undertaking. Such an agreement may concern:

(a) An Agency project;
(b) A bilateral or multilateral arrangement in the field of nuclear energy under which the Agency may be asked to administer safeguards; or
(c) Any of a State's nuclear activities unilaterally submitted to Agency safeguards.

83. "Statute" means the Statute of the Agency.

84. "Throughput" means the rate at which nuclear material is introduced into a facility operating at full capacity.

85. "Unilaterally submitted" means submitted by a State to Agency safeguards, pursuant to a safeguards agreement.

Address by Foreign Minister Couve de Murville to the General Assembly [Extract], September 29, 1965

I have spoken of Europe and I have spoken of Asia. None of the vital questions being posed there will be the subject of debates in this General Assembly, and only the India-Pakistan conflict is on the Security Council’s agenda, for the implementation of the cease-fire and to seek a solution on the substance of the problem. We will therefore broach the discussion of the world’s present problems here from a different angle. This angle will in fact be that of disarmament.

I deliberately approach this major chapter in the context of the general international situation, and not of military technology or of one or another specific measure. For how can one imagine that it is

1 A/PV.1341 (prov.), pp. 51-52.
possible to separate disarmament problems from the framework in which they necessarily fall—that is to say, the problems of war and peace? Five years ago, the peoples experienced a moment of hope, when there seemed to be the beginning of a general détente in the cold war and there were preparations for a meeting of the big Powers to discuss, in particular, a halt to the armaments race. Incidents, which you can recall, abruptly put an end to the undertaking, and doubtless, in the final analysis, the situation was still not ripe enough to confirm the prospects which, fleetingly, had begun to emerge. Since that time, and for grave reasons, the opportunity has still not arisen. One of these reasons is the progressive extension of the war in Viet-Nam, which makes it quite difficult to seek a real détente. Another reason is also, most obviously, the growing and spectacular intervention into world affairs of a China that is now a nuclear Power, and the fact that its action cannot be exercised within the framework that is available to all the other Powers. Henceforth, disarmament talks may indeed be undertaken here or there; but the vital elements of conviction are lacking, and consequently those of hope. There is talk in this General Assembly of organizing a world conference on disarmament. The idea certainly appears generous, if it is devoid of ulterior motives. But, in order to be meaningful, could such a conference be anything other than a conference on détente, and therefore on peace? If this were so, then the doors would really be open onto the future.

When, in our times, disarmament is spoken of, the general tendency is to call it "nondissemination." Doubtless this is a way—a somewhat instinctive way—of saying that the nuclear weapon is the vital thing, and consequently the major danger. France desires dissemination no more than any other country, and knows quite well that the Powers that find themselves with the redoubtable privilege of the atomic weapon will never agree to share it with others. France also knows that in reality, behind the discussions that are being pursued in Geneva or elsewhere, inevitably lie the major international problems, and first of all—why not say so?—that of the future of Germany. But what appears to us, above all, is that the essential does not lie there. If it were truly a matter of disarmament, the first concern would be to prevent what exists from growing, and then to reduce it. In other words, it is the atomic Powers that are involved. Once they were to consent to limiting their manufacture, to diminishing their stockpiles gradually and to submitting themselves to the appropriate controls, dissemination would appear clearly to be what it really is: that is, a by-product, and not the root, of the evil.

Considerations of this sort could appear naive and therefore Utopian. However, they only serve to repeat the obvious: namely, once
again, that the problem of disarmament is the problem of war and peace—that is, it is first of all the problem of the Powers that have the means to wage war and thereby those to establish peace. The responsibilities incumbent upon them are immense. France has never ceased to say this. It believes that it is never too late to reiterate it. Nor is it ever too late to draw the conclusions.

While so many grave questions thus remain open, the world is being transformed, developed and organized. Who could better bear witness to this than the sixty or seventy States that, during the past ten years, became Members of the United Nations Organization as they formed themselves and became independent? Decolonization is the major phenomenon of our times. It has nearly reached its term, even though problems still remain and even though crises could still happen before these problems are definitively settled. France is happy and proud to have made its contribution for the share that fell to it. May I venture to recall that, for her, the final chapter of this great undertaking was closed right here, on 8 October 1962, when I had the honour of supporting before this General Assembly the candidacy of the very young Algerian Republic—a positive conclusion to a long and painful ordeal which, once the wounds were bound, ultimately left feelings of friendship and a multitude of mutual interests.

News Conference Remarks by the Chinese Communist Vice Premier (Chen): Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [Extracts], September 29, 1965 1

On Sharing Nuclear Knowledge

The most important task for the Afro-Asian countries today is to shake off imperialist control. The just struggle of Afro-Asian countries against imperialism and colonialism is the best atom bomb.

A London Times correspondent asked whether China was prepared to share her nuclear knowledge with any of the developing countries.

In reply, Vice-Premier Chen Yi first commented on the western countries' practice of dividing nations into the "developed" and the "under-developed." He said: The western countries have shown a superiority complex by claiming themselves to be "developed" while degrading some other countries by calling them "under-developed."

I do not agree with these terms. Now they promote the so-called under-developed countries by describing them as developing countries. So far as China is concerned, we are not grateful for that. The facts over the past three centuries show that the so-called developed countries have developed by exploiting the colonies, while the so-called under-developed countries remain undeveloped as a result of imperialist and colonialist exploitation. No rigid line should be drawn by classifying certain countries as developed and some others as under-developed. We hold that, politically, the Asian, African and Latin American countries which persist in opposing imperialism and colonialism are advanced, while the West European and North American imperialist countries are backward. Economically, we do not believe that the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America will for ever remain backward and that Western Europe and North America will for ever be in the van technically. The people of Asia, Africa and Latin America will overtake the industrially advanced countries within a few decades, once they shake off the control of imperialism and old and new colonialism and start to build their countries by relying on their own efforts. The history of New China over the past 16 years provides a most vivid evidence. China has achieved great successes in national construction mainly through the united efforts of the government and the people, through self-reliance, hard work and the exploitation of her own resources. So far there has not been any country in the world which can change its state of backwardness by merely relying on foreign aid.

Vice-Premier Chen Yi said: There are two aspects to the question of nuclear co-operation. As for the peaceful use of atomic energy and the building of atomic reactors, China has already been approached by several countries, and China is ready to render them assistance; as for the request for China's help in the manufacture of atom bombs, this question is not realistic.

In my opinion, the most important task for the Afro-Asian countries today is to shake off imperialist control politically, economically and culturally and develop their own independent economy. This task is an acute struggle and its accomplishment will take quite a few years. Any country with a fair basis in industry and agriculture and in science and technology will be able to manufacture atom bombs, with or without China's assistance. China hopes that Afro-Asian countries will be able to make atom bombs themselves, and it would be better for a greater number of countries to come into possession of atom bombs.

In our view, the role of atom bombs should not be over-stressed. The United States has been brandishing the atom bomb for atomic blackmail over the past twenty years, but it has failed. The just
struggle of Afro-Asian countries against imperialism and colonialism is the best atom bomb.

On China's Development of Nuclear Weapons

The Japanese correspondents asked about the development of nuclear weapons in China. Vice-Premier Chen Yi said: China has exploded two atom bombs. I know this and so do you. A third atom bomb may be exploded. As to the time of its explosion, please wait for our communique. Atomic technology and delivery technology are, of course, rather complicated, but Chinese, Asians and Africans certainly can all master them, if efforts are made.

China does not decide her foreign policies according to whether or not she has got atom bombs. We are ready to enter into friendly co-operation with still more countries in order to oppose imperialism and colonialism; isolate U.S. imperialism and safeguard world peace.

We reaffirm that all countries, big and small, should come together and agree on the destruction of atom bombs and on the prohibition of the use, manufacture, stockpiling and testing of nuclear weapons. China is manufacturing atom bombs in order to liquidate them and for the purpose of self-defence. China has pledged never to be the first to use atom bombs. Our nuclear weapons will only be used for defence.

Address by Pope Paul VI to the General Assembly

[Extract], October 4, 1965

35. You, gentlemen, have done and are doing a great work: you are teaching men peace. The United Nations is the great school where that education is acquired, and We are here in the Aula Magna of that school. Whoever takes a place here becomes both pupil and teacher in the art of building peace. And when you leave this hall, the world looks to you as to the architects, the builders of peace.

36. Peace, as you know, is built not only by means of politics and the balance of forces and interests. It is built with the spirit, with ideas, with works of peace. You are labouring at this great work. But you are as yet only at the beginning of your labours. Will the world ever succeed in changing the exclusive and bellicose state of mind which up to now has woven so much of its history? This is hard to foresee; but it is easy to affirm that we must resolutely take the road towards a new history, a peaceful history, one that will be

1 General Assembly Official Records: Twentieth Session, 1347th Plenary Meeting, pp. 3-4.
truly and fully human, the very history God promised to men of good will. The roads to it are mapped for you: the first is that of disarmament.

37. If you wish to be brothers, let the weapons fall from your hands. You cannot love with offensive weapons in your hands. Even before they cause victims and ruins, weapons, especially the terrible weapons modern science has given you, beget bad dreams, nourish bad feelings, create nightmares, mistrust and sombre resolves; they exact enormous expenditures; they bring to a halt projects of useful work undertaken in solidarity; they warp the psychology of peoples. So long as man remains the weak, changeable and even wicked being that he often shows himself to be, defensive arms will, alas! be necessary. But you, your courage and valour spur you to study ways of guaranteeing the security of international life without recourse to arms: this is an aim worthy of your efforts, this is what the peoples expect of you. This is what must be attained. And for this, unanimous trust in this Institution must grow; its authority must grow; and the goal, it is to be hoped, will then be reached. Then you will win the gratitude of all peoples, relieved of the crushing expense of armaments and delivered from the nightmare of ever imminent war.

38. We know—and how could We not rejoice in the knowledge?—that many among you looked with favour upon the invitation in the cause of peace that We addressed to all States from Bombay last December: to devote to the benefit of the developing countries at least part of the savings which can be realized by reducing armaments. We here renew that invitation, with the confidence your sentiments of humanity and generosity inspire in Us.

Message From President Johnson to Secretary of Defense McNamara: Installation of Large Aperture Seismic Array System, October 14, 1965

With the dedication of the new Large Aperture Seismic Array installation in Billings, Montana, this country has taken another step toward a comprehensive nuclear ban.

This new Department of Defense installation, the first of its kind, will help detect and identify earthquakes. It brings us closer to the day when science can distinguish with certainty between underground nuclear explosions and other forms of seismic disturbances.

In following our policy that America's peaceful technological advances be shared with other nations, I have directed that data from
the new installation be made freely available to all countries of the world.

The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 represents real progress, and we are continually trying to move forward to a comprehensive and lasting ban on the testing of nuclear weapons.

This new detection site is another important step toward our goal. My congratulations to you, to the representatives of the United Nations, to Governor Babcock and Senator Metcalf and to all those who have helped to make this dedication ceremony possible.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Fedorenko) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [Extracts], October 18, 1965

It was because of the initiative of the Soviet Union that a most important and urgent problem—that of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons—has been inscribed on the agenda of the twentieth session of the General Assembly. It is one of the most acute problems of our day and a very serious discussion must be devoted to it. It must be at the very centre of the work of this session of the General Assembly because the question of the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is closely linked to ensuring international cooperation and the maintenance of peace.

For the time being, nuclear weapons—a sort of Damocles sword of our century—are in the possession of the armies of several States; and this is a fact, a reality. But the tremendous danger of a nuclear war incipient in the very existence of atomic and hydrogen weapons is made worse today by the clear trend towards the further dissemination of nuclear armaments.

This is the question: are nuclear weapons going to fall into the hands of more and more new States, or shall we succeed in stopping the process of the dissemination of nuclear weapons and in controlling events? If, in addition to the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Chinese People's Republic—which already possess nuclear weapons and are permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations—other States embark upon the path of the creation of their own nuclear weapons or obtain access thereto, it will be too late and even practically impossible to reverse

1 Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291-293.
2 A/C.1/PV.1355, pp. 6-32.
this trend of events. This is all the more obvious since, with each passing year, the manufacture of nuclear weapons becomes relatively simpler and the number of States possessing the necessary potential resources increases constantly. In a few years, according to the estimates of specialists, several States can become members of the so-called "nuclear club".

It is quite legitimate and natural that the prospect of the further spread of nuclear weapons—the most terrifying means of mass destruction—cannot but be a matter of apprehension for the peoples of the world, causing concern and fear among all who really care about maintaining peace and freeing mankind from the horrors of a rocket and nuclear war.

One does not need to be a military specialist to understand that the risk of unleashing war, a war in which nuclear weapons would be used, will increase many times over if that weapon proliferates on this earth, if nuclear arsenals multiply, if they are created without any control by an ever increasing number of States.

It is symptomatic that a majority of the heads of delegations who spoke in the general debate at this twentieth session of the Assembly stressed the enormous importance of the problem of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and pointed to the need for an immediate solution.

We have come to that point where it is essential to take immediate measures to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, where the time has come to tackle that problem, fully conscious of our responsibility. That is the reason the Soviet delegation made a proposal concerning the urgent conclusion of an international treaty which would put an end to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.1

The goals and intentions of the Soviet Union are crystal clear. We sincerely wish to erect a barrier on the road to a nuclear armaments race. We struggle to prevent the increase of the risk of war which is linked to the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

This urgent task is all the more urgent because, at this hour of history, we come ever closer to an increase in tensions. Sometimes it is said that an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is only a way of assuring a nuclear monopoly for the five present great Powers, but it should be stressed that those who advance such a thesis are either erring, albeit sincerely, because they take an oversimplified view of events, or are purposely trying to prevent an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to delude people. It has always been far from our intention to perpetuate the situation created at the present point in history, in which there are several Powers in the world in possession of nuclear weapons. On

1 Ante, pp. 443-446.
the contrary, we want to see the so-called nuclear club go out of existence completely, and the sooner the better.

We want to see erased from the international glossary concepts such as nuclear weapons or nuclear wars. We want to put an end to the division of States into nuclear and non-nuclear States. In other words, the Soviet Union is the most energetic and consistent advocate of the liquidation of all nuclear weapons in all countries. We wish to see all countries, large and small, using the powerful energy of a liberated atom for peaceful, and not military, purposes.

It is well known that it was not the Soviet Union that started the nuclear armaments race. We were not the first to test or to create this weapon of mass destruction. No, it is not our country that was the first to test the atomic bomb on the inhabitants of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, leaving a deep wound which has not disappeared in more than twenty years. Had the proposal of the Soviet Union to outlaw atomic weapons\(^1\) been adopted—and we made that proposal immediately after the end of the Second World War—the world would not have found itself in this dangerous vortex of a nuclear armaments race which costs incredible material resources and which threatens mankind with the most destructive military catastrophe.

At the present time, the Soviet Union constantly and categorically is in favour of the unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons and the destruction of all stocks of these weapons. The full liquidation of nuclear weapons and the means of delivery are at the very heart of the programme of general and complete disarmament, the programme put forward by the Soviet Government,\(^2\) and the implementation of such a programme would be a stable guarantee of general peace.

As is well known, the Soviet Government proposes that Powers possessing nuclear weapons should, even before their total prohibition, make a statement that they will not be the first to use such weapons. We repeat that the Soviet Union is prepared to assume such an obligation if the other nuclear Powers act in the same way. Yet it is a fact that to this very day nuclear weapons have not been outlawed, and the Soviet Union, without ceasing its efforts on the diplomatic level in favour of the prohibition of these weapons, was compelled, because it had no other choice, to create its own nuclear weapons. In these conditions, the urgent implementation of measures which would limit the armaments race is essential, measures which would, first of all, limit nuclear weapons, and an important measure of that kind would be an agreement to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

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2 Ante, pp. 77–102.
It is obvious that by itself an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be a measure limited in scope, and one which could not be a goal in itself but must be that line beyond which we can travel the straight road leading to our main objectives, the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament.

As was pointed out by the head of the Soviet delegation, Foreign Minister Gromyko, in his statement at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons is indissolubly linked to the struggle for the prohibition and liquidation of nuclear weapons and the prevention of a nuclear war, which is the constant aim of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, and with an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons both the nuclear Powers and the States not possessing such weapons would stand to gain.

As was stated by Foreign Minister Gromyko, it is much preferable to link one's future not to weapons of mass destruction and not to the various aspects of military competition under the conditions of a nuclear armaments race, but to measures which tend to limit the dangers of nuclear war and to disarmament. Because of these considerations the Soviet Union has taken a stand in favour of a speedy agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons since, under present conditions, it is unfortunately impossible to find a more radical solution. However, it would be dangerous and harmful to underestimate the importance of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which would be an important step in the direction of the total prohibition of nuclear weapons. In fact, nobody even doubts this obvious truth.

All of us know full well that the problem of the prevention of the spreading of nuclear weapons is not a new one. We know that it has been on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly for more than a day and more than a year. Much time has been spent in interminable discussions on this matter during the negotiations in Geneva. The question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been debated many times in different international forums. In the resolutions that have already been adopted on this question by the General Assembly, the conviction was expressed that the increase in the number of States which will possess nuclear weapons was becoming ever more imminent, and this threatens not only to speed up the pace of the nuclear armaments race, but also to increase the difficulties of preventing a new war and ensuring international peace and security.

1 *Ante*, p. 436-441.
All of us are aware that the General Assembly has taken a stand in favour of the urgent need to conclude an international agreement to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and that it has appealed to all States possessing nuclear weapons and those not possessing them to make every effort to reach this objective. Why is it then that up to this very day no agreement has been reached on this problem? Because the representatives of some leading Powers in NATO are seeking, under the guise of an international agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to make their dissemination legal in fact. That is the reason for this situation which makes it impossible to solve this problem in a positive manner. It is essential that there be full clarity in this matter and that no misunderstanding should arise.

The Soviet delegation considers it essential to stress once again that an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will be effective only if all loopholes are closed to those States not possessing nuclear weapons. Such an agreement must fully prevent the creation of multilateral or other nuclear forces of NATO, which would represent an especially dangerous form of dissemination of nuclear weapons. But it is well known that the United States adheres to a different concept which in fact, if one may speak in this way, is tantamount to closing and bolting the main doors to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but which would at the same time open a very dangerous back door through which a whole multilateral fleet, armed with hundreds of rockets with nuclear warheads, would be able to go to sea.

The position of the United States was clearly expressed at the last session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. The fact that no change has occurred in this point of view of late was borne out quite clearly by the statement of the representative of the United States, Ambassador Goldberg, at the present session of the General Assembly. Even when one first reads the United States position on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, one has to think what the main element of this position is. Is it the desire to make a gesture to placate the overwhelming majority of the States of the world or is it the desire by all means to legalize the plans for the creation of a multilateral Atlantic force in NATO which would give access to nuclear weapons to the revenge-seekers of West Germany? The United States position, as we stated, opens up the possibility of giving access to nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States, especially the Federal Republic of Germany in the framework of multilateral or other nuclear NATO forces. This was stated without any ambiguity by the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

1 See ante, pp. 423-436.
From everything I have said, it is clear that the United States position not only does not eliminate the danger of the further spread of nuclear weapons, but also aims directly at legalizing access to these weapons and, in the final analysis, to participation in the possession, management and utilization of them by the non-nuclear Powers of NATO—and, first of all, by the Federal Republic of Germany. In other words, it is a matter of sanctioning forms of dissemination of nuclear weapons, which represent the greatest danger to peace and international security; it is a plan for the creation of so-called multilateral or other NATO nuclear forces and, in the framework of these forces, access to nuclear weapons would be granted to the Federal Republic of Germany.

We deem it essential to emphasize that access to nuclear weapons for the Federal Republic of Germany, whether in a system of multilateral forces or under any other guise, would inevitably compel the socialist States members of the Warsaw Treaty to take corresponding measures in order to protect their security and guarantee peace in Europe. In this regard a very clear statement was made by the participants in the session of the Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw, in January 1965.1

The vital interests of the peoples of all countries of the world demand that the United States and its allies completely renounce the implementation of any plans that would give West Germany access to nuclear weapons. It is these plans which constitute the main obstacle that prevents the solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In the light of what I have stated, the United States position is inconsistent from the point of view of reaching an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and it cannot serve as the basis for such an agreement.

Some non-nuclear countries have recently expressed the view that the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be viewed in a wider context and in relation to other measures, for instance the end of the production of nuclear weapons by nuclear Powers, the reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons, and so forth. We do not wish to ascribe unworthy motives to any country; we merely analyse the positions of various countries on this question objectively. But what would such an approach to this question mean in practice? It would mean that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would become a more difficult problem. It would mean that conditions would be put forward which would make an

1 *Ante*, pp. 5-9.
agreement much more difficult. Inevitably, questions of control and inspection, as well as other questions of that type, would arise.

If the solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is made dependent upon the solution of other problems, one can say in advance that there would be a grave danger of failure for the whole problem. Consider what would have happened if, at the time, we had put conditions forward with respect to the problem of the Moscow Agreement banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and had over-burdened, so to speak, that problem? It is obvious that had there been such an approach at the time, we still would not have an agreement. Yet this agreement has been recognized as a most positive achievement by the overwhelming majority of States. This is why we are convinced that the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be considered separately from all other questions. All efforts must be made in order to solve this problem as rapidly as possible. Everything must be done to make our task easier and not more difficult.

In this connexion, we should like to stress again that an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be an effective contribution to the cause of peace and to the consolidation of the security of peoples only if the agreement established a real, and not an artificial, obstacle to States which do not now possess nuclear weapons gaining access to them. The agreement must preclude any possibility of the dissemination of nuclear weapons through any channel—through the direct transfer of these weapons to non-nuclear States, through the collective control over such weapons within the framework of a military alliance, or in any other way.

The Soviet delegation considers it necessary to stress that there must be no exceptions and no reservations with respect to the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is only in this way that an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons can have any practical meaning or value for the cause of peace.

The draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons presented by the Soviet Union is consonant with these most important needs. The Soviet draft treaty provides that nuclear and non-nuclear States must assume certain obligations, and if such obligations were carried out, all ways would be closed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This draft treaty has worked out in detail exhaustive formulas to prevent any leaks of nuclear weapons into the arsenals of non-nuclear States or access by these States to nuclear weapons. The draft treaty provides for the nuclear Powers the essential obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons under any guise, directly or indirectly, through a third State or a group of States, to the ownership or control of States or groups of States not possessing
nuclear weapons. It also provides that nuclear Powers will not accord to such States or groups of States the right to participate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the draft treaty provides for the obligation on the part of nuclear Powers not to grant nuclear weapons or control over their placement to the units of armed forces, or to various military personnel of States not possessing nuclear weapons, even when such military personnel is placed under the command of non-nuclear States, within the framework of any military alliance.

These provisions contained in the Soviet draft treaty exclude the possibility of access to nuclear weapons through military blocs. They exclude the possibility of creating multilateral or Atlantic nuclear forces which would enable non-nuclear Powers—above all the Federal Republic of Germany—to obtain nuclear weapons.

Under present-day conditions, when science and technology enable advanced industrialized countries to set up, with the assistance of nuclear Powers and in relatively brief time, the production of nuclear weapons, the clause of the Soviet treaty is especially important which prohibits the nuclear Powers from providing assistance "directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States, to States not at present possessing nuclear weapons in the manufacture, in preparations for the manufacture or in the testing of such weapons", and from transmitting "to them any kind of manufacturing, research or other information or documentation which can be employed for purposes of the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons". *(Article I)*

On their part, non-nuclear Powers, signatories of the treaty, must undertake "not to create, manufacture or prepare for the manufacture of nuclear weapons either independently or together with other States, in their own territory or in the territory of other States". They also undertake "to refrain from obtaining nuclear weapons in any form, directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States". *(Article II)*

The draft treaty provides that the parties "shall refrain from offering any support, encouragement or inducement to States seeking to own, manufacture or exercise control over nuclear weapons". *(Article III)*

The Soviet Union is prepared immediately to sign a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which would take into account the above-mentioned needs and objectives. We consider that it is essential to draw attention once again to the fact that the Soviet delegation has presented a draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which has been circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, and which has been distributed to members of the First Committee.¹ We would like to express the conviction that

¹ *Ante*, pp. 443-446.
this draft treaty tabled by us will receive wide support from Member States of the United Nations and that we shall pass on from words to practical deeds in the field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviet delegation would like to draw the attention of the Committee to another important aspect of the problem. If we were successful in our effort to conclude a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons after the Moscow Test-Ban Treaty, this would be a most important step forward in international relations, which would be extremely important in itself and which at the same time would contribute to consolidating peace and solving other international problems.

Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, October 18, 1965

Mr. Chairman, before starting my prepared statement, I wish to say that it is the expectation of my delegation that we will be governed here in this Committee strictly by the pertinent rules of procedure. As you said, before calling on the Soviet representative this morning, members should inscribe to speak with the Secretary of this Committee. Mr. Chairman, my delegation did just that; that is to say, we asked the Committee Secretary last week that the United States be inscribed to speak on the item “Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”. At that time we asked and were told that no other delegation had been inscribed on the Secretary’s list of speakers. At that time we assumed—and I submit we had reason to assume—that the United States would be the first speaker on this item.

I regret that there seems to have been a misunderstanding on this point. I suggest that we follow the normal pattern of adhering to the rules of procedure and that, in the words of rule 111 of the rules of procedure, you call on speakers “in the order in which they signify their desire to speak”.

As we resume our discussion of disarmament questions—some four months after the meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and one month after the recent session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament—some of us may be tempted to ask, as did one of our colleagues at our first organizational meeting: Has any progress been achieved? Has any solution been arrived at? Must we start again from scratch?

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1 A/C.1/PV.1355, pp. 33-47. Mr. Csatorday, the Hungarian delegate, was Chairman of the First Committee.
Without in any way minimizing the difficulties that lie ahead, the United States does not take a pessimistic view. Progress depends to a great extent on the political will for agreement. For its part, the United States has that will. We hope that in the course of our discussions others will manifest an equally strong and equally sincere will to work for the concrete results that all of our peoples desire and look to us to achieve.

The United States remains fully committed to the objective of general and complete disarmament, and we continue to work towards that end. But there is one problem that is of such pressing urgency today and so vital to maintenance of the peace in the future and, indeed, to holding open the doors to progress towards general disarmament, that my Government and, I am happy to say, almost all of the Governments represented in this room today, attach the highest priority to it. That question is non-proliferation: the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons.

On 15 June, 1965, the United Nations Disarmament Commission adopted by an overwhelming majority resolution DC/225, in which it recommended that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament:

. . . accord special priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, giving close attention to the various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures.1

Non-proliferation received major attention in the deliberations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament when it reconvened in July, as will be noted from the Committee's report which is before us.2

In his message to the opening session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on 27 July, President Johnson stated that the very first objective he had assigned the United States delegation was:

To seek agreements that will limit the perilous spread of nuclear weapons, and make it possible for all countries to refrain without fear from entering the nuclear arms race.

The President also said:

No difference among any of us, on any other issue, can be allowed to bar agreement in this critical area.3

That spirit motivated the United States delegation on 17 August 1965, when I had the honour of presenting to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament the United States draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.4 Our draft treaty embodies important contributions from Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom. The

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1 *Ante*, p. 262.
3 *Ante*, p. 281.
4 Mr. Foster's statement of Aug. 17 appears *ante*, pp. 349–353.
text of the United States draft treaty may be found annexed to the report of the ENDC which has been distributed as General Assembly document A/5986, dated 22 September 1965.1

Also annexed to the report is a joint memorandum on non-proliferation submitted by eight members of the ENDC—Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic.2 We welcomed their memorandum as a useful contribution to the ENDC's discussions. In their memorandum, the eight express their deep concern with the problem of non-proliferation. Referring to the draft treaty which the United States tabled at Geneva, the eight countries express regret "that it has not yet been possible to reconcile the various approaches for an appropriate or adequate treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons." We fully share their regret.

Also submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee and appended to its report is a draft unilateral declaration of non-acquisition of nuclear weapons, submitted by the Italian Government on the initiative of its distinguished Foreign Minister and now President of the General Assembly.3

If we recall the long record of United Nations efforts to encourage a non-proliferation treaty, I am sure that all must agree that the offering of the United States draft treaty for negotiation at Geneva on 17 August 1965 was a very significant step. It marked the first time that an actual treaty text had been put on the table to implement the General Assembly's unanimous call four years ago, in resolution 1665 (XVI), for an international agreement to bar the spread of nuclear weapons.4 The United States draft treaty is our effort to respond to the renewed wish of the United Nations, embodied in the June 1965 resolution of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

In tabling the United States draft treaty in Geneva, I made perfectly clear that it was offered "for discussion and negotiation". We were prepared and eager to begin negotiation for a non-proliferation agreement at Geneva. We remain so today.

Let me now say a few brief words about the United States draft treaty. We sought to make it as simple and straightforward as possible. It would prohibit nuclear Powers from transferring nuclear weapons into the national control of any country not having nuclear weapons, either directly or indirectly, through a military alliance. Non-nuclear States would have a corresponding obligation not to receive the transfer of nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear States would also be prohibited from manufacturing nuclear weapons and

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1 The U.S. draft treaty may be found ante, pp. 347-349. The ENDC report appears ante, pp. 427-430.
3 See ante, pp. 411-412.
4 Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 694.
the nuclear States could take no other action to increase the number of independent nuclear entities in the world, whether a State or some other kind of organization. Control over nuclear weapons, that is, power to use them, now rests only in national hands.

We believe it important that all parties undertake in a non-proliferation treaty to co-operate in facilitating the application to their peaceful nuclear activities of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or their equivalent. We recommend as strong a provision on this subject as is possible in the light of the views of all those interested in acceding. Many countries are increasingly accepting IAEA safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities, and we welcome this trend. My own country has placed one of its large nuclear power reactors under IAEA safeguards, and the United Kingdom has done likewise.

In terms of a non-proliferation treaty, however, the application of international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities should not be viewed as of interest to the nuclear Powers alone. On the contrary, international safeguards should be of special interest to the non-nuclear States as a means of assuring them that their neighbours and others are in fact complying with the treaty.

Our discussions at Geneva were most useful in clarifying points of view and in highlighting the major issues which must be resolved on the way to agreement on a treaty. Unfortunately, those discussions could not progress further towards agreement because the Soviet Union sought to impose certain prior conditions which are unnecessary and unreasonable. In doing so, the Soviet Union appeared to maintain its preoccupation with the achievement of certain of its political objectives in Europe, a preoccupation which unfortunately it has so far permitted to have priority over the world-wide danger of nuclear proliferation. Once more today, the Soviet representative has given priority to that preoccupation.

As I made clear at Geneva, the United States is opposed to any form of dissemination of nuclear weapons, direct or indirect. We seek no nuclear sharing arrangement in NATO which could involve such dissemination. The treaty we have suggested would bar such dissemination since it would prevent the creation of any additional entity, whether a State or organization, having an independent power to use nuclear weapons.

If the Soviet Government is as determined and prepared to prevent proliferation as its representative would have us believe today, then I think it would be highly preferable that we address ourselves objectively and dispassionately to the problem. Sterile polemics about the

1 Ante, pp. 446-460.
2 See Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 214-221.
3 UK Treaty Series no. 70, Cmnd. 2753.
Federal Republic of Germany will not help us to achieve agreement, and to continue on this plane would not augur well for the future of our discussions.

The Soviet representative also sought to make us believe that his Government is and has been second to none in its determination and readiness to act to prevent proliferation. The facts do not bear this out as regards the past. Judging by actions, rather than words, Soviet interest in halting proliferation is belated. But, if they say that their interest today is deep and genuine, we do not question it. If the Soviet Union will now suit its actions to its words, then we should be able to conclude the agreement which we all want.

I can only note with regret that the Soviet Union did not appear to be moved by the same sense of urgency as the United States in Geneva. However, the fact that the Soviet Union has now offered a draft treaty of its own for discussion may indicate that there is basis for hope that the urgency of countering proliferation is coming to be recognized. In its present form the Soviet draft continues to focus narrowly on Soviet preoccupations with NATO and does so in a manner which we cannot accept. Yet we are encouraged by the fact that perhaps the Soviet Union is now prepared to negotiate. If the possibility of real negotiations now finally exist, we can view this as a sign of progress. I propose that we return to Geneva as soon as possible with the firm resolve to seek to agree on a treaty which we all can support.

An important trend of recent discussions, whether in the United Nations' Disarmament Commission or the Eighteen-Nation Committee, has been to view the problem of non-proliferation in the context of a broad group of related measures of which a non-proliferation treaty would be the central measure. It has been suggested by some, however, that these related measures should be a necessary step on the part of the nuclear Powers to accompany the foreswearing of nuclear weapons by States not possessing them. It seems to us that to pose the problem in this fashion obscures the essential fact that the spread of nuclear weapons is at least as much—and in some instances more—of a threat to the security of the present non-nuclear States of the world than it is to the nuclear States. The probability of nuclear weapons being used will almost certainly increase as the number of fingers on the trigger increases. And so it is imperative to make progress where we can, when we can, remembering that agreement in one area can often be the catalyst to precipitate in another area agreement that may have long eluded us.

This does not mean that the United States does not attach equal importance to efforts to make progress as quickly as we can on other measures related to non-proliferation. We have, in fact, introduced

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1 *Ante*, pp. 443–446.
new elements of flexibility into our positions to increase the possibilities of agreement.

The measure related to non-proliferation efforts that is foremost in the minds of most is a comprehensive test ban. I need not stress the great importance which we continue to attach to the limited test ban treaty, to which over one hundred countries have subscribed. We continue to hope and to urge that it will be universally accepted. President Johnson stated only last week:

The nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 represents real progress and we are continuously trying to move forward to a comprehensive and lasting ban on the testing of nuclear weapons.¹

At Geneva my delegation indicated that we are ready to take current scientific capabilities fully into account in discussing the numbers and modalities of on-site inspections for verification of a comprehensive test ban.² Representatives from many Members of the United Nations attended the inauguration of our large aperture seismic array in Montana last week, which is one important phase of our research effort to improve our capabilities for monitoring a comprehensive test ban. President Johnson has announced that in following United States policy that our peaceful technological advances be shared with other nations, he has directed that data from this new installation be made fully available to all countries of the world.³ We support the suggestion made at Geneva by eight ENDC members, in another joint memorandum attached to the ENDC report, calling for an exchange of scientific and other information among the nuclear Powers in an effort to facilitate agreement on a comprehensive test ban.⁴

The Soviet Union, which a few years ago was prepared to consider some on-site inspections, is now opposed to any on-site inspections whatsoever. We say to the Soviet Union once again: Let us sit down together and compare our scientific data. Let us explore every opportunity to determine whether some accommodation can be found.

We will have more to say on this general subject when the agenda item specifically devoted to the test ban comes under discussion. I should like to note only at this stage that a moratorium on underground testing, either alone or combined with a ban on underground tests above a certain seismic threshold, is not a sound solution and is therefore not acceptable.

As we seek to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we cannot forget the vehicles for delivery of these weapons of mass destruction. The United States has therefore proposed exploring a

¹ Ante, p. 466.
² See ante, pp. 384-390, 406-408.
³ Ante, pp. 465-466.
verified freeze of the numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. As Ambassador Goldberg announced on 23 September, if progress could be made on the freeze, the United States would be willing to explore also the possibility of significant reductions—

I repeat, significant reductions—in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.¹ Here is a measure that would give graphic assurance to the non-nuclear States of the willingness of the nuclear States themselves to halt and to turn back the nuclear arms race.

In working towards the effective limitation of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems, we have also sought agreement to halt and reduce mounting stockpiles of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. I refer in this connexion to our proposal for a verified cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons use and for the transfer to peaceful uses of agreed sizable quantities of such materials. As illustrative figures—and I underline the word illustrative—we have proposed that the United States transfer 60,000 kilogrammes of U-235 and the Soviet Union 40,000 kilogrammes to peaceful uses.²

I should like to call particular attention to Ambassador Goldberg's announcement to the General Assembly on 23 September of the new United States proposal for the actual destruction of nuclear weapons. We propose the demonstrated destruction by the United States and the Soviet Union of nuclear weapons from their respective stocks to obtain the 60,000 kilogrammes of U-235 to be transferred to peaceful uses by the United States and the 40,000 kilogrammes to be transferred by the Soviet Union. We are prepared also to include the plutonium from these weapons, if the Soviet Union would do likewise.

When the United States had earlier proposed a cut-off of fissionable material production and transfer to peaceful uses of these illustrative amounts of 60,000 kilogrammes and 40,000 kilogrammes respectively of U-235, the Soviet Union replied that this was not disarmament, but rather control without disarmament. We cannot agree with this Soviet contention. A cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons would, even by itself, be a very important step in halting and turning back the nuclear arms race. But if there were earlier misgivings on the part of the Soviet Union, unfounded though they may have been, everyone will agree that the new proposal made by the United States most assuredly is disarmament, for we are proposing that fissionable material be removed from actual weapons, that the weapons—the casing and all internal mechanisms—be destroyed, and that the fissionable material be transferred for exclusively peaceful purposes. I repeat, this is disarmament. The number of weapons

¹ Ante, p. 435.
² Ante, p. 106.
to be destroyed would be very substantial, and I shall have more to say about this weapons destruction proposal later in our discussion.

Before concluding my remarks, I should like to touch on one or two other points relating to non-proliferation. The first is the problem of ensuring the security of nations that forswear the manufacture of nuclear weapons. It has been suggested that non-nuclear States should have some assurance that their security will not be weakened by their forswearing of nuclear weapons. United States policy was stated last October by President Johnson:

The nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it.¹

As Ambassador Goldberg has indicated, action by the General Assembly could be a useful part of such assurances,² and I wish to reaffirm today my Government's readiness to work to this end.

Nuclear-free zones in appropriate regions of the world could also contribute significantly to the non-proliferation objectives we seek. While I shall wish to speak at greater length on this subject at a later time, it is pertinent to our present discussion to recall that several times in the past my Government has made clear its support for the creation under appropriate circumstances of nuclear-free zones in such regions as Africa and Latin America.

To sum up, we now have the opportunity really to come to grips with concrete issues in our efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. We cannot let pass the present opportunity to press forward until agreement on a non-proliferation treaty is reached, for that opportunity may not present itself again under such favourable conditions as today, if ever. At the same time, the United States wishes to move forward as rapidly as possible towards a comprehensive test ban treaty; a freeze and then a reduction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; and a cut-off of production of fissionable materials and transfer of such materials to peaceful purposes, involving the demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons. These involve complex and difficult negotiations. In the opinion of the members of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament at the end of its last session, as is stated in the Committee's report before us:

extensive discussions on major problems relating to certain collateral measures were particularly valuable in clarifying the respective points of views of member Governments.

The report adds:

The Committee believes that these discussions and exchanges of views may facilitate agreement in the further work of the Committee.³

¹ Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 468.
² Ante, p. 434.
³ Ante, pp. 429-430.
My Government looks to the discussions commencing today in this Committee to contribute further to the better understanding and the will to succeed that are essential if negotiations at Geneva are finally to bear fruit. We hope that the General Assembly will, therefore, urge that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament promptly reconvene upon completion of our discussions here and give renewed priority to the question of a non-proliferation treaty and related measures.

It is my Government’s strong wish that the next report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will contain an agreed non-proliferation treaty acceptable to all Governments which share our wish to act now to prevent proliferation.

Statement by the Brazilian Representative (Sette Camara) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [Extract], October 22, 1965

And for those who have been pleading and negotiating, here and elsewhere, year after year, in a long sequence of meetings with no practical results, it is encouraging to note the preoccupations of the two super-Powers with the urgency of halting and reversing the spread of nuclear weapons. Moreover, this is of significant importance since the past sixteen months have been marked by a growing anxiety over the lack of agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty as well as on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We attach much importance to both questions, which are intimately linked, as a means of paving the way for the attainment of our ultimate goal, general and complete disarmament.

If in the bare field of disarmament the signing of the Moscow Treaty represented an important step in the right direction, one must not lose sight of the fact that the major political gains of the partial test-ban treaty involve its effects on countries other than the United States or the Soviet Union. And this is particularly true because without testing in the three environments no country would, in the present circumstances, independently develop its nuclear capability and build a nuclear arsenal of its own.

1 A/C.1/PV.1359, pp. 6–11.
2 Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291–293.
It is, therefore, a question of finding the appropriate means of extending the Moscow Treaty to cover underground tests, in accordance with the preamble of that treaty, whereby the nuclear Powers expressed their determination to continue negotiations with a view to achieving a discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests. By omitting underground tests, a door has been left open for the defeat of the final objectives embodied in the partial test-ban treaty.

During the last meeting of the Disarmament Commission, I had occasion to stress that whatever agreement we reach in the field of disarmament ultimately depends on the degree of flexibility of the nuclear Powers. It depends almost on what the representative of the Soviet Union called "the political will". Such a will, however, is a result of a careful evaluation made by either side on capabilities, intentions and risks. These considerations, in the opinion of the Brazilian delegation, are of paramount importance when we arrive at the urgent question of nuclear proliferation. We face today the most dangerous challenge in the history of mankind. It is a race against time. Unless the world community devises effective ways and means of halting and reversing the nuclear race, it may unleash a competition without precedent. It would be logical to assume that once this happens, the world strategic military balance will be tipped and the security of nations seriously affected by the prospects of what has been called "nuclear blackmail".

We cannot, therefore, hide our apprehensions over the urgency of narrowing certain differences that have so far prevented the nuclear Powers from agreeing on a treaty preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. And we deem it essential that the remaining obstacles be removed in a spirit of mutual concessions and reciprocal accommodation. With many other delegations, we note with anxiety certain obstacles arising out of temptations to rely on nuclear weapons as a test of political power.

Both draft treaties reveal the existence of a political will. Nevertheless, my delegation feels obliged to reiterate certain considerations which, in our opinion, should be brought into the approach to non-proliferation. We share the conviction that a treaty on non-proliferation, besides imposing strict obligations on non-nuclear Powers, should contemplate or at least give an indication that non-dissemination is not an end in itself, but a means of achieving the ultimate end of general and complete disarmament under strict international control. This is a question of basic importance for the fate of disarmament in general and the dissolving of the so-called "nuclear club" in particular. Moreover, we consider it essential that a draft treaty should also contain precise provisions that cope with certain situations in which countries may feel obliged to resort to nuclear research in

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1 For the U.S. and Soviet draft treaties, see ante, pp. 347–349, 443–446.
order to safeguard their sovereignty and territorial integrity. And in this context, I entirely agree with the representative of Nigeria that: An indispensable element in any non-proliferation measure is, therefore, a firm undertaking with adequate guarantees by the nuclear Powers not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Powers under any circumstances whatsoever, or to threaten to use them.¹

It is a sacred right of every independent nation to decide what best suits its national interests. And a treaty of this nature will bear fruit only when all countries, I repeat, all countries feel safe from the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

This concept of reciprocal responsibility was fully endorsed by Brazil in the joint memorandum submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.²

Brazil shares the conviction that an agreement to stop the spread of nuclear weapons should embody that concept of reciprocal responsibility between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, and must be followed by concrete measures envisaging the gradual reduction of all nuclear stocks and vehicles.

In discussing the question of non-proliferation, the efforts of the Latin-American countries to establish a nuclear-free zone are worth mentioning. The Latin-American countries have made concrete progress on the road that lies ahead of us and the results achieved so far reveal the high degree of realism and justified caution that prevailed in most of the deliberations already undertaken by the Preparatory Committee for the Denuclearization of Latin America. Nevertheless, two problems of basic importance for the success of our programme still have to be solved: first, agreement on the geographical demarcation of the zone to be subject to the treaty; and secondly, assurances from all nuclear Powers that they will respect in all its aspects and consequences the juridical status of the zone. We consider these prerequisites as essential for the preparation of a treaty as conceived for the purpose of prohibiting the manufacture, stockpiling and transportation of nuclear weapons in Latin America. I reserve my right to revert to this question in a more detailed manner when we take up the item concerning the Denuclearization of Africa.

The contagious and cumulative effects of nuclear proliferation bring a sense of urgency to the deliberations of the current session of the General Assembly.

It is essential that the General Assembly take all necessary steps in order to provide the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament with constructive guidelines for the completion of a treaty to which all countries may safely adhere.

Unless an agreement is reached now, in the coming decade the nuclear club will be enlarged, and arms control and nuclear disarma-

¹ A/PV.1356 (prov.), pp. 27-30.
ment may become less attainable. All efforts towards non-prolifer-
ation are thus fully justifiable, particularly on the part of the nuclear
Powers which must act promptly and in keeping with the high respon-
sibilities incumbent upon them.

Statement by the U.A.R. Representative (Fahmy) to
the First Committee of the General Assembly: Non-
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, October 22, 1965

It is with a great sense of responsibility that we take part in the
discussion of the item presently before the Committee, namely, the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We do so not merely because
the United Arab Republic is a member of the Eighteen-Nation
Disarmament Committee but because we are fully convinced that
it is high time that concrete steps be taken to stop the spread of
nuclear weapons, either directly to non-nuclear States or under the
disguise of any other form of organization, military or otherwise, or
association, or what is coming to be known as "new entities". This
is a serious problem, which needs urgent action and straightforward
decisions before it is too late and before the situation becomes too
complex and insoluble.

Having said that, I may add that it is encouraging to see general
agreement between the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers as to the
importance and acuteness of this problem. It is abundantly clear
that the spread of nuclear weapons has become the focal point in
the major steps which should be taken along the road which could
eventually lead to the solution of the chronic problem of disarmament.

The importance of the non-proliferation problem does not stem
only from the fact that it will be the subject of an international and
legally binding instrument; its importance is due to its impact and
the far-reaching political, military, strategic and even economic
consequences of such an agreement either on the non-nuclear Powers
or on the nuclear Powers or, for that matter, on the relationship
between them; and, lastly, to a great extent, to its repercussions on
the future of the world and the balance of power for many genera-
tions to come. That is why we in the United Arab Republic and,
I am sure, for that matter, all the nations of the world attach such
importance to this problem.

Admittedly, there rests upon the nuclear Powers the onus of
reaching an early agreement in this regard. On the other hand,
the non-nuclear Powers, which constitute the bulk of humanity,

1 A/C.1/PV.1359, pp. 21-35.
have a direct and equally valid concern. Thus, there should be no impression that it is a one-sided issue; rather, it is an international problem of wide implications which surpass the immediate interests of the members of the nuclear club.

So far as the United Arab Republic is concerned, when we tackle this problem we do so on the basis of principles and having in the forefront of our minds the basic objectives behind any international agreement dealing with non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore, we do not believe that it is the right approach to discuss this problem on the basis of one draft, two drafts, or even more. We are of the opinion that the whole question should be approached on the basis of fundamental principles and, if we find that it is possible to agree on those principles, then it would not be difficult to draft an international agreement which fits them. The starting point is to focus our attention and try to find agreement on the objectives behind any treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If we agree—and I hope we can—on this basic point, then we can discuss the clauses which any treaty for that purpose should embody. After we have taken all these basic steps, and not before, we can discuss the modalities, the format of the treaty and its articles, one by one.

Convinced of the soundness of this approach, we believe that we should apply our minds to an attempt to find frank and real answers to the following points:

(1) whether there is at this stage real readiness and a sincere desire to put the names of our respective Governments on a formal treaty which binds us all, nuclear and non-nuclear Powers;

(2) whether the political atmosphere is auspicious enough for the conclusion of an international instrument of such magnitude;

(3) that, if we are firmly dedicated to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, then we should have an international agreement which really, and not artificially, ensures and safeguards this goal;

(4) if we agree on this paramount point, we should be able to agree on another basic principle, namely, that any international agreement should be as tight as possible and should indeed be free of any loopholes whatsoever;

(5) any international treaty dealing with non-proliferation would not only take into account the interests of the nuclear Powers but should also reflect the relationship and obligations of those Powers vis-à-vis the non-nuclear Powers;

(6) that any international agreement on non-proliferation should not be made on the assumption that it should give the nuclear Powers certain privileges at the expense of the non-nuclear Powers, because it would then be a one-sided agreement to which many, if not the majority, would hesitate to adhere;
(7) that any international agreement should be viewed as a permanent international obligation and, as such, should not embody vague or controversial provisions which, for one reason or another, could be used by the signatories as a pretext for taking action, either individually or collectively, which would defeat its very purposes;

(8) that any international agreement on non-proliferation should not have what are known as "escape clauses", drafted in a way which weakens the agreement's importance from the very beginning, even before it is signed; otherwise it would be not a real agreement but an artificial facade to deceive world public opinion;

(9) that an international agreement on non-proliferation should be worked out in such a manner that all Powers of the world would adhere to it;

(10) that any international agreement, while preserving the nuclear status quo as it exists in the world at present, should not permit in any form whatsoever a changing of the nuclear balance; rather we expect that agreement to diminish all incentives, legitimate or otherwise, to increase the number of potential nuclear Powers;

(11) that any international treaty on non-proliferation would be a step towards reaching agreement on the prohibition of the use of, and the destruction of, all nuclear weapons.

We have outlined some of the main principles which should be thoroughly discussed and agreed upon before we embark on the process of drafting any international document which deals with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If we cannot agree on those basic issues and if they are not made as clear as possible, then we do not expect that it will be possible in the foreseeable future to agree on the basic points which, in all candour, are prerequisites to any international treaty which deals with non-proliferation, if we really mean it to be as effective as possible, as acceptable as possible and as widely applicable as possible.

The United Arab Republic does not believe that the First Committee is the appropriate place for going into detail and discussing all the articles which are embodied in the various documents before us, but we are convinced that the proper way to deal with this issue in the General Assembly is to pronounce ourselves as clearly as possible on the various basic principles to which I have alluded.

An agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, if achieved, would be a real and basic contribution towards peace, towards paving the way to real disarmament, towards putting into effect the principles of peaceful coexistence and, lastly, towards building a world based on confidence and not on fear and suspicion. Comparison has frequently been made between the concern of the nuclear Powers and that of the non-nuclear Powers in regard to this
problem. I believe that it would be a grave mistake to say that the nuclear Powers are more concerned than the non-nuclear Powers. The nuclear Powers—or, to be precise, the super nuclear Powers—have enough nuclear weapons in their arsenals not only to destroy themselves but also to inflict on others, without any justifiable reason whatsoever, the horrors of a nuclear armed conflict. I hope that my saying so will not be construed to mean that the concern of the non-nuclear Powers is motivated only by fear on their part. It is very well known that science has no barriers, and it will not continue to be a monopoly of certain countries. The advances in science and technology, coupled with the normal growth of the industrial potential of many States, will enable those States, if they choose or are forced to do so, to obtain the same might. However, we are convinced of and dedicated to the cause of peace and we do not wish to see a situation develop which would compel certain Powers to join the club of the destructive atom. We should rather hope and expect that this hated side of the atom be converted completely to peaceful purposes.

This deep concern which is shared by the world at large could not be better demonstrated than by the declaration issued by the Heads of State or Government of the African Countries who met in Cairo in July 1964. They declared:

1. . . . we are ready to undertake through an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or control atomic weapons;
2. Appeal to all peace-loving nations to accept the same undertaking;
3. Appeal to all the nuclear Powers to respect this declaration and conform to it;
4. Request the General Assembly of the United Nations at its nineteenth regular session to approve this declaration and to take the necessary measures to convene an international conference for the purpose of concluding an agreement to that effect.1

Again this determination of the non-nuclear Powers to contribute to the early concluding of an international agreement on non-proliferation was amply stated in the programme for peace and international co-operation adopted by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cairo in October 1964:

The Conference requests the Great Powers to abstain from all policies conducive to the dissemination of nuclear weapons and their by-products among those States which do not at present possess them. It underlines the great danger in the dissemination of nuclear weapons and urges all States, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons, to conclude non-dissemination agreements and to agree on measures providing for the gradual liquidation of the existing stock-piles of nuclear weapons.

The declaration goes on:

As part of these efforts, the Heads of State or Government declare their own readiness not to produce, acquire or test any nuclear weapons, and call on all countries including those who have not subscribed to the Moscow Treaty to enter

into a similar undertaking and to take the necessary steps to prevent their territories, ports and airfields from being used by nuclear powers for the deployment or disposition of nuclear weapons. This undertaking should be the subject of a treaty to be concluded in an international Conference convened under the auspices of the United Nations and open to accession by all States.\(^1\)

As a further demonstration on the part of the Government of the United Arab Republic of our conviction of the importance of this problem, we would state that we were pleased to see that the safeguards and inspection system of the International Atomic Energy Agency was adopted by an overwhelming majority at the conference which was held recently in Tokyo.\(^2\) We supported this system as a further proof of our determination to tackle appropriate measures to create the proper atmosphere for the conclusion of an international Treaty dealing effectively with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. But let me make it clear that the mere approval of the system is not sufficient in itself, but should be completed in other forms with suitable action which should stimulate further agreements against non-proliferation.

I have alluded to our concept of the basic principles which, we believe, should be guaranteed before the formal conclusion of an international treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are sure that, realizing the vast responsibilities emanating from this problem, the time will come—and we hope that it will be soon—when an international treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, worthy of our signatures, can be concluded. Thus the United Nations would be implementing one, if not the most important, of its responsibilities under the Charter.

We are aware of the sincerity of all those who are interested in reaching agreement on this issue. We appreciate the contributions of the United States and the Soviet Union and of all other States which have, formally or informally, contributed to closing the gap which apparently exists between the various positions.

I have referred to the declaration adopted by the Heads of State or Government of the Organization of African Unity and the declaration of the non-aligned countries. As far as we are concerned, we abide by these obligations. If this indicates anything, it is that there is a real drive to reach an agreement in the near future, and for that reason we believe that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should accord it special priority and that, in re-examining this problem on an urgent basis, it should take into account not only the formal drafts which were submitted,\(^3\) but also the impact of the debates in this Committee and in the General Assembly, the importance of which should not be minimized.

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 444.
\(^2\) Ante, pp. 446-460.
\(^3\) See ante, pp. 347-349, 443-446.
The eight non-aligned countries which participated in the Geneva talks have demonstrated continually their sincere desire to create a bridge between the various positions of the super-Powers. We are gratified by the support which the memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations received.¹ We have heard and will doubtless continue to hear sound and wise counsel in this Committee, and for that reason it would be unwise to ignore the important issues which were raised in this body.

We are aware of many other problems which are germane to the issue under discussion, namely, the completion of the Moscow Test-Ban Treaty,² the denuclearization of zones, the halting of the production of fissionable material for military purposes, the conversion of plutonium in nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes, and the destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles. All these collateral measures are issues which deserve serious consideration which should take place at the same time as negotiations concerning the problem of non-proliferation. But this, in our opinion, should not make it necessary that the solution of one problem, or agreement upon it, should be dependent on the others.

It may be recalled that in my statement in the Disarmament Commission I referred to the concept of nuclear guarantee.³ It is a well known fact that since then this new concept has not been received sympathetically. In our opinion, this nuclear bilateral guarantee might indeed lead to a virtual proliferation of nuclear weapons. A nuclear guarantee, if encouraged would tempt other nuclear Powers to offer the same guarantee, and thus the effect of a nuclear guarantee would be, in the end, to place the world in a situation where vast areas were divided under a nuclear trusteeship of this or that Power. For this reason we do not believe that such a guarantee is conducive to reaching an understanding of the basic issue before us, namely, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

I repeat what I have already said in the Disarmament Commission, namely, that a nuclear guarantee is a new neo-political formula of far-reaching and complex consequences, politically, economically, strategically and otherwise. This neo-political protection is not as simple as it may seem to many. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not a private undertaking; nor, for that matter, is it the monopoly of eighteen Powers, Members of the Geneva Committee. Its scope and magnitude encompass all the nations of the world. It is a serious issue and a challenge which, we hope, we shall be able to meet in accordance with our obligations to humanity and the future of our world.

² Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291-293.
³ Ante, pp. 155-156.
Statement by the Indian Representative (Trivedi) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [Extracts], October 26, 1965

The Indian position on this problem has been explained in detail in the Disarmament Commission and in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. During the current session of the Assembly, our Foreign Minister summarized it once again in the general debate. He said:

I would . . . reiterate our firm conviction that the only practical approach to the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is that both the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers should undertake simultaneous obligations through an international instrument that might be agreed upon. It is essential that, while the non-nuclear Powers renounce production, acquisition and control of, and access to, nuclear weapons, the nuclear Powers should also refrain simultaneously from further production of these weapons and their delivery vehicles and reach agreement on a reduction of existing stockpiles. That would really be the essence of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Indian delegation has all along looked at this problem in its proper perspective and in its real form rather than in its superficial and consequential manifestations. The central fact of the situation is that further proliferation has already taken place, as so graphically detailed the other day by our Vice-Chairman, that this proliferation, which exists, poses a serious menace, and that one cannot solve the problem effectively by compromising with this evil and calling it a fact accompli. The Indian approach, therefore, is that an adequate or appropriate treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should deal with the problem of present proliferation as well as future proliferation. At the same time, referring to India's national decision, as distinguished from what should constitute a rational, balanced and non-discriminatory international treaty, our Foreign Minister stated:

Even though my country has possessed the capacity for quite some time now to manufacture nuclear weapons, we have refrained from doing so.

The Indian Parliament passed the Atomic Energy Act in 1948 and the Government launched a full-fledged atomic energy programme for peaceful purposes as early as 1954. That was eleven years ago. India has large uranium deposits and extensive thorium-rich minerals—the largest in the world. We started work on our first reactor in 1955, ten years ago, and it became critical in 1956—the first in Asia.

1 A/C.1/PV.1363, pp. 3-21.
2 A/PV.1358 (prov.), p. 41.
3 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
Besides the four nuclear-weapon countries, we are the only country having a plutonium extraction plant in operation. The country which now wishes to be described as a nuclear Power in fact told us a few years ago that we were fifteen years ahead of it in nuclear technology. And yet, we have refrained from manufacturing nuclear weapons. It was only last week that our Prime Minister reiterated India's position on this issue at a press conference in Aurangabad. When we are talking, therefore, of the requirements of a rational and balanced treaty, we are not talking of national decisions but of the basic components of a permanent international instrument.

The approach indicated by our Foreign Minister for an adequate and appropriate treaty on non-proliferation is also the basic approach envisaged in the joint memorandum on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons presented to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee last month by the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic. These delegations expressed their conviction that:

measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should... be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.¹

Some of these tangible steps need to be coupled with measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons, while others can follow.

We had an exhaustive debate on this subject in the Disarmament Commission last spring. The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee went into this problem comprehensively. Many representatives referred to it in the general debate during the current session of the Assembly, and we have already had many illuminating statements from several delegations in this Committee during the last few days.

It appears to us that these discussions have led to the emergence of three broad approaches towards a solution of the problem, and all of them deserve a constructive response from us. We appreciate that there are divergencies of different degree even among the various delegations which favour a particular approach, but basically our discussions reveal three general trends.

Firstly, there is the non-aligned, non-nuclear approach. It was enunciated broadly at the Cairo Conference in October last year, and I should like to quote the relevant extract in full.

The Conference requests the great Powers to abstain from all policies conducive to the dissemination of nuclear weapons and their by-products among those States which do not at present possess them. It underlines the great danger in the dissemination of nuclear weapons and urges all States, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons, to conclude non-dissemination agreements and to agree on measures providing for the gradual liquidation of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

As part of these efforts—

¹ Ante, p. 425.
I repeat, "as part of these efforts"—
the Heads of State or Government declare their own readiness not to produce, acquire or test any nuclear weapons, and call on all countries including those who have not subscribed to the Moscow Treaty to enter into a similar undertaking. . . .

Coming back to the question of the three approaches emerging in our discussions on the subject, the non-aligned non-nuclear approach was, as I said, broadly enunciated in the Cairo Conference. It was also reflected in the Disarmament Commission resolution, DC/225, adopted on 15 June of this year. The Disarmament Commission recommended that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should accord special priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, giving close attention to the various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme—
I repeat: "a programme"—
of . . . related measures.2

The same approach is also envisaged in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned delegations in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, where these delegations expressed their conviction that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race.3 That is also the approach outlined by a large number of non-aligned non-nuclear delegations in the general debate during the current session and during the present debate in our Committee. I do not propose to take the time of the Committee by referring in detail to these statements, but I should like to draw particular attention to the powerful and lucid exposition of this approach given to us by the representative of Liberia last Friday.4

As I said earlier, there are some differences in nuances among the delegations which maintain this broad approach, but generally their view is that an appropriate or adequate international treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should not isolate the issues of future proliferation and present proliferation. The view that the Indian delegation has consistently maintained is that future proliferation is a consequence of existing proliferation and that one cannot deal effectively with the consequence without dealing with the cause. That was, in fact, the inescapable import of the scholarly analysis given to

1 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 444.
2 Ante, p. 262.
us the other day by our Vice-Chairman\(^1\) and of the eloquent address given to us yesterday by the representative of Peru,\(^2\) emphasizing the ethical and juridical aspects of the problem.

Then there is the second approach, the approach underlying the appeal made by the Foreign Minister of Italy and President of the current session of our Assembly. Addressing the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Mr. Fanfani referred to the obstacles facing agreement on an acceptable treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and mentioned the misgivings of non-nuclear nations about renouncing these weapons for ever in an international treaty without some progress in nuclear disarmament by the nuclear Powers themselves. He then went on to say:

But if it were not possible within a reasonable time to prepare such a draft comprising obligations both for the nuclear countries and for the non-nuclear countries, the Italian delegation would reserve the right to appeal to the non-nuclear countries to take an initiative which, without prejudice to their own points of view, would establish a certain period for a moratorium on the possible dissemination of nuclear weapons. One could imagine that the non-nuclear countries, in particular those close to nuclear capability, might agree to renounce unilaterally equipping themselves with nuclear arms for a pre-determined length of time, it being understood, of course, that if their demands, referred to above, were not met during that time limit, they would resume their freedom of action.\(^3\)

The Italian delegation has in fact submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee a draft of such a declaration,\(^4\) and the representative of Italy referred to it in his intervention in the Committee a few days ago.\(^5\)

This, therefore, is the second approach. It recognizes the validity of the non-aligned, non-nuclear approach of dealing with the problems of future and present proliferation together, but seeks to obtain a moratorium on future proliferation for a short agreed period of time, during which the nuclear Powers should agree to cease all further production and embark on a programme of reduction of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles.

Several countries have shown interest in this approach, and some have suggested that the Fanfani moratorium be linked with other measures. Denmark and Sweden have, for example, suggested that in order to make this proposal more balanced it should be combined with a moratorium on underground tests. The Indian delegation has suggested that the Fanfani appeal be dovetailed into a general scheme of non-proliferation.

Then there is the third approach, which is the approach of the

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1 Ambassador Leopoldo Benites was Vice Chairman. His remarks appear in A/C.1/PV.1358, pp. 42-54.

2 A/C.1/PV.1361, pp. 11-37.


4 *Ante,* pp. 411-412.

nuclear Powers, of their partners in military alliances and of others who feel that their security is safeguarded by the existing nuclear Powers. This approach seeks to deal only with the limited problem of further proliferation, or rather the proliferation of nuclear weapons to countries which have not exploded a nuclear weapon device. It does not deal with the extremely serious and most urgent problem of those which have exploded nuclear devices, whether they have a nuclear weapons stockpile or not, whether they have a reliable nuclear delivery system or not. In fact by its act of omission, it permits them to go ahead and proliferate.

The two major nuclear Powers have submitted draft treaties based on this approach. There are, of course, significant variations in these two drafts and divergencies of detail among the various countries which support the approach underlying these draft treaties. The Indian delegation fully recognizes the sincerity of this approach and of the genuineness of the objectives underlying the two draft treaties. It appreciates the apprehension of the nuclear Powers and their allies that the nth-Power problem is a serious problem and that, if it is not tackled effectively, it will make the international objective of disarmament difficult.

References have been made in this context to concepts of nuclear monopoly and of a privileged and exclusive club of nuclear-weapon Powers. We should like to emphasize with all the sincerity at our command that we do not for a moment believe that the draft treaties presented by the United States and the Soviet Union are designed to perpetuate such a monopoly or exclusiveness. In fact, we are fully convinced that these countries genuinely desire arms control and limitation and disarmament. Whatever may be the view of other countries, expressed here or elsewhere—mostly elsewhere—the non-aligned non-nuclear nations have referred to these concepts not in the context of the motives of the nuclear Powers but in the context of the actual effect an international treaty would have if based only on an approach of that kind. An international instrument has to be examined on an objective assessment of its implications and results, and not on what its draftsmen intend it to be. The Moscow Test-Ban Treaty was drafted, to reduce the arms race and limit the nuclear menace, but its denial by one country has, in fact, led to nuclear proliferation. It is essential therefore that we learn by experience.

As I said earlier, however, those are broad approaches; there are several divergences even among the delegations which favour a particular approach. As far as the nuclear-Power approach is concerned, the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United

1 Ante, pp. 347-349, 443-446.
2 Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 291-293.
States, and others, have emphasized these divergences in their frank and illuminating statements before our Committee.

As the Indian delegation has pointed out in Geneva, it adopts a flexible approach to all these well-meaning attempts at a solution of the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time, we are convinced that an adequate or appropriate treaty on non-proliferation—to quote the phrase used by the non-aligned Eight in their memorandum—should deal simultaneously with the problems of future and present proliferation, and that it will be necessary to enlarge the drafts before us so as to embrace the essential features of the non-aligned non-nuclear approach. It is only then that we shall have not only a balanced and non-discriminatory treaty, but also real and effective non-proliferation.

Apart from the lack of appropriate provisions dealing with existing proliferation—or, rather, dealing with the problem of ensuring that a would-be nuclear Power does not continue to build up a stockpile and develop a nuclear weapon delivery system while everyone else subscribes to an international treaty not to do so—the limited approach envisaged in the drafts submitted by the nuclear Powers has another lacuna. It is based on the presumption of the assurance of security of nations provided by military alliances. It is an approach that appeals to the countries which feel that their security is safeguarded by the military alliances of nuclear Powers. That approach does not, however, take into account the security of the non-aligned non-nuclear countries. Those countries do not believe in military alliances. The non-aligned nations proclaimed their views on the subject in an article of faith incorporated in the Cairo Declaration of October 1964. They said:

The Conference reiterates its conviction that the existence of military blocs, great-Power alliances and pacts arising therefrom has accentuated the cold war and heightened international tensions. The non-aligned countries are therefore opposed to taking part in such pacts and alliances.

I should like to quote in that context what the representative of Poland said in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in another context:

Members and non-members of military alliances must be treated equally. I stress the point because, whilst prohibiting the transfer of control only, the Western Powers leave the door open to various forms of nuclear partnership with their allies through all sorts of collective arrangements, whatever their nature. That would raise the present status of non-nuclear States belonging to military alliances as compared to the status of non-nuclear States which are not aligned. In other words, the non-nuclear NATO countries would be unjustifiably accorded special treatment over other non-nuclear countries. We can ill afford a new division among countries. The present one, I submit, is hardly tolerable.

1 Ante, pp. 424–425.
2 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 445–446.
3 ENDC/PV.229, p. 7.
As a country which is non-aligned and which has always been opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form whatever, India is in agreement with that sentiment.

At the same time, what Mr. Goldblat said in the context of nuclear-sharing arrangements applies equally to the approach underlying the draft treaties submitted by the nuclear Powers. That approach does not take into account the security of non-aligned non-nuclear States which believe that their security lies not in guarantees or military alliances but in concrete and meaningful steps towards disarmament. In particular, no rational or balanced treaty should permit any country which would like to call itself a nuclear-weapon Power, and which would assume no obligations whatever under that treaty, to commence manufacturing nuclear weapons, build up stockpiles, perfect delivery systems and proliferate.

We do not propose at this stage to examine in detail, article by article, the two drafts before us. It might be useful, however, if the Indian delegation indicated its views on the central content of the drafts, as reflected in article I of the two texts.

We agree with those delegations which have said that on the issue of non-dissemination of weapons and technology there should be no loopholes and that all doors should be closed to access to nuclear weapons being provided by nuclear Powers in any manner or form. In the memorandum submitted by India to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in September last year, we said:

> There should be a clear understanding, or agreement, that... no change should be made by either nuclear side in any arrangement that may exist at present for the control, use, possession or transfer of nuclear weapons, or for the training of nationals of non-nuclear States in the use of such weapons, and that all existing arrangements should be frozen on each side.\(^1\)

We continue to maintain that position, and we trust that when it is possible to agree upon an adequate and appropriate treaty incorporating the non-aligned non-nuclear approach on the issue, the relevant article I will be as comprehensive and water-tight as possible, obviating all loopholes, theoretical or otherwise.

I have taken the liberty of analysing the three broad approaches which have emerged during our discussions in Geneva and here. I have also drawn the particular attention of the Committee to the interesting suggestion made by the Prime Minister of Malta, which is in line with the declaration made by the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries. The Indian delegation has no doubt that these various approaches will be studied carefully by all of us and that when the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Commission resumes its detailed negotiations on this subject, it will be able to reach a synthesis

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\(^1\) *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 410-411.
of the different ideas and solutions and, to use a phrase used by the non-aligned eight in their memorandum, will be able "to reconcile the various approaches for an appropriate or adequate treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons". What we need—and I quote again a phrase used by the non-aligned eight—is a treaty which can receive "the support of the entire international community".1

U.S. Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, October 26, 1965 2

The General Assembly,

Conscious of its responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for disarmament and the consolidation of peace,

Recalling its resolutions 1665 (XVI) of 4 December 1961 3 and 1908 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963,4

Mindful of the recommendation contained in the resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 15 June 1965,6

Noting the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament dated 16 September 1965, submitted to the Disarmament Commission and to the twentieth session of the General Assembly,6 including the memorandum of 15 September 1965 contained therein on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons submitted by the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic,7

Convinced that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would endanger the security of all States and make more difficult the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Noting with satisfaction that draft treaties to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons have been submitted respectively by the United States of America 8 and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,9

1 Ante, p. 425.
2 A/C.1/L.337, Oct. 26, 1965. This resolution was not voted on.
3 Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 694.
5 Ante, pp. 260–262.
8 Ante, pp. 347–349.
9 Ante, pp. 443–446.
Noting further that a draft unilateral non-acquisition declaration has been submitted by Italy as a possible interim measure in the event that the conclusion of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be unduly delayed,\textsuperscript{1}

Believing that the differences standing in the way of concluding a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons can and must be resolved,

1. Urges the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to reconvene as early as possible and, taking into account all relevant proposals and the discussion on this question at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, to accord special priority at its next session to continued efforts to reach agreement on a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to agree on other related steps to halt and turn back the nuclear arms race;

2. Requests the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to submit to the General Assembly at an early date a report on the results of its work on a treaty or agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Soviet Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, October 27, 1965 \textsuperscript{2}

\begin{quote}
The General Assembly, having examined the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and also the relevant draft Treaty, Recognizing the urgency and great importance of the question of preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, Noting that an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but should be a step on the way to banning and liquidating nuclear weapons and to general and complete disarmament,

1. Considers it necessary to conclude a Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as quickly as possible, and urgently appeals to all States to exert every effort to achieve that aim;

2. Considers that the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should be based on the following main principles:

(a) States possessing nuclear weapons should undertake not to transfer to States not possessing nuclear weapons, in any manner—
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Ante}, pp. 411-412.

\textsuperscript{2} A/C.1/L.338, Oct. 27, 1965. This resolution was not voted on.
directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States, or through military alliances—nuclear weapons or the right to participate in the ownership of such weapons or in the possession, control, emplacement or use of nuclear weapons; not to assist those States in the manufacture, in preparation for the manufacture, or in the testing of such weapons; and not to transmit to them any information which can be used in the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons;

(b) States not possessing nuclear weapons should undertake not to devise, manufacture or prepare to manufacture nuclear weapons, either independently or jointly with other States, in their own territory or in the territory of other States, and should renounce access to nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever—direct or indirect, through third States or through groups of States;

3. Transmits the draft Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons submitted by the Soviet Union to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for detailed study; and

4. Suggests that that Committee should come to an early agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on the basis of the main principles stated above.

Statement by the Swedish Representative (Myrdal) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, October 27, 1965

The challenge which the disarmament question presents to the world of today seems to have been given an even greater share of attention than usual in the general debate at this year's session of the General Assembly. I, for one, have perceived a heightened sense of urgency that the dangerously mounting spiral of arms competition must be broken now. From those statements which have placed the problem of disarmament in the context of the present world political situation we can derive both moral inspiration and practical ideas, when this Committee sets out to give guidelines for the further negotiations about disarmament measures. Within this Committee, too, the number of statements already made by representatives of many nations has greatly enriched the debate. This has considerably aided us in clarifying contended issues and suggesting new constructive approaches, not least in the domain under immediate discussion—that is, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

For that reason the Swedish delegation can forgo any attempt to review the whole width of the problem, and can concentrate on a few specific points.

1 A/C.1/PV.1365, pp. 18-27.
The point of departure is that for the issue of non-proliferation, as for all problems pertaining to nuclear disarmament, we look in the first instance to the nuclear Powers for an agreement to be reached between them. If the deliberations have so far stalled, it has been because of differences in the postures of the two nuclear super-Powers. To any non-participant observer, those differences, relating chiefly to the situation in Europe, cannot seem unsurmountable. But it is not for us to judge—only to wait. And I hope it is not just wishful thinking if we have interpreted the statements made in this Committee by the representatives of the nuclear Powers as being somewhat more encouraging than hitherto, as meaning that a convergence of views is in the offing.

If the primary responsibility for progress towards nuclear disarmament is thus placed on the nuclear Powers, that is due not to any consideration of sheer formalities in regard to the conclusion of a treaty, but to a hard set of facts in the world of reality. Public opinion today is eagerly looking for signs of the willingness of the super-Powers to act as leaders on the route from the nuclear arms race.

That brings me to my second point: the reluctance of non-nuclear Powers to shoulder a primary and, as a matter of fact, a solitary obligation to make renunciatory decisions in regard to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This position may have given rise to some misunderstanding or misinterpretation, but I hope to no apprehension. Neither should it be construed as a posture of bargaining if so many of the representatives of non-nuclear nations have stated that they want to see progress made in such a way that nuclear and non-nuclear countries alike give undertakings as to sacrifices in the nuclear field. That position corresponds to a very real clamour from world public opinion. Its main concern is and remains with presently existing nuclear strength, which is experienced as a sinister threat under which the world is smarting.

The position of my country on that point is clear. Our delegation continues, as always, to be in favour of and to work for halting and reducing armaments, and particularly nuclear armaments, through international agreements. While the preliminary deliberations on an agreement in regard to non-proliferation have been going on, Sweden, together with those other members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee that stand outside alliances, has formulated certain more general considerations. I quote, as so many preceding speakers have done, from the eight-nation memorandum, attached to the report of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee:

The eight delegations are convinced that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should, therefore, be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.1

1) *ante*, p. 425.
This view is obviously shared widely outside the number of delegations who signed the memorandum, to judge not least from statements made in this Committee. The memorandum does not demand that several measures should be bound up within the confines of one and the same treaty, but that they should be simultaneously encompassed by our negotiations. Foremost among such measures stands that of a comprehensive test ban. Other measures where advances seem possible have been listed in earlier deliberations, as well as in this Committee.

The statement thus serves as a reminder of the need to establish that psychological and political basis in public opinion, both in the world at large and in individual countries, which is a prerequisite for wide acceptance of a treaty renouncing nuclear power.

The situation at the signing of the Moscow treaty provides a telling demonstration of these political realities. At that time there was no question of one-sided commitments. The Moscow treaty did correspond exactly to the considerations asked for in the eight-nation memorandum. It implied a double-sided and not a one-sided curtailment of the freedom of action of nations, large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear. The obligation which the nuclear Powers then laid upon themselves to discontinue their test explosions in three environments was a truly impressive feature of that agreement. The result was that pledges of an even more portentous character were made by the non-nuclear countries. It should not be overlooked that they, when entering upon the solemn obligations of the Moscow treaty, drastically reduced their possibilities of manufacturing any nuclear weapons.

Viewing the Moscow treaty in retrospect raises another significant point. Is it not true that a most considerable concern in regard to proliferation relates to those States which did not adhere to the Moscow treaty? A crucial problem in relation also to a non-proliferation treaty is: who is going to sign? Which States are going to co-operate? The Swedish Government does cherish the hope that through sustained negotiations, primarily in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, it will be possible to reach such agreements that they gain support from an overwhelming number of States. In this regard, it is but natural that we follow with particular interest developments in neighbouring States in Central Europe, inasmuch as they are of relevance with regard to the possibility of gaining a broad-based and firm support in public opinion for adherence to a non-proliferation treaty.

So far, I have spoken with a certain optimism about the prospects of reaching a consensus on an international treaty about non-proliferation. Several delegations have, however, voiced concern lest it be

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1 Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291–293.
impossible to harmonize the various lines of national interests and political attitudes without considerable delay, in particular, to reconcile the positions taken by the nuclear super-Powers on this issue. For such a contingency the non-nuclear Powers must examine possibilities of taking the initiative in their own hands in order, if possible, to proceed to agreements between themselves. That such opportunities exist, and are already being actively explored, should not be overlooked. The most important of these avenues towards non-proliferation is, of course, that of establishing nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world, opportunities for which are significantly being pursued both in Africa and in Latin America. My Government has always maintained that this approach was well worth exploring, besides that of a general treaty to stop nuclear proliferation. Members of this Committee might recall that our then Foreign Minister, Mr. Undén, introduced a resolution to that effect, alongside with the one presented by Ireland; the two resolutions in fact carry the numbers 1664 and 1665 of the sixteenth session of the General Assembly.¹

A second avenue of progress, which also stands open to independent initiative on the part of non-nuclear countries, is that indicated by the Foreign Minister of Italy, and which therefore, in our parlance, is duly referred to as the “Fanfani proposal”.² Non-nuclear nations might proceed to consider an interim, voluntary and time-limited commitment to refrain from action for manufacturing nuclear weapons or otherwise acquiring them. Agreements on such a scheme for simultaneous but unilateral non-acquisition declarations might well provide a highly valuable “practice period”, from which certain conclusions of practical value might be drawn as to how a treaty-bound renunciation of nuclear weapons would work; for instance, what prohibitory formulæ to employ, whether to draw the line at actual manufacturing of weapons or manufacturing of fissile material of weapons grade, or at some stage of preparations or, perhaps, at the moment of decision-making. Hints might also be obtained, as well, as to how many nations would be prepared to implement a treaty. Considerable uncertainties as yet prevailing might thus be dissipated.

As has been indicated in earlier statements of ours, Sweden would be prepared to consider adhering to some such arrangement as a temporary measure if other nations find it worthwhile. A definite prerequisite is that such a moratorium would be fixed to a certain limited duration, perhaps a couple of years. Any “open-ended”, indeterminate moratorium cannot be considered acceptable. The very purpose of negotiating a treaty is to be able to introduce specific

² *Ante*, pp. 411-412.
terms for the obligations entered upon by signatory parties. The view that unlimited moratoria pending the outcome of negotiations are unacceptable, because they undermine these very negotiations, has often been expressed in relation to disarmament questions, specially emphasized by representatives of western Powers. Recognizing the importance of this principle, the Italian draft declaration clearly spells out the requirement for a time schedule as conditioning the self-renunciation on the part of the presently non-nuclear countries. The originator of the plan, Mr. Fanfani, also explicitly stated, when presenting it for international consideration, on 29 July in Geneva, that it was intended to "create an element of pressure and persuasion on the nuclear countries".1

This political purpose of an interim arrangement, namely, to press for a permanent settlement of the non-proliferation issue and for wider disarmament measures, would be totally lost if no date for expiration and renewed examination of the situation were fixed in advance.

Our conclusion on this score is that the Italian proposal should be referred to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to be examined together with all other suggestions, whether made in draft form, as the two treaty texts already before us,2 or submitted in statements to this session of the General Assembly.

My final point refers to the question of control. When centring our deliberations on the question of non-proliferation we are uniquely fortunate in not having the issue bedevilled by an intractable problem of control. The formula for appropriate control is already generally accepted, a revised system of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards just having been voted into existence at the meeting of the IAEA in Tokyo.3 My delegation would first sincerely recommend that in connexion with the establishment of nuclear-free zones and with any arrangements similar to the suggested unilateral non-acquisition declaration, just as in connexion with an international treaty, participating States should accept to place their nuclear-power programmes under control by the IAEA. As a matter of fact, we consider it highly desirable that all States parties to any bilateral agreements, whether as importers or as suppliers of power plants and fuel elements, demand that such agreements be submitted to the IAEA safeguards system. An international framework of control for commercial activity in the nuclear-power field is becoming increasingly urgent in order to ascertain that reactors and related installations are utilized for peaceful purposes only.

It has been announced already in Tokyo, but I judge it highly appropriate that it should also be explicitly stated in this central

1 Ante, pp. 288-289.
2 Ante, pp. 347-349, 443-446.
3 Ante, pp. 446-460.
organ of the international community and in direct connexion with disarmament discussions, that the Swedish Government has recently taken the decision to seek the application of IAEA safeguards, and thus of international control, to its hitherto bilateral agreements in this field. I need hardly stress that our nuclear-power programme is directed to peaceful purposes only.

My remarks today have been restricted to the area of non-proliferation problems, and even so have only touched upon a few points. Together with statements of principle which the Swedish delegation has had the opportunity to make in earlier debates, my remarks should suffice to make our position clear as to the kind of resolution text we support. First, it should not overlook the fact that, if we regard the situation outside of alliances, the possibilities of proliferation by way of independent manufacturing of nuclear weapons are already largely closed through the Moscow Treaty. General acceptance of IAEA control would be a further step of great practical value. The main purpose of a resolution must be to express forcefully the desire of this community of nations that very decisive steps towards halting the nuclear arms race and reducing the nuclear threat must be taken in the immediate future. With such a send-off, the negotiating body which is working for us—the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee—should come under a pressing obligation to proceed simultaneously and immediately along a broad frontline of disarmament measures, seeking a balanced set of such partial measures where progress is possible, including specifically an international treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The political difficulties which now act as barriers between the nuclear super-Powers, and the diversifications of view between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, are, after all, insignificant in comparison with the great interest which unites us, or should unite us, namely, to reduce the threat that we will all perish because we are busy building a gigantic nuclear trap—a man-made device to destroy mankind.

If all parties concerned place such a reminder before their eyes, the road to agreement should become a short one.

Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, October 27, 1965

Because we now have two draft treaties before us, my delegation believes that our exchange of views on the question of non-proliferation
has been more meaningful than ever before in this Committee. I cannot take the time of the Committee to comment on all the thoughtful statements we have heard in the past few days, including those of this morning and this afternoon, but I should like to refer to the statement made by the representative of Libya on 19 October. We welcome his support of the United States draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.\(^1\) He asked for an explanation of paragraph 1 of article VI of the United States draft, the paragraph containing the withdrawal clause.

Let me say, in response, that a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons should be a lasting instrument, and not a temporary or transitional agreement. In this we fully share the view expressed by Dr. Fahmy in his statement of 22 October.\(^2\) The United States wishes to stop proliferation for all time. Nevertheless, we are mindful of the fact that Governments must reserve the right to assess engagements of this nature in the light of the state of compliance by other parties, and of other circumstances which might vitally affect their continued adherence to the treaty. That is why it was found necessary to include a withdrawal clause in the limited test-ban treaty.\(^3\)

The withdrawal clause contained in article VI of our draft non-proliferation treaty is fashioned after the provision in the limited test-ban treaty, but contains two important additions: first, a party wishing to withdraw under the limited conditions set forth must give notice three months in advance to the Security Council as well as to all other signatory and acceding States. This notice must include a statement of the extraordinary events which the party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. These requirements provide an additional deterrent to a hasty or unfounded withdrawal action, without limiting the right of withdrawal.

A requirement to give notification and explanation to the Security Council is clearly appropriate in view of the serious implications of withdrawal by any party for the security of other parties to the treaty. It would afford an opportunity to discuss the matter and a possibility for consultations to avert the withdrawal. It thus also provides an explicit role for the United Nations, as urged by the representative of Peru.

The second addition to the limited test-ban treaty formula is a provision calling for review of the treaty after a specified period, with the agreement of two-thirds of the parties. This was included in part because of the wide concern expressed by many participants in the Geneva discussions this summer and in the Disarmament Commission this spring that a treaty such as this should be accompanied by

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\(^1\) *Ante*, pp. 347–349.

\(^2\) *Ante*, pp. 485–490.

\(^3\) *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.
progress to halt the increase in nuclear stockpiles and to begin to reduce them. One of the preambular paragraphs in our draft treaty explicitly recognizes this concern. It calls attention to the desire of all of us to achieve effective agreements to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce armaments, including particularly nuclear arsenals. A review provision would enable the parties to the treaty—should they find it necessary—to assess the degree of progress being made in the reduction of nuclear arsenals.

The United States has proposed a number of measures to stop the build-up of, and to reduce, nuclear stockpiles. We are prepared to agree to them even before a non-proliferation treaty such as we have tabled is agreed upon and signed. We do not believe they should wait on this treaty or that this treaty should wait on them. While we believe that the drafting of an agreed non-proliferation treaty should have special priority when we return to Geneva, we wish to proceed on all such measures, making progress wherever we can.

In my statement of 18 October, I stressed the significance of one such measure—the new United States proposal for the demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons. We are gratified at the interest many delegations have expressed in this proposal. This new proposal should meet the concern of those who have alleged that the standing United States offer to cease production of fissionable material for weapons and to transfer agreed quantities to peaceful uses is not disarmament. We have never understood how those who make this assertion can really contend that a halt in the build-up of fissionable stocks and their actual reduction by transfers to peaceful uses is not disarmament. But the newly expanded United States proposal should remove any doubt on that score.

What we are now proposing is that the fissionable material to be transferred to peaceful uses be removed from actual weapons and that the weapons themselves—the casings and internal mechanisms—be destroyed. The number of weapons to be destroyed would depend, in the first instance, on the agreed quantities of fissionable materials which each side is to transfer to peaceful uses. It would also depend on the size and nature of the actual weapons which each side offered for destruction.

One thing is clear. In order to obtain the amounts of fissionable material which, on an illustrative basis, we have suggested be transferred to peaceful uses, namely, 60,000 and 40,000 kg, respectively, by the United States and the Soviet Union, it would be necessary to destroy a very large number of weapons. To be more specific, the United States would have to destroy several thousand weapons; the Soviet Union would, in turn, have to destroy thousands of its weapons. I repeat, the number would have to be of the order of several thousand.

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1 Ante, pp. 480-481.
Moreover, we are suggesting the destruction of nuclear weapons, including fusion and fission types, which could have yields extending up into the megaton range. We are, in short, talking of a substantial measure of disarmament. And the large amount of fissionable material contained in these weapons would become available for peaceful uses under safeguards which would prevent its future diversion to weapons use.

Another promising feature of this proposal is that the verification of the destruction of weapons would be simple. Indeed, we have referred to it as the demonstrated destruction of weapons because, in essence, it involves nothing more than observation at the spot. Each country would establish a depot on its own territory, and the destruction of weapons would be carried out there under its own supervision. Observers from the other country would be present to see for themselves that weapons were actually taken into the depot to be destroyed and that the agreed quantities of fissionable materials were removed to be set aside for peaceful purposes. For its part, the United States would welcome the presence of additional observers from other countries who might wish to witness the implementation of this measure.

The demonstration procedure can be devised in such a way that secret design features of the weapons are not revealed to the observers of any country. We are prepared to describe in greater detail the technical features of this proposal in Geneva, so that there should be no basis for any fear that the procedures could be used for espionage or any other undesirable purpose; nor would they provide a means for promoting proliferation by revealing weapons design information.

To constitute a meaningful disarmament step, this proposal would, of course, have to be accompanied by a verified halt in the production of fissionable material for weapons use. At Geneva, the United States has already tabled such a proposal and has spelled out a workable procedure for verifying such a cut-off, a procedure designed to limit the intrusiveness of the inspection to the barest essentials.1

Here, then, is a proposal for a real and meaningful disarmament, directly relevant to halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It can be negotiated promptly and its implementation would, at long last, begin the process of turning back the nuclear arms race. We are convinced that its implementation would also contribute to reducing international tensions and that it would provide an example for future disarmament steps in the field of conventional as well as nuclear armaments.

Now, I should like to refer again to the importance of IAEA safeguards as a means of preventing nuclear proliferation. One of the most encouraging aspects of our discussions to this point has been the growing support voiced by various speakers for the acceptance of

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1 See *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 235-238.
international safeguards as part of any treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. In our view, a provision regarding such safeguards is a key element in the treaty, and its absence is one of the deficiencies we see in the Soviet draft.

According to the best available estimates, many nuclear power plants will be built during the next ten years all over the world. As a by-product of the generation of electric power, these plants will unavoidably produce thousands of kilograms of plutonium. If it is left to individual States alone to account for the disposition of this substantial quantity of plutonium, suspicions are bound to arise as to the possibility that some of it may be used to make nuclear weapons.

Fortunately, international mechanisms now exist through which States can provide reassurance to others that their peaceful nuclear activities are truly peaceful. The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency is a practical, reliable way to demonstrate to anyone concerned that nuclear material is not being secretly diverted to some military use. A recently completed review of the system has resulted in improvements and simplifications which should make it even more workable and acceptable. On 27 September the revised system was unanimously approved in Tokyo by the IAEA General Conference, which consists of representatives of ninety-three countries. The time has now come for the broad acceptance of IAEA or equivalent international safeguards on all civil uses of atomic energy.

With respect to States which now possess nuclear weapons, the full value of safeguards will not be achieved until such States agree to halt all production of fissionable materials for weapons use as the United States has proposed. But for States which do not now possess nuclear weapons, acceptance of international safeguards on all their nuclear activities would constitute a major step toward curbing nuclear proliferation. One of the chief pressures for nuclear weapons proliferation is the suspicion that neighbouring States plan to develop such weapons. If these suspicions could be dispelled through international safeguards, the incentives for proliferation would clearly be reduced. Moreover, since the safeguards provision will contribute to the durability of a nonproliferation treaty, it should be of interest to everyone.

The United States furthermore believes that international safeguards coverage should be expanded without even waiting for the conclusion of a formal non-proliferation treaty. Accordingly, we have adopted a policy of transferring to the IAEA, as rapidly as practicable, the administration of safeguards on the United States bilateral atomic energy agreements with other countries. Safeguards on thirteen such agreements have already been transferred to the IAEA. We urge that other supplier countries adopt a similar policy.

\[1\text{ Ante, pp. 446–460.}\]
and that all States invite IAEA inspection of all their indigenous peaceful nuclear facilities.

More than a year's practical experience with IAEA inspection of a large power reactor in the United States has strengthened our conviction that IAEA procedures are not costly or burdensome, do not jeopardize the privacy of commercial design information, and in no way interfere with peaceful nuclear activities. It is encouraging to note that the Latin American States have included IAEA safeguards in their draft proposal for a nuclear-free zone in Latin America.¹

The application of international safeguards to all the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be a major step toward curbing proliferation of nuclear weapons.

But, the immediate problem is the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. Such a treaty is now within our grasp, even though it may take difficult negotiations and some more precious time to achieve it. The United States will spare no effort to achieve an effective treaty with the least possible delay.

In the eloquent statement of the representative of Poland, and again in the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union yesterday, there was much stress on the need to make some substantive progress here and now, if not on a complete treaty, then at least on its underlying principles.

But, is this really the path of progress? Is it agreed principles we lack, or is it rather the translation of agreed principles into effective, mutually-acceptable and legally-binding treaty provisions? Having two draft treaties before us, should we now turn back and argue over general principles?

What more do we need by way of a guiding principle than the unanimously agreed General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI) on this subject?² What more do we need than the agreement we all share that any proliferation of nuclear weapons would endanger the security of all States, and that it should be prevented for all time? This is now common ground for all of us. The difficulty arises when we move from such principles to their elaboration in concrete treaty provisions.

This is the real problem and it is well illustrated by the controversy over the concept of access. The Soviet delegate yesterday repeated his charge that the United States draft treaty would provide access to nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries.

This is simply not so. If the United States draft were adopted, no non-nuclear country could acquire nuclear weapons, national control over nuclear weapons, or the power itself to fire nuclear weapons. No such country could acquire access to information on

¹ Ante, pp. 378-381.
² Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 694.
how to manufacture nuclear weapons. And what could not be done
directly could not be done indirectly through a military alliance.
Furthermore, what could not be done in dealing with a non-nuclear
country could also not be done in dealing with nationals of such a
country. Finally, to close any so-called loopholes which might
conceivably be present, the treaty would ban any action which
would cause an increase in the total number of entities having inde­
pendent power to use nuclear weapons.

The United States is opposed to any form of dissemination of nuclear
weapons, direct or indirect. No proposal we have put forward for
the nuclear defence of NATO nations would provide access to nuclear
weapons, or to nuclear weapons manufacturing information, to any
non-nuclear country. Indeed, this has been prohibited by the funda­
mental atomic energy legislation of the United States since 1946.
There are those who have been less careful than the United States in
guarding against any action which might add to the number of
countries having nuclear weapons. It ill behooves them now to
criticize United States proposals and United States policy, which
have consistently been opposed to any proliferation.

In the Polish and Soviet statements of yesterday, much was also
made of an alleged effort on the part of the NATO countries to create
a sort of mixed category of States, to make some sort of exception
of these States and in particular of the Federal Republic of Germany.
My Government has made it crystal clear that we seek no exceptions
and that we seek no arrangement in NATO that would permit the
proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This being said, however, I am bound to point out to the represent­
atives of the Soviet Union and of Poland that it is not the United
States which has created a special situation in Europe. It is not the
United States which is seeking to perpetuate an unsound, unsafe and
unjust situation in Central Europe. It is not the United States which
has selected the countries of Western Europe, and especially the Fed­
eral Republic of Germany, as aiming points for hundreds of interme­
diate range nuclear missiles. This is what distinguishes these countries
from others, and this is the reason they seek effective arrangements
for their common defence.

If real progress is to be made, we must turn to the difficult but nec­
ессary task of negotiation. Any attempt now to press for further
agreement on principles or guidelines in this large Committee is bound
to result in a reiteration of known positions. Such reiteration can
serve no useful purpose at this stage. On the contrary, we should
begin directing our efforts away from generalities and toward detailed
negotiations. That can best be done in the Eighteen-Nation Com­
mmittee.
It has come to my attention in the last few moments that there has now been tabled by the USSR a proposed resolution—subject to amendment, Sir, as you have indicated—which sets forth for approval here the substance of the operative paragraphs of the Soviet draft treaty. Obviously, this one-sided approach is not something which can help us to achieve agreement. I suggest a more useful approach would be to refer to the negotiators the problem of finding an agreed method by which we can truly progress to a halt in the threatening prospect of proliferation of nuclear weapons. That is why—in the draft resolution we circulated yesterday—we have proposed the reconvening, as early as possible, of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give special priority to continued efforts to reach agreement on a treaty, and to agree on other related steps to halt and turn back the nuclear arms race.

Contrary to the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union yesterday, we do not regard this as a sort of game, the object of which is to bounce this problem back and forth between the General Assembly and the Eighteen-Nation Committee. We believe that progress was made at the last session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament as a result of the tabling by the United States of its draft treaty and the clarification of views which was achieved in discussing that treaty. Progress is also being made in this Committee. As I have already said, the tabling of a Soviet draft treaty represents a further step forward and our discussion here has further clarified the positions of many Governments.

The basis is now being established for a meaningful and, we hope, definitive negotiation. For its part, the United States will miss no opportunity and spare no effort to advance and facilitate the process of negotiation until the agreement we all want becomes a reality.

News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Rusk [Excerpts], November 5, 1965

Q. Mr. Secretary, what place in the priority of American current foreign policy do nonproliferation and the NATO nuclear organization really occupy?

A. Well, I think the attempt to draw some priorities between these two matters is a fruitless and misleading attempt. On the one hand, we feel that it is an urgent matter to get on with the problem of the

1 Ante, pp. 499-500.
2 Ante, pp. 443-446.
3 Ante, pp. 498-499.
proliferation of nuclear weapons. We have submitted a treaty in Geneva, which would accomplish that purpose, if everyone would adhere to it. This is a matter which cannot wait too long, because the possibilities of proliferation exist and there are those who might be tempted to go down the road of additional national nuclear forces.

Now, the reason I say that priorities between that purpose, which is an urgent one, and NATO nuclear arrangements is false is that I know of no discussions of nuclear arrangements in NATO which involve proliferation. I know of no discussion of any arrangements which increase the numbers of national nuclear forces.

In other words, it is not necessary for us to accept charges made by others which have no reality or no content in them, particularly when they are made by those who would like to eliminate NATO, who would like to disrupt the relations between the United States and Western Europe, who would not like to see the Federal Republic on a basis of an equal partner in any arrangement.

So I think that we ought not to be misguided here by this false scent that has been dragged across the track of nonproliferation by any misunderstanding about what is being discussed in the nuclear arrangements in NATO.

Now, there is no discussion there that involves proliferation, particularly at a time when no one is willing to comment about what the nuclear arrangements are in the Warsaw Pact. We know there are weapons among the members of the Warsaw Pact that don't carry hand grenades. Everyone feels perfectly free to talk about the nuclear arrangements in NATO, and no one is willing to talk about the nuclear arrangements in the Warsaw Pact.

And so we don't accept the idea that a priority, as between these two important problems, is to be accepted or acknowledged. Both are important problems. Both need a solution. I think both can obtain a solution.

Q. Mr. Secretary?
A. Excuse me. All right, John [John Hightower of the Associated Press]?

Q. What did you mean in an earlier answer about nuclear arrangements in the Warsaw Pact? Are there such arrangements? Is there information on some system which exists there?
A. I was just pointing out that, whatever they are, they are secret. And everybody feels perfectly free to talk about whatever arrangements we have in NATO because given the nature of our governments in NATO and the openness of our societies and our policies, NATO arrangements are up for public discussion. And I haven't heard any public discussion of nuclear arrangements in the Warsaw Pact. I just

1 Ante, pp. 347-349.
don't know what they are. I could guess, but the point is that they are not a matter of public information to be subjected to public discussion.

Q. Do you think there is some system which is comparable to what has been talked about for the Atlantic alliance?

A. I just don't know. I don't know. But I think it's interesting that I don't know.

Q. Mr. Secretary, were you saying that continued integration in NATO is absolutely essential if our troops are to remain there?

A. Well, you will forgive me if I speak for the moment as an ex-chief of war plans in a theater of war. With these troops in the heart of Europe, there is a certain de facto impulsion toward integration of strategy and command and arrangements and logistics and all sorts of things. So that we are in perhaps a special situation—certainly we are the largest country that has forces in Europe outside of our own territory. So this is something that is required, it seems to us, by the operational necessities of the situation.

Therefore, we are not inclined to go into this purely as a theoretical matter. There are some very practical problems that need an answer, and the integrated arrangements seem to us to take care of those practical problems.

Q. Well, we have other weapons systems that are assigned, rather than integrated, under NATO. Are you suggesting that the troops, as such, could not work under such system?

A. Well, this is a very tenuous and hypothetical difference. The troops that are there are there against the contingency they might have to be employed. And, if they have to be employed, then certain other things follow. And we are just interested in seeing that these things are kept in a reasonably tidy fashion and that we not find ourselves in complete confusion at a moment of crisis.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Secretary General of NATO, Mr. Manlio Brosio, said on the 4th of October, I think, that, "The right of Germany to shape its own destiny should be reflected in nuclear arrangements." Do you agree to that statement, and, if so, what can it possibly mean?

A. Well, I think that a country like the Federal Republic, which is sitting on the target of hundreds of Soviet missiles, can be expected to be curious about what is happening in the nuclear field and, therefore, that they are interested in the nuclear arrangements in NATO, interested in the nuclear defenses of NATO, interested in nuclear policy, nuclear arrangements. And, therefore, we are trying to work out a nuclear arrangement in NATO which meets these elementary needs.

This problem would never have arisen had hundreds of Soviet missiles not been produced and been placed in target on Western
Europe. That is what has given rise to this problem. It is not something that was invented in the West. It was in direct response to the changed circumstances in the nuclear situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the nonproliferation question, do you consider it is possible to have, or to offer, an American or an American-Soviet-British guarantee against nuclear blackmail to third countries that might have some effect on this problem?

A. Well, this is a very complicated question which is being studied, as you undoubtedly know, very thoroughly. I wouldn't want to comment on what the possibilities might be. I have a feeling that joint guarantees of the sort that you describe would not be completely reassuring to some nations who may feel that they would be subject to nuclear blackmail. But I just wouldn't want to go down that path very far because we are studying it, and I don't have an answer to suggest at this moment.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on nuclear defense, do you think there is any likelihood that an agreement can be reached short of creating some new hardware force for the West that would be satisfactory?

A. Well, let's see. We have the MLF proposal before NATO. We have the British ANF proposal before NATO. These matters will be discussed further among the NATO countries. Let's let that take its course and have these discussions grapple with these questions. I wouldn't want to give you a categoric answer to that. Certainly, we are confronted—NATO is confronted—with nuclear hardware on the other side, and our nuclear defenses are very much involved in problems of hardware.

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I go back to your answers on the Warsaw Pact with relation to nuclear weapons? I understand that you say that you don't know what arrangements they may have. But I am wondering if it is fair to turn your statement around the other and obvious way and say that you think that it is possible that the East European satellites may under some arrangement have some voice in Soviet nuclear strategy?

A. No; I am not saying anything more than what I said earlier. I don't want to embroider that. I am pointing out that a good many people seem to think that it is perfectly natural for the Soviet Union to be included as a party in discussing nuclear arrangements in NATO, and that I find a most extraordinary point of view—where there has been no public disclosure or participation by anyone else in whatever the arrangements are in the Warsaw Pact, for example, and when the basic attitude of Eastern Europe toward NATO is, shall we say, unenthusiastic. I don't consider the Soviet Union as a party to the discussion of arrangements in NATO.
Statement by the U.A.R. Representative (Fahmy) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, November 8, 1965

As the general debate on the item which is at present before the Committee is coming to a close, I have the honour and privilege, on behalf of the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, to introduce formally the joint draft contained in document A/C.1/L.339. Before doing so, it is pertinent to make the following general remarks. First, that in spite of the fact that the joint draft is an initiative of the eight Powers, it is the result of thorough and long negotiations, which made it possible to have an agreed draft which we hope will gain the overwhelming support of the members of the Committee.

Secondly, while the eight Powers in their contacts have no doubt benefited from the advice, constructive suggestions and proposals of many countries, extensive and almost daily negotiations took place and, particularly, with the United States and the Soviet Union.

Thirdly, this is a compromise resolution and, as you all know, any compromise resolution is not a perfect resolution and, undoubtedly, would gain from any further improvements. But, while admittedly it could be improved by further suggestions, these improvements or other proposals would, no doubt, upset the various delicate balance of the draft in its present form. So, because of this delicate balance, it is the fervent hope of the co-sponsors that the members of the Committee realize the hard and difficult task the co-sponsors would have if they were to start anew to accept any amendments. This, we hope, will not be construed as unwillingness on our part to respect the opinion of others or to accommodate them. Far from it.

Our fears are genuine that once we start on this path, there will follow a chain of amendments and I hope you will all agree that it is a rather late stage to start all over again.

Fourthly, the eight-Power draft, as it is before you, is in fact a compromise draft, even as far as the eight Powers are concerned; and, as such, it naturally does not spell out the basic positions of the co-sponsors.

Fifthly, after extensive negotiations with both the Soviet Union and the United States delegations, I can safely say that both delegations endorsed the draft as it stands.

1 A/C.1/PV.1373, pp. 3-25.
2 Identical with the resolution approved by the G.A. Nov. 19, 1965 (post, pp. 532-534).
Sixthly, the important point in our opinion is that, as a result of the adoption of this draft, negotiations should resume as urgently as possible, with a view to bringing about a treaty which genuinely prevents the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Now, we do not believe that the joint draft needs any interpretation; we believe it is, in fact, self-explanatory. As you look at the preambular paragraphs, you find that they are clear and take cognizance of almost all proposals, declarations, draft treaties, memoranda and General Assembly resolutions which have direct bearing on the problem.

One of the operative parts, and especially paragraph 1, “urges all States to take all steps necessary for the early conclusion of a treaty preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons”. I think this is a desire on which we all agree and for which we should work.

Operative paragraph 2 speaks of the basic principles which should constitute the framework of the negotiations when they are resumed in Geneva.

Paragraph 2 A is one of the main principles meant to ensure that a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would not permit nuclear and non-nuclear Powers to proliferate these weapons, directly or indirectly, in any form. If we really mean what we say, we do not believe that anyone can but support such a basic principle.

It is abundantly clear from the consensus of the general debate in this Committee that the very nature, scope and import of the treaty and the future of both nuclear and non-nuclear Powers make it necessary that the legal, political and other obligations arising from the treaty should constitute an acceptable balance of mutual responsibility and obligation between the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. It should represent a new era of partnership, of obligations and responsibilities. Otherwise, the treaty provisions would lack the main force necessary for its validity.

No treaty on non-proliferation should be drafted on the assumption that it takes care only of the interests of the nuclear Powers. This is what paragraph 2 B is meant to convey. I may add, at this stage, that the wide acceptance of this draft could be considered as the first step in implementing the spirit of paragraph 2 B.

As to paragraph 2 C, it is self-explanatory. However, it should be clear that a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself, but must lead to further steps towards the realization of general and complete disarmament, gradually dispensing with nuclear weapons in order to achieve complete nuclear disarmament.

Any treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has to be an effective instrument if it is really intended to be an instrument of peace. That is why, in paragraph 2 D, the joint draft resolution speaks of “acceptable and workable provisions” to be embodied in
the treaty to ensure its effectiveness. As members are aware, some of the ideas that may come to mind in this connexion are mentioned in certain proposals which are before the Committee. But this does not foreclose other ideas or proposals aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of the treaty.

Paragraph 2 E is really a desirable addition to the principles cited in paragraph 2. It complements them, and we believe that if it is respected and carried out it will doubtless add to the effectiveness of the treaty. It is, therefore, a very commendable principle supported by many delegations in this Committee.

For the reasons I have given, the co-sponsors fervently hope that the joint draft resolution commends itself to the members of the Committee and earns its wholehearted support. Having said that, I reiterate once again my appeal to those delegations who made suggestions or sought clarification to realize that, in the light of the stages through which the draft resolution went, the delicacy and probable results of any further dialogue on the various parts of the draft might give rise to different interpretations which, we are sure, would not serve any useful purpose.

If I may be permitted to do so, I should like to reintroduce the proposal previously made by Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico that, in the event of general and wide support for the joint draft, the Committee appeals to the delegations of both the United States and the Soviet Union not to press for a vote on their draft resolutions. If my appeal is heeded, only one draft will be before the Committee, namely the eight-Power draft contained in A/C.1/L.339. If we can agree on this point, and avoid asking for the floor once again, I formally move that we now proceed to the vote on the draft resolution, applying the relevant rules of procedure.

Before concluding, I would like to express, on behalf of my delegation and myself personally, our deep gratitude to all delegations for their co-operation and patience. I regret it if, in my desire to satisfy all the members of the Committee, I failed to accomplish my task in the best possible way. I would be failing in my duty, Mr. Chairman, if I forgot your efforts in providing me with valuable advice and guidance, which made this achievement possible. To the Secretary of the Committee and his colleagues I address a special word of thanks for the trouble they took to help me.

Finally, I hope that the members of the Committee will allow me on this occasion to end my statement with a quotation from my statement in this Committee on 22 October 1965:

An agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, if achieved, would be a real and basic contribution towards peace, towards paving the way to real disarmament, towards putting into effect the principles of peaceful coexistence.

1 Ante, pp. 347-349, 499-500.
and, lastly, towards building a world based on confidence and not on fear and suspicion.¹

Therefore, on behalf of the eight co-sponsors, I urge members of the Committee fully to support the joint draft resolution. If adopted by the Assembly, it will indeed be a victory in the mutual understanding of the gravity and urgency of the problem. Let us, then, adopt the draft resolution and proceed to further negotiations at Geneva as speedily as possible.

Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, November 8, 1965 ²

Before explaining my delegation's vote on the resolution just adopted,³ I should like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to those delegations whose patient and tireless efforts made it possible to obtain such an impressive degree of support for this important resolution. We congratulate them on the success of their efforts.

We particularly welcome the resolution’s appeal to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to reconvene as early as possible to give urgent consideration to the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty. Discussion here in New York which has culminated in this resolution will, I am sure, be an incentive to all of us in Geneva to reach early agreement. The consensus of this Committee that the negotiations should take place in Geneva, and soon, places great responsibility on those of us who will shortly reconvene at the conference table of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The United States delegation will return to Geneva with renewed determination to seek agreement on an effective treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Under these circumstances, the United States is prepared not to press its draft resolution to a vote if the Soviet Union will agree to do likewise.

I shall be brief, now, in explaining my delegation’s view of various provisions of the resolution which we were pleased to support. My first comment relates to operative paragraph 2 A of the resolution. We agree that the treaty should not permit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, in any form. We agree that there should be no loop-holes, and the United States draft treaty per-

¹ Ante, p. 487.
² A/C.1/PV.1373, pp. 37–41.
³ The resolution appears post, pp. 532–534.
As I stated to the Committee on 27 October, the United States draft treaty, if adopted, would not permit any non-nuclear country to acquire nuclear weapons, national control over nuclear weapons, the power itself to fire nuclear weapons, or access to information on manufacture of nuclear weapons. What could not be done directly would not be permitted indirectly, through a military alliance. Moreover, the United States draft treaty would bar any action which would cause an increase in the total number of entities having independent power to use nuclear weapons. No proposal that the United States has considered in NATO would place control of nuclear weapons, or information on their manufacture, in the hands of any non-nuclear country. We therefore consider operative paragraph 2 A to be compatible with the United States position, as it has been repeatedly and clearly set forth.

I have previously expressed to this Committee the conviction of my Government that a non-proliferation treaty is as much—and perhaps more—in the interest of the non-nuclear States as in that of the nuclear States. Nevertheless, we can appreciate the desire of many non-nuclear States to achieve a balance between obligations assumed by the respective parties in the framework of the treaty. As we understand operative paragraph 2 B, it seems directed essentially to the association of a non-proliferation treaty with the various related measures on which certain speakers have placed emphasis. The United States agrees that a non-proliferation agreement is not an end in itself, and that we must press forward with related collateral measures. My Government has a keen interest in this objective. It has proposed, and continues vigorously to advocate, a number of specific proposals for related measures. What is important is that we make progress where we can, when we can. We must be careful not to condition agreement on one measure or another, so that we achieve a complete impasse and block chances for any significant arms control and disarmament progress anywhere.

We would have preferred to see an operative paragraph 2 D which reflected more clearly the wide support voiced in this Committee for the IAEA or equivalent international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities. We regret that this was not possible.

In these brief remarks I have indicated our understanding of this resolution and our grounds for supporting it. The negotiations which will shortly resume at Geneva will be difficult; a successful outcome will depend upon the willingness of all participants to approach this task with the determination and goodwill which was so evident in our discussion here. This will be a vital negotiation, and the result could well affect the security of every country for years to come. A suc-

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1 See ante, pp. 347–349.
2 Ante, pp. 505–512.
cessful negotiation of an effective treaty may not, by itself, completely meet the security needs of all countries, and we are prepared to consider further what can be done to provide additional assurance. However, a non-proliferation treaty would be one of the most significant contributions we could now make towards international stability and peace. The United States will spare no effort to achieve it as soon as possible.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Fedorenko) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, November 8, 1965

The Committee has concluded its examination of one of the most important problems of the present session of the General Assembly, the question of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

There is no need to stress again the importance and urgency of this matter for the consolidation of peace and security in the world, since the discussion in our Committee is an eloquent testimonial to this fact of a practically unanimous recognition of the urgent need to conclude, as soon as possible, a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are convinced that, if we succeeded in reaching agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons after the Moscow Treaty—the partial test-ban Treaty—in space, in the atmosphere and under water, this would be a new, important step, contributing to the consolidation of peace and the solution of other international problems.

Of course, the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not a goal in itself; and the Soviet Union delegation shares the views of those who, quite justly, pointed out that such a treaty is a marker on the road to the liquidation of nuclear weapons and the so-called nuclear club, on the road to general and complete disarmament. Such an agreement could be an effective contribution to the cause of peace and strengthening of the security of peoples only if this agreement creates a real, not a supposed, barrier on the road to the spread of nuclear weapons under any guise.

The treaty, we are deeply convinced, must absolutely exclude any possibility of spreading nuclear weapons through any channels, apparent or secret; through the direct transfer of such weapons to non-nuclear States; through giving access to such weapons; or through collective controls over such weapons in the framework of a military alliance; or through any other means.

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1 A/C.1/PV.1373, pp. 61-70.
2 *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.
I avail myself of this opportunity to express our appreciation of the efforts of those who supported our proposal.1 At the same time, the Soviet Union delegation cannot but express regret that, because of the position of certain Powers, we did not succeed here, without further delay, in concluding an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We have just voted in favour of the draft resolution tabled by the non-aligned nations, members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.2 The Soviet Union delegation supported this draft resolution, whose contents speak for themselves. We see no special need to comment on this text, even less to comment on it in detail. We would merely like to point out that, in the decision we have taken, there is a clear indication that in the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons there should be no loop-holes which would permit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, in any form.

Of course, no statement made by anyone can alter the clear significance of this clause which means that it is essential to put an end to the spread of nuclear weapons, in any form, existing or possible, under any guise, including, for instance, access to such weapons on the part of West German revenge seekers through military blocks.

In the draft resolution, and now, in the decision which we have adopted, is found a clear indication of the desire of the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world to see a decision taken in the field of nuclear weapons to put an end, before it is too late, to the dangerous process of dissemination of nuclear weapons. In this connexion, it must be pointed out that the statement of the representative of the United States, which was made a few minutes ago,3 unfortunately, testifies to the fact that the United States strives, as it has done before, to be guided not by the need to conclude, as soon as possible, a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but is guided, above all, by the interests of the military NATO bloc. This follows clearly from the statement made today by the representative of the United States in this Committee when he again endeavoured to justify the position of the United States, especially the draft treaty of the United States on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,4 a draft, which as we have had to say many times, can not serve as a basis for an agreement, since it admits of the possibility of spreading nuclear weapons in their most dangerous form. This statement was, obviously, motivated by an unwillingness to facilitate the solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

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1 Ante, pp. 443-446.  
2 Post, pp. 532-534.  
3 Supra.  
4 Ante, pp. 347-349.
This is due not to the content of the draft resolution, but motivated rather by internal political considerations.

At today’s meeting of the Committee, we heard several representatives state that it was indispensable to achieve general and complete disarmament and, not only a treaty on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which, according to them, has no importance in itself. In our view, there is no justification for opposing an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to the solution of general and complete disarmament. Such a way of putting the question, which is tantamount to adopting the position of all or nothing, is not in the interest of our cause, it does not contribute to our progress, although, of course, we do not wish to cast any doubts on the intentions of those who made such statements; we merely wish to analyse objectively the meaning of such a thesis. The fact remains that the importance of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, without any doubt, would be such that it would be an important step towards general and complete disarmament, a way of moving closer to a solution of this most important problem of our times. Here, we would like to stress that it is necessary to evince patience and to be consistent in our common efforts.

The Soviet delegation has taken note of the efforts of the non-aligned countries in their search for a compromise solution, especially the efforts of the ambassadors of the United Arab Republic, India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Burma, Mexico, Brazil and Sweden, as well as the Rapporteur of the First Committee, Ambassador Fahmy. For its part the Soviet delegation, taking into account the fact that the Committee has unanimously adopted the draft resolution put forward by the eight non-aligned countries, is ready not to insist on a vote on the draft resolution tabled by the delegation of the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that the Soviet Union will continue to bend every effort in order to reach a speedy agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in order to prohibit and liquidate all stocks of nuclear weapons, in order to reach general and complete disarmament.

Statement by Chancellor Erhard to the Bundestag [Extract], November 10, 1965

TRANS-ATLANTIC SECURITY NEEDS

Germany cannot defend herself on her own; but without Germany Europe cannot be defended either. Europe cannot safeguard its free-
DOM without America, while America’s freedom is ultimately dependent on the defence of Europe.

The Federal Government has at all times regarded general and controlled disarmament as one of its principal objectives. We reaffirm this once again and declare our readiness to support all those international endeavours which bring the world closer to this aim.

But let us not deceive ourselves: Disarmament alone is not a panacea for the restlessness of nations, for tension and conflict shaking the world. As long as suppression and aggression in their most varied forms such as, particularly, the use of force, have not been eliminated from this world, freedom-minded countries must be in a position to defend themselves effectively. For this reason disarmament policy as the Federal Government sees it must go hand in hand with a policy aimed at removing the sources of tension and unrest. The real aim, greater security for ALL, would otherwise not be attainable.

A general disarmament programme must be comprehensive in a threefold sense: It must include nuclear as well as conventional armament; it must bind all countries that matter; and it must not discriminate against any country.

Another fundamental demand which the Federal Government as, in fact, many governments raise is that any disarmament measures must not cause any global or regional shift in the balance of power. And thirdly: It must be an over-all programme, even if this can only be carried out in stages.

The Federal Government is prepared to examine all proposals as to whether they are attended by political progress or conducive to such progress. We shall make energetic efforts to ensure that no system of disarmament, relaxation or security measures is established on the concept of a divided Germany, thus aggravating the partition of our country.

**NATO as Basis**

I would recall at this juncture that the Federal Republic of Germany in 1954 gave a voluntary undertaking to its allies to renounce the production of ABC weapons on its territory. We would welcome it if as many other countries as possible were to follow that German example. With this pledge we have fulfilled, eleven years ago, the essential element of any treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The North Atlantic Alliance has proved its worth. The enormous military power of our alliance has so far shielded Western Europe and will continue to do so. NATO is the basis of our defence policy.

Moreover it has for a long time been an important instrument of political consultation among the allies. In critical times NATO has also proved its political value. Its members have always spoken up in favour of German reunification in freedom.

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DETERRENCE THE AIM

However, in view of the developments in weapons technology NATO can only fulfil its task if even its peace-time organization is such that it will deter every opponent from venturing an attack or attempting blackmail. The ideas about the function of weapons as a means of politics have changed. To us and all peace-loving peoples they are, contrary to any former methods of pressure, no longer designed for war but to prevent war by their deterrent force. They are more and more becoming an instrument of political strategy directed towards peaceful conciliation.

The Federal Government believes that it is necessary for NATO to adjust itself to new political and military conditions. It is in particular necessary to solve such problems as result from the fact that some members of the alliance now have nuclear weapons while others have not. All allies should, however, be given a share in the nuclear defence, which should be in keeping with the extent of the danger threatening them and with the extent of the burdens they bear.

We are thinking in terms of a joint nuclear organization and we participate in relevant deliberations with the allied powers. We have repeatedly made known that we do not desire national control of nuclear weapons. We should, however, not be kept out of any nuclear participation simply because we are a divided country. The partition of Germany is an injustice. It must not be augmented by another injustice by making it more difficult for us—who are rendering substantial contributions to the Western alliance—to defend ourselves against the open threat from the East. Such views weaken the alliance and simultaneously encourage the Soviets to insist on the partition of our continent.

We enjoy special relations with the United States, Great Britain and France. These are not just explained by facts under international law or by political, economic or military conditions. Indeed they have, in a process of which we can all be proud, been developed over the years into bonds of friendship between the governments and the peoples.

The United States bears the main defence burden of NATO; it possesses an arsenal of nuclear weapons which is superior to that of the Soviets; it maintains moreover some 240,000 troops in Germany who are fully ready for action and who form an inalienable component of our joint defence. It has made a decisive contribution towards maintaining the freedom of West Berlin as well as access to that city. Our vital interests command us to co-operate closely with the U.S.A. politically and militarily.

However, let me speak in particular about Europe: The great plan of European union was, is, and remains the purpose of our policy.
The concept of, and the faith in, a united Europe has formed our political will and has given us hope. The old traditional European order does no longer stand up to the spirit and the demands of our present century. Alliances, treaties and individual arrangements in the old style will no longer do. A new, a united and great Europe must, along with the United States and the Soviet Union, acquire the standing that is in keeping with the historic, intellectual and cultural achievements of its peoples. Europe must take shape, politically, economically and militarily.

Developments over the past two decades have made us see even more clearly that this is the only chance for our old continent to be secured a world standing that will rest on a firm and durable foundation.

Nonaligned Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly: World Disarmament Conference, November 16, 1965

The General Assembly,
Mindful of the continuing interest and responsibility of the United Nations in connexion with the solution of the disarmament problem,
Reaffirming the paramount importance of disarmament for the contemporary world and the urgent need for the achievement of this goal,
Believing that it is imperative to exert further efforts towards reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament with effective international control with a view to securing lasting peace in the world,
Convinced that all countries should contribute towards the accomplishment of disarmament and co-operate in taking immediate steps with a view to achieving progress in this field,

1 A/C.1/L.340, Nov. 16, 1965. The resolution was sponsored by Algeria, Burma, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, U.A.R., Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia. These countries were later joined by the following co-sponsors: Burundi, Central African Republic, Cuba, Dahomey, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Rwanda. A revised version of this resolution was adopted by the G.A. on Nov. 29, 1965 (post, p. 585).
Convinced also that a world disarmament conference would promote the realization of general and complete disarmament,

Reaffirming the resolution DC/224, adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 11 June 1965, 1

1. Endorses the proposal adopted at the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cairo in 1964, on the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited; 2

2. Urges that the necessary consultations be conducted with all countries for the purpose of establishing a widely representative preparatory committee which will take appropriate steps for the convening of a world disarmament conference not later than 1967.

Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the First Committee of the General Assembly: World Disarmament Conference, November 18, 1965 3

The question of convening a world disarmament conference stems from the resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 98th meeting on 11 June 1965 which, inter alia, recommended that the General Assembly give urgent consideration at its twentieth session to the proposal for convening such a conference. 4 It is pertinent, therefore, to recall the discussion that led to the adoption of that recommendation and the reasons why the United States abstained in the vote on that resolution.

On 9 June I stated in the Disarmament Commission that there were a number of considerations to take into account when examining the advisability of a world conference. 5 So far as the United States is concerned, I said then, the primary consideration is whether the convening of such a conference in foreseeable circumstances will in fact facilitate agreements on arms limitations and reductions which are possible now. For such agreements provide the only dependable steps to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

I said that we are far from convinced that this would be the result of a world conference. On the contrary, we are concerned lest, in the absence of positive indications that such a conference could produce

1 Ante, p. 253.
2 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 445.
4 Ante, p. 253.
5 Ante, pp. 241-244.
useful results, it would only impair the negotiations which are now possible—and indeed essential—in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and elsewhere.

We have read carefully, again, the debate at the Disarmament Commission and listened with close attention to the statements made so far in this Committee. I am bound to say that we are still not persuaded that a conclusive case has been made for convening the proposed conference under present and foreseeable circumstances. Let me, therefore, take this opportunity to restate my Government's position on this question.

The United States has consistently—in deed, as in word—demonstrated its readiness to take urgent and practical action to halt the arms race, to turn it back, and to reduce the dangers of armed conflict.

Our constant aim is to promote serious and responsible negotiations to that end. We agree with the special priority accorded by the Disarmament Commission, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and in turn by this Committee to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, while continuing to work toward the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament. In accordance with the non-proliferation resolution adopted by this Committee, the United States is determined to press forward in negotiations to achieve, as soon as possible, a treaty on non-proliferation, one to which we earnestly hope that all nations of the world can subscribe.

While seeking progress on non-proliferation, we attach equal importance to continued efforts to reach agreement on other, related steps to halt and turn back the nuclear arms race. To facilitate agreement, the United States has introduced new proposals and new elements of flexibility into its earlier proposals and positions. We have called attention to our willingness to take into account recent scientific progress in finding the basis for an agreement on a comprehensive test ban.¹ We have reiterated our desire for a verified freeze of the numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and our readiness, if progress is made on a freeze, to consider significant reductions in such vehicles.²

We believe the time is ripe for a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons and for the transfer to peaceful uses of agreed, sizable quantities of such material. In connexion with the latter, we have proposed the demonstrated destruction by the United States and the Soviet Union of thousands of nuclear weapons from their respective stocks.³

I have called these proposals once again to the Committee's attention to emphasize that the United States seeks the achievement

¹ See ante, pp. 434–435, 479.
² See ante, pp. 435, 479–480.
³ Ante, pp. 435, 480.
of concrete measures as soon as possible. We are prepared to negotiate seriously on such measures now, in Geneva, and elsewhere. I have recalled these proposals also because there seems to be a tendency on the part of some to feel that a Government’s desire to achieve progress in disarmament is somehow demonstrated by its willingness to participate in a world disarmament conference. As far as the United States is concerned, our desire to achieve progress has been demonstrated by concrete proposals.

The only relevant issue is whether such a conference is likely to facilitate the conclusion of those agreements which are now urgent and feasible, or would it delay them? Would such a large conference be able to deal constructively with the sort of technical and complex measures I have mentioned, or would its time be wasted in listening to polemics designed to exaggerate differences rather than to reconcile them?

Although the eighteen-nation forum has not yet made the progress we have all desired, its discussions have paved the way for several existing agreements. We are convinced that these discussions have also served to lay the groundwork for future agreements which would be instrumental in halting the arms race. As we have stated before, we are not aware that the participants in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament feel that their inability this year to achieve further agreements is due to the absence of one or more Governments, or that the difficulties they have encountered would disappear in the forum, if it were modified.

The question is whether a world disarmament conference in the foreseeable circumstances will help to resolve those difficulties. We doubt it. We continue to believe that such a conference could hamper the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and that nothing should be allowed to interrupt the process of negotiation there.

We are aware that many supporters of the world conference view it as a means of associating certain militarily significant States with future disarmament talks. All of us agree that if substantial progress toward general and complete disarmament is to be made, communist China must, at an appropriate stage, participate directly in the process of negotiation. But it is not at all clear that all States wish to enter into disarmament negotiations. Moreover, until such participation can be achieved on a constructive basis, we must continue our efforts to reach agreement on those urgent measures to which the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission and this Committee have rightly given priority—principally non-proliferation and related measures to halt and turn back the nuclear arms race.
Let me say here and now that my Government's reservations regarding a world disarmament conference are not based on any desire to keep communist China out of disarmament negotiations or out of a world disarmament conference; nor are they based on any unwillingness to participate with its representatives in meaningful talks that could advance the cause of peace and disarmament. On the contrary, we would welcome any serious indications of communist China's interest in promoting peace and disarmament. Indeed, we would be prepared to find appropriate ways to bring such indications to bear on the solution of current problems, be they problems affecting the restoration of peace in South-East Asia or problems involved in achieving arms limitations and reductions.

But where is the evidence that the Chinese Communists are prepared for serious disarmament discussions—let alone negotiations? The channels for discussion with communist China have remained open. Various Governments, including three nuclear Powers, are represented in Peiping. In addition, the United States has engaged in periodic talks with representatives of communist China in Warsaw over several years. To be precise, we have held 127 talks, thus far, in this continuing dialogue. These channels have elicited no evidence of serious interest by the communist Chinese leadership in halting the nuclear arms race or in other meaningful disarmament measures. Instead, they have confirmed their defiance of world opinion in starting atmospheric tests in the face of the Treaty banning such tests. Despite numerous appeals, some from the General Assembly, they have refused to subscribe to that treaty and continue openly to attack it.

I shall not take the time of this Committee to quote from recent Chinese communist statements recording their negative views on such questions as a comprehensive test ban and nuclear-free zones, or appearing to encourage nuclear proliferation by other nations.

Quite apart from communist China's attitude, there are many questions of organization, of procedure and of substance to be studied before Governments can be expected to reach decisions regarding their attendance at any such world disarmament conference. It is this factor which makes any decision to convene a conference inadvisable at this time, to say nothing of setting a date for such a conference. It would, for example, be necessary to have a clear understanding on such matters as the auspices under which such a conference would be held, where it would convene, when and for how long, what its agenda would be, how its secretariat services would be provided, how much it would cost, who would pay for it, and other questions of a similar character.

These are certainly not prior conditions, as the Soviet Union representative stated this morning. They are nothing more than the normal preparations for any conference.
Another major question that needs careful study is that of attendance at such a conference. As other speakers have pointed out, to say that all countries should be invited does not solve the problem. The establishment of a list of those to be invited would in itself be quite a task. It is clear that all Members of the United Nations and the specialized agencies must be invited, but the further question remains as to how to assure the actual participation of militarily significant countries. It would seem prudent, as one of the steps towards a world conference, to find ways to ascertain if communist China would, in fact, attend and make a substantive contribution. Under present circumstances, we see no particular purpose to be served by a conference which might add nothing to what we are able to accomplish in the United Nations.

If any world conference is to be held, it would seem absolutely necessary as has already been suggested by the representative of Canada, on 19 October, that some sort of preparatory body be created to examine the organizational and substantive issues involved and to report its recommendations to Governments. We are certain that many Governments share the view that they must reserve their decision regarding participation until they can study the recommendations for dealing with these many issues.

Unless careful preparations were made to assure that a world conference could meet in propitious circumstances, it would merely reflect discord and serve as a propaganda forum, thus worsening the atmosphere for negotiations. It could result in a hardening of positions, rather than in a wider measure of agreement.

The United States will give careful study to recommendations for dealing with such questions as the organization of such a conference, its agenda, finances and participation. Until such recommendations are available, however, we must continue to reserve our position regarding our participation.

As our experience teaches us, there is no shortcut to disarmament agreements, no easy device, and no panacea, but only hard work and the kind of dedication which has been reflected here in our discussions. Let us therefore insist on the same hard work in connexion with preparations designed to assure that any world conference would facilitate and not hamper progress in disarmament negotiations. Those preparations should be undertaken in a manner that would give the greatest confidence to all concerned. We cannot afford to risk a futile propaganda display that would dismay world opinion and set back the very goals we all wish to achieve.

I reserve the right to speak again later in the debate.
Saudi Arabian Amendments to the Nonaligned Draft Resolution on a World Disarmament Conference, November 19, 1965

1. Insert a new second operative paragraph to read as follows:

2. *Invites* the five major nuclear Powers to meet, formally or informally, within the next nine months at any place convenient to them in order to explore possible areas of agreement on world disarmament questions, as a prelude to convening a world disarmament conference;

2. Change the present operative paragraph 2 as follows:

3. *Urges* after due consultations among all States that a standing committee be established for the twofold purpose of (a) acting as a liaison between the said five nuclear Powers and lending its good offices to them when required; and (b) taking such steps as may be appropriate, in the event these Powers concur, for convening a world disarmament conference not later than 1967.

General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX): Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, November 19, 1965

The General Assembly,

Conscious of its responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for disarmament and the consolidation of peace,

Mindful of its responsibility in accordance with Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Charter, which stipulates that the General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to both the Security Council or to both

Recalling its resolutions 1665 (XVI) of 4 December 1961 and 1908 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963,

Recognizing the urgency and great importance of the question of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Noting with satisfaction the efforts of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic to achieve the

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2 A/RES/2028 (XX), Nov. 23, 1965. The resolution was sponsored by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, U.A.R. It was adopted by a vote of 93 to 0, with 5 abstentions (Cuba, France, Guinea, Pakistan, Romania).
3 Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 694.
solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as contained in their joint memorandum of 15 September 1965,¹

Convinced that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would endanger the security of all States and make more difficult the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Noting the declaration adopted by the Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first regular session, held at Cairo in July 1964,² and the Declaration entitled “Programme for Peace and International Co-operation” adopted by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964,³

Noting also the draft treaties to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons submitted by the United States of America⁴ and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,⁵ respectively,

Noting further that a draft unilateral non-acquisition declaration has been submitted by Italy,⁶

Convinced that General Assembly resolutions 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961 and 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963 aim at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Believing that it is imperative to exert further efforts to conclude a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,

1. Urges all States to take all steps necessary for the early conclusion of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

2. Calls upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give urgent consideration to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, to reconvene as early as possible with a view to negotiating an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, based on the following main principles:

(a) The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form;

(b) The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers;

(c) The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament;

³ Ibid., pp. 443 ff.
⁴ Ante, pp. 347–349.
⁵ Ante, pp. 443–446.
(d) There should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty;
(e) Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories;

3. Transmits the records of the First Committee relating to the discussion of the item entitled "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", together with all other relevant documents, to the Eighteen-Nation Committee for its consideration;
4. Requests the Eighteen-Nation Committee to submit to the General Assembly at an early date a report on the results of its work on a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

White House Statement on Nuclear Warheads for NATO Allies, November 22, 1965

1. As has often been stated we have made nuclear warheads available to our NATO allies but custody of all such warheads remains with the United States.
2. President Johnson is, and as Vice President was, fully aware of specific arrangements made by the Department of Defense with our NATO allies.
3. As has often been stated, no nuclear warheads on U.S. weapons or held in U.S. custody for our NATO allies can be used without specific authorization of the President of the United States.

Revised Saudi Arabian Amendments to the Non-aligned Resolution on a World Disarmament Conference, November 22, 1965

1. Insert a new second operative paragraph to read as follows:
2. Appeals to the major nuclear Powers to meet informally within the next nine months at any place convenient to them in order to explore possible areas of agreement on world disarmament questions, as a prelude to convening a world disarmament conference;

1 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 13, 1965, p. 939. The statement was made by Presidential Press Secretary Moyers.
2 A/C.1/L.344/Rev. 1, Nov. 22, 1965. The original Saudi Arabian amendments appear ante, p. 532. For the nonaligned draft resolution, see ante, pp. 526-527. The Saudi Arabian amendments were not voted on.
2. Change the present operative paragraph 2 as follows:

3. *Urges* after due consultations among all States through the Secretary-General or independently by direct or indirect contacts that a standing committee be established for the threefold purpose of (a) acting as a liaison between the major nuclear Powers and lending its good offices to them when required; (b) taking such steps as may be appropriate, in the event these Powers concur, for convening a world disarmament conference not later than 1967; and (c) reporting the results of their negotiations to the twenty-first session of the General Assembly.

Address by Secretary of State Rusk to the Second Special Inter-American Conference [Extract], November 22, 1965

... I would note the need to avoid within our hemisphere competitive arms races. Our resources are desperately needed for economic and social development. With all its imperfections, we are blessed by the most mature and reliable system for regional security and peacekeeping on the face of the planet. As military budgets are formulated, we should keep these facts before us—and the examples, past and present, of the burdens and consequences of all arms races.

Here I am not pointing a finger at my associates in the hemisphere, because these arms races are a frightful burden that we know deplete and divert resources away from the unfinished business of our own people, and I think we both feel that there is no field in which we ourselves would more readily advance than in the field of disarmament if we could find a way to move forward.

The experience of the Cuba missile crisis gave to the Western Hemisphere a heightened awareness of the need to control modern weapons and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. One of the initiatives that received added impetus in 1962 was the proposal to create a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. The United States has followed with keen and sympathetic interest the efforts of Latin American countries to work out agreed arrangements for excluding the proliferation, the stationing, or storage of nuclear weapons within the territory of Latin American states. We have noted the encouraging progress toward this end which was made during the current year at discussions in Mexico City. The United States believes the project of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America is constructive statesmanship

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1 *Department of State Bulletin*, Dec. 20, 1965, p. 994. The conference was held at Rio de Janeiro.

2 See *ante*, pp. 369-384.
in the best tradition of the hemisphere. We welcome the effort and would be glad to see it reach a successful conclusion.

Statement by Ambassador Goldberg to the First Committee of the General Assembly: World Disarmament Conference, November 23, 1965

I have followed with close attention the debate in the First Committee and, in particular, the discussion concerning the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference. Since we are now nearing a vote, I do not intend to take the Committee's time to restate the position of the United States in any detail.

As Ambassador Foster made clear in his statement of 18 November, the desire of the United States to achieve early progress in arms limitation and reductions, particularly in the nuclear field, has been demonstrated by a series of specific, concrete and practical proposals. These proposals are now before the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, and we strongly believe that nothing should be allowed to delay or interrupt the process of negotiation at Geneva. We have noted with satisfaction that the sponsors of the resolution now before us take the same view.

We have also stated frankly our reservations concerning the utility of a world disarmament conference convened in present circumstances. We maintain those reservations. But we also note, as the representative of Algeria pointed out yesterday, that the resolution now before us would, in effect, have us decide only in principle to convene a conference. The actual decision remains to be taken in the light of the results of the consultations and preparations called for in this resolution.

I should like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to the sponsors for having added a new operative paragraph 3 which assures that all countries will be kept informed of the results achieved by the preparatory committee. Although we still believe that the resolution could have been improved with a few other changes, we feel that the new operative paragraph 3 goes a long way to meet our concerns.

Let me turn now to the consultations called for by the second operative paragraph of this resolution with a view to establishing a preparatory committee. In normal circumstances we would expect

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1 A/C.1/PV.1381, pp. 5-7.
2 Ante, pp. 527-531.
3 Post, p. 585.
to see greater precision and more detail in an operative paragraph of this nature. We all understand, however, why the sponsors have preferred to formulate this paragraph in very general terms.

Nevertheless, this paragraph deals with a most important matter. As a number of speakers have already stressed in the debate in this Committee, a conference of the kind herein proposed must be carefully prepared if it is to have a reasonable chance of producing the constructive results we all seek to obtain. We are certain that many governments share the view of the United States that they must reserve their decision as to participation in the proposed world conference until they can consider the recommendations prepared by a preparatory committee concerning the agenda, timing, finances, participation and similar questions relating to the proposed conference.

As a number of speakers have also pointed out, a preparatory committee will also have to decide what is meant by the clause "to which all countries would be invited". It is clear that all Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies must be invited, but it remains to be decided what other countries would be invited.

As we have thought about the preparations required for such a conference, we have been struck by the elementary common sense underlying the approach taken by the representative of Saudi Arabia and reflected in his amendments. We believe that the essential point in his suggestion is that a small group should be asked to explore whether there is in fact a constructive basis for a world disarmament conference. We believe that this suggestion deserves careful consideration.

I wish therefore, on behalf of my Government and my delegation, to inform this Committee that the United States would be willing to participate in a small, initial group to explore areas of agreement on disarmament questions as a preliminary step in the preparations for convening a world disarmament conference.

There are, however, a number of well known difficulties in establishing a group along the lines suggested by the representative of Saudi Arabia, not the least of which is the fact that one of the participants which he proposed has stated that it would not be prepared to meet with that particular group. The representative of Saudi Arabia himself took cognizance of these difficulties in the changes he made yesterday in his proposed amendment. We believe, for our part, that it would be essential to add a few other countries to such a group. These might include several States which have major peaceful nuclear programmes, as well as several which have played leading roles in developing the idea for a world disarmament conference. We believe

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1 *Ante*, p. 532.
2 See *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 486–487.
3 *Ante*, p. 534.
that the results of an initial discussion in such a group would be helpful to the preparatory committee which would be established pursuant to the resolution now before us.

In view of the apparent desire of the sponsors of this draft resolution to avoid incorporating details which might prejudice the realization of its objective, however, we do not think it necessary to amend the present draft resolution to incorporate any specific reference to an initial exploratory group. This is a matter which could be arranged in the course of the consultations called for by the draft resolution. We wish to express our appreciation to the representative of Saudi Arabia for his valuable suggestions which, of course, are contained in the records of this Committee. We understand his reasons for not being inclined to press his amendments to a vote.

In conclusion, let me recall that in his statement of 18 November, Mr. Foster made it clear that my Government's reservations regarding a world disarmament conference are not based on our unwillingness to participate in meaningful talks with anyone if such talks could advance the cause of peace and disarmament. But we do insist—and I am sure that our insistence is understood—that a conference of this kind should be carefully prepared, and a decision as to our participation in such a conference will be made in the light of such preparations.

Since we have concluded, as is apparent from my remarks, that the draft resolution as it now stands before this Committee meets our major concerns, and taking into account the stated intention of its sponsors to insist on careful and thorough preparations—which are indispensable to the success of any conference which might take place—the United States will vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.340 as revised.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Tsarapkin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly:
Underground Test Ban, November 23, 1965

The Soviet Union has always been in favour of the prohibition of all tests of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons in all environments, since such a prohibition would be in the interests of the strengthening of peace and halting the armaments race. It goes without saying that nobody has any illusion, and everybody understands, that the prohibition of nuclear tests in itself cannot fully stop the armaments race or reduce the threat of a nuclear war to any considerable extent.

1 A/C.1/PV.1382, pp. 8-16.
At the same time, it is quite clear that the adoption of such a measure would have as a consequence a natural end to the perfecting of such weapons and to the dangerous radioactive fall-out in the atmosphere, under water, in space and also underground. The constant position of the Soviet Union in this matter can be seen, be it only from the fact that as early as 1955 the Soviet Union was the first among the nuclear Powers to propose that States possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons should, as one of the first measures, undertake to cease tests of such weapons.¹

The constant struggle of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving States, and the efforts of world public opinion, led to the conclusion, in August 1963, of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.² Thus, an important first step was taken towards the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. The representatives of over 100 States in the world have signed this document and undertaken solemnly to respect its provisions. Yet, the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, as was justly pointed out during the general political discussion in the General Assembly, as well as in our Committee, solved only part of the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

We may recall that in the preamble of the Treaty it is said that the participants wish to obtain the complete cessation of all nuclear weapons tests for all time. Despite the fact that since the signing of the Treaty over two years have elapsed, this provision remains unfulfilled. Up to the present time underground nuclear tests have not been prohibited, and the Soviet delegation could not but express its regret.

Our position on the question of the prohibition of underground tests is clear-cut and very precise. It has been stated in the memorandum of 7 December 1964.³

The Soviet Government is prepared to agree immediately to the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests on the basis of the use of national means of detection for control of the ban. Such a step would be in conformity with the interests of the consolidation of peace and the limitation of the arms race, and it would promote the achievement of the goal of prohibiting the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The prohibition of all types of tests, including underground tests, would serve as an obstacle to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

However, it goes without saying that this measure cannot play such a role if access to nuclear weapons is obtained by devious ways through military alliances. Would the prohibition of all nuclear tests, includ-

ing underground tests, serve any useful purpose as an obstacle to the further spread of nuclear weapons if the West German revenge-seekers obtained access to ready-made and tested nuclear weapons through their participation in the so-called multilateral nuclear force of NATO or through other methods? Of course not.

We note with satisfaction that the proposals of the Soviet Union concerning the prohibition of underground tests are being actively supported, just as were the proposals of the Soviet Union concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, by all countries supporting peace, disarmament and the relaxation of international tension.

Thus, I should like to repeat that the Soviet Union is ready to agree immediately to the application of the Moscow Treaty to underground tests of nuclear weapons.

In this connexion, I wish to remind the Committee that the Soviet Union supported the proposal made by the representative of the United Arab Republic in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva on 17 August 1965, that the Moscow Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water should also be applied to underground nuclear tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75, and that there should be a voluntary moratorium under which the nuclear Powers would refrain from any further underground nuclear testing pending agreement on the decision needed for a comprehensive test ban treaty.¹

On 7 October 1965, in the general debate during the twentieth session of the General Assembly, the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Riad, confirmed this proposal and stated:

We trust that those suggestions will receive due consideration during this session; for we believe that without the cessation of underground nuclear tests the Moscow Agreement will remain an unfinished endeavour.²

In addition to the position set out in our memorandum of 7 December 1964, the Soviet delegation is prepared to agree to a solution of this problem on the basis of the proposal of the United Arab Republic. Unfortunately, the solution of the problem of the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests is blocked by the position of the United States and its Western allies. It is that position which constitutes the only obstacle to the complete solution of this problem. The United States persists in its effort to obtain the right to send to the territory of the Soviet Union a group of foreign inspectors under the pretext of verifying suspicious underground occurrences. In its memorandum of 29 April to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the United States said that its requirement for on-site in-

¹ See ante, pp. 340–347.
² A/PV.1351 (prov.), p. 43.
spection to verify compliance with a ban on underground nuclear tests still existed.\(^1\) The Soviet Union cannot agree to this position.

It is well known that various States, including the United States, now have highly developed technological means of detecting underground nuclear explosions. These means should enable them to verify compliance with the agreement prohibiting underground nuclear tests without the need for any international inspection. The Soviet Union is ready to reach agreement along the lines I have indicated.

On the other hand, it is obvious that in present-day conditions, when there is no disarmament, the foreign inspection on which the United States insists would only serve the interests of those military circles which obstinately attempt to penetrate the territory of the Soviet Union in order to indulge in espionage. This attitude, of course, is unacceptable and is contrary to the cause of peace and the security of States.

At times we hear it stated that there should be scientific and technical discussions to determine the possibilities of control over underground tests.

The Soviet delegation has often pointed out that any proposal designed to revert to the status quo ante, to the old discredited attempts to approach the solution of this problem from a technical angle, could only complicate and obfuscate matters and indefinitely delay the solution of the problem of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests. It goes without saying that we cannot accept such ideas and proposals.

I must recall in this connexion that negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water for a long time yielded no results. We were in an impasse precisely because of divergent viewpoints concerning the question of inspection and control. A political approach was required to solve the problem and to bring about the signing of the Moscow Treaty. Now, two years after the signing of that Treaty, nobody has the slightest doubt that national means of detection are quite sufficient to ensure respect for the Treaty. There is not the slightest doubt that the Treaty is carried out and respected by all participants. It is necessary to follow this path, to apply the Moscow Treaty provisions to underground nuclear weapons tests and thus to solve the question of banning nuclear tests in the remaining environment which, as yet, is not included in the treaty.

The position which the United States still adheres to demonstrates that the United States is obviously not interested in ceasing underground nuclear weapons tests, that it intends to continue such tests and that it intends to continue the further perfecting of nuclear

\(^1\) Ante, p. 105.
weapons by underground tests. Such a position is contrary to the interests of peace and disarmament and contrary to the opinion expressed in the General Assembly and in our Committee that an end should be immediately put to the dangerous spread of nuclear weapons. The United States must revise its obsolete and unrealistic position. An agreement on the application of the Moscow test-ban Treaty to underground tests would afford the possibility of ending underground tests immediately and thus make possible a further important step forward towards a limitation of the armaments race.

We hope that at the present session of the General Assembly, a decision will be taken on this basis.

Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Underground Test Ban, November 25, 1965 ¹

Before I enter into my general remarks, Mr. Chairman, may I express to you, and through you to the representatives of Liberia and the United Kingdom, and all other members of the Committee, the appreciation of my delegation for your courtesy in allowing us some observance of one of our traditional holidays. I hope that others will enjoy it as well.

A comprehensive test ban is among the most important and, logically, should be among the more feasible of the related collateral measures to which so much attention was given in our earlier discussion of non-proliferation. A ban on the underground testing of nuclear weapons, following the limited test ban Treaty of 1963 banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water,² would fulfil an almost universal desire to ban all nuclear testing, in all environments and for all time. In halting all testing of nuclear weapons the nuclear Powers would be taking a significant step paving the way to other measures for halting and turning back the nuclear arms race. Nuclear and non-nuclear States alike, in subscribing to a comprehensive test ban, would be making an immensely valuable contribution to the efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. We are also not unmindful of the salutary effects which a comprehensive test ban could have in contributing to further easing of international tension and to the betterment of relations among Governments.

¹ A/C.1/PV.1385, pp. 52–62.
² Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 291–293.
In view of these general considerations, it is not surprising that the delay in achieving a comprehensive test ban agreement has given rise to a sense of frustration and even of irritation in some quarters. But it is not enough to will an agreement; we cannot simply overlook the technical obstacles.

There is certainly no other subject in the history of disarmament during the past decade that has received more study and attention than this problem of a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. My Government has played a key role in these developments and discussions, beginning with President Eisenhower's initiative of January 1958, which resulted later that year in the Soviet agreement to a technical conference on the question of the cessation of nuclear testing. Throughout that conference on the discontinuance of testing, throughout the negotiation of the limited test ban, and to this day, my Government has given exhaustive study to this problem. It is because we attach great value to a comprehensive test ban that we have continued to devote sizable resources to seismic research in order to improve our capability of detecting and identifying underground nuclear tests. Those members of this Committee who were among the representatives of United Nations Member States invited last month to the inauguration of our large-aperture seismic array in Montana were able to see and judge for themselves one direction which our research activity has been taking.

With the Committee's permission, I might briefly outline some of the aspects of the question of detection of underground tests—its promise and its limitations.

I shall avoid going into too much detail at this time. I might refer those delegations interested in a fuller description of the technical aspects to my statement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on 2 September 1965. However, it will perhaps make my subsequent remarks clearer if I do make one or two general observations at the outset.

What we are detecting by seismic means are simply earth tremors. It is by a complex process of interpretation of the data from seismometers regarding these earth tremors that we seek to determine whether the tremor resulted from natural causes—that is, an earthquake—and therefore could not be a man-made explosion. There is considerable variation in the geographic distribution of earthquakes, but some of the areas with the greatest number of earthquakes are located in a belt surrounding the Pacific Ocean, and another belt extends from the Kamchatka Peninsula to the Black Sea. Moreover, there is considerable variation from year to year in the number and size of earthquakes.

2 For the conference report, see *ibid.*, pp. 1090–1111.
This compounds the problem of singling out and positively identifying nuclear explosions from among those earth tremors that we can detect. Furthermore, some earthquakes produce seismic signals which cannot be distinguished from those produced by nuclear explosions. The strength of the seismic signal generated by a nuclear explosion also varies with the nature of the soil in which the underground nuclear explosion is contained. Those are some of the factors that complicate efforts at detection and identification of underground nuclear tests.

Since the Geneva Conference of Experts in 1958, the United States has been conducting a broad programme of research in seismology, the primary objective of which has been to develop improved techniques for detecting seismic events, for locating them and for identifying whether they are of natural origin. Our research programme has led to substantial increases in our knowledge of these matters which are basic to the problem of verifying a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

We have found that the use of large arrays of seismometers will improve our capability of separating out the background noise caused by continuous vibrations of the earth from the true signal emitted by a seismic event. Such an array comprises some 525 seismometers distributed in a certain pattern over a large area. That is the kind of array which is now in operation in Montana.

As I have said, seismic background noise tends to mask the signal emitted by a seismic event, and in the past has prevented us from detecting the smaller seismic events. If a system of ten to twenty such large arrays were to be established on a worldwide basis, then it would be possible to detect events which produce signals equivalent to nuclear detonations in the range of only hundreds of tons. Yet after an event has been detected it is necessary that we attempt to identify its cause.

Identification requires the recording of a larger seismic signal than is needed for detection purposes alone. By reducing the background noise and thus making the seismic signal clearer and more distinct, large arrays will aid in identifying seismic events. But, unfortunately, the recordings of some earthquakes are like those of man-made explosions. No technique is known at present which will permit the identification of explosions as such by seismic systems at remote locations—that is, at distances which might be involved with strictly national systems. However, a variety of techniques have been developed which allow us to identify those earthquakes which have characteristics most distinguishable from those of explosions. It appears to us that by using these techniques it will be possible to identify about 80 per cent of the natural earthquakes which produce seismic signals that correspond to yields above a few kilotons.

In the case of the Soviet Union, for example, the remaining 20 per cent of the natural events which could not be distinguished from
possible explosions would amount to an average of about forty-five events each year. While some of those might be further identified by the use of ocean-bottom seismometers, which would more accurately reveal the location and characteristics of the event, even with the use of these sophisticated techniques there would remain a substantial number of unidentified events in any year.

We know of no way to identify these remaining events short of some inspection at the site of the events. If the scientists of the Soviet Union, or of any other country, could demonstrate to us any satisfactory techniques for identifying these events without on-site inspection, they would be making a great contribution to our objective.

I have dwelt on those points in order to demonstrate why it is not possible to dispense with some on-site inspections. However, as I indicated at Geneva and subsequently reiterated earlier in the debate in this Committee, we are prepared to take current scientific capabilities fully into account in discussing the numbers and modalities of on-site inspections for verification of a comprehensive test ban. We warmly welcome the suggestion of eight members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, in their joint memorandum, that the nuclear Powers should exchange scientific and other information to facilitate agreement on a comprehensive test ban.\(^1\)

The representative of the United Kingdom stated the case for such talks convincingly when he spoke in this Committee yesterday. If there is disagreement on the technical potentials of seismic detection and identification methods between the Soviet Union and the United States—and there appears to be—then let our scientists sit down together and discuss this problem objectively. We regret that the Soviet Union has shown no interest whatsoever in doing so.

The Soviet Union has argued that we must follow the principle of the limited test-ban treaty, which contains no explicit provision for international control. We suggest, on the contrary, that the limited test ban has indeed vindicated the position that international obligations in the arms control and disarmament field should be accompanied by appropriate measures of verification. The nature of the measures will depend on what is to be controlled. Such measures may be national or international, but the point is that verification is clearly necessary.

The limited test ban applied to those environments where means of verification which were perfectly appropriate could be developed adequately on a national basis. This unfortunately is not so in the case of underground testing, where some other form of verification must be devised. It need not be unacceptably intrusive. And,

\(^1\) *Ante*, pp. 425-426.
contrary to continued Soviet allegations, it would not have any purpose for espionage, notwithstanding the seemingly chronic sensitivity of the Soviet Union on this point.

What is involved is permitting a small inspection team to go to a given site and to determine whether an unidentifiable event was due to a nuclear explosion or to natural causes, that is, an earthquake. The Soviet Union, which a few years ago was prepared to agree to a certain number of on-site inspections, has since refused to agree to any inspections at all, claiming that national control measures alone were adequate.

Yet some on-site inspections are essential if parties to a comprehensive test ban are to have adequate assurance that all parties are also fully complying with it. It would seem to be in the interest of all parties to ensure that a comprehensive test ban is a lasting and viable agreement. Any agreement that could not allay—and that might even stimulate—distrust and suspicion would be a tenuous and potentially short-lived agreement.

We believe these difficulties are surmountable and that an effective comprehensive test ban agreement can be achieved. It is always tempting to look for shortcuts. One such shortcut is the suggestion for an unverified moratorium on underground tests. We have already had one understanding regarding the suspension of underground testing and the Soviet Union started testing again in spite of official statements that it would not be the first to do so. We are not inclined to repeat that unfortunate experience.

Moreover, a moratorium might diminish pressure for the stable and permanent comprehensive test ban we all seek. The breaking of a moratorium would hardly create conditions conducive to the subsequent negotiation of a comprehensive test ban. For these reasons, a moratorium on underground testing is unacceptable to the United States.

Where then does the path to agreement lie? In our view it lies in demonstration of flexibility on both sides—the United States and the Soviet Union. My Government, as I have stressed, has expressed its willingness to exercise flexibility regarding the position it took in the past and remains prepared to negotiate. We call on the Soviet Union to do likewise.

In a previous statement before this Committee I noted that only last month President Johnson stated:

The nuclear test ban Treaty of 1963 represents real progress and we are continuously trying to move forward to a comprehensive and lasting ban on the testing of nuclear weapons.\(^1\)

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\(^1\) *Ante*, p. 466.
My Government does not take lightly the commitment it subscribed to in the preamble to the limited test ban Treaty. The parties thereto vowed to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. They expressed their determination to continue negotiations to that end. The United States will return to Geneva with the strong determination and hope that renewed negotiations will prove possible and lead to early agreement on a verified, comprehensive test ban.

I reserve the right of my delegation to make a further statement at the time of the vote.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Tsarapkin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Underground Test Ban, November 26, 1965

I would like to make a few statements in connexion with the remarks made yesterday by the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster. Also, so as not to speak again, I would like to take this opportunity to speak about the resolution.

The delegation of the Soviet Union on 23 November stated its position on the question of the suspension of all nuclear and thermonuclear tests. We noted, with satisfaction, that most delegations speaking in the debate pointed out the urgent need for the banning of all nuclear and thermonuclear tests, stressing, thereby, that such a ban would strengthen the peace and help to put an end to the armaments race. Our position on the question of the cessation of underground tests was explained not only in our remarks last time, but it was also clearly explained in a number of official statements of the Soviet Union Government.

We are suggesting the banning of subterranean tests by means of the use of national detection techniques. The past two years' experience since the Moscow Treaty shows that such national detection techniques are both realistic and effective.

Unfortunately, the United States position and that of other western Powers make it impossible, at this stage, to settle the issue of the banning of these underground tests. In order to put an end to all possibilities of agreement on the subject of the banning of underground tests, the

1 A/C. 1/PV.1386, pp. 31-46.
2 Supra.
4 Ante, pp. 538-542.
5 Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 291-293.
representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, more or less in passing referred to the proposal regarding the suspension of all nuclear and thermonuclear tests. Mr. Foster rejected it on the pretext that this was tantamount to a moratorium and the establishment of a moratorium on underground tests was something to which the United States could not agree.

Now, in connexion with this moratorium problem, I should like, by way of a reply to the representative of the United States—and also to those who supported his position—to introduce a point of clarity in the trend of events to which he saw fit to refer yesterday. Objecting to the proposal of the Thirty-Four Powers regarding the immediate suspension of underground tests, Mr. Foster said:

We have already had one understanding regarding the suspension of underground testing and the Soviet Union started testing again in spite of official statements that it would not be the first to do so. We are not inclined to repeat that unfortunate experience.\footnote{Supra.}

To these remarks of Mr. Foster, we should, first of all, say the following: There was no formal understanding between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States on such cessation; there were unilateral declarations on the part of the Government of the United States\footnote{See Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, vol. II, pp. 1112, 1221.} and the Union of Socialist Republics,\footnote{The U.S.S.R. announced on Mar. 31, 1958, that it was unilaterally suspending tests (ibid., pp. 978-980), but it resumed testing in Sept. 1958 and continued until Nov. 1958. No further Soviet tests were announced until 1961.} made at different times in the autumn of 1958, regarding the suspension or rather a moratorium on nuclear tests. Of course, these declarations on a moratorium were mutually dependent on one another. In other words, the refusal or rejection of this moratorium by one party released, of course, the other party from its own obligations regarding such a moratorium.

Now, let us see how the history of this moratorium evolved. Three or four months had barely passed since the proclamation of the United States on nuclear tests when the Joint Chiefs of Staffs of the Armed Forces of the United States approved plans for the holding of nuclear tests in Nevada and in the southern part of the Pacific Ocean. It is obvious that such action on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was contrary both to the letter and to the spirit of the United States declaration regarding a moratorium on nuclear tests. The representative of the Soviet Union at the three-Power Conference in Geneva on the cessation of nuclear tests drew attention to this aspect of the case, at the sixty-first meeting, in February 1959.\footnote{GEN/DNT/PV.61, pp. 29-30.} Six months later, in August 1959, at the one hundred and twentieth meeting, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, at the three-
Power talks, drew the attention of the representative of the United States and the representative of the United Kingdom to the statement of Mr. McCone, the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission and of the Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee, Senator Anderson, who stated quite unambiguously that the United States was proposing to undertake every type of nuclear test—underground, in outer space and in the atmosphere.¹

In accordance with these statements on the part of these representatives and of Congress, it was obvious that the United States declaration on an alleged moratorium was merely a manoeuvre designed, not to put an end to nuclear tests, but merely to save time in order to prepare new, even more intensive efforts.

This can also be seen from the fact that after the moratorium declaration by the United States and at a time when the representatives of the United States in Geneva were conducting negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests, the United States Atomic Energy Commission allocated many tens of millions of dollars in order to finance the preparation of nuclear test sites on the Eniwetok, Bikini and other atolls. The end of the story is that a little more than a year after the United States proclaimed a moratorium, on 29 December 1959 President Eisenhower of the United States made a statement in which he announced that from 31 December 1959 the United States would consider itself free from any undertaking under the so-called moratorium, or rather, relieved of these undertakings.²

With this statement by the President of the United States, the moratorium was liquidated, and the United States was merely waiting for the appropriate moment to put an end to it. Thus you see, Mr. Foster, the facts show that if you choose to talk about the "unfortunate experience", you must seek the culprits in your own ranks. The USSR had absolutely nothing to do with this. Following the rejection of the moratorium by the United States, the USSR was of course completely free to take whatever action it chose, and therefore Mr. Foster's remark to the effect that the United States was not inclined to repeat this unfortunate experience is totally irrelevant and can in no way serve as an argument in justification of the refusal of the United States to accept the proposal for an immediate cessation of underground tests.

In addition to this reference to the so-called unfortunate experience—and an unfortunate reference it was—Mr. Foster used yet another rather odd argument to justify the United States rejection of the 34-Power proposal when he stated that the proposal is unacceptable to the United States because it represents what he calls a shortcut to a more comprehensive test-ban agreement. But it is the specific

¹ GEN/DNT/PV.120, pp. 4-7.
virtue of this proposal and certainly not a fault that it does represent a shortcut to the desired goal. I suggest that this argument was as incomprehensible to everyone as it was to me.

The third argument used by Mr. Foster is that this proposal “might diminish pressure for the stable and permanent comprehensive test ban we all seek”. We suggest exactly the opposite: the adoption of this proposal for the immediate cessation of underground testing would act as a powerful catalyst in accelerating the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban, and all obstacles which have delayed such an agreement would disappear. One of the principal obstacles is the attempt of manufacturers of nuclear devices to retain underground testing in order further to perfect them.

From the arguments put forward yesterday by Mr. Foster we can see that the United States has absolutely no serious justification of its refusal to accept an immediate ban on underground testing. In his statement, the representative of the United States joined his British colleague in NATO in rehashing an almost eight-year-old argument. Once again he made it known that as a reward for United States agreement to an underground test ban, his country demanded the right to send foreign inspection teams to any part of the Soviet Union where, in their view, nuclear testing was suspected. The United States, by insisting on international control of inspection, is in fact attempting to force acceptance of its age-old idea of control without disarmament. This idea has been emphatically rejected by the Soviet Union because such control could not be separated from espionage; it would in fact become espionage.

While reiterating this position, the United States does not take into account the fact that even in the absence of a comprehensive agreement on general and complete disarmament, it is frivolously—and without weighing the consequences—resorting to force of arms in its relations with other States. At a time when international tension is growing, when the nuclear arms race has intensified, when the threat of a thermonuclear war is becoming ever greater, an agreement on the banning of underground tests could be reached only on the basis of the use of national controls over the implementation of that agreement.

It is on that level that the problem was solved in the Moscow Treaty, with respect to control over tests in the three media subject to that ban: under water, in outer space and in the atmosphere. The solution with respect to an underground test ban through the use of national controls seems all the more reasonable since national means of detection and identification over a period of years have already proved effective over extensive areas.

Such an approach to the problem is also valuable in that it offers none of the parties any military advantage and does not infringe upon their State security, which is of course essential. Under present...
conditions such an approach to this issue is not only reasonable, it is the only possible one if there exists a sincere wish to reach agreement, rather than to obstruct.

In view of the foregoing, the Soviet delegation would like to say a few words regarding the 34-Power resolution. We should like first of all to pay a tribute to the tireless efforts of the non-aligned States which, over a period of many years, have been seeking to put an end to all nuclear testing, including underground tests. These efforts have gone hand in hand with those of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, which also seek the extension of the Moscow Treaty banning testing in three media to provide a further ban on underground tests, so that at last we might put an end to the dangerous race to perfect existing weapons and devise horrendous new ones.

Although these efforts have been pursued for some years now, unfortunately, they have always met with the persistent refusal of the United States to agree to a ban on the last remaining type of tests—underground tests. Yesterday we all heard the representative of the United States say that the proposal is not acceptable to his Government. The Soviet Union—and I should like to emphasize this once more—wholeheartedly supports the proposal to put an end to all types of tests, including underground tests. This is why operative paragraph 1 has our full support even though we regret the deletion of the word “immediately” or “forthwith”. However, this point was clarified by the representative of Sweden. He and the representative of the United Arab Republic stated today that the goal sought in operative paragraph 1 is immediate suspension of all types of tests.

We also support operative paragraph 2 in which the General Assembly calls upon all countries to respect the spirit and the provisions of the Moscow Test Ban Treaty. Concerning the matter of controls, we might say that this paragraph implies the use of national detection and identification techniques such as are envisaged in the Moscow Treaty, that is to say, without reference to international control and inspection.

However, operative paragraph 3 causes serious misgivings on our part. I could even say it gives rise to suspicions; it does not state that the provisions of the Moscow Test Ban Treaty should be extended to underground tests. It appears to be seeking some new kind of treaty, some new type of arrangements regarding the effective banning of nuclear weapons tests. On this subject we all know the views of the United States and its Western partners, of course. With this in mind, we feel that operative paragraph 3 as now worded could give the Western Powers leeway to continue to sabotage all efforts to ban underground tests. In it the United States and its NATO partners could find justification for flaunting its demand for inter-
national controls and inspection. If they can do this they will be able to postpone indefinitely the drafting of any agreement. Using this paragraph as an excuse, they may try to drown this whole question of banning underground tests in a morass of endless, completely fruitless technical discussions—a tactic at which they have been very successful in the past.

That is why we cannot agree with the terms of operative paragraph 3, in its present form. We consider it superfluous, in this wording; its inclusion in the resolution may prove a harmful deterrent to the achievement of the purpose of the resolution.

We also have a few misgivings about the preamble but we have already mentioned these, so we shall not repeat them again now.

For all the reasons just stated, our delegation will not be able to support this draft resolution. In order to bring to a speedy end all nuclear testing, the Soviet delegation has stated that it is prepared to solve this problem on the basis of the proposal of the United Arab Republic, which is known to all. We refer here to the threshold moratorium proposal. We regret that the Western Powers failed to express any interest in this proposal and therefore no more was heard of it.

The difficulties which face us when we come to draft concrete proposals aiming to solve the problem of the immediate banning of underground tests are a direct result of United States policies. These policies, as we all realize, consist in retaining freedom of action on the part of that Power, to enable it to perfect existing weapons and devise new ones. To be able to do this, the United States must be in a position to control the effectiveness of these new and perfected types of nuclear weapons. This means that they must be able to test them. If the United States really favoured an effective test ban, there is a clear path open to them. We must put into practice the proposal which has been made—and not merely express disapproval on the basis of assumptions or guesswork—that the use of national detection and national identification techniques gives countries assurance that the treaty will be respected. After all, in 1963 the Western partners—the United States, first and foremost—did have enough commonsense and goodwill to overcome their suspicions and doubts to refrain from insisting on international control and inspection concerning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. They did sign the Moscow Treaty, which mentions only national detection and identification methods. This Treaty has been in effect for the past few years and no one has any doubts about its being respected by the parties who signed it.

Yet do not all of us remember the insistent demands which were made regarding the need to establish international detection and control, and how vociferous these demands were? They were made
by Western experts and representatives during the negotiations on the banning of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Yet, we have been able to do without them. Practice has shown that national supervision of control and detection are completely adequate for checking each other's compliance with an agreement. We must apply this principle to underground tests also. It is better to have an agreement about which one has a few doubts and to let time, experience and practice smooth the way, putting our trust to the test to prove whether it was justified or misplaced.

Of course, it is far better, far safer for the peoples of the world to have such an agreement with assumed or imagined shortcomings than to reject it, as the United States is now doing, with all the dangerous consequences it may entail.

We are addressing a pressing appeal to the United States to review its obsolete, unrealistic position and to cease insisting upon the establishment of international control and inspection. Such insistence will lead nowhere. We appeal to the United States to show its good will and to agree to the proposal for an immediate end to nuclear tests on the same basis underlying the Moscow Test Ban Treaty in 1963.

It is our hope that the United States will hear this appeal and make it possible for a step to be taken forward along the road to the restriction and reduction of the armaments race.

Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Suspension of Nuclear Tests, November 26, 1965

I regret the necessity of responding to the remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union.

First and foremost, I should like to correct one statement in which he said that the statement by President Eisenhower in December 1959 was the end of the story in connexion with the unilateral undertakings by the United States and the Soviet Union. I think he has neglected to recall that on 14 January 1960, the then Chairman, Mr. Khrushchev, stated:—and this, mind you, is less than three weeks after the statement of President Eisenhower's just referred to by the representative of the USSR.

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1 A/C.1/PV.1386, pp. 46–47.
2 Supra.
I would like to re-emphasize that the Soviet Government . . . will continue to abide by its pledge not to renew experimental nuclear explosions . . . if the Western Powers do not start testing atomic and hydrogen weapons.¹

I think everyone in this room will recall that the Western Powers did not renew testing such weapons until the Soviet Union had commenced testing theirs on 1 September 1961. They did this at the very time that the representative of the Soviet Union was pressing, in a disarmament conference, for a threshold treaty and a moratorium.

It was an unfortunate experience, as he said, and as I said yesterday.² It was a very unfortunate experience, not only for the United States, but for the whole world, since that most extensive series of tests ever undertaken continued in spite of the cries for cessation from the General Assembly and from all the members of this body.

I think also that certain statements by military and other individuals in the United States to which he referred were taken out of context. It is true, in the world today, that the United States and the Soviet Union must maintain, for security purposes, preparations for defence. The President of the United States is the only one who can call for testing or for the use of nuclear weapons, and in no case did he change and call for such tests until after the Soviet Union had done so.

One further point. The Soviet representative has referred to our emphasis on not taking shortcuts. We are perfectly willing to take shortcuts if they are on sound ground. A shortcut, in which the wishful agreement overlooks the difficulties of not being able to determine whether clandestine tests are taking place, is not on sound ground but on treacherous footing. It is that point which I wish to make clear in my statement of yesterday. I will comment later on the resolution when it is my turn in the explanations of vote on the resolution.

¹ Ibid., 1960, pp. 5–6.
² Ante, pp. 546, 549.
SUMMARY

The arms limitation agreements reached in 1963–64 demonstrate that progress is possible in reducing the dangers and costs of military and political competition. But this Committee believes that additional steps are urgently required to deal with a series of problems that, left unresolved, threaten to disrupt seriously whatever uneasy equilibrium has been achieved in world politics. Two imperatives are uppermost: first, to halt the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the present five atomic powers; second, to curb and then reduce the arms buildup taking place among and within these same five countries, a spiral driven upward by new technological possibilities and by the uncertainties resulting from nuclear proliferation. These major challenges are closely related to four other pressing problems: first, the buildup of conventional arms, particularly in the developing countries, which inflames national sentiments, threatens to bring on war in several regions of the world, and wastes vital economic resources; second, the still unresolved security problems of Central Europe; third, the failure so far to engage the People’s Republic of China in a genuine dialogue exploring possible common interests in arms limitations; and, fourth, the structural inadequacies of the United Nations for internal peacekeeping missions and for the supervision of arms limitations.

To deal effectively with these challenges will require that the governments and peoples of the world set aside fear, chauvinism, cynicism, and inertia to invest the resources, courage, and good will required to build mutual security in ways less costly and dangerous than primary reliance upon strategic autarky.

The Committee believes that the control of nuclear armed forces is becoming more difficult with each passing year and that a major effort must be made now to halt the drift toward international anarchy. There is a desperate need to re-establish confidence in the capability of the United Nations to ensure the peace. We believe that the United States, as the most powerful nation in the world, can take the lead in seeking agreements on measures of collective security and of arms limitation and reduction and should do whatever can usefully

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1 The report was prepared for the White House Conference on International Cooperation (Nov. 28–Dec. 1, 1965). Although the Committee consulted with Government officials, the report represents the views of the Committee and is not an official statement of U.S. policy.
and safely be done unilaterally as well as jointly. Toward that end we propose a series of steps which taken together would make a systematic and significant beginning to more far-reaching disarmament.

In arms control as in medicine, prevention is more attainable than cure. Therefore many of the measures we recommend are designed to prevent further deterioration of the present situation, but they also may facilitate larger accomplishments not now within reach.

The merit of specific recommendations is open to debate. What is incontestable is the urgency of a renewed commitment—in this country and others—to an intensified program that will halt and reverse the perilous trend of competition in arms before new rounds of weapons development and deployment are initiated. Immediate steps are needed in the next year to put a brake on developments that can only hinder progress toward comprehensive disarmament measures under law which stand as our ultimate goal.

I

WHERE WE STAND

A. Challenges and Opportunities

Twenty years have passed since the founding of the United Nations and the onset of the nuclear age—two decades of struggle in man's efforts to control the instruments of force and reduce the incentives to use them. But as the likelihood of conflict has ebbed and flowed, efforts to achieve limitations on arms have had frighteningly little success.

The initial United States attempt to establish a United Nations monopoly over atomic energy foundered. A new superbomb, dwarfing the atomic bomb in its capacity for destruction, was developed and deployed. By 1955, arms control negotiators in East and West had conceded that the strictest international inspection might not detect hidden reserves of fissionable materials with sufficient reliability to permit their controlled elimination. And five years later no one was able to prevent the enormous and still continuing expenditures on massive deployments of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). These failures can be measured in the trillion dollars that the world has spent for armaments in twenty years, and they can be measured in the capacity of either of two governments to destroy in hours hundreds of millions of persons.

Simultaneously with these failures has come one important success: a widespread acceptance of the axiom that general war is inconceivable as a rational instrument of policy; and a corollary interest in methods of harnessing the mutual concern to prevent it. Other achievements are smaller. They include: a rapid communication
link between Washington and Moscow for grave emergencies;¹ a treaty preventing all but underground nuclear tests, thus halting the radioactive pollution of the atmosphere by the superpowers;² a U.N. resolution reflecting the intention of the major powers not to place weapons of mass destruction in outer space and calling upon others to refrain from doing so;³ a set of simultaneous announcements of intentions to slow down the production of fissionable material.⁴ In addition the United States has made a major effort to construct elaborate controls and handling procedures for the weapons constructed and to devise and adopt strategies consistent with them. Finally, the United States Government has organized and supported the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

But the world’s problems continue to multiply, and the drift to international anarchy is perceptibly quickening. First of all, the number of nations now possessing nuclear weapons or seriously considering their construction is so large that the reciprocal expectations of mutual restraint, upon which efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons are ultimately based, are weakening. A failure to surmount this crisis of confidence and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries promises to be at least as costly as some of the major failures of the last twenty years: in the time and attention of statesmen taken from more positive tasks; in expenditures; in the exacerbation of tense political relationships; and in increased risks of nuclear violence.

Indeed, the spread of nuclear weapons has already threatened to spark a second problem by encouraging one or both of the major nuclear powers to seek protection from less powerful nuclear states in anti-missile systems, systems quite capable of catalyzing a new round of offensive weapons.

Third, the unresolved problems of Central Europe stand as festering sores in East-West relations, complicating other problems of arms limitation, increasing misunderstanding and friction, and remaining a source of potential military conflict.

A fourth concern of growing seriousness is the buildup of non-nuclear armaments, especially in the developing areas of the world, where internal instability and endemic political differences have recently erupted in conventional war. Further buildup threatens more violence.

Underlying many of these issues is a fifth problem, that of Communist China—her absence from the United Nations, her contempt for it, her incipient atomic capability, and the threat that she poses to her neighbors.

¹ Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 236–238.
² Ibid., pp. 291–293.
³ Ibid., p. 538.
⁴ Ibid., 1964, pp. 165–171.
Sixth, there is the failure so far of the United Nations to establish any but the most rudimentary and improvised machinery for peacekeeping. Related to this is the propensity of the great powers to bypass the United Nations in the settlement of disputes.

These six fundamental problems are all related, all urgent, and all inescapable; these are the issues to which this Committee has addressed itself and concerning which it believes further efforts must be made. The merit of our suggestions is, of course, open to debate and further analysis. What is incontestable, however, is the need for a renewed commitment on all sides to efforts that will reverse a continuing and dangerous trend of competition in national armaments and total reliance upon them.

Finally, the Panel believes that the United States, as the strongest nation in the world, can afford to make the largest effort. And as a group of American citizens, we naturally direct our recommendations to our own Government. However, the Panel by no means believes that U.S. governmental actions alone can bring about the results desired. Further, the Panel recognizes and values the considerable efforts that the United States Government has been and is making.

B. Guidelines and Assumptions

The issues considered by this Committee have given it reason to be grimly concerned about the future. Mankind can ill afford another twenty years of failure to deal with the realities of the nuclear age. For this reason especially, the Committee is determined to point to the problems that must and can be dealt with now, in the present, problems that will otherwise quickly become more difficult. This applies especially to the problems of proliferation; what we cannot stop, we shall have very little hope of rolling back. And it applies also to the irrecoverable costs of another round of strategic weapon procurement.

In our concern for present problems, we do not mean to slight much more comprehensive measures of arms reduction and much more significant measures for improvements in collective security that the world must continue to seek. But we are aware that the “modest” steps proposed in this report taken together—and some taken separately—would represent more negotiated progress than has been achieved in two decades, and would greatly facilitate further progress. Thus, if we emphasize negotiable measures requiring minimal inspection of Soviet and U.S. territory, it does not mean that we are any less devoted to seeking the maximum degree of general disarmament that can eventually be achieved. It suggests only that we are anxious to achieve what is eventually desirable by making a start with what is presently possible. In particular, we believe that the world military balance is such that there are many measures that can be taken by U.S.-Soviet agreement, or by parallel action, that will improve our security whether or not other nuclear powers accede to them at once.
Because only the far-sighted and the powerful can conceive or venture the actions necessary to turn down the arms spiral and to shape a more peaceful world, we believe that the United States is obligated to take the lead in proposing measures of collective security and of arms limitation; obligated to using its influence to secure their acceptance; and obligated to make every effort to conduct its affairs so as to avoid impeding their progress. This is a responsibility of world leadership. In addition, we believe that America's own most urgent security interests lie ever more clearly within the domain of arms control and that we can no longer seek national security chiefly in arms and alliances alone. A nation's gains in turning down the arms competition, in reducing the likelihood of conflict throughout the world, and in improving the prospects for a world of "cease-fire and peaceful change" have become first-priority concerns, we shall make progress in resolving them only when we recognize them as such and act accordingly.

We assume that accomplishments in one area of arms control will facilitate work in another and that "package agreements" can be useful. And we believe that progress toward political settlements, in Central Europe for example, will both facilitate and benefit from arms control and disarmament agreements. The notion that progress is impossible in one area, e.g., curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, until agreements have been reached on other problems of arms control is a notion we reject. Finally, we recognize that much of what we say will bear on issues treated by other panels.

II

HALTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A. Key Elements of the Problem

The spread of nuclear weapons threatens to bring about a painful, expensive, and dangerous reorganization of international relations. It threatens to add new dimensions to the very fears that encourage it: new concerns in the struggle for Arab-Israeli understanding; new barriers to a permanent easing of Indian-Pakistani tensions; and new setbacks to improve relations between Western and Eastern Europe. It threatens established political relationships between countries and within them; dissension over the hard decisions it entails in governments already torn by dissension; realignments associated with shifting power in non-aligned areas; and, for those in major-power alliances, the premature assertion of an unreal independence based on nuclear status alone. There are, in these problems, the seeds of a hundred crises.

1 Problems of Communist China are treated in sec. VI, infra.
Nuclear weapon systems are expensive—more expensive than they appear to be at first—and many of those who want them most can afford them least. Will nuclear deployment replace economic development in parts of Asia, Latin America, the Near East, and will misery and suffering be prolonged in this way? Will the United States be forced to pay indirectly in economic aid for nuclear weapons that it opposes? Or will her refusal to do so alienate her friends? Alternatively, will she be forced to supply nuclear weapon systems, to those who should never have demanded them, in an ignominious effort to avoid either being cheated or being hated?

Nuclear weapons are dangerous. The United States devotes a great deal of effort to controlling the circumstances under which its weapons might be used, and rightly so. But the spread of nuclear weapons will put them in circumstances incomparably more dangerous than one of our own weapons out of control not only to others but to ourselves.

The spread of nuclear weapons requires a reorganization of international relations as well. Do we prefer an enforced interdependence or the spurious equality in which countries large and small threaten one another in an anarchy of violence-producing potential? The world must be brought together; nuclear weapons can pull it apart.

Finally, we must count it a most serious cost of proliferation that the best hopes and aspirations of the world may be put off for many years while wisdom and labors are devoted to diminishing dangers and resolving problems that might still prove avoidable by prompt and timely efforts.

These are real dangers and urgent ones. We urge immediate steps to avoid them, and these steps need not and should not be restricted to arms control measures. The desire for nuclear weapons stems not only from security concerns but also from political aspirations. And, in any case, it may be amenable to political methods of solution that are not always closely related to guarantees of security. The full weight of U.S. influence and U.S. capacity for constructive diplomacy should be placed at the disposal of this critical problem at this critical time.

B. Non-Proliferation: Breaking the East-West Deadlock

The key elements of a non-proliferation agreement are already set forth in the Irish resolution adopted unanimously by the U.N. General Assembly in 1961 and endorsed repeatedly by the United States: first, that the nuclear states “refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to states not possessing such weapons”; second, that the non-nuclear powers “undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons. . . .”

1 Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 694.
Recent attempts to reaffirm this agreement in a treaty have con­fronted an apparently basic divergence between the Soviet Union and the United States on the issue of nuclear arrangements in NATO. What the Soviets have viewed as proposals for further diffusion, the U.S. has with equal logic argued are safeguards against possible future diffusion. It is clear that the matter is most important; it is equally clear that it cannot be settled in a merely bilateral Soviet-U.S. context. This issue is accordingly examined in Section IV “Europe and Disarmament.”

In any case, however, it would be a most serious error, if as a result of Soviet unwillingness to enter a non-proliferation agreement, the United States and others felt precluded from negotiating or encourag­ing such agreements as may prove possible. The Soviet Government is very likely to respect them. It is opposed to proliferation; it has long ceased to contribute to Communist China’s nuclear program; it has recently supported mandatory safeguards for fissionable material monitored by the International Agency for Atomic Energy (IAEA), and it has repeatedly voiced opposition to the further spread of nuclear weapons.

C. The Longer Run

But even were every non-nuclear power to declare its present intent not to seek nuclear weapons, there would be the longer-run problems posed by the continuing incentives to do otherwise, incen­tives that must be eliminated or reduced if nuclear weapons are to remain restricted to the five present nuclear powers.

First and foremost among these incentives are the security problems of the non-nuclear powers. Non-nuclear states must be protected from the threat of such force as would persuade them that nuclear weapons were an easy, a necessary, an urgent counter. This requires that nuclear powers commit themselves to refrain from the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear ones. It requires that nuclear powers must pledge themselves to defend the victims of such aggression with all necessary means. But perhaps most important, it means that nuclear and non-nuclear powers alike must commit themselves to refrain from the use of force across na­tional boundaries and must commit themselves, in as wide a variety of circumstances as possible, to prevent others from doing so. So long as boundaries are or might be changed by force, so long will nuclear weapons appear a potentially useful deterrent to aggression.

We therefore support the formulation and ratification of suitable regional agreements aimed at guaranteeing borders to the satisfaction of those countries most tempted to purchase nuclear weapons for this purpose. In addition, of course, we stress the importance of institu-
tionalizing the peacekeeping arrangements discussed below in Section VII.

The Committee recognizes, however, that some of the incentives for nuclear proliferation are political, requiring for their diminution either evidence of major-power willingness to cooperate to keep the peace or, to the extent that nuclear renunciation is a sacrifice, evidence that the major powers are themselves showing a comparable restraint in their effort to halt the “vertical” proliferation of their own arsenals. To this end, the Committee suggests six measures on which immediate agreement should be sought:

a) A comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, adequately verified. New improvements in national detection systems might make it possible to accept a treaty in which inspection followed a challenge based upon a threat of withdrawal; ultimately any quota of inspections is no more dependable than such an arrangement would be. Alternatively, new improvements in seismological instruments might make it possible to close the small gap in views of the two sides on acceptable numbers of on-site inspections whose existence prevented agreement in 1963.

b) As an earnest of their intention to limit and reduce strategic weapons, a pledge by the nuclear powers to commit an agreed fraction, such as one-half of one per cent, of their military expenditures to appropriate UN organs for peacekeeping and economic assistance.

c) A complete halt in the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. of production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons, as has been recently proposed by the United States; alternatively, such more gradual measures as would be acceptable to both sides and essentially symmetrical in their effects.

d) A transfer for non-weapons uses of agreed quantities of weapons-grade U-235 by the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. to the IAEA for the benefit of developing countries. Safeguards should permit the reposition upon demand of any such material used in an unauthorized manner, e.g., in research which is directed toward the development of nuclear weapons.

e) Elaboration and intensification of IAEA inspection and the subordination of all transfers of fissionable material to IAEA controls.

f) Whether the halt be gradual or complete, an opening of all U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. atomic energy plants to IAEA inspection to ensure compliance with the agreement. The U.S. initiative in opening the Rowe, Massachusetts, reactor to IAEA inspection should be broadened, unilaterally if necessary, and it should be matched by the willingness of others engaged in peaceful uses of atomic energy to permit inspection.

In addition, the United States should seek an experimental Alaskan-Siberian zone of nuclear and conventional arms limitations centered
around the Bering Straits. The Committee believes that this step would be a sound, significant, and imaginative initiative in the development of arms limitations in other parts of the world. Such a zone would involve comparable areas on each side, and the arrangement could be implemented with bilateral or United Nations inspection and supervision.

More generally, the Committee believes that nuclear-free zones in Latin America, Africa, and in the Near East are among the most feasible arms limitation agreements at this time and among the most hopeful ones for a long-term barrier to nuclear diffusion in those areas. In certain cases, the creation of these zones may make necessary minor modifications in present U.S. security practices, modifications of far less importance to the nation than the securing of a nuclear-free zone; the small problems that these changes will raise should not obscure the larger interest.

III

CONTROLLING STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS

A. Containing the Arms Race

Just as we stress containing the spread of nuclear weapons, we also place high priority on containing the competition in weapon procurement of the United States and the Soviet Union—not least because success in the latter will be useful in the former. At a minimum, and for its own sake, the major powers must strive to check a competition that will otherwise lead periodically to the expensive procurement, deployment, or redeployment of entirely new weapon systems. It is, after all, the continuing competition to perfect and deploy new armaments that absorbs quantities of time, energy, and resources that no static strategic environment would demand; that exacerbates U.S. and Soviet relations with unreal considerations of strategic advantage or disadvantage; that keeps political leaders in both great powers off-balance and ill-prepared for far-reaching agreements; that fixes the attention of both sides on the most threatening aspects of the opposing posture; and, especially, that provides heightened risks of a violent spasm of procurement—one spurring to new levels the cost, distrust, and the explosive dangers of an unending competition in arms.

We also stress containing the arms race because it is an objective that may well be far easier to realize than reductions of strategic weapons, or, put another way, because an ounce of prevention may be worth a pound of cure. This was, for example, the principle underlying the U.N. resolution calling for a ban on weapons of mass destruction in orbit. Perhaps an even more important instance of the potential application of this principle concerns antiballistic missile systems (ABM).
B. ABM: A Three-Year Moratorium

We urge both the United States and the Soviet Union to agree—explicitly or tacitly—to a moratorium of at least three years on new deployment (but not on the unverifiable research and development) of systems for ballistic-missile defense. While the ostensible purpose of the immediate deployment of ABM defenses (at least in the United States) has now become that of dealing with the limited threat posed by China's potential nuclear forces, a U.S. or a Soviet ABM system would almost certainly induce both superpowers to step up their strategic weapon programs in an effort to ensure their respective "deterrent" capabilities.

The reason for our proposal is simple; this Committee does not believe the time is appropriate for a decision to deploy. First of all, there remains the basic question of the military value of the system. Here many technical questions remain to be answered. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in his 1965 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, summed up the status of the ballistic-missile defense system as follows:

Although the NIKE X development is progressing satisfactorily, there are many technical problems still to be solved, and I believe it is still premature to make any commitment to production and deployment at this time. Over and above the technical problems there are even greater uncertainties concerning the preferred concept of deployment, the relationship of the NIKE X system to other elements of a balanced Damage Limiting effort, the timing of the attainment of an effective nation-wide fallout shelter system, and the nature and effect of an opponent's possible reaction to our NIKE X deployment. Accordingly, we propose to continue the development of the NIKE X system on an urgent basis, and a total of about $400 million has been provided in the FY 1966 budget for that purpose, including $10 million for some preliminary production engineering.\(^1\)

Beyond the technical and military-economic questions, the Panel believes that the United States has not given the political consequences of the ABM deployment sufficient thought and certainly has not yet explored the ways in which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could avoid unintended effects of the systems on the other's deterrent force. There are many other questions still unanswered and unconsidered. Shall the systems be emplaced in Europe? Will they be sold to allies by ourselves or by the Soviets? Can we and the Soviet Union devise ways by which we acquiesce in reduced, but still enormous, deterrent capabilities? Will our action simply play into the hands of the Communist Chinese effort to disrupt U.S.-Soviet relations in general and arms limitation efforts in particular? Does

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\(^1\) Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 4016 To Authorize Appropriations During Fiscal Year 1966 for Procurement of Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessels; and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, for the Armed Forces, and for Other Purposes Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Eighty-ninth Congress, First Session, pt. 7, p. 256.
the Chinese threat really require immediate action on the part of the U.S. and the Soviets? And how far are we and the Soviets planning to go in building active defenses? The costs involved in the systems under discussion are measured in tens of billions of dollars; their strategic implications are enormous and long-lasting; and their political impact may be the most startling of all—especially in Europe. The matter deserves the closest and most intense discussion and thought; a three-year moratorium would produce it.

We also believe that the political posture of the Soviet Union is delicately poised at the moment; it is very clearly in the U.S. interest to avoid such actions as might deflect the Soviet Government from a course of improving its relations with the West. Encouraging the start of a new round of expenditures and dangers at this moment therefore seems inopportune. And in three years' time, it may be possible, not only to see more clearly what strategic threat the People's Republic of China will and will not soon present, but also what the response of both the United States and Soviet Union should be.

C. A Freeze on Strategic Delivery Vehicles

In the absence of a moratorium, and assuming that ballistic-missile defenses are built, the United States will have to rethink its suggestion of early 1964 that a freeze on offensive and defensive weapons and their characteristics be considered by the United States and Soviet Union and discussed with their major allies. This is because an agreement along these lines would not be possible during the construction of ballistic-missile defenses; because it seems technically difficult to design a proposal that would freeze a dynamic contest between deployed ballistic-missile defenses and the weapons designed to surmount them; and because it may be more difficult, though this is somewhat controversial, to reach agreement on a freeze of offensive weapons while the defenses that neutralize them were uncontrolled.

These considerations argue against ballistic-missile defenses, and they argue for redoubled efforts to achieve quickly whatever appropriately balanced freeze can be negotiated. In this regard, the Committee believes that the United States should not restrict herself to the details of the initial formulation but should reaffirm her willingness to consider different kinds of freeze proposals from every quarter. Thus, the United States need not freeze as of any given date but might agree on specified weapon levels. Further, she need not freeze characteristics of weapons if no more than a freeze on numbers of weapons seems negotiable. Nor need the United States focus on restrictive, detailed, and technically complicated freezes. She might propose instead a freeze so simple and general that it could be "ratified" by si-

1 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 8.
multaneous coordinated announcements and inspected by continually improving unilateral methods—those same methods upon which she would rely in the absence of agreement as well, for that limited part of her preparedness that depends upon knowledge of Soviet actions.

D. Toward a Reduction of Strategic Delivery Systems

Of course, the United States cannot be content with containing the competition or freezing it. At a minimum she should continue to seek coordinated methods, with or without formal agreements, to destroy weapons deemed obsolete and superfluous. Such acts would have primary importance as signals of readiness to cooperate; we have noted earlier how important this signal can be in non-proliferation efforts.

More generally, we consider much deeper cuts in strategic inventories—on the order of a one-third cut—to be worth serious consideration. The United States has already accepted the notion that some comprehensive arms control agreements need not include inspection of operational weapon inventories; the U.S. 1964 freeze suggestion made this point.\(^1\) The Committee believes that verification of destruction would be sufficient for some reduction agreements as well.

We also note that the imbalance between U.S. and U.S.S.R. strategic forces is not so great as is often implied—if targets in Western Europe, as well as in North America, are matched against targets in the U.S.S.R. This increases the feasibility of agreement because disarmament agreements can be based on a Soviet willingness to balance part of American reductions with reductions in their threat against our European allies.

E. Reaffirm Prohibition Against Nuclear Weapons in Space

The recent announcement by the United States of her intention to carry out experiments for the purpose of learning about the military uses of satellites\(^2\) gave rise to serious misinterpretation and led some observers to the erroneous conclusion that the United States was repudiating her intention, now embodied in a U.N. resolution, to refrain from placing nuclear weapons in space. To ensure against this possible misunderstanding; the United States Government should continue to reaffirm, as Ambassador Goldberg recently has, her commitment to the General Assembly resolution against weapons of mass destruction in outer space.\(^3\)

\(^3\) *Ante*, p. 434.
IV

Europe and Disarmament

A. The Present Situation

Since 1945, the confrontation of the United States and the Soviet Union across the German zonal boundary has been a central political fact affecting the arms race. In the early postwar period, the temporary nature of the German partition, the unsettled conditions in Western Europe, Soviet maintenance of troop levels despite substantial Allied disarmament, Soviet probes in other areas of the world, and the general Soviet posture under Stalin generated widespread fears of a Soviet attack across the boundary. The Berlin Blockade and the Korean War seemed to confirm these fears. A rapid buildup of Western arms followed, and the Warsaw Pact nations replied in kind, probably further stimulated by American talk of “rollback” of the expansion of Communism into Eastern Europe.

Over the last decade and for a variety of reasons, the threat of Soviet attack has been waning. In particular, it has become increasingly obvious to both sides, first, that neither will retreat under pressure from Central European positions taken up after the Allied victory and, second, that resort to violence would be irrationally risky. For example, even the abortive uprisings in East Germany (1953) and Hungary (1956) did not result in Western military action in Eastern Europe; the risk of Western attack, as perceived by the Soviet Union, was thus reduced. For the U.S., the Soviet split with China and the growth of Eastern European independence within the Soviet bloc have been among the factors diminishing the supposed risk of Soviet attack. In addition, a general recognition of the possibility of unintended war has been still another factor inhibiting the use or threat of violence. But the confrontation continues, while parallel interests in avoiding war provide an overriding motive on both sides for resolving this central and most dangerous issue: an unsettled and divided Germany.

Looked at in terms of current realities, the German problem shows a tangle of partly conflicting, partly parallel interests as among the United States, the Soviet Union, and Germany. To make progress in solidifying the reduction of tension sufficiently to permit more progress in arms control and disarmament requires that the parties concerned see parallel interests as outweighing conflicting ones.

The German people—articulately in the West and silently in the East—want reunification. The United States has backed them in this desire; indeed, American spokesmen voiced it before the Germans felt strong enough or self-confident enough to do so. Now the demand for reunification has become a sufficiently strong factor in West
German public sentiment that its continued support by the United States is crucial to relations with the Federal Republic.

The United States has sought the integration of West Germany into Western Europe and a close-knit alliance between Western Europe and the United States. This has been one of the most important persistent strands in United States foreign policy in the postwar period. Its purposes have been twofold: to promote within Germany a stable, responsible, Western-oriented, democratic government, living in harmony with the countries of Western Europe that Germany had conquered and occupied in World War II; to contribute to the strength, military and other, of the Western Alliance. As ultimate goals, to which the Alliance and integration contribute, the U.S. wants peace and stability in Europe.

The Soviets have sought security, especially the security of the new borders and the legitimation of the regimes of the Warsaw Pact states. In some of these states and in the Soviet Union as well, there is also a genuine fear of Germany, reflecting both the experiences of World War II and the belief that the "German problem" might be the cause of another conflict. In addition, the Soviets have sought continued hegemony in East Germany, both as an end in itself for political and economic reasons and as a means of ensuring the security of Eastern Europe. They probably judge—rightly—that East Germany cannot stand on its own as a viable Communist state in the face of the superior numbers, strength, prosperity, and freedom of the Federal Republic.

The great common interest of the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe is in a settled political situation that would result in enough reduction of the tension of confrontation to ensure continued peace. Germany remains the great issue of the confrontation, and the one most likely to become the occasion of conflicts from which neither can readily retreat. Joint interest in avoiding such conflicts leads to joint interest in resolving this issue. Since the stability recently experienced may well prove temporary under the pressure of the conflicting goals described above, the importance of the U.S. interest in avoiding conflict is underlined. If a conflict ever arose, it would probably begin with the devastation of Germany, and the interest in peace is at least as important for the Germans as it is for the Soviets and the Americans.

The key question, of course, is whether this common interest is important enough to overcome the conflict of interests on all sides. United States insistence on close military integration of West Germany within the Alliance, and German reinforcement of that insistence, is inconsistent with the German and American desire for reunification, given the Soviet concerns for security. On the other side, the Soviet desire to legitimate the postwar settlement is in conflict with continued Soviet support of the independence of East
Germany, since it is now impossible for the Soviets to expect West Germany and her allies to accept the division of Germany as permanent.

Reconciliation of these conflicts must, logically, include some change in military arrangements in both parts of Germany, in connection with a process that makes continued movement toward reunification possible. In general, such evolution can probably take place only in an atmosphere of increasing détente and increased freedom for the Eastern European states in relation to the Soviet Union. The alternate possibility of bringing about a Soviet retreat from East Germany by maintaining or increasing Western pressures (or seizing the opportunity of an unforeseen crisis to force a sudden retreat) is, as a practical matter, excluded. The evolution of the military balance makes it ever less likely that such a risky course could succeed. Further, it is doubtful that our European allies would really favor any such attempt at forcing a Soviet retreat.

The search for détente and the loosening of the ties of the Pact in the East has implications for the Western Alliance. The military element in Western relations must not be viewed as central, and accordingly should be given less emphasis. Some general loosening of Alliance ties must also be accepted, since alliances inevitably show greater solidarity in periods of threat than in periods of calm. Neither of these changes means the withdrawal of the United States from Europe or the lessening of the security ties between America and Western Europe. Rather, the opposite is true, since the defense of Western Europe remains vital to the security of the United States and the evolution of military technology continues to make effective European self-defense more rather than less difficult and costly.

B. Recommendations

The most important contribution that arms restrictions can make toward peace in Europe lies in measures that signal and encourage détente and help to perpetuate and solidify whatever degree of relaxation can be achieved.

Thus the Committee suggests first that the United States take the lead in seeking a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organizations. Within the next three years, the NATO Treaty comes under review by its signatories. It would be highly desirable to reaffirm the mutual commitment of North America and Western Europe to their joint security interests in a context which formalizes the defensive nature of these interests. A non-aggression pact would do no more than recognize explicitly what has already been recognized tacitly, that the situation in Central Europe—including the situation in Berlin—can be changed only by mutual consent, not by force. Nonetheless, formalizing this recognition can be an important step in institutionalizing the détente.
Second, the Committee believes that the United States should lead its allies in the search for means to reduce, rather than increase, the buildup of nuclear weapons in and near Central Europe. In this connection, solutions to the nuclear problem of the Alliance should be sought in arrangements that do not result in the creation of new nuclear forces. One possible method which meets this condition is the "Select Committee" that the Secretary of Defense has recently suggested. Properly developed, this would provide for more involvement of our Western European allies, especially Germany, Great Britain, France (if she so desires), and Italy in a genuine dialogue on the detailed business of planning for the Alliance's strategic force. The point of such a Committee is to give practical institutional substance to the proposition that the U.S. nuclear forces are the Alliance Strategic Force. In this connection, it is important that the Committee function not only at a high Ministerial level but also with reference to the whole executive apparatus, military and civilian, through which governments do their work. Further, this principle of more intimate association at the working levels of actual decision-making in major Allied capitals can usefully be extended to non-nuclear matters as well.

One desirable consequence of this procedure could be a more fruitful involvement of the principal NATO allies in discussions of disarmament and arms control. This is especially important in relation to the problems of Europe and in regard to Germany. Heretofore, NATO consultation on disarmament has usually offered little that is positive. This in turn has reflected its sporadic character; when it springs from an ongoing participation in the central military problems of the Alliance, it can reasonably be expected to be better informed and more constructive.

Third, the Committee believes that the United States should seek agreement both with her allies and with the Soviets to measures which could reduce the danger of surprise conventional attack in Europe. These could include the manning of fixed observer posts at selected points in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and the extension of the Huebner-Malinin agreement covering mobile observers more widely through the NATO–Warsaw areas. Both these measures could best be proposed in the context of a NATO–Warsaw non-aggression pact, thus giving such a pact substance.

Fourth, we believe that the United States should encourage an examination of the problem of parallel troop reductions in West and East Germany by the United States and the Soviet Union. Reductions are not to be conceived as tantamount to withdrawal, which would change the military balance; but rather, as adjustments equitable for both sides which would preserve the balance at less cost and

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strain for each. An exploration in these terms would have to begin with the Western allies most concerned, but, if it is to have any effect, it must proceed to exchanges with the Soviet Union.

Finally, we believe that the United States should explore, first with Germany and the other Western allies most concerned, the nature of the security arrangements with respect to Eastern Europe that progress toward reunification would demand and permit. To take one possible example, a series of arrangements might be concluded between the Federal Republic and East Germany to cover trade, the movement of persons, and the like, leading ultimately to some kind of confederation when agreement could be reached as to how steps beyond confederation could be taken and what final security arrangements were appropriate to that stage.

V

Conventional Arms Races in the Developing Countries

Intense conventional arms races are taking place in several areas of the world at great cost to the participants, at the risk of the peace and tranquillity of their regions, and at the risk of appalling destruction should war break out. Thus, UAR and Israel have per capita rates of military expenditures among the highest in the world. Between them they spent approximately one billion dollars on armaments in 1963. Pakistan and India, in a situation complicated by the threat from Communist China, had accumulated weapons at an increasing rate until conflict broke out between them. And Africa has not been free of an arms buildup.

The international traffic in arms which makes these buildups possible is extremely complex, ranging from direct government-to-government arms sales to the transfer of super-power arms technology from those who have acquired it to those who have not. To some extent this trade is already regulated in the major exporting countries. With minor exceptions, armaments do not enter the world market without the active consent of the governments concerned, both sellers and purchasers. But there is at present very little international coordination or agreement concerning the types of weapons that should be supplied and the types of clients that may receive them.

In general, the Committee believes that serious efforts should be made to control the arms traffic and that these efforts, like those directed at nuclear proliferation, should aim first at measures to regulate the traffic directly and second at reducing incentives for conventional arms buildups.

Consequently the major arms suppliers should refrain from further introduction of sophisticated weapons such as bombers, tanks, and submarines into underdeveloped areas. The past record of both the United States and the Soviet Union is bad. Efforts should be made
to encourage the developing states themselves to explore, presumably on a regional basis, the possibility of agreement not to acquire such weapons. Agreement should be sought through the United Nations to limit the sale and acquisition of conventional arms. This appears to be most feasible in the context of regional agreements as a first step and is discussed below. At the least, the United Nations could revive the practice of the League of Nations of printing an "armaments yearbook" on international arms transfers. Such a document would go some distance toward removing some of the exaggerated fears that may develop in relative secrecy.

In the long run, however, as with nuclear proliferation, peacekeeping arrangements will be necessary to allay the anxieties and dampen the ambitions that motivate purchase of arms on the world market. This is discussed in Section VII.

VI

COMMUNIST CHINA AND ARMS LIMITATIONS

With the explosion of two nuclear devices, China has reminded the world that she intends to develop a formidable nuclear and conventional military capability. In the long run, any system of world security and any extensive nuclear or conventional disarmament will have to include Communist China.

But the long run can be very long. At the present time and for a considerable number of years to come, any agreement that might conceivably be negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union—even including a very substantial reduction in strategic forces or a nuclear freeze—could, from a strategic point of view, be safely implemented while the Chinese continue their efforts to develop their own nuclear force. Even forces much larger than the present Soviet force would not find it possible to destroy the present U.S. retaliatory capability diminished by fractions of one-third or one-half. Nor would the U.S. lack, under the terms of a reduction agreement, the strategic forces necessary to respond to less comprehensive Chinese threats than an all-out attack. Whatever future bombers, land-based missiles, or submarines were retained for protection against the Soviet Union could be designed to be retargetable to Chinese targets.

The Soviet strategic force and technological change will remain the most serious threats for many years, and U.S. force size is not so finely calculated that it cannot cope, albeit with some modifications, with the relatively minor additional strains placed upon it by China. Peking's nuclear strength, for some years, will be capable only of acting as a catalyst on fears and uncertainties; a catalyst that uses the strategic instabilities and interactions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union to stimulate responses wholly disproportionate to its threat.
Thus, a ballistic-missile defense designed to shoot down Chinese missiles might nevertheless lead the Soviet Union into building more missiles or into a corresponding defensive system that would have the same effect on us. That it is in Communist China's political interest, as presently conceived in Peking, to attempt to weld this catalytic power and thus to disrupt Soviet-American relations is likely; that the U.S. should guard against the failures of nerve and perception that permit disruption is an equally obvious corollary.

With respect to proliferation, analogous problems exist. While Communist China's nuclear explosions have made nothing impossible except her own foregoing of nuclear weapons, her continued detonations and missile firings will make the attainment of agreements far more difficult. Again, this is not necessarily for strategic reasons but may also be for political ones; China's actions and the anxiety aroused by her political intentions are equally important.

For these reasons we believe that there are advantages, with respect to limiting both proliferation and the arms race, in bringing Communist China into a dialogue that will dispel whatever fears are illusory and permit the world to grapple, in a concrete way, with those that are not. The United States wants to know whether China plans to spread atomic weapons to other countries; whether she wishes to provoke or restrain her neighbors from producing a nuclear capability comparable to her own; whether she would participate in a constructive or a destructive way in formal disarmament talks; and so on. From the standpoint of arms control as well as from others, this information would be of great value. In the long run, the U.S. will have to talk to China about arms control, and analogous discussions with the Soviets have proven much more useful than was initially anticipated. Moreover, since discussions would be especially useful if undertaken soon, we see no point in delay.

We believe that efforts should be made to open bilateral talks on arms control with the People's Republic of China, similar to those carried on in Warsaw but devoted to arms control. We favor an exploration of conditions under which the People's Republic of China would qualify for and accept the obligations of the U.N. Charter, and could join the United Nations. We would support suitable initiatives to achieve these ends. And should a World Disarmament Conference be convened, as recommended by the U.N. Disarmament Commission to the General Assembly,1 we would favor the invitation of the People's Republic of China to that conference.

1 Ante, p. 253.
CONFIDENCE IN PEACEKEEPING AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO NATIONAL ARMAMENT

The important problems of peacekeeping, of peaceful settlement of disputes, and of assuring peaceful changes are being treated by two other panels. We look forward to seeing their reports. But these problems take on a special significance for our Committee, because without their solution, much of the arms control for which we have argued would be far more difficult to attain. Without confidence in adequate peacekeeping machinery, nations will continue to arm themselves, and their neighbors will respond in kind. Without confidence in the feasibility of peaceful settlements, nations will prepare to settle their disputes by force. And in the absence of machinery for change that is peaceful, nations will anticipate change that is violent. Limitations on arms demand confidence that peace is possible even as they provide it. This is especially important in the developing areas, where the pace of conventional and nuclear preparations is likely to be critically dependent on confidence.

For these reasons, we want to strengthen a growing expectation that world opinion in general, the United Nations in particular, and the major powers especially, will be ready and willing to prevent armed conflicts and, if they occur, to prevent them from being fought to a military conclusion. Such preventive action will obviously require a broad spectrum of military, political, and other capabilities.

To this end, we propose, first, the creation of a versatile United Nations Peace Force under the control of the Security Council and responsive to the General Assembly. Such a force could be composed initially of two elements: standby units voluntarily earmarked by the member states but controlled and supported by them until requested by the United Nations for deployment in a specific operation; and a small elite force of about one to two thousand men available for immediate deployment as a “fire prevention brigade.” Such a force could be deployed or developed on a regional basis, if that were desired.

The United States could play a decisive role in the evolution of a United Nations Peace Force by assisting in the development of the necessary U.N. military staff; by providing logistic support and, upon request, training programs for designated military contingents; and, above all, by encouraging and assisting other nations to pledge the necessary forces.

The Committee also recommends that the International Law Commission and the U.N. Legal Counsel’s Office undertake comprehensive studies on the applicability of international law to international peacekeeping forces.
Second, with or without a United Nations Peace Force, confidence in international mechanisms for providing security would be enhanced by the existence of a functioning U.N. Peace Observation Corps, preferably recruited and trained by the United Nations and available to the Secretary-General. Its main function would be to focus the eyes of the international organized community on a situation which if ignored could endanger the peace. For the purpose of creating a climate conducive to arms control agreements, this mechanism would provide confidence that, at the very least, the international community would take formal cognizance of disturbances of the peace.

For those who would place confidence in the functioning of international guarantees and of international opinion, it is especially important that the Peace Observation Corps be capable of rapid deployment. To this end, the Secretary-General should be authorized to activate the Corps on the basis of preliminary reports that a disturbance has arisen. Units of the Corps could be stationed throughout the world. So that the circumstances and early stages of an outbreak of violence might be reported at first hand, prior consent for fact-finding on their territories by as many states as possible should be a component of the agreement. The Peace Observation Corps could also be utilized to investigate possible violations of arms control agreements.

Third, ways and means of providing continuing financial support for the U.N. Peace Force and the Peace Observation Corps should be an integral part of the arrangements creating them. We continue to support the prescriptive principle that all U.N. members should pay their fair share of the cost of peacekeeping operations. But we recognize that an objectively reliable method of financing would be useful in a variety of circumstances under which operations might be authorized despite the unwillingness of all to contribute to their costs. Our earlier recommendation that the nuclear powers voluntarily commit a small fraction of their military expenditures, such as one-half of one per cent, to a U.N. fund would provide one sound method, utilizing commitments insignificant in comparison to national defense expenditures. One can hardly regard the desire for international security arrangements as a serious one if financial commitments so modest as these are not forthcoming.

Fourth, we recommend that the United States continue to work toward the establishment of a U.N. Disarmament Organization. While most of the arms limitations proposed in this report can be verified by national means, some—such as the zonal arrangements in the Bering Straits—should be administered and inspected by the United Nations. The United Nations could acquire valuable experience by its involvement in such operations, thus helping to pre-
pare it for the task of administering more comprehensive arms limitations.

Fifth, in addition to having confidence in the security afforded by a U.N. Peace Force and Peace Observation Corps, nations acquiescing in arms limitations or restraints will wish to be assured that effective non-military sanctions can be applied against aggressors. The United Nations should conduct continuing studies of the ways in which collective action of this kind can be effective.

Sixth, criteria for defining aggression will be necessary to persuade the peaceful that violations of their integrity will not go unrecognized for what they are. This requires the clarification of non-aggression provisions; the United States should take the lead in putting forward a non-aggression treaty embodying the proposals made by President Johnson in January, 1964.1 This might be formulated as a variety of regional arrangements. And the U.S. should support agreement on what constitutes illegal threat and use of force along the lines of a protocol drafted by a U.N. special committee in 1964 as follows:

1. Every State has the duty to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

2. In accordance with the foregoing fundamental principle, and without limiting its generality:

(a) Wars of aggression constitute international crimes against peace.

(b) Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular or volunteer forces or armed bands within its territory or any other territory for incursions into the territory of another State.

(c) Every State has the duty to refrain from instigating, assisting, or organizing civil strife or committing terrorist acts in another State, or from conniving at or acquiescing in organized activities directed towards such ends, when such acts involve a threat or use of force.

(d) Every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the existing boundaries of another State, or as a means of solving its international disputes, including territorial disputes and problems concerning frontiers between States.

3. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs affects the provisions of the Charter concerning the lawful use of force.2

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1 *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 5-7.

While the foregoing measures might go some distance toward tranquilizing the fears that would otherwise make themselves evident in weapon procurement, they are not in themselves sufficient in the long run. Not only must they be supplemented eventually by much greater peacekeeping efforts, but they must be complemented by the evolution and strengthening of mechanisms by which problems are resolved without arms—methods of peaceful settlement and change. United States influence could do much to encourage rather than impede such progress. The Committee recommends further study of such possibilities as a World Court of Equity, a Standing Panel of Mediators, and a Board of Arbitration. We believe that the United States should reconsider its hesitation to ratify a number of relevant and long-standing conventions. And we recommend the repeal of the Connally Amendment—we cannot expect others to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court if we ourselves are not willing to strengthen it.\footnote{See \textit{A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49} (S. Doc. 123, 81st Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 155-156.} It may well be that these are the kind of measures that will finally prove to be most effective in the control of arms. For we understand that it is in the ultimate growth of world law that arms and the problems which they present will eventually be subdued.

VIII

STRENGTHENING THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

The very creation of the ACDA by the United States in 1961 was a significant and long overdue achievement. But ACDA has not yet achieved an effectiveness commensurate with its responsibilities. In part, this reflects the lack of widespread public understanding of, and support for, its purposes and programs. Therefore, we urge a reconsideration by the Congress of its elimination from the original Arms Control and Disarmament Bill of a public services department.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. To halt the growth and spread of nuclear arsenals we recommend the following steps:

1) That the United States seek a non-proliferation treaty that prohibits the transfer by atomic powers of nuclear weapons and manufacturing capabilities and their acquisition or manufacture by non-nuclear powers.

2) That the United States seek to establish the conditions—military, political, and economic—in which both the non-nuclear
and nuclear powers will perceive that their security and other interests are best served by preventing any further spread of nuclear weapons through adherence to a non-proliferation treaty.

3) That the United States seek an agreement with the other nuclear powers pledging them (a) not to attack or threaten to attack with nuclear weapons a non-nuclear power and (b), if a non-nuclear power is thus threatened or attacked, to defend it with all necessary means.

4) That the United States seek acceptance of a series of other measures to halt the buildup and spread of nuclear weapons:

   a) A comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty adequately verified, perhaps utilizing recent improvements in national detection systems making it possible to rely on challenge inspections or to otherwise bridge the gap in acceptable numbers of on-site inspections that appeared to prevent agreement in 1963;
   b) A U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R. treaty to cease all production of weapons-grade fissionable material;
   c) The transfer of agreed quantities of such material to the IAEA for peaceful uses by the developing countries;
   d) Elaboration and intensification of IAEA inspection and the subordination of all transfers of fissionable material to IAEA controls;


II. To limit and reduce strategic delivery capabilities we recommend that the United States seek agreement with the Soviet Union and, if feasible, with the other nuclear powers on the following sequence:

1) A moratorium of at least three years on the deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems;
2) A freeze on the number of strategic delivery vehicles;
3) A reduction in total numbers amounting to one-third of each party's medium- and long-range delivery vehicles, beginning with the destruction of obsolete stocks.

III. To curb conventional arms races among the underdeveloped countries we recommend the following initiatives:

1) That the United States seek to have controls established over the traffic in arms by (a) major-power agreement to refrain from introduction of sophisticated weapons; (b) regional non-acquisition
agreements; (c) U.N.-supervised agreements regarding sale and acquisition; (d) the establishment of a U.N. monitoring system to record the traffic in arms.

2) That the United States join with other major powers to provide adequate security for the less developed nations; in addition, the United States support the establishment of U.N. peacekeeping procedures to the same end.

IV. To further reduce tensions in Europe and move toward settlement of the outstanding East-West differences we recommend the following measures:

1) That the United States, working with its allies, seek a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization.

2) That the United States seek to ensure that measures to improve Western security arrangements do not result in the creation of new nuclear forces, but instead provide for greater involvement of our Western European allies in the planning for use of U.S. strategic forces as well as other military planning and arms control problems.

3) That the United States explore arms control, related security provisions, and other measures which would help lead to German reunification; and, in this connection, the possibilities for balanced reductions of U.S. and Soviet troops and weapons in Central Europe be examined.

V. That the United States attempt to bring the People's Republic of China into a genuine dialogue on disarmament and other security matters: (a) by seeking bilateral talks on arms control matters of joint concern; (b) by ascertaining the conditions under which Communist China could qualify for and accept the responsibilities of membership in the United Nations; and (c) by supporting efforts to bring Communist China into the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference or a World Disarmament Conference, if held.

VI. To make the law of the U.N. Charter more effective and to strengthen U.N. peacekeeping machinery we recommend:

1) That the United States support the creation of a U.N. Peace Force, perhaps composed of two parts, (a) standby forces committed by member nations and (b) an elite force of one to two thousand men recruited by the United Nations.

2) That the United States offer to provide training and logistic support for the U.N. Peace Force and encourage others to do so.

3) That the United States support the development of an effective U.N. Peace Observation Corps recruited by and available to the Secretary-General.

4) That the United States and other nuclear powers commit a fraction, such as one-half of one per cent, of their annual defense
expenditures to support the U.N. Peace Observation Corps and other peacekeeping activities of the U.N.

5) That the United States encourage regional and worldwide non-aggression arrangements embodying the proposals made by President Johnson in January, 1964.

6) That the United States devote further study to mechanisms to facilitate peaceful change, such as a World Court of Equity to deal with political disputes, as well as ways and means of making greater use of the International Court of Justice and regional tribunals to deal with juridical disputes.

7) That the United States repeal the Connally Amendment.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A report such as this cannot possibly use the phraseology and embody the precise views and nuances of philosophy that all the Committee members, the Chairman included, might express if called upon to write it alone. However, this report represents the consensus of this Committee and is subscribed to by each of us in principle, even though not in every item. Members of the Committee worked alone and in panels, often with the aid of outside consultants, to produce sections of the report which were woven into the final document. The integration of the work of the various panels was carried out under the direction of the Chairman. The document has been discussed at several meetings of the Committee and revised to take account of these deliberations, prior to its submission here in final form. We are particularly grateful to Jeremy J. Stone, Louis Sohn, Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Amelia C. Leiss, and Morton H. Halperin for their assistance in thinking through or helping to draft portions of the report.

The Committee had the benefit of numerous discussions and consultations with officers of government agencies, and areas of agreement and disagreement with government positions were discussed in detail. In its final report, the committee exercised its independent judgment.

Donald G. Brennan
Fredrick M. Eaton
Vernon Ferwerda
John Fischer
Roswell Gilpatric
Joseph J. Johnston
Carl Kaysen

Robert Martin
John M. Mitchell
William V. O'Brien
Josephine Pomerance
Richard Spillane, S.J.
Harold E. Stassen
Jerome B. Wiesner, Chairman
Walter C. Clemens, Jr., Executive Officer
Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Resolution on Nuclear Tests, November 29, 1965

I shall be very brief in my remarks on the draft resolution now before us.\(^2\)

As I stressed before the Committee yesterday, my Government actively continues to seek agreement on a comprehensive test ban. We are, therefore, in complete accord with the over-all aim of the draft resolution, even though we would have preferred to see the language of certain sections improved. If time were not at a premium, we would be tempted to suggest various changes in the text now before us.

We have decided to refrain from doing so in order not to protract discussion and to permit this Committee, with its crowded agenda, to move on promptly to the next agenda item.

I shall therefore limit myself to a few comments in explanation of my country’s vote.

In the third preambular paragraph, it is noted with regret that nuclear weapon tests have continued to take place. We share the regret that it has not yet been possible to reach agreement on a verified comprehensive test ban that would halt all testing. But in the absence of such agreement the United States finds it necessary, in the interests of its security, to continue underground testing as per-

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\(^1\) A/C.1/PV.1387, pp. 7-11.
mitted by the limited test-ban treaty.\textsuperscript{1} The Soviet Union is also conducting such tests.

We are pleased to note that in the final preambular paragraph, as well as in operative paragraph 3, the draft resolution takes cognizance of the importance that progress in seismic detection and identification techniques could have in facilitating agreement on a comprehensive test ban. We regard this as the key to reaching agreement on such a comprehensive treaty.

As regards operative paragraph 1, let me say that we can accept the wording, as it now appears, as an expression of the almost universal desire which we strongly share to bring about the permanent cessation of all testing as soon as possible. We believe this can and must be accomplished by means of an adequately verified agreement. For the reasons that I gave yesterday, an unverified moratorium would be wholly unacceptable to the United States.

We strongly endorse the call on all countries to respect the spirit and provisions of the limited test-ban treaty, as stated in operative paragraph 2. Universal compliance with this treaty would in itself mark a major advance toward disarmament and international stability.

Finally, we welcome the call in the final operative paragraph for a prompt renewal of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. In returning to Geneva, it is in the spirit of that paragraph that we shall, with determination, seek to achieve agreement on an adequately verified treaty.

It is on this basis that the United States is pleased to be able to join in supporting this resolution.

Statement by the Nigerian Representative (Obi) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Denuclearization of Africa, November 29, 1965\textsuperscript{2}

My delegation intends to make just a brief statement on this question at this stage. This is partly because of the limited time now available to the Committee if it is to do justice to the other items on its agenda, for as you know, Mr. Chairman, we are always willing to co-operate with the Chair in expediting our work. Furthermore, the position of my delegation on this question is very well known.

My delegation has always approved and supported in principle the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. We have

\textsuperscript{1} Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291–293.

\textsuperscript{2} A/C.1/PV.1387, pp. 42–47.
done so because we are convinced that a denuclearized zone would be a useful first step towards limiting the area of nuclear infection, and as such would contribute immensely towards a complete cure of this deadly virus.

All of us agree that everything possible should be done to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. The creation of nuclear-free zones would assist considerably in attaining this objective. That is why we support in principle the various proposals aimed at creating nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, be they in Central Europe, in the Scandinavian regions, among the Balkans, around the Mediterranean, in Latin America, or in Africa. We do recognize, of course, that there may be difficulties involved in achieving this objective in some of these regions, but we believe that they can be overcome. These difficulties may be due to the military and political postures of the countries or the regions concerned, and their relationships with one another. However, we sincerely trust that the complex problems involved will be solved as a result of sustained efforts by those primarily concerned.

Africa is perhaps in a happier position than most of the other regions for which denuclearization is sought. Africa is relatively free from most of the complex military and political problems which bedevil the realization of this objective in the other areas of the world. We are also in the fortunate position of having already secured a resolution, more or less unanimously adopted by this Organization on the subject. That resolution—resolution 1652 (XVI)—calls upon Member States:

(a) To refrain from carrying out or continuing to carry out in Africa nuclear tests in any form;
(b) To refrain from using the territory, territorial waters or air space of Africa for testing, storing or transporting nuclear weapons;
(c) To consider and respect the continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone.¹

Since the adoption of that resolution, the African States have given serious consideration to the problem on various levels: at Addis Ababa, at the heads of State level;² at Lagos, at the Foreign Ministers' level; and at Cairo last July.³ The African members of this Organization decided to ask for the inclusion of this item on the agenda because they feel that this Organization should be kept informed of the problem, especially after the solemn declaration of their Heads of State and Government last July in Cairo on this subject.

But, in addition to reaffirming the earlier resolution on the denuclearization of Africa, and noting the action taken so far by the African States, my delegation feels that this Organization still has a part to play in the realization of our goal. We recognize that this is primarily

² Ibid., 1963, p. 195.
a matter for the African States themselves, and we are working towards this within the framework of our regional organization—the Organization of African Unity. While it is primarily an African question, we have always recognized, however, that there is need for assistance from other and various quarters; we require the assistance of this Organization and of its hard-working and diligent Secretary-General, U Thant.

In view of the Secretary-General's interest in halting the spread of nuclear weapons, of which denuclearization is an important element, my delegation is convinced that should the African States and their Secretary-General ask the Secretary-General of the United Nations for assistance, they would get it.

Furthermore, we have always recognized that States—other than those in the continent of Africa—and especially those among them with nuclear capability, have an important role to play towards the denuclearization of Africa. We expect the nuclear Powers to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-free zone; we now ask the nuclear Powers to give us a firm undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against us, or threaten to use them against us, under any circumstances whatsoever.

My delegation had called for such an undertaking when we were considering the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If they were unable to accept the suggestion in that wider context, we trust they will feel able to do so in the limited context of the denuclearization of our continent.

We from Africa are perhaps fortunate that the considerations, which would have made the nuclear Powers unable or unwilling to give such a wide undertaking, do not apply to Africa. We hope that the nuclear Powers will, without any special reservation, give a firm undertaking to the African States covered by any denuclearization arrangement that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons now in their arsenals against our States; by deciding to denuclearize our continent and thus make it impossible for them to acquire nuclear capability, the African States are taking a most responsible step which would contribute immensely towards world peace and stability. It is, therefore, to be hoped that their efforts will receive the full support of all States and, in the first place, that of the nuclear Powers.
General Assembly Resolution 2030 (XX): Question of Convening a World Disarmament Conference, November 29, 1965

The General Assembly,

Mindful of the continuing interest and responsibility of the United Nations in connexion with the solution of the disarmament problem,

Reaffirming the paramount importance of disarmament for the contemporary world and the urgent need for the achievement of this goal,

Believing that it is imperative to exert further efforts towards reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament with effective international control, with a view to securing lasting peace in the world,

Convinced that all countries should contribute towards the accomplishment of disarmament and co-operate in taking immediate steps with a view to achieving progress in this field,

Convinced also that a world disarmament conference would promote the realization of general and complete disarmament,

Reaffirming the resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 11 June 1965,

1. Endorses the proposal adopted at the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in 1964, on the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited;

2. Urges that the necessary consultations be conducted with all countries for the purpose of establishing a widely representative preparatory committee which will take appropriate steps for the convening of a world disarmament conference not later than 1967;

3. Urges further that all countries be kept informed, as appropriate, of the results achieved by the preparatory committee in accordance with paragraph 2 above.

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1 A/RES/2030 (XX), Nov. 30, 1965. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 112 to 0, with 1 abstention (France).
3 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 445.
Maltese Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly: International Transfers of Arms, November 30, 1965

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of general and complete disarmament,

Believing that a general and effective system of publicity to transfers between States, whether by way of trade or otherwise, of arms, ammunition and implements of war, would be a constructive contribution towards the relaxation of international tension and the development of relations of mutual trust between States,

Recognizing that such publicity would improve the possibility of making progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Recalling that a "Yearbook on the Trade in Arms, Ammunition and Implements of War" was published by the League of Nations,

Invites the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to consider the question of transfers between States, whether by way of trade or otherwise, of arms, ammunition and implements of war, with a view to submitting to the General Assembly proposals for the establishment of a system of publicity through the United Nations.

Letter From the Chairman of the First Committee of the General Assembly (Csatorday) to the President of the General Assembly (Fanfani): Question of Convening a Conference for the Purpose of Signing a Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Weapons, November 30, 1965

By letter dated 24 September 1965 (A/C.1/896), you informed me of the allocation to the First Committee of agenda item 29 (Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons: reports of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on

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1 A/C.1/L.347, Nov. 30, 1965. On Dec. 2 the First Committee rejected the resolution by a vote of 19 to 18, with 39 abstentions.
Disarmament). At its 1390th meeting, held on 30 November 1965, the First Committee decided to refer the item to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for further study and to defer consideration of this item in the General Assembly until its twenty-first session.

(Signed) Karoly Csatorday
Chairman of the First Committee

Statement by the U.A.R. Representative (Fahmy) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Denuclearization of Africa, November 30, 1965

The denuclearization of any region is as important to the world at large as it is to the countries and peoples who live in that region. For this reason, the denuclearization of any area cannot, in our opinion, be taken in isolation of all circumstances prevailing in, or surrounding the region. In other words, the denuclearization of Europe, or a part of it, has direct impact on the denuclearization of Africa and, on the other hand, the denuclearization of that continent would naturally affect Europe and Asia. That is why the discussion of the denuclearization of any continent or area, whether it is discussed in the United Nations or in the proper regional organization, necessitates serious and sober consideration of all the elements involved. I repeat, our considered opinion is that the denuclearization of any region would naturally encompass all political, physical, strategic, potential capabilities, and certainly the conditions surrounding the same region, whether on the ground, or in the seas.

I hope that by stating our basic views in this clear way it will not be construed that the United Arab Republic is not favouring the denuclearization of the whole world, or for that matter the continent of Africa. We have made it abundantly clear on many occasions that we believe in, and will strive for, the realization of the desired goal of many nations to see certain regions denuclearized.

As far as Africa is concerned, we are in full support of the denuclearization of this continent where we live, and we will make every endeavour and exert every effort within our capabilities to make this desired goal a reality. This was, and still is the policy of the Government of the United Arab Republic.

The members of the First Committee might agree that when a group of countries is determined to denuclearize their region they

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1 A/C.1/PV.1389, pp. 13–21.
have, for their own security and self-preservation, to put at the forefront of their consideration the realities as they presently appear, coupled with the expected developments in and around the same region in the future.

In this same room, during the eighteenth regular session, in connexion with the item entitled "Denuclearization of Latin America", speaking for the Government of the United Arab Republic, I presented its views on the basic issues which are germane and which would certainly be encountered in the event of any serious attempt to denuclearize any region.

On 19 November 1963, at the 1341st meeting of the First Committee, I presented the following eight points which in our opinion, are of particular importance to this issue:

First, that the denuclearization of any geographical entity, whether it is on land or on the sea, should be examined on its merits.

Secondly, that in some areas, because of various obvious reasons, denuclearization could not be realized unless examined in conjunction with conditions prevailing in other neighbouring areas.

Thirdly, that any denuclearization of any area should be worked out and agreed upon basically by the countries most concerned.

Fourthly, that in order to have political or military effect, any programme to denuclearize any area should have the solemn support and respect of the nuclear Powers.

Fifthly, that to avoid loopholes in the denuclearization of any area, it is not necessary to have a very elaborate system of physical inspection; it is enough, in our opinion, to have a limited but technically adequate system of verification.

Sixthly, that any system of verification should have every respect for the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the States concerned, and to this end it must be based mainly on resources and personnel recruited from the same States.

Seventhly, that any system of verification should not be used in one way or another as a pretext for interfering in the internal affairs of the countries concerned.

Eighthly, that the definition of any area should encompass not only the independent States therein, but all other territories, even if these territories are under the authority of a foreign State.

These conditions are a prerequisite for the ultimate and real denuclearization of any area.

Now as far as Africa is concerned, I would like to add the following main points which fit in the present picture of the African continent and which must be considered before it could be realistically argued that Africa could factually be denuclearized:

First, that all foreign bases—air, military depots or otherwise—should be dismantled. In this connexion there is a two-fold obliga-
tion: one lies on the foreign Power, and the other lies upon the African country. As to the foreign Power, it should relinquish its ambitious imperialistic designs and, accordingly, depart from the African soil. As to the African State, it is under the obligation to rid itself of these foreign military bases.

Secondly, that the denuclearization of Africa should take into account the present foreign military bases on the islands surrounding Africa.

Thirdly, that all racist regimes, whether in the heart of Africa or planted on its borders, should be under firm obligation either to cede authority to the original inhabitants of the country or be brought under international guarantees which would not enable them, under any circumstances or pretext, to nullify the letter and intent of any international agreement declaring the denuclearization of Africa.

Fourthly, that the nuclear Powers should undertake not to extend any assistance—material, scientific or technical—under any disguise, to any racist regime in or around Africa which might assist this or that regime in clandestinely manufacturing nuclear weapons.

Fifthly, what is the definition of Africa when we speak of denuclearization? Is it only the solid part of the continent as known in geography? Or is it something else in this nuclear context.

All these are very important problems and I am convinced that if we seriously ponder them, and other issues, no one, in or outside Africa, could but agree with these considerations.

As ample proof of their dedication to this desired goal, the Heads of State or Government of the African countries, meeting in Cairo from 17–21 July 1964, with every sense of responsibility, adopted a solemn declaration from which I shall quote the following main parts:

We, African Heads of State and Government,

Conscious of our responsibilities towards our peoples and of our international obligation, under the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, to use our best endeavours to strengthen peace and security,

Convinced that the conditions ensuring international peace and security must prevail in order to save humanity from the scourge of nuclear war,

Profoundly concerned at the effects of the dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Confirming United Nations resolution 1652 (XVI) calling upon all States, to respect the denuclearization of the continent of Africa,

...  

1. Solemnly declare that we are ready to undertake through an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or control atomic weapons;

2. Appeal to all peace-loving nations to accept the same undertaking;

3. Appeal to all the nuclear Powers to respect this declaration and conform to it;

4. Request the General Assembly of the United Nations, at its nineteenth regular session, to approve this declaration and to take the necessary measures
to convene an international conference for the purpose of concluding an agreement to that effect.¹

This declaration was unanimously endorsed at the Non-Aligned Conference, meeting in Cairo from 5–10 October 1964.²

All this took place on the highest level, and if it proves anything, it proves the awareness of those statesmen of the importance of this problem.

In the draft resolution which we had the honour to co-sponsor with the other African countries, the readiness of the African States could not be made clearer as to their determination to fulfil this pledge.³ In paragraphs 5 and 6 of the joint draft it is made clear that the obligations emanating therefrom are of a universal character, and it calls upon all States, and in particular the racist regimes in Africa or around it, to abide by them as such and consequently take the necessary action to prove their respect for the obligations stated in paragraphs 5 and 6.

Having said that, it is natural that upon adoption of this draft resolution the Organization of African Unity would start the necessary studies for the denuclearization of Africa, and that all stages through which this very important question passes should be within the Organization of African Unity. In this connexion it is obvious that the African countries would benefit from the experience of and advice rendered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and from whatever facilities might be requested by the OAU in this regard.

Before concluding, it is fitting to record our deep appreciation of the steps that have been taken by the Latin American countries. There is no doubt in our minds that we in Africa would also benefit a great deal from the lead which they have taken. The illuminating statement which this Committee heard yesterday from the representative of Peru, Ambassador Belaunde, and the expected contributions of other representatives from Latin America would serve as constructive guidance to us in Africa. It may be helpful, at certain stages, if the Organization of African Unity can receive from the Organization of American States periodic reports and information on achievements and progress in Latin America.

As representatives of the United Arab Republic, we are ready in all seriousness to work and co-operate fully with our African brethren in the final accomplishment of this end, namely, the denuclearization of Africa on the basis of realities and for the sake of Africa. We would not like to see the African continent either isolated or left far behind in the rapid developments occurring in other parts of the world. Africa should play its role, and to play it effectively it should not abandon the wagon of progress.

¹ Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 294–295.  
² Ibid., p. 445.  
Statement by the Soviet Representative (Tsarapkin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Denuclearization of Africa, November 30, 1965

The idea of the creation of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world is being increasingly supported everywhere. The peoples of the world understand very well that the creation of denuclearized zones leads to the limitation of areas where nuclear weapons could be used and, therefore, to diminishing possibilities of the unleashing of nuclear war, with its catastrophic consequences. The adoption of such measures as the creation of denuclearized zones would give rise to serious obstacles in the way of the dissemination of nuclear weapons to new countries and continents, would contribute greatly to the relaxing of international tensions and slow down the armaments race.

Just lately the first concrete steps have been taken in this direction. According to a treaty signed in 1959 the huge area comprising the Antarctic has been so designated, as is well known. The construction of military bases and fortifications in that region has been prohibited; nuclear weapons cannot be tested there nor can nuclear wastes be discharged in that part of the world. However, if it became possible to agree not to locate nuclear weapons, in Antarctica—which is an area with a very sparse population—it would seem that similar efforts are even more necessary in densely populated areas such as Europe, Africa and other continents. It is even more important to free these areas from the threat of nuclear annihilation.

The Government of the Soviet Union has always spoken out in favour of the creation of denuclearized zones in various areas of the world, since such a measure would pave the way for effective limitation of the areas where nuclear weapons could be stockpiled and used and would therefore reduce the threat of nuclear war and hamper the armaments race. We support the proposal to create denuclearized zones in central Europe, in northern Europe, in the Balkans, in Africa, in the Indian Ocean, in the Near and Middle East and in other parts of the world. The Soviet Union has proposed an agreement which would denuclearize the Mediterranean, and considers that in the interests of peace and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the obligation to create denuclearized zones should be assumed not only by groups of States—for example, all the States on one continent constituting a vast area—but also by individual States and countries.

We should like to mention once more that the Government of the Soviet Union is prepared to guarantee respect on its part for all such zones which might be established if other nuclear Powers would be

1 A/C.1/PV.1390, pp. 26-36.
willing to assume the same obligations. This is the position of principle which the Soviet Union takes in this question of the creation of de-
nuclearized zones. As this indicates, there is a possibility for making serious efforts of large scope in this field, the consequences of which would be highly favourable for all participants to any such agreements. However, one should not limit oneself to debating the matter at ses-
sions of the General Assembly; we should progress to concrete, prac-
tical steps with a view to the actual accomplishment of such measures.

In connexion with our discussion on the Declaration on the de-
nuclearization of Africa,¹ it is necessary to raise the question of the need to create a denuclearized zone in the most sensitive part of the world, namely, Europe. In the past we have heard, and we still hear at the present time, many enthusiastic comments concerning the denuclearization of Antarctica. Of course, this is a commendable accomplishment; it is good that by multilateral agreement this part of the world has now become a denuclearized zone. But everyone knows that in that forbidding, sparsely populated area there are only a few dozen people—scientists and technicians—who live there for short periods of time only. It is for this reason, in the main, that it was possible to come to agreement with the United States on the decree that Antarctica should be denuclearized.

Even more enthusiasm is evident in the United States for the idea expressed on 29 November, at a conference held at the White House, concerning the denuclearization of the moon—which is even further removed than Antarctica—where not even one human being resides.² In fact, there is no life of any kind there. Is it not strange that the position of the United States changes and becomes more and more rigid and antagonistic when proposals to denuclearize territories inhabited by men are made? For instance, the situation became much more complicated when, a few years ago, people started talking—in this connexion—in the United Nations about Africa.

Everyone will recall, I am sure, how representatives of Western countries, especially the United States, obstinately and energetically opposed the very idea of denuclearizing Africa, alleging that, lacking enforcement measures, such an agreement would remain a dead letter and would only spread dangerous illusions among the peoples of this part of the world.

Objections raised by the United States were even more categorical and obstinate when it was proposed to denuclearize the most densely

¹ See post, pp. 624–626.
² The White House Conference on International Cooperation suggested that the UN Outer Space Committee draft a convention on outer space exploration incorporating "the essential elements" of the Antarctic Treaty. Such a convention would "give substance to the principle . . . that celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation. It would become . . . a code for human activity on the moon." (Report of the Committee on Space, p. 31.)
populated part of the world, central Europe, or northern Europe, or the Balkans, or the Mediterranean. But it is in that part of the world that over 200 million Europeans live. Instead of removing the nuclear menace from Europe, the United States has transformed this part of the world into an atomic powder keg, literally speaking.

A few days ago, the Secretary of Defence of the United States, Mr. McNamara, was good enough to inform the world that there are over 5,000 United States nuclear warheads now in Europe. He also said that in the near future the United States Government intended to increase this number to 6,000. Against whom have this monstrous number of nuclear warheads been stored? The answer is obvious: against the peoples of Europe and against the socialist countries.

Europeans legitimately ask what is the position in the United States? Everybody sees that on the American continent there is not a single foreign nuclear warhead threatening the security of the United States. Compare the state of affairs in America and in Europe. You will readily be convinced that the situation in Europe is fraught with extreme danger. Europeans cannot, of course, take a fatalistic attitude or view matters with philosophic detachment. They cannot countenance a situation in which the United States, an enthusiastic supporter of West German revanchists, attempts to deluge Europe with its nuclear warheads. Think of it: 5,000 or 6,000 nuclear bombs stored in Europe. Hunters have a saying: once every ten years even an unloaded gun goes off by itself. But here, in Europe, there are thousands of nuclear bombs. It is easy to understand that, the greater the number of nuclear bombs concentrated in a most sensitive area where opposing military forces confront each other, the greater the danger of conflagration. One lethal mistake will suffice to sow death among dozens of millions of Europeans. We must, before it is too late, end this folly, this irresponsibility of nuclear maniacs who are rather graphically depicted in the American film, "Dr. Strangelove". It is these Doctors Strangelove who have deluged Europe with thousands of nuclear weapons and who are preparing the nuclear annihilation of Europe.

The question arises, now more than ever, of proclaiming central Europe, northern Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean a denuclearized zone, so as to protect Europeans against a nuclear catastrophe whose clouds loom ever more ominously over the destiny of Europe.

The question of the creation of a denuclearized zone in Africa has been debated several times in the General Assembly. At the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, a resolution initiated by African States was adopted calling in particular, upon all States to respect the continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone. The Soviet

Union actively supported this proposal at the time. The question of the creation of a denuclearized zone in Africa was further developed at the Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at Addis Ababa in May 1963.\(^1\) At the Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity held in July 1964, a declaration was adopted proclaiming Africa a denuclearized zone.\(^2\) At the Cairo Conference, the Heads of State and Government of non-aligned countries once again, in October 1964, affirmed that the denuclearization of Africa and of other parts of the world constituted a step in the right direction, since it contributed to the strengthening of international peace and security and allowed a relaxation of tensions.\(^3\)

The African States have raised the question of the denuclearization of Africa at the present session of the General Assembly, and this is abundant proof of the desire of the countries in this part of the world to take a new step forward towards the creation of a denuclearized zone in Africa.

The Soviet Union, for its part, fully understands and supports without reservation these legitimate aspirations of the African countries. The Soviet delegation is following with close attention the debates in the Political Committee on the question of the denuclearization of Africa. It goes without saying that statements by representatives of African countries are especially important in this connexion, and we should like to welcome the statements made by the representatives of Nigeria, Tanzania, Ghana, the United Arab Republic and other delegations, who stressed the importance of the creation of denuclearized zones. As far as we are concerned, we fully support the position of the African countries, who have declared here that their objective in declaring Africa a denuclearized zone is to remove the continent of Africa from the sphere of conflict between nuclear Powers.

In this connexion, we would like to stress that the Soviet Union has always taken a stand in favour of the creation of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world. We have always said that this must be accompanied by the elimination of foreign military bases which can be used for the storing of nuclear weapons. Therefore, it goes without saying that the transformation of Africa into a denuclearized zone presupposes the elimination of all foreign military bases on African soil, because the retention of such military bases in African countries would result in uncertainty among other countries that the status of the denuclearized zone in Africa is respected by all States.

We also fully share the views expressed by African representatives who told the Committee that the adoption of a decision by the General

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\(^1\) Ibid., 1963, p. 195.
\(^2\) Ibid., 1964, pp. 294–295.
\(^3\) Ibid., p. 445.
Assembly on this matter must constitute a step towards the solution of the fundamental question of the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet delegation is in favour of preparing, as rapidly as possible, an international legal document which would translate into fact the denuclearization of Africa, and it appears to us that the draft resolution submitted by the African countries is a step in the right direction. To conclude, permit me to express our conviction that this Committee and the General Assembly will take the appropriate decision, as proposed by the African countries, and thus the African States will take an important step forward towards their objective: the creation of a denuclearized zone on their continent, and the conclusion of a legal document which would solemnize this decision. This would undoubtedly constitute one more step towards the strengthening of peace, the limitation of the nuclear armaments race, and the relaxation of international tensions.

Remarks by Secretary of State Rusk at the White House Conference on International Cooperation, December 1, 1965

Q. Sir, this question from the Honorable Joseph S. Clark, the distinguished United States Senator from Pennsylvania. Does the State Department support a treaty of general and complete disarmament, as proposed by President Kennedy?

A. Yes, yes, and we've spent a great deal of time on it, at conferences and in bilateral discussions. We have a lot of reasons for being very serious about disarmament. I mentioned certain ones of them when I talked to you about the problem of war and the necessity for peace in my opening remarks. I suppose you realize that since 1947 the United States has spent $800 billion in defense budgets. Let your 30 committees' imaginations range over what could be accomplished in the world if we could spend $800 billion for some other purpose. What a different world this would be, and for the other side too, because on their economic base they have spent probably at least as much, if not more, relative to the economic base.

Now, we must continue to work at this problem of disarmament, and I hope we can find additional points where we can meet and agree as we did in the nuclear test ban treaty, rather than simply

2 The U.S. treaty outline appears ante, pp. 111-140.
3 Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291-293.
by occupying each other’s rear with proposals a dozen or so on each side, which don’t touch the real interests of the other side or the points of agreement. There is one important problem that stands in the way apart from certain of the tensions caused by, say, Viet-Nam or other particular issues of that sort, and that is the problem of confidence, the problem of how to deal with fear and suspicion in the absence of assurance. On these matters peoples are not likely to trust each other, but what we can do, it seems to me, is to organize machinery which makes the question of trust irrelevant.

Now, I daresay that practically everyone in this room is relaxed about the nuclear test ban treaty, because we can tell you that we do not believe the nuclear test ban treaty is being violated. Suppose we were not able to say that to you. Suppose we had to hold open the prospect of cheating; then the erosion of confidence around the world and the flareup of tension and hate and fear would be extremely difficult to restrain.

Now, let us confess that on this issue we are asking—when we ask for inspection or assurance—we are asking for what might be called a unilateral confession from the Soviet Union, because when they look at us, they’re pretty well taken care of. We have an open society; that takes care of about 98 percent of it. You add a few talkative officials to a few energetic reporters, and you add just a little soupçon of espionage, and they’ve got it made. They know what we’re doing and what we’re not doing.

But when we look at them it’s quite a different matter—it’s quite a different matter—a closed society, where we can’t give our own people assurances they would be able to give their people if we had an agreement without some sort of inspection or assurance. This turns up in a number of ways on the matter of a comprehensive test ban. We have said recently, and repeatedly: “This is not for us a policy question; this is a technical and scientific question. If the technical and scientific people on both sides would tell us what was possible in terms of assurance, then our policy will adjust to that. Therefore, why don’t we let your scientists and technicians, and ours, sit down and see what can be done, and perhaps conduct some joint experiments, to determine what can be done?” The answer is: “No. For us this is not just a scientific and technical question; it’s also a policy question. There won’t be any inspection.”

On the question of defense budgets we have suggested that we should have some what might be called technical discussions on the subject of what goes into a defense budget. In the case of the Soviet Union their research and development budget is outside of what is normally called a defense budget. Our research and development relevant to the military is very heavily inside of our own defense budget. These are things we ought to talk about. They have shown no readiness to sit down and talk over the component elements
of the respective defense budgets. But we'll continue to gnaw at it. We've got to; we can't afford to let delays or discouragements turn our hand away from the effort. But it is not a simple thing to bring great powers to a point where they can build a confidence between them, so as we reduce our arms, we can live in confidence with each other.

I'm afraid—I'm afraid I have time, or you have time, for about one more question—you're supposed to be reconvening in another session.

Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Denuclearization of Africa, December 1, 1965

At the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, and during the last session of the Disarmament Commission, the United States welcomed the initiatives of the States of Latin America and of Africa in undertaking studies with a view to achieving and maintaining a nuclear-free status for those regions. The objectives sought by those initiatives are in harmony with our policy to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and therefore they have our enthusiastic support.

With regard to arrangements to be made to achieve the denuclearization of Africa, we must of course reserve our position until we can examine the specific provisions which will appear in the convention yet to be developed in order to give legal effect to the declaration of the African Heads of State or Government. The fact that the initiative is being taken by the States concerned fully satisfies one of the criteria that we believe should govern the establishment of denuclearized zones. We shall examine the legal instruments which are to be developed also in the light of our other criteria, namely, (a) that the denuclearized zone should preferably include all States in the area, especially any whose failure to participate might render the agreement ineffective or meaningless; (b) that no State or group of States should derive military advantage from the creation of the zone; and (c) that provision should be made for an adequate verification, which would include procedures for following up on alleged violations in order to give reasonable assurance of compliance both to States included in the zone and to those outside the zone that have undertaken to respect it. In this connexion, we strongly hope that the African States will find it possible to include in their convention provisions for the acceptance

1 A/C.1/PV.1391, pp. 13-17.
of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards similar to those under consideration by the States of Latin America.

With these general considerations in mind, I can say that the United States views with sympathy the draft resolution before us as revised.¹ We are in full agreement with most of its provisions and with the spirit of others even though they contain some ambiguities and raise possible difficulties. Some of these difficulties may be resolved in time or by the convention which the African States have stated they intend to conclude.

Turning now to certain provisions of the draft resolution, I wish to remind the Committee that the United States abstained in the vote on resolution 1652 (XVI) which is mentioned in the second preambular paragraph.² We found part of that resolution premature and other provisions created possible difficulties because of their ambiguity.³

We understand the reference to "various other areas of the world" in the fourth preambular paragraph to refer to those areas where, as in the case of Africa, the establishment of a nuclear-free zone would not upset the military balance. As we have stated on other occasions, we believe that the goal mentioned in the fifth preambular paragraph can only be achieved with assurance and safety as the result of the implementation of a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

We welcome the revised text of operative paragraph 1 which removes the main difficulty we found in the draft originally proposed.

Operative paragraphs 2 and 3 would have the Assembly endorse the Declaration of the African Heads of State and Government⁴ and call upon all States to respect it. That Declaration is in fact a statement of intention. It states the readiness of the States concerned to undertake, through an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or control nuclear weapons. The United States is pleased to support that statement of intent as being fully consistent with our policy to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

As for operative paragraph 4, we have on other occasions made clear why the United States cannot, outside the framework of general and complete disarmament, subscribe to declarations or pledges concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons, I shall not take the time to reiterate our reasons. I stated them fully most recently in the Disarmament Commission on 17 May of this year.⁵ I should like to stress, however, that it is the concept of pledges of non-use which we find unsound, in general, and not its application to Africa. I am

³ See ibid., pp. 580–582.
⁵ Ante, pp. 174–175.
certain that our inability to support this concept on general grounds will in no way be misunderstood by the States concerned and that it will in no way hinder them in the development of a convention on the denuclearization of Africa.

Although there seems to be some ambiguity in the drafting, and apart from the reference to using nuclear weapons, on which I have already commented, we find that operative paragraphs 5 and 6 appear to be generally consistent with basic United States policy as expressed in the United States draft of a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. We wholeheartedly endorse operative paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 and wish the African States Godspeed in their further efforts to achieve the denuclearization of Africa.

With this explanation of our position, we shall be able to give our support to this draft resolution. Despite the problems raised by the provisions to which I have referred, we shall vote for this resolution. This vote will underscore our conviction that a soundly conceived and appropriately implemented nuclear-free zone in Africa would help to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. It would contribute to world peace and stability, and it would facilitate progress towards general and complete disarmament.

Revised Cypriot Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Question of General and Complete Disarmament, December 1, 1965

The General Assembly, having received the reports of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/5731 and A/5986),

1. Requests the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue its efforts towards making substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as on collateral measures con-

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1 A/C.1/L.348/Rev. 1, Dec. 1, 1965. In its original form, operative par. 1 used the phrase “other collateral matters” (A/C.1/L.348, Nov. 30, 1965), replaced in the Dec.1 version by “collateral measures.” The draft resolution was further revised on Dec. 2 by adding a preambular par. referring to past G.A. resolutions. After the addition of a third preambular par. and some drafting changes in the first two operative pars., the resolution was approved by the G.A. Dec. 3, 1965 (post, pp. 622–623).


3 Ante, pp. 427–430.
tained in the reports of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament;

2. Decides to refer to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament all documents and records of the First Committee during the discussions of all questions related to the disarmament question;

3. Requests the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume its work as early as possible and report to the General Assembly, as appropriate, on progress achieved.

Statement by the Maltese Representative (Pardo) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: International Arms Shipments, December 1, 1965

I am sure that I need not make a fully comprehensive statement on the draft resolution which my delegation has the honour to submit for consideration. The draft resolution, contained in document A/C.1/L.347, is so modest in scope and, I hope, so non-controversial in substance that I am sure only a few words are needed.

In view of the difficulties experienced in obtaining agreement on concrete measures of disarmament on the basis of the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations, the General Assembly, at its seventeenth session, in resolution 1767 (XVII), while calling upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament expeditiously to resume negotiations on general and complete disarmament under effective controls, recommended that urgent attention be given by that Committee to various collateral measures intended to decrease tension and to facilitate general and complete disarmament. Again, at its eighteenth session, the General Assembly, in resolution 1908 (XVIII), urged the Eighteen-Nation Committee to make efforts to seek agreement on measures which could serve to reduce international tension, lessen the possibility of war and facilitate agreement on general and complete disarmament.

In accordance with these resolutions, interesting proposals for collateral measures outside the nuclear field were submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1964 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Brazil and the United Kingdom, among others. However, in its report to the Disarmament Commission and

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1 A/C.1/PV.1392, pp. 17–22.
2 Ante, p. 586.
3 Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 439–442.
5 Ibid., 1963, pp. 624–625.
to the nineteenth session of the General Assembly, contained in document A/5731, the Eighteen-Nation Committee reported that it had not reached any specific agreement either on the question of general and complete disarmament or on any of the measures aimed at lessening international tension.¹

Again, in its last report, contained in document A/5986, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament reported that "in view of present international developments, a number of members concentrated their attention . . . on collateral measures".² However, the collateral measures discussed by the Committee do not appear to have been directly related to the non-nuclear aspect of general and complete disarmament, in view of the high priority attached to the questions of nuclear dissemination and proliferation, and to the achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

As far as we are aware, there was little discussion of collateral measures intended to reduce tensions and to facilitate general and complete disarmament. Yet, as was recognized in operative paragraph 2(a) of the resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 102nd meeting on 15 June 1965,³ in the present international situation consideration of any measure or proposal which might contribute to the relaxation of international tension and to the development of relations of mutual trust between States is one of the most urgent and necessary tasks of the United Nations; it is, indeed, a prerequisite if we are to make any progress at all on disarmament questions.

I do not pretend that the draft resolution submitted by my delegation can by itself bring about any radical change in the international atmosphere. It is, among other things, too limited in scope. It does, however, I believe, have the merit of drawing attention to a problem which up to now has received little attention in the United Nations, and which is scarcely less serious in its implications than that of nuclear proliferation and dissemination. I refer to the dissemination of non-nuclear weapons. As my delegation pointed out last spring, in the Disarmament Commission, we are faced not only with an arms race between the nuclear Powers but also by arms races among some non-nuclear Powers.⁴

These arms races which affect large areas of the under-developed world are always dangerous in that not only do they tend to render unstable local balances of power but also, often, may be a prelude to the direct involvement and even confrontation between major military Powers. In addition, the cost to the participants can be very high, some poor countries have among the highest per capita rates

¹ Ibid., 1964, pp. 435-440.
² Ante, pp. 427-430.
³ Ante, pp. 260-262.
⁴ See Disarmament Commission Official Records; 75th Meeting, pp. 13-16.
of military expenditure in the world. The sums devoted to military expenditure, much of which is often applied to the import of arms, by some non-nuclear Powers are sometimes not insignificant, even in absolute terms. Thus, in 1963, in the area of interest of my country, the Mediterranean, two countries to the east of us spent, between them, over $1,000 million on armaments. In a more distant area of the world, two other countries, both poor, spent between them an even larger sum on armaments in 1964.

In these and other cases, arms races on the present scale are only made possible by arms and/or subsidies received from abroad. Although, in our view, this situation is tragic in that scarce resources are diverted from much needed economic and social development, we do not question the right of any country to request arms for the protection of its security, or of any State to devote a substantial portion of its programme of aid to or trade with developing countries to making possible the satisfaction of such requests. There can be little doubt, however, that the secrecy surrounding many of these transactions exacerbates delicate situations, and can endanger the peace of the world. This, according to the Charter, is the concern of all Members of the United Nations.

I have spoken of secrecy. Actually, it is seldom that significant transfers of arms or military equipment from one country to another can take place in total secrecy. The major Powers are usually aware of arrivals of arms in areas in which they are interested, and normally they are quickly informed of the type and military potential of the arms or equipment involved. The interested neighbours of the importing country, however, may not be quite so well informed; they will probably be aware of the general category of arms and military equipment—whether fighter aircraft, tanks, anti-aircraft guns, or other—reaching their neighbour, but some time may elapse before they can obtain reliable information concerning the precise quantity, type and military worth of the arms imported. In the meantime, they may have over-reacted by ordering more sophisticated arms, or larger quantities of arms, than would have been needed to balance the imports of their neighbour. Thus the arms race may go further and accelerate faster than the countries concerned might wish. In these circumstances we feel that an effective system of publicity might make a modest contribution to relaxing local tensions and if not halting, at least moderating the arms race.

Equally important is the fact that the United Nations has no reliable information on the arms traffic.

In accordance with Article 99 of the Charter, the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which, in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. Surely, in certain circumstances, an excessive accumula-
tion of armaments in one or another region of the world is a matter which may threaten international peace and security. Surely, also, the transfer between States of arms, ammunition and implements of war, which in the past ten years has totalled perhaps $35,000 million, is a significant factor in many such situations. Yet, the Secretary-General has difficulty in bringing the matter to the attention of the Security Council since he has no reliable information. Thus, the United Nations must repeatedly take emergency action to cope with the outbreak of armed conflicts which could, perhaps, have been avoided had the threatening symptoms been brought to the attention of the Security Council in good time through the impartial channel of the Secretary-General.

Although the matter has not previously been discussed in the United Nations, there is nothing new in the idea of giving publicity to the transfer between States, whether by way of sale, trade or otherwise, of arms, ammunition and implements of war. The activity of the League of Nations in the disarmament field was largely based on the assumption that a full and frank exchange of military information was a prerequisite for any progress towards the limitation or reduction of armaments. Article 8 (6) of the Covenant of the League read as follows:

The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes.1

Article 8—and I take the liberty of quoting from the 1923 report of the Temporary Mixed Commission of the League—"was not drawn up with a view to facilitating the work of general staffs. Its object was to improve the political atmosphere by creating confidence".2 This is precisely the object of the draft resolution submitted by my delegation. It is not necessary to examine here in detail the techniques employed by the League to implement the provisions of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It is sufficient to mention that, starting in 1924, a Yearbook on the Trade in Arms, Ammunition and Implements of War was published by the League, and that this particular publication was considered so entirely non-controversial that, to the best of my knowledge, it never aroused any debate of principle. The Yearbook on the Trade in Arms, together with another League publication—the Armaments Yearbook—contributed to create and maintain for ten years an atmosphere of confidence in which it was possible to stabilize world armaments. This is an achievement which we hope one day the United Nations will match.

2 A. 35 (Part II) 1923. IX., p. 8.
There is a small, but interesting, point which it might be useful to mention in connexion with the League Yearbook on the Trade in Arms. The publication was, in the first instance, prepared at the request of the Temporary Mixed Commission, and was intended for preliminary work relating to the expected Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms. After signature of the 1925 Convention for the supervision of the International Trade in Arms, publication of the Yearbook was continued by the League, both as a useful means of supplementing and co-ordinating the system of publicity established by the Convention, and in view of the expected Disarmament Conference. It might be useful if an experimental edition of a Yearbook covering transfers between States of arms, ammunition and implements of war could be published in advance of the disarmament conference which we are planning for 1967.

It cannot be contested that the international traffic in armaments is a problem, that it is an urgent problem, and that it has, in the past, and may in the future, endanger the peace of the world. We ask that the problem be recognized. We have no illusion that publicity alone will solve this problem, but we hope that it may diminish some of the dangerous consequences of the trade as now practised by enabling the United Nations to become aware of and to discuss dangerous situations before armed conflicts break out.

There are many ways in which publicity could be effected. Although we have our preferences, we shall not voice them at this stage since we feel that the matter can best be examined, in the first place, by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. That is all that the modest—and I hope, non-controversial—draft resolution submitted by my delegation seeks to achieve.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Tsarapkin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 2, 1965

In beginning the discussion of the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament it is to be pointed out from the outset that, as far as we are concerned, we are being asked to carry out a rather intangible task: to draw up the results of practically two years of work of a special organ in which talks were conducted regarding the various aspects of the problems of disarmament. For, unfortunately, there are no results, and there is nothing to analyse, because

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1 A/C.1/PV.1393, pp. 2-27.
2 Ante, pp. 427-430.
during that time no agreements were reached in the Committee that could contribute to the solution of the problem of disarmament; and outside the Committee there was a constantly accelerating armaments race, an expansion of the number of States participating in that race, and an exacerbation of international tensions.

The United States and its allies in their military blocs are taking further steps to intensify and expand the armaments race. In the United States budget for next year it is planned to spend, directly and indirectly, approximately $60,000 million for military purposes. According to official data, the strategic nuclear forces of the United States have been tripled in the last four years. Special forces that have been given special training in order to carry out undeclared wars throughout the world have been increased by a factor of eight. The number of the army divisions that are in battle readiness has been increased by 45 per cent. The number of Marines has been increased by 15,000. The means of transporting troops by air have been doubled. The fire power of the tactical air forces has similarly been increased by a factor of two. During recent times the armed forces of the United States—to which I shall revert later—have been constantly increased. The level of recruitment in the armed forces of the United States has reached its highest point for the whole of the period since the Second World War. There is an increase in the numbers of American troops on foreign territories. New military bases are being constructed in foreign lands.

At the present time, the United States has deployed outside the borders of its own country over a million armed personnel—in other words more than one third of its total armed forces. The United States is going forward at top pace in improving its most recent equipment, including rockets; and new plans for the military utilization of outer space are being hatched.

The intensification of the armaments race by the United States cannot be separated from the sharp increase in the aggressive tendencies of the policies of the United States in recent times. We cannot separate the leading circles of the United States from the idea of making armed interventions, of repressing by force of arms the national liberation movements of the peoples in various parts of the world. Official United States personalities, in their statements, confirm that the increase in the rhythm of United States military preparations is directly connected with the expansion of the aggressive war which the United States is waging in Viet-Nam. For this purpose the United States has earmarked additional billions of dollars, has recruited additional reserve troops, and has increased the production of all types of equipment—aircraft, helicopters, aircraft carriers, tanks, and so on.

It has been stated that the number of military personnel in Viet-Nam will be increased in the next few months to 300,000, and possibly
by next summer to half a million. The new boom in the military preparations of the United States will be illustrated by the following facts. The United States now has prepared an immense programme for the modernization of its armed forces. This modernization has been prompted by the war that the United States is waging in Viet-Nam. Detailed plans have been prepared, for the next five-year period, to purchase new types of tanks, helicopters and aircraft, as well as munitions and other types of military equipment, for a sum of $16,000 million. The scale of these purchases will, on the average, be twice as great as the expenses for these purposes in the previous financial year.

It has become known that in connexion with the war in Viet-Nam, the question will be raised in Congress, in January, of earmarking further funds for the military budget for the current financial year in the sum of $7,000 million. It is known that for these purposes the Pentagon already received an additional $700 million last year, and in the current year a further $700 million will be assigned. There has been a sharp increase also in the United States in the contingents of the armed forces. In July of this year the United States adopted a decision to increase the numbers of the armed forces by 340,000 persons.

Each one will understand that this line of the United States is incompatible with the general orientation toward disarmament. It is clear to all now that the United States is not at all trying to achieve disarmament, and hence the absence of progress at disarmament talks and the great boom in the armaments race by the United States.

The most active participation in the arms race is also being taken by partners of the United States in military blocs and, in the first instance, by the Federal Republic of Germany. By the beginning of 1965, the West German Bundeswehr's formation had been completed: seven infantry divisions, three tank divisions and other divisions had been activated. The aerial forces of West Germany, which have at their disposal supersonic airplanes of the modern type, include five squadrons of heavy bombers, three squadrons of pursuit planes, three squadrons of light bombers, four squadrons of transport aircraft and three squadrons of reconnaissance planes. The naval forces of West Germany are likewise constantly on the increase. Two units of the German Army are already provided with middle-range rockets which can be equipped with nuclear warheads. Six divisions have been provided with Nike rockets, and nine divisions with Hawk rockets. The total military forces of the West German army stand at a figure of one-half million. The direct military expenses of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1965 stood at 21,000 million German marks.

A serious threat to peace in Europe and the whole world is represented by the plans to give the West German revanchists
access to nuclear weapons. The Soviet delegation has spoken on this question in detail in the course of the debate in our Committee on the item regarding non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, and we would wish to limit ourselves here merely to referring to the facts that the active participation of NATO in permitting the West German revanchists to gain access to nuclear weapons is acquiring an ever more ominous character. Recently, new facts have come to light which indicate that Bonn is continuing to insist upon its aspirations to be granted the right to do as it will with NATO's nuclear armaments.

We also cannot fail to see that this whole fuss regarding the granting of access to nuclear weapons to the West German revanchists is taking place against the background of the just completed discussion in the General Assembly of the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. This fact, in itself obviously points to a double game being played by the United States. It indicates the chasm that exists between the words of the United States representatives during negotiations on disarmament and the practical actions of the United States, which result in giving the West German militarists and revanchists access to nuclear weapons. These facts indicate that the negative position of the United States and of certain Western allies of the United States in NATO in regard to matters of disarmament flows from their aggressive foreign policies. All this has brought about the impasse in the talks in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, which, as was pointed out in its report to the General Assembly, has been unable to make any headway in regard to agreement upon a programme for general and complete disarmament or in regard to partial or collateral measures on disarmament and the limitation of the armaments race.

While recognizing in words the need to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament, the United States by its action is hampering the formulation of an effective programme for general and complete disarmament. The United States plans make no provision at all for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and, by means of various fabricated excuses, the United States is trying to avoid the liquidation of this type of weapon.

The essence of the proposals which the United States delegation has defended for more than two years in Geneva, and which it has tried to advocate at the present session of the General Assembly,\(^1\) boils down to a single purpose: to disarm in such a fashion as to maintain the bloated American war machine; to retain intact the existing structure of the armed forces of the Western Powers; to maintain the American bases and troops in foreign territories; to retain full freedom in the utilization of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery; and to retain the possibility for further increases in military expenses. In

\(^1\) See *ante*, pp. 111-140.
other words, the United States would wish so to disarm as to retain for itself throughout the whole process of disarmament the ability to unleash at any time and to wage nuclear and rocket war.

All this, in fact, has nothing in common with the task before us, which is to bring about a halt to the arms race and a relaxation of international tensions and to lead to general and complete disarmament. It is naive to believe, as some do, that the lack of progress in the field of disarmament may be explained by the fact that there are differences of viewpoint in regard to control over disarmament. Nothing could be further from the truth than such an explanation of the causes for the lack of progress in the talks on disarmament. The Soviet Union has stated on many occasions that it is ready to adopt any proposal of the Western Powers on control over disarmament measures, on condition that the Western Powers adopt the Soviet proposals regarding general and complete disarmament. Thus, the issue is not at all one of disagreement over controls, but over the fact that the Western Powers—and first and foremost, of course, the United States—are trying to evade the issue of disarmament. They are moving in precisely the opposite direction. They are intensifying the arms race, they are intensifying military preparations, they have embarked upon imperialist adventures and armed aggression.

If one were to follow the development of the economic indices of the United States for the past fifty years, one would see that the more or less prolonged periods of economic boom coincided with wars in which the United States has participated or which the United States itself has waged.

This was so in the case of the First World War, in the case of the Second World War, at the time of the United States war in Korea and now in the war of the United States against the Vietnamese people.

In Wall Street in New York, the world financial centre, people are happily rubbing their hands saying that the new grandiose programme for the modernization of the armed forces of the United States and the further escalation of the war in Viet-Nam promise to provide a further impetus to the United States economy and will make it possible to pump additional billions of dollars into the purses of the various corporations throughout the country—from Pennsylvania and Michigan to Texas and California.

But what sort of economic system is this in the United States if, in order to liquidate the economic recession, and in order to maintain the economic activity of the country at a high level, wars are required? What then is the economy of the United States? Can it not do without wars? If that is the case, then one could well quote from Shakespeare that "something is rotten in the State of Denmark" indeed. Incidentally, President Eisenhower, before the end of his term as President, warned the nation against the danger threatening the country from the ever-increasing influence on the economic and
political life of the country of the so-called military and industrial complex of the United States.\(^1\)

What is now taking place in the world—the military adventures of the United States in Viet-Nam and the other countries of South East Asia, the military intervention of the United States in the countries of Latin America and Africa, the intensification of the arms race, the dead-end in the negotiations on disarmament—is the direct consequence of the imperialist course of the foreign policy of the United States, a policy that is based on positions of strength. The advocates of this imperialist policy of positions of strength are the forces that President Eisenhower warned against toward the end of 1960, whose policy would bring about dangerous consequences.

The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, in his statement to the present session of the General Assembly, definitely pointed out the reason why the disarmament talks have been paralysed. He stated:

Special agencies and even ministries for disarmament may be established, but so long as there is no real desire to demobilize even a single soldier, let alone part with armies, talks on disarmament will not move forward. It is precisely the existence of opposing political goals, not the technical difficulty of implementing disarmament, that is paralysing the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.\(^2\)

To sum up, it can be said that the United States would wish to disarm in such a way that it would be able to maintain throughout the whole of the disarmament process the ability to unleash and wage a nuclear and rocket war at any time. All this, as has been pointed out, has nothing in common with the tasks before us which consist of putting an end to the arms race and of relaxing international tension—which are the tasks of general and complete disarmament.

The aggressive foreign policy of the United States and the negative position flowing therefrom that it follows—and this applies to the other Western Powers—in the disarmament talks were responsible for the fact that the favourable possibilities for the attainment of success in the disarmament talks which were created as a result of the Moscow Agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests\(^3\) were not utilized.

The approach of the Soviet Union to the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament is a different one. The Soviet Union bases itself on the position of principle that the first and foremost purpose of disarmament should be agreement regarding such measures as would—from the very beginning of the disarmament process and even as early as its first stage—if not fully eliminate the possibility of unleashing a nuclear war, at least radically limit that possibility. With this purpose in mind, as is known, the Soviet Union submitted the proposal on the liquidation of all types of weapons of

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\(^{1}\) *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961*, p. 5.

\(^{2}\) Ante, pp. 437—441.

\(^{3}\) *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291—293.
nuclear delivery, except those which the Soviet Union and the United States would retain until the end of the third stage of disarmament—a strictly limited and agreed quantity.\(^1\) An agreement could be reached on the number of intercontinental and anti-missile and anti-air-type rockets with nuclear warheads. This Soviet proposal, which for the sake of brevity has been called the "nuclear-rocket umbrella", was submitted as a step to meet the position of the Western Powers which had expressed fears in regard to the security of States in the course of disarmament if, as early as the first stage as was proposed by the Soviet Union all means of delivery of nuclear weapons were to be destroyed.\(^2\) The Soviet Union, while not sharing these fears and considering them to be groundless nevertheless displayed its readiness to take into account these fears which the opposite side had stated, precisely for the purpose of facilitating the attainment of an agreement. It was for that reason that we made a proposal regarding the "nuclear-rocket umbrella" although we believe that a better guarantee of safety and security would be not the maintenance of nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them—even in limited numbers—but total disarmament and the total liquidation of all nuclear weapons and all means for their delivery.

In agreeing to retain the "rocket nuclear umbrella" or, as some people call it, a minimum restraining force, the Soviet Union proceeded from the premise that the possibility of utilizing nuclear weapons must be so limited as to ensure that these weapons would not constitute a threat to any State in the future, so that it might, to some extent, serve only as a means of restraint. This means of containment and this point of view of the Soviet Union was supported by the non-aligned countries which participated in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Thus far, however, the United States has not given any answer as to whether it agrees in principle with our compromise proposal, regarding the "nuclear-rocket umbrella" as a basis for the solution of the problem of the liquidation of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, and thereby the elimination of the threat of a nuclear and rocket war. The position of the United States cannot be explained by reason of the fact that it does not understand the essence of the approach to the problem of nuclear disarmament. We have explained our position in considerable detail on many occasions. The reason for the negative approach of the United States is that, in basing itself upon its aggressive imperialist policies, it has in fact \(^3\) the goal of reaching an agreement on

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\(^1\) See *ibid.*, pp. 515–516.

\(^2\) For the original Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, see *ibid.*, 1962, vol. I, pp. 103–127. The revised Soviet draft treaty appears *ante*, pp. 77–102.

\(^3\) The provisional English translation reads "with". Corrected on basis of provisional Russian text.
general and complete disarmament, but the goal of the armaments race and the exacerbation of international tensions. The United States must necessarily change its attitude and policies regarding disarmament. The Soviet Union, for its part, continues to consider it essential to co-operate actively in overcoming the deadlock at the talks on general and complete disarmament. General and complete disarmament would provide the basis for guaranteeing lasting peace.

Basing its position on those considerations, the Soviet Union is prepared to accept any realistic approach to the method and order of further discussion of the programme of general and complete disarmament. If some States feel that for the time being the discussion of the first stage of disarmament should be postponed—which discussion has turned out to be fruitless in view of the position of the Western Powers—we are prepared, in proceeding to a detailed elaboration of a programme of general and complete disarmament, not to start with the first stage, in regard to which there is a greater degree of disagreement, but to start with the third stage, in regard to which there has appeared some similarity of basic positions, as was suggested by the delegation of Sweden in the Eighteen-Nation Committee.\(^1\)

The Soviet Union has stated on many occasions that, for the purpose of attaining general and complete disarmament, the elimination of the burden of the arms race and the elimination of threats of war, it is prepared to consider any constructive ideas and proposals. With the idea of achieving general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union is in favour of the implementation of partial measures that might restrict the arms race and relax international tension, thereby paving the way for more radical measures. The proposals of the Soviet Union in this regard are stated in the memorandum presented for the consideration of the nineteenth session of the General Assembly on 7 December 1964.\(^2\) They are formulated in the light of the comments of various States which have made their views known in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and outside that Committee.

Some of the proposals contained in the Soviet memorandum have already been discussed in our Committee. We are thinking of the questions of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and the cessation of underground nuclear tests. The field of nuclear disarmament should also include the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, which question was referred to the Eighteen-Nation Committee for consideration at the request of the delegation of Ethiopia.\(^3\) The Soviet Union takes a firm stand in favour of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has systematically declared itself to be in favour of the implementation of this measure since the very first days of the appearance of nuclear weapons. We consider

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1 See Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 302.
2 Ibid., pp. 509-517.
3 See ante, pp. 586-587.
such action to be the first step towards the total elimination and destruction of all nuclear arsenals. In the desire to achieve a practical solution to the problem, the Soviet Union supports likewise the proposals of other States, including those of Ethiopia and the Chinese People's Republic.\(^1\) The Soviet Union considers that in order to achieve the objective of eliminating the threat of nuclear war through the elimination of all nuclear weapons what is necessary is to invite all Powers, including the nuclear Powers, to take such action. In order to achieve such an agreement, the Soviet Union is prepared to assume the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, if such an obligation is assumed by the other Powers. That is the position of the Soviet Union in regard to the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and the Soviet Union will defend that position in the course of further discussions on disarmament.

One of the most important issues in contemporary international life is the question of the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed in alien territories. The presence of foreign troops in the territories of other countries and the preservation of military bases are among the principal sources of the increased threat to world peace. Facts show that the aggressive actions committed by the United States in Viet-Nam, especially recently, and in other parts of the world are directly connected with the use of United States armed forces and military bases in foreign territories, especially in South Viet-Nam, Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea, the island of Okinawa and elsewhere. It is well known that one of the causes of tension in the Caribbean is the presence in Cuba, in spite of the will of Cuba and in spite of its firm objections and protests, of the United States military base at Guantanamo. Foreign military bases in countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America, Europe and other parts of the world are the product of that imperialist policy. Those bases constitute bastions of neo-colonialism. They constitute a threat to the security and freedom of the people in those parts of the world. It is no accident that in various parts of the world the peoples and States are waging a struggle against military bases. In this connexion we should refer to the opinion expressed by such an important international forum as the Cairo Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, which in its declaration proclaimed in particular:

foreign military bases are in practice a means of bringing pressure on nations and retarding their emancipation and development, based on their own ideological, political, economic and cultural ideas.\(^2\)

At the present session of the General Assembly the representatives of many countries have spoken out against foreign military bases and

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\(^1\) See *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, p. 455.

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 446.
the stationing of troops in the territories of foreign countries. As is well known, the most numerous military bases are those of the United States, whose close network of bases extends many thousands of miles from the national territory of the United States and covers the whole of the globe. The United States system of military bases includes large bases with facilities for launching rockets with nuclear warheads, bases of the strategic air force, naval bases, conventional and atomic submarines equipped with Polaris missiles, and a large network of storage bases with military equipment, armaments and facilities and numerous hangars and launching sites. As stated in data published in the Press of the United States, the United States has on foreign territories more than 2,000 military bases and other facilities, of which approximately 150 are large-scale bases. For the period 1953 to 1963 the United States had spent, only for purposes connected with the establishment or use of these bases, $99,000 million. Now a process of modernization of United States military bases on foreign territories is going on. They are being supplied with rocket and nuclear weapons and they are being increased in number. The House of Representatives of the United States on 6 August 1965 confirmed the earmarking of the amount of $58 million for United States bases in the Far East.\(^1\) That is one of the most recent illustrations of the activities of the United States mentioned in the Press. The United States has also disclosed an intensified construction of atomic submarines equipped with Polaris missiles, which in fact are floating military bases.

The programme for building missile-bearing atomic submarines should reach the figure of 41 units for 1967. There are two bases for servicing Polaris submarines—one at Holy Loch in Scotland and the other at Rota in Spain. A similar base is being constructed on the island of Guam. The Pentagon is trying to increase the sphere of its bases to spread over the Indian Ocean. Recently it was said that a new missile base belonging to the United States and the United Kingdom was being built on the British colonial possession, the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. And this has given rise to a resolute protest on the part of India.

The Soviet Union supports the demands of the peoples of the colonies for the immediate liquidation of foreign military bases deployed in their territories, especially at the British base in Aden, which is being used by the colonial Power for strengthening its dominion and repressing the national liberation movement there.

A serious threat to international peace and security is constituted by the presence in Western Europe of military bases and armed forces which are saturated with nuclear weapons. We pointed out in our earlier statement that Western Europe contains 5,000 nuclear war-

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\(^1\) H. Rept. 738, 89th Cong., 1st sess.
heads of American production, and this figure is to be increased to 6,000.\(^1\) We cannot fail to stress the anomaly of such a situation: twenty years after the end of the Second World War, there are still foreign troops on the territory of European States; there are nuclear weapons on those territories, which have been converted into veritable powder kegs.

A serious threat to world peace is also caused by the presence of American troops in Japan and South Korea, two decades after the end of Second World War in the Far East and ten years after the end of the United States war in Korea.

The Soviet Union is in favour of the speediest possible liquidation of all foreign military bases on foreign territories, including bases for Polaris missile submarines, and the withdrawal of all troops back to national boundaries. The General Assembly, in assuming the task of guaranteeing the safety and security of people, has every right to demand that States which maintain missile bases on foreign territories should liquidate them without delay and should withdraw their troops to their own territories.

Another important measure is the decrease in military budgets of the various States. The Soviet Union, for many years, has been presenting proposals to decrease such budgets. Displaying its own initiative in the solution of this problem, the Soviet Union has on many occasions decreased its own military budget. In 1964, the level of military expenditures in our country was decreased unilaterally by 600 million roubles. In 1965 the Soviet Union effected a further unilateral decrease in defence expenditures of 500 million roubles.

The Soviet Government considers that, in the present international context and in the light of a further intensification of the arms race, it would be desirable and useful to agree upon a decrease in the military budgets of States. The implementation of such a measure would permit a substantial curtailment in the armaments race, would lower the tempo of the accumulation of lethal weapons and substantially improve the international situation. It should be pointed out that a decrease in military budgets would be a manifestation of the willingness of States to embark upon a course leading to the achievement of methods of disarmament. Such a willingness was indicated a few years ago when the United States was about to begin to decrease its military budget, but it has since departed from that course and has again proceeded to increase its military budget and to speed up the arms race. If other means of ensuring, a decrease in military budgets in the nearest possible future are available, we should take advantage of them. It should be mentioned here that the implementation of a measure to decrease military expenditures, as compared with other measures of slowing down the arms race is a

\(^1\) See ante, p. 593.
less complex matter, since the attainment of an agreement on this question does not require any involved agreement or a harmonizing of the various technical and military problems; nor does it require the revealing of domestic defence structures by either side at a time when disarmament has not yet been achieved. Agreement on this point would not upset the existing balance of forces and would not give either party any military advance; nor would it jeopardize the security interests of either side.

Agreement on such a measure would promise the early achievement of tangible benefits which might be derived by each State from the transfer of at least a part of its military expenditures for peaceful development. A decrease in the military expenditures would benefit all States. The only losers would be those who are called the death-mongers, those who derive profits from the sale of lethal weapons. And their loss of profit would be welcome indeed.

We should also note that in previous discussions at sessions of the General Assembly and in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, it was felt that proposals regarding the decrease in military budgets were met with considerable interest and appreciation. At that time, representatives of socialist and non-aligned countries spoke in favour of such proposals. Surely, such a favourable attitude would indicate that we have sufficient grounds for achieving a successful solution of the question of the decrease in military expenditures.

The Soviet Government proposes to the large military Powers that they now agree to decrease their military projects by 10 per cent to 15 per cent, or by any other agreed figure. The Soviet Government, which is steadfastly assisting the developing countries, which have important tasks to perform in strengthening and developing their national economies, expresses its readiness; on the achievement of a mutual agreement on a decrease of military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent, to ensure that a certain part of the funds thus saved should be orientated towards the developing countries as assistance.

In conclusion, the Soviet delegation deems it essential to stress that the problem of disarmament is one of the basic and radical problems of modern times which affect the vital interests of all countries. The armaments race would lead to a waste of the colossal material wealth of the countries at a time when millions of people suffer from famine, poverty and disease, which must lead to the logical conclusion, namely, war. Any procrastination with regard to the solution of this problem would further increase the great threat of war which looms over mankind. The implementation of practical measures on disarmament would make it possible to release huge funds for the acceleration of the economic development of all countries, for further development in science and technology for the benefit of mankind by the creation of huge additional possibilities for over-
coming economic difficulties and for raising the living standards of people, both in the developed and in the developing countries.

I should like to repeat that the Soviet Union, on the attainment of an agreement which would limit in practice the armaments race, is prepared to ensure that a certain part of the funds saved thereby could be directed towards providing assistance to developing countries. The total expenditure by all countries in the world has, according to the calculations of economists, risen to approximately $120,000 million a year. One does not require considerable imagination to visualize what great benefits from the point of view of economic development could be derived if States agreed at least on a 10 per cent decrease in their military budgets and used the $12,000 million thereby saved for peaceful purposes. Experts have calculated that this would be enough to ensure that during twenty years it might be possible to eliminate poverty, disease and famine, as well as illiteracy, in the under-developed countries in the world by building forty-eight such giant metallurgical plants as that which now exists in India, or eight such giant power plants as the Aswan Dam in the United Arab Republic. This sum would be sufficient to create fifteen or twenty industrial energy and power centres, for instance, in the basins of the African rivers of the Niger, the Congo and the Zambesi, in the basins of the great rivers of Asia such as the Mekong or of India such as the Ganges, or in the Andes and on the great rivers of Latin America.

In recent times, military expenditures have increased even further. Recently, the well-known Swedish economist, Gunnar Myrdal, expressed the view that the military expenditure of all the countries of the world had now reached approximately $2,000 million a year.¹ That is why the struggle for general and complete disarmament must be one of the principal features of the foreign policies of States. Ideas on and plans for disarmament should not be merely the subject for constant speeches, but should be ideas and plans which are put into practice. We must join the efforts of all who are truly in favour of disarmament and, united, we should wage war against those who oppose disarmament.

We pay tribute to the non-aligned countries, including those which have participated in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, for their valuable opinions which have assisted us in making headway in the disarmament talks. In this connexion, we must express our gratification at the unanimous support which was given at the present session of the General Assembly to the idea of the convening of a world disarmament conference, which unquestionably would assist in the search for future ways and means to solve the problems of general and complete disarmament. We expect that

the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee will similarly draw the necessary conclusions from the discussions which have taken place at this session of the General Assembly.

For its part, the Soviet Union is firmly resolved to strive by all means towards general and complete disarmament and, pending a solution of this important problem, to strive towards the adoption of measures to limit the armaments race and to reduce international tension.

Statement by ACDA Director Foster to the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 2, 1965

Before I deal with the matters properly before this Committee, I should like to comment briefly on the statement made this morning by the representative of the Soviet Union. Even though I must say we regret it, we have come to expect that the Soviet representative will inject a note of sharp discord at the end of our disarmament sessions. He has done this previously at Geneva and he did so again this morning. Once again he has used a discussion of general and complete disarmament as an excuse to launch into polemics against my country. I see no need to take the time of this Committee to reply in detail to his distorted and tendentious statements, but however useful such statements may be for his Government's propaganda mills, they serve no useful purpose here. Nothing he has said regarding the situation in Viet-Nam, for example, can alter the facts as they are known by those having access to them. The facts, as they are generally known, are that the United States has responded to aggression in Viet-Nam which is supported and directed from the North. Our response has been in direct proportion to that aggression. It will cease when peace is restored there by peaceful, unconditional, negotiations. We strongly desire such negotiations. I only wish the representative of the Soviet Union had expressed a similar desire.

The representative of the Soviet Union also treated us to the latest version of the Soviet Union catalogue of United States and western armaments. Without taking the time now to correct some of his figures, which, as usual, were based on the wildest speculation his newspapers clippers could provide, let me remind the Committee that—in the absence of agreement on arms reductions programmes—both sides are maintaining and improving their military posture. On

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1 A/C.1/PV.1394, pp. 12–22.
2 Supra.
the Soviet Union side the figures are shrouded in complete secrecy, but the military displays and boastful statements that accompany the Soviet Union's anniversary parade on 7 November usually provide some slight clue as to the continuing Soviet Union military buildup.

In the case of the United States, accurate figures are readily available, for those who take the trouble to look them up, and they occur in our annual military budget which is published in voluminous detail and which is subject to extensive public and congressional hearings and debate. On the Soviet Union side, all is secrecy. Last year, for example, the published military budget of the Soviet Union comprised just sixteen words and one lump sum.

And this, of course, is the reason why Soviet Union calls for reductions in military budgets by stated percentages mean so little. Who knows what sums for military research, production, and deployment are spread over other parts of the Soviet Union budget? Our attempts to interest the Soviet Union in a purely technical comparison of the budgetary procedures of our two countries have been summarily rejected.

The United States is second to none in wanting to reduce military expenditures, and in using a part of the savings for the development of other countries, but as long as the need exists to meet aggression, we shall meet it. We shall also continue in the meantime to provide economic assistance on a very large scale to other countries, as we have done for so many years.

I was both surprised and disturbed that the Soviet Union representative was compelled this morning to fall back on the kind of unreal description of the United States economy which we used to hear quite often from the USSR representatives in the unlamented past. If I understood him correctly, he was saying that the United States needs war and conflict in order to maintain prosperity. Such a claim is absurd, and I should like to recommend that he read the July 1965 report of the Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament,1 established in 1963 by the President of the United States,2 a copy of which I gave him last summer in Geneva. The report is for sale by the United States Government Printing Office, but I shall be glad to give him another copy gratis. The report concludes that the shift in our economy away from defence spending presents no major problem for our economy and that, if a reduction in international tension should permit a curtailment of the amount spent for defence, we would, as a society, be far better off.

I might recall that some observers during World War II doubted the ability of the United States economy to adjust to post-war demobilization without experiencing serious problems, and many

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1 See ante, pp. 290–293.
feared a return to the depressed conditions of the 1930's. Yet demobilization was extremely rapid, and no unemployment problem developed. Between 1945 and 1946, our national defence purchases of goods and services were reduced by 75 per cent. This reduction was equivalent to more than 25 per cent of our gross national product in 1945, or nearly three times the present percentage of our gross national product represented by defence expenditures.

Nevertheless, despite the size and pace of our post-World War II demobilization, the average unemployment rate in the immediate post-war years remained below 4 per cent of the labour force, and business investment more than doubled.

Yet the Soviet Union representative has the audacity to say that the United States fears the economic effect of disarmament. Rather than persisting in outworn ideological views about the American economy, the Soviet Government would do better to publish an honest analysis of what effect disarmament would have on the highly militarized economy of the Soviet Union.

The attempt made by the Soviet Union representative to place the blame on the United States for lack of progress in arms reductions cannot mislead anyone who has followed the course of the discussions in Geneva. All of our proposals for concrete, realistic steps to halt the build-up and to begin the process of reduction have been turned down by the Soviet Union. For its part, the Soviet Union continues to advance politically motivated proposals designed, as in the case of foreign bases, to alter the military balance to its advantage.

What are we to think of a Government which proclaims its readiness to undertake sweeping declarations and drastic disarmament and, at the same time, refuses even to discuss meaningfully the detailed proposals we have made to freeze the production of strategic nuclear vehicles, to consider reductions in such vehicles, to halt the production of fissionable materials for weapons and, by destroying thousands of nuclear weapons, to transfer substantial quantities of such material to safeguarded, peaceful uses? 1

It should be clear to all who heard the Soviet Union representative's polemic this morning why it has not been possible to achieve greater progress at Geneva. Nevertheless, we shall persist in our efforts to achieve progress there and elsewhere, for surely, sooner or later, the voice of reason will be heard in the Soviet Union. When that happens, the United States will be ready to go at least half way to meet the Soviet Union. Let us only hope that the process of genuine negotiation will not be delayed further for the sake of Soviet propaganda.

I shall now address my remarks to the subject before us. As we near the end of our disarmament debate with the consideration of the

1 See ante, pp. 102-111.
question of general and complete disarmament, I am reminded of the truth of T. S. Eliot's great line: "Human kind cannot bear very much reality". Perhaps that is why we seem inclined to act as if we could ignore the fact that the world now possesses the power to destroy itself. Yet we must bear the reality, and we must find our way to disarmament.

The draft resolution which we shall shortly adopt cannot, of itself, bring us much closer to our desired goal of general and complete disarmament. But it will stand as evidence that the Governments here represented understand the gravity and the danger of our situation. It will express our determination to work for general and complete disarmament, as part of our common, long-term effort to achieve a better and a safer world through the application of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and through the steady development of international law and effective peace-keeping arrangements.

The outline for a treaty on general and complete disarmament which the United States has submitted and discussed in Geneva would, in our view, provide a sound framework for this common effort—a framework within which the goal of general disarmament could be achieved without threat to the security of any nation.

We are far from reaching that goal, but there are no shortcuts to it. We must, as I said, bear the reality of the situation. If we are to achieve general and complete disarmament, we must first halt the present arms race, and particularly the nuclear race, and turn it back. We must begin with those areas of arms limitation and reduction where agreement seems possible, and we must begin now. We must avoid the lure of easy slogans and deceptive generalities and face the fact that agreements in this area involve complex matters of military balance, of scientific technology, and of appropriate verification. We must realize that such agreements provide the only dependable steps toward general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

At the last session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, priority was rightly given to consideration of a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to the need to conclude a treaty banning all tests of nuclear weapons. In so doing, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament heeded the recommendation of the Disarmament Commission as expressed in its resolution DC/225, which was adopted by a vote of 83 to 1, with 18 abstentions.

At this session of the General Assembly we have in effect already reiterated the priorities recommended by the Disarmament Commission. The United States agrees with these recommendations and

1 *Ante*, pp. 111-140.
therefore expects that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will continue at its next session to give urgent attention to those collateral measures.

But we also strongly agree that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should continue its work toward general and complete disarmament under effective international control and in accordance with the joint statement of agreed principles.

We believe that the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Cyprus adequately expresses what I am sure is the view of this Committee on the need to continue negotiations towards general disarmament. However, we agree with the suggestions made by the representatives of Italy and Peru yesterday that the resolution should be completed by adding at least a preambular reference to past resolutions concerning general and complete disarmament. We think it is important to add this element of continuity to the draft resolution. We hope that the representative of Cyprus will so modify his proposal. We are certain that such an addition would be generally welcome, since the resolutions cited yesterday and today by the representatives of Italy and Peru were all adopted without a dissenting vote. With such an addition, we should be pleased to vote for this draft resolution.

Since the Committee is pressed for time, I should like to take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, to comment briefly on the proposal submitted by the representative of Malta. This is, essentially, a proposal for a study of a reporting procedure which would turn the spotlight of publicity on sales and other transfers of arms. Underlying the proposal is the assumption that such publicity would discourage arms sales or transfers or, at least, provide timely warning of dangerous build-ups. Yet that is precisely where the difficulty lies. Experience suggests that a frontal—and I might say, a mechanical—approach to eliminating secrecy from arms transfers is no more likely to succeed now than it did in the past. Nevertheless we are grateful to the representative of Malta because he has, in fact, already succeeded in turning attention to one aspect of arms control and reduction which tends to be ignored these days. In stressing the urgency of the need to halt and turn back the nuclear arms race, we too often forget that lives lost in recent and current conflicts have been the result of the use of conventional arms.

As I pointed out in the Disarmament Commission earlier this year, we cannot ignore the threat of regional races in conventional arms among the smaller Powers. We are all aware of special situations and of serious threats confronting various countries, but the

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1 *Ante*, pp. 599-600.

2 This par. was added to the Cypriot resolution, *infra.*

3 *Ante*, p. 586.
fact remains that arms races involving increasingly sophisticated conventional armaments already pose a threat in several areas. In today's world such regional races pose a grave threat to world peace. Moreover, funds expended on armaments are all too often diverted from urgently needed programmes of economic development. We believe that local, and particularly regional, initiatives for arms control and reduction might well enhance the security of the nations concerned, while releasing funds for the constructive work of economic and social development. The United States would greatly welcome such initiatives, which might well include some variant of the proposal made by the representative of Malta.

For these reasons, we feel that while it would not be advisable to take formal action to recommend to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament this proposal by the representative of Malta, it should stand in the record of our discussions as a reminder to the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and, indeed, to all of us, of the need to focus greater attention on conventional arms limitations. We should therefore welcome mention of the proposal by the representative of Malta in the Rapporteur's report. We hope that all nations will give consideration to ways and means to curb conventional arms races.

General Assembly Resolution 2031 (XX): Question of General and Complete Disarmament, December 3, 1965

The General Assembly,

Having received the reports of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

Recalling its resolutions 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959, 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1767 (XVII) of 21 November 1962 and 1908 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963,

Conscious of its responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for disarmament and the consolidation of peace,

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1 A/RES/2031(XX), Dec. 6, 1965. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 102 to 0, with 6 abstentions (Albania, Algeria, France, Guinea, Mali, United Republic of Tanzania).
2 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 435-440; ante, pp. 427-430.
6 Ibid., 1963, pp. 624-625.
1. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue its efforts towards making substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as on collateral measures;
2. Decides to refer to the Eighteen-Nation Committee all documents and records of the First Committee concerning all matters related to the disarmament question;
3. Requests the Eighteen-Nation Committee to resume its work as early as possible and to report to the General Assembly, as appropriate, on the progress achieved.

General Assembly Resolution 2032 (XX): Urgent Need for Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests, December 3, 1965

The General Assembly,
Having considered the question of the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapon tests and the relevant sections of the reports of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament;
Recalling its resolution 1762 (XVII) of 6 November 1962 and 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963 on the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons;
Noting with regret that notwithstanding these resolutions nuclear weapon tests have taken place,
Recalling the undertaking given by the original signatories to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963, to continue negotiations for the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time;
Recognizing the mounting concern of world opinion for the fulfilment of this undertaking,

1 A/RES/2032(XX), Dec. 7, 1965. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 92–1, with 14 abstentions. Albania voted against the resolution, and the following countries abstained: Algeria, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Guinea, Hungary, Mauritania, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.
5 Ibid., pp. 291–293.
Mindful of the crucial importance of a comprehensive test ban to the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Noting with satisfaction the joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic and annexed to the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

Convinced that agreement in regard to taking this further step towards nuclear disarmament would be facilitated, inter alia, by the important improvements made in detection and identification techniques,

1. Urges that all nuclear weapon tests be suspended;
2. Calls upon all countries to respect the spirit and provisions of the Treaty on banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water;
3. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue with a sense of urgency its work on a comprehensive test ban treaty and on arrangements to ban effectively all nuclear weapon tests in all environments, taking into account the improved possibilities for international co-operation in the field of seismic detection, and to report to the General Assembly.

General Assembly Resolution 2033 (XX): Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, December 3, 1965

The General Assembly,
Believing in the vital necessity of saving contemporary and future generations from the scourge of a nuclear war,
Recalling its resolution 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, which called upon all Member States to refrain from testing, storing or transporting nuclear weapons in Africa and to consider and respect the continent as a denuclearized zone,
Recalling its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965 on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

1 Ante, pp. 425–426.
2 A/RES/2033(XX), Dec. 7, 1965. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 105 to 0, with 2 abstentions (France and Portugal).
4 Ante, pp. 532–534.
Observing that proposals for the establishment of denuclearized zones in various other areas of the world have also met with general approval,

Convinced that the denuclearization of various areas of the world would help to achieve the desired goal of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, at its first regular session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964, issued a solemn declaration on the denuclearization of Africa in which the Heads of State and Government announced their readiness to undertake, in an international treaty to be concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, not to manufacture or acquire control of nuclear weapons,1

Noting that this declaration on the denuclearization of Africa was endorsed by the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in the Declaration issued on 10 October 1964,2 at the close of their Second Conference, held at Cairo,

Recognizing that the denuclearization of Africa would be a practical step towards the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons in the world and towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and of the objectives of the United Nations,

1. Reaffirms its call upon all States to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-free zone;
2. Endorses the declaration on the denuclearization of Africa issued by the Heads of State and Government of African countries;
3. Calls upon all States to respect and abide by the aforementioned declaration;
4. Calls upon all States to refrain from the use, or the threat of use, of nuclear weapons on the African continent;
5. Calls upon all States to refrain from testing, manufacturing, using or deploying nuclear weapons on the continent of Africa, and from acquiring such weapons or taking any action which would compel African States to take similar action;
6. Urges those States possessing nuclear weapons and capability not to transfer nuclear weapons, scientific data or technological assistance to the national control of any State, either directly or indirectly, in any form which may be used to assist such States in the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons in Africa;
7. Expresses the hope that the African States will initiate studies, as they deem appropriate, with a view to implementing the denuclearization of Africa, and take the necessary measures through the Organization of African Unity to achieve this end;

2 Ibid., p. 445.
8. **Urges** the African States to keep the United Nations informed of any further developments in this regard;

9. **Requests** the Secretary-General to extend to the Organization of African Unity such facilities and assistance as may be requested in order to achieve the aims of the present resolution.

**Letter From ACDA Director Foster to Chairman Garcia Robles: U.S. Attitude Toward Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone, December 10, 1965**

**Dear Mr. Chairman:**

In response to the Negotiating Committee’s request to me on October 26, the following points reflect the attitude of the United States towards the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Latin America.

The United States supports the creation of nuclear free zones such as a Latin American nuclear free zone, where the initiative for such zones originates within the area concerned; where the zone includes all states in the area whose participation is deemed important; where the creation of a zone would not disturb necessary security arrangements; and where provisions are included for following up on alleged violations in order to give reasonable assurance of compliance with the zone. An effective agreement based on these principles, which were presented by US representatives at the Eighteenth Session of the General Assembly and reaffirmed by the United States at the United Nations Disarmament Commission earlier this year, would complement efforts to achieve the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

As recently as November 22, 1965, Secretary of State Rusk stated before the Second Special Inter-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro the following:

The United States has followed with keen and sympathetic interest the efforts of Latin American countries to work out agreed arrangements for excluding the proliferation, the stationing, or storage of nuclear weapons within the territory of Latin American States. We have noted the encouraging progress toward this end which was made during the current year at discussions in Mexico City. The United States believes the project of a nuclear free zone in Latin America is constructive statesmanship in the best tradition of the Hemisphere. We welcome the effort and would be glad to see it reach a successful conclusion.

We are aware that the governments of Latin America are now considering certain aspects of the proposed zone in preparation for

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1 ACDA files.
2 See *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 553–554, 582–583.
additional meetings of the Preparatory Commission and its committees. Our final position, of course, will have to await decisions on the nature and scope of the zone.

We do not wish to have included in the proposed nuclear free zone the Virgin Islands, since it is United States territory, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, because of its integral relationship with the United States. In the case of both of these areas, the United States must deal with disarmament policies affecting other nuclear powers. From the US point of view, we would be agreeable to inclusion of the Panama Canal Zone, although of course the well-established transit rights would not be affected by the establishment of the proposed nuclear free zone. We could also agree to include Guantanamo if Cuba participates.

The United States believes it important that all states in the area should participate. The refusal of certain states to participate would lead us to consider whether their exclusion might render the agreement ineffective or meaningless, or whether the agreement would still be worthwhile.

The United States heartily approves the proposal of the Preparatory Commission to apply IAEA safeguards to all Latin American nuclear activities, which would permit verification against the diversion of peaceful activities to weapons development. For verification against the introduction of nuclear weapons, we believe that other procedures would have to be considered. The United States understands that such other procedures are under consideration by Governments participating in the Preparatory Commission.

In the hope that the governments of Latin America can successfully achieve a viable and workable nuclear free zone, the United States welcomes opportunities to exchange views with the representatives of the Preparatory Commission and the governments of Latin America.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM C. FOSTER

North Atlantic Council Communiqué,
December 17, 1965


2. In a comprehensive survey of international affairs, the Ministers reviewed the whole field of East-West relations.

3. In pursuit of their common objective of ensuring peace and security, the members of NATO have promoted and extended their contacts and exchanges with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. They will continue to seek an improvement in their relations with these countries. The Ministers noted with satisfaction that these efforts had met with some degree of response, mainly in the sphere of bilateral relations.

4. Although no major crises had arisen in Europe, the Soviet Union continues to oppose a settlement of the cardinal issues between East and West. Such a settlement, which must safeguard the legitimate interests of all concerned, remains one of the essential objectives of the Alliance. At the same time, the Ministers also noted that the Soviet Union continues to devote an increasing share of its economic and technical resources to military purposes.

5. In this situation the Ministers emphasized their determination to maintain the unity of the Alliance and to ensure its collective defense.

6. The Council noted with regret that no progress had been made towards overcoming the division of Germany. The accusations leveled against the Federal Republic of Germany do not make a solution any easier. Rejecting these accusations, the Council reaffirmed that a just and peaceful solution to the problem of Germany can be reached only on the basis of the right of self-determination. They also reaffirmed that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs. With regard to Berlin, the Alliance stands by the terms of its Declaration of 16th December, 1958.\(^1\)

7. Turning to problems outside the Atlantic area, the Ministers noted that tension had diminished in some parts of the world. But in Southeast Asia conflicts continued. With regard to Viet-Nam, the United States Secretary of State reaffirmed that the United States, while determined to fulfill its commitments, remained ready to enter without preconditions into negotiations to end the war. He recapitulated the views of his government as to the bases for a peaceful settlement. The United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defense outlined British policy on the subject of Rhodesia and expressed appreciation for the support received from the Allied Governments. He stressed the need for further concerted action by members of the Alliance. Consultations will continue not only on these problems but also on those to which several Ministers drew attention, arising out of the policies pursued by the People's Republic of China.

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\(^1\) American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 602–603.
8. The Ministers reaffirmed the concern of their governments for the social and economic welfare and continuing progress of the developing countries.

9. The Ministers reaffirmed that the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control remained one of the principal objectives of their governments. They expressed their regret that so little progress had been made towards this end. They viewed with concern the potential danger of the spread of nuclear weapons in various parts of the world. They agreed that this problem should be kept under constant review and that the search should be continued for ways of averting the danger. The Ministers welcomed the recent decision to convene periodical meetings in NATO in order to intensify the examination of detailed technical aspects of arms control and for the exploration of new possibilities for progress in disarmament.

10. The Ministers noted with satisfaction the progress made in studies of the interrelated questions of strategy, force requirements and resources, which had been initiated by the Ministers at their session in Ottawa in May 1963. Force goals for the period 1965 through 1970 are being worked out, as the first of a series of steps designed to secure a closer alignment between NATO military requirements and national force plans within the agreed strategic concept of a forward defense posture. They accepted in principle the introduction of new procedures designed to improve the annual process of reviewing the defense efforts of member countries and agreeing upon their force contributions. These procedures, by projecting Alliance force goals and country plans five years ahead each year, are designed to enhance the capacity of the Alliance to adapt its defense plans to changes both in military technology and in the international situation.

11. The Ministers instructed the Council in permanent session to review the organizational and financial basis of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force.

12. The Secretary General, as chairman of a Special Committee of Defense Ministers, made a progress report to the Council. The Ministers had a discussion on this report.

13. The Ministers approved a resolution inviting the Council in permanent session to set up a program for defense assistance to Greece and Turkey for 1965 with the participation of the greatest possible number of member countries, and to ensure that the commitments taken in this respect are implemented with the least possible delay. At the Ministerial meeting in the Spring of 1966, the Council in permanent session will report on the implementation of this program, and submit proposals for a program for 1966 in the light of relevant defense planning studies.

14. The Ministers heard a report from the Secretary General on his activities under the "watching brief" in regard to Greek-Turkish relations entrusted to his predecessor by the Council at their meeting in The Hague in May 1964. They confirmed their support for the activities of the Secretary General under his "watching brief" mission and agreed that they should continue. They also reiterated their support for the efforts of the United Nations to reduce tension in Cyprus and reaffirmed their determination to contribute to bringing about a peaceful, agreed and equitable solution of the problem in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Council endorsed the Secretary General's plea for an early resumption of constructive discussions between Greece and Turkey. The Ministers expressed their confidence that the parties concerned would refrain from any action prejudicial to such a solution. Against this background, the Council stressed the importance of a speedy solution to the financial and other problems involved in the continuation of the United Nations peace-keeping operation.

15. The Ministers approved a report on civil emergency planning. They noted that a reappraisal of civil emergency planning is being conducted and reaffirmed the importance of such planning for the protection of the civil population.

16. The next meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Ministerial level will be held, on the invitation of the Belgian Government, in Brussels at the end of May or beginning of June, 1966.

General Assembly Resolution 2078 (XX): Effects of Atomic Radiation, December 18, 1965

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 913 (X) of 3 December 1955, which established the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and its subsequent resolutions reaffirming the desirability of the Committee continuing its work,

Concerned about the potentially harmful effects to present and future generations resulting from the levels of radiation to which man is exposed,

1 Ibid., June 1, 1964, p. 852.
2 A/RES/2078(XX), Jan. 7, 1966. The resolution was unanimously adopted by the G.A.
Conscious of the continued need for compiling information on atomic radiation and for analysing its effects on man and his environment,

1. Takes note of the reports of the United Nations Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation on the work of its thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth sessions;

2. Commends the Scientific Committee for its valuable contributions to wider knowledge and understanding of the effects and levels of atomic radiation during the ten years of the Committee's existence;

3. Requests the Scientific Committee to continue its programme, including its co-ordinating activities, to increase the knowledge of the levels and effects of atomic radiation from all sources;

4. Commends the World Meteorological Organization for its work in carrying forward the scheme for monitoring and reporting levels of atmospheric radio-activity;

5. Acknowledges with appreciation the assistance rendered to the Scientific Committee by the World Meteorological Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency;

6. Recommends that all parties concerned continue their cooperation with the Scientific Committee;

7. Notes the intention of the Scientific Committee to submit a report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide the Scientific Committee with the assistance necessary for the conduct of its work and the dissemination of its findings to the public.

General Assembly Resolution 2092 (XX): Conversion to Peaceful Needs of the Resources Released by Disarmament, December 20, 1965

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 1837 (XVII) of 18 December 1962 and 1931 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 on the conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament,

Taking into account its resolution 1710 (XVI) of 19 December 1961 on the United Nations Development Decade, which calls for proposals

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1 Ibid., Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/5814); A/6123.
relating, \textit{inter alia}, to the utilization of resources released by disarmament for the purpose of economic and social development, in particular that of the developing countries,\textsuperscript{1}

\textit{Recalling also} Economic and Social Council resolution 982 (XXXVI) of 2 August 1963 on the economic and social consequences of disarmament, concerning, \textit{inter alia}, the advantages which disarmament could have on the economic and social programmes throughout the world,\textsuperscript{2} and Council resolution 1087 (XXXIX) of 30 July 1965,\textsuperscript{3}

\textit{Bearing in mind} the recommendation contained in annex A.VI.10 of the Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development\textsuperscript{4} which pointed to the necessity of paying due attention to the trade aspects of the economic programme of disarmament in considering studies and working out proposals within the framework of the United Nations on the economic and social consequences of disarmament as provided by the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly,

\textit{Having considered} the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament",\textsuperscript{5} and the relevant chapters of the reports of the economic and Social Council,\textsuperscript{6}

1. \textit{Takes note} of the Secretary-General’s report and the reports of the Economic and Social Council;

2. \textit{Expresses its appreciation} to Governments for information so far received by the Secretary-General;

3. \textit{Hopes} that Governments of Member States, particularly of those countries significantly involved, will make a serious effort to develop national studies of the economic and social aspects of disarmament and transmit them to the Secretary-General as early as feasible;

4. \textit{Requests} the Secretary-General to continue to inform the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council of the national studies submitted to him concerning the economic and social consequences of disarmament, of the international studies carried out as part of a co-ordinated programme of the Inter-Agency Committee set up by the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, and of such studies undertaken by non-governmental organizations as he deems appropriate;


\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Documents on Disarmament}, 1963, pp. 279-281.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ante}, p. 290.

\textsuperscript{4} See \textit{Documents on Disarmament}, 1964, p. 214.

\textsuperscript{5} \textit{Ante}, pp. 165-168.

5. Decides to include this item in the provisional agenda of its twenty-first session.

Joint Communiqué by President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard, December 21, 1965

President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard have completed 2 days of intensive, cordial, and candid conversations in Washington. They were accompanied by Secretaries Rusk, Fowler, and McNamara; Ministers Schroeder and von Hassel and other advisers. They discussed all major matters of joint concern to the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany and of general import for the Free World.

The future of the Atlantic Alliance was a central topic in the conversation. The President and the Chancellor agreed that close political and military cooperation among the nations of NATO was necessary. They affirmed the determination of both Governments to maintain and to strengthen the Alliance and its political and military institutions.

The President and the Chancellor gave close attention to the nuclear problems confronting the Alliance. They agreed that the Federal Republic of Germany and other interested partners in the Alliance should have an appropriate part in nuclear defense.

In this connection the Chancellor emphasized that the Federal Republic of Germany neither intended nor desired to acquire national control over nuclear weapons, that it had in 1954 given an undertaking to its allies not to produce such weapons in Germany, and that, finally, it is the only State in the world to have subjected itself to international supervision of such an obligation.

The President and the Chancellor noted with satisfaction that the Defense Ministers of a number of NATO countries have started discussions on the possibility of improving present nuclear arrangements within the Alliance.

The President, after noting that the deterrent power of the Alliance had proved completely effective and was being constantly modernized, stated the views of the United States that arrangements could be worked out to assure members of the Alliance not having nuclear weapons an appropriate share in nuclear defense. The President and the Chancellor agreed that discussion of such arrangements be continued between the two countries and with other interested allies.


The President and the Chancellor were in agreement in upholding the principle of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons into the national control of States. They were of the view that Alliance nuclear arrangements would not constitute proliferation of nuclear weapons and in fact should contribute to the goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. They stressed the importance of continuing efforts to reduce the threat of war and bring about effective arms control.

The President and the Chancellor voiced mutual satisfaction at the arrangements worked out, and already successfully under way, between the United States Space Agency and the German Ministry of Scientific Research for a joint project to launch a German-built satellite to probe the inner radiation belts. The President suggested several other possible cooperative projects, including a probe to the Sun and a probe to Jupiter. He also indicated his intention to send a commission to Europe early in 1966 to consult with the German Government and other European Governments which wish to join in the cooperative exploration of space.

The President and the Chancellor had an intensive exchange of views on the question of Germany's reunification. They reaffirm their strong determination to pursue all opportunities for attaining as soon as possible the common objective of the peaceful reunification of Germany on the basis of self-determination. The President and the Chancellor reject malicious allegations designed to cast doubt on the peaceful intentions of the Federal Republic of Germany. The exchange of views between the two Governments on the German problem and related questions will be continued.

The President and the Chancellor emphasized that pressures on Berlin would continue, as in the past, to be met with firmness and determination. They underlined that a lasting solution of the problems of Berlin can only be found in a peaceful solution of the German problem on the basis of self-determination.

The President and the Chancellor reaffirmed the view that a lasting relaxation of tension in Europe and in West-East relationships will require progress toward the peaceful reunification of Germany in freedom. Both leaders restated their intention to continue to seek improvement in relations with the nations of Eastern Europe.

The Chancellor reaffirmed Germany's fundamental commitment to European unity and his confidence in the ability of the effective institutions already created to contribute to its achievement. The President assured the Chancellor that the United States remained convinced that a united Europe is important to the achievement of an effective Atlantic partnership.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that the successful conclusion of the Kennedy Round trade negotiations is of major importance to the progress of the Free World, for developed and developing countries alike. They also agreed that, to attain their full
promise, these historic negotiations must move forward as rapidly as possible with the active participation of the EEC.

Recent developments in other parts of the world, particularly in the Far East, were also examined. The President described the situation in Viet-Nam and the efforts of the Governments of South Viet-Nam and the United States, together with their allies, to bring about a peaceful and just settlement. He expressed his appreciation for the support of the Federal Republic of Germany in the struggle to deter Communist aggression against South Viet-Nam. The Chancellor stated the determination of his Government to continue to assist in this effort for the cause of freedom.

The President and the Chancellor reviewed the aid programs of their governments and emphasized the great importance of effective aid to developing countries. In this connection, they noted that over 90 percent of all external resources flowing to these countries is provided by the Free World. They agreed that there was need for increased effort on the part of developed countries to provide funds to assure that adequate levels of aid are maintained. At the same time, they emphasized the need for greater self-help by the developing countries. The President was pleased to hear the Chancellor's description of the progress of the German Development Aid Service (German Peace Corps).

The President and the Chancellor welcomed the establishment of the Asian Development Bank, to which their governments would make substantial contributions. They reemphasized the value of economic and social development in Southeast Asia as a way of promoting peace in that region.

They also discussed the arrangements between the two governments whereby United States military expenditures in Germany entering the balance of payments are offset by the Federal Republic through its purchase of United States military equipment and services. It was agreed that these arrangements were of great value to both governments and should be fully executed and continued.

The President and the Chancellor discussed social developments in the United States and in Germany. They expressed the view that their concepts of the "Great Society" and the "Formierte Gesellschaft" have much in common and that a joint discussion of experiences should take place as soon as possible.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that the tradition and practice of effective consultation between their governments—reflecting the friendship and trust which has grown up between the people of the United States and Germany—would lead to even closer and more fruitful relations in the future between the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and their partners.
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

To the Congress of the United States:

I am transmitting the Fifth Annual Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

This report describes a year of intense negotiation and research. It reveals an increased seriousness on the part of many nations toward the problems of arms control and disarmament.

In 1965, under the increasing pressure of the nuclear threat, arms control and disarmament was taken up at the first meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 5 years; at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva; in the fall session of the 20th General Assembly; and in private diplomatic exchanges.

In all of these activities the United States position benefited from the thorough research and careful preparations of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, carried out under the authority granted it by the Congress.

This research and preparation has been carried out on a wide variety of problems—from weapons inspection to the economic consequences of reductions or shifts in military spending. In all this work our guiding principle has been the long-range security of the United States, which inevitably involves the long-range peace and stability of the world.

HALTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

During 1965 the concern of the world turned increasingly to the vital question of preventing nuclear weapons from becoming standard equipment in the world’s arsenals. We are approaching a critical period in efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Many countries now have the resources, the technical ability, and the scientific manpower needed to build nuclear weapons systems. We hear voices saying that these countries can afford such costly weapons, even though they would have to be bought at the expense of the basic needs of their people.

I have committed my administration to the task of persuading the nonnuclear countries that it is neither in the interests of their security, nor of world peace, to develop nuclear weapons. This has been the main thrust behind the efforts of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the past year, and it will continue to be in the year we are now entering.

1 H. Doc. 382, 89th Cong., 2d sess.
On January 27, 1966, I presented to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva a seven-point program designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce nuclear stocks.\(^1\) I have instructed our negotiators to walk the extra mile necessary to insure that the weapons of war submit to man's need for peace.

In giving these instructions, and in transmitting this report, I reaffirm my belief that it is possible through reason and through patient effort to translate the world's common interest in survival into concrete acts of restraint and accommodation between the nations.

**Lyndon B. Johnson.**

**The White House, February 15, 1966.**

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**LETTER OF SUBMITTAL**

**United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,**

**Office of the Director,**

**Washington, January 19, 1966.**

**The President,**

*The White House.*

MR. PRESIDENT: I submit herewith to you for transmittal to the Congress, as required by the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, the fifth annual report concerning the activities of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

This report covers the period from January 1, 1965, to the end of the calendar year. The Agency has arranged for it to be printed by the Government Printing Office.

Respectfully,

**William C. Foster.**

**INTRODUCTION**

The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is entering the fifth year of its statutory mission to search out ways to end the arms race and lessen the threat of war. Its staff is highly specialized and brings to the task a developing expertise in many fields—military, political, scientific and economic. The work of the Agency falls primarily into two categories: preparation for and management of international negotiations, and research into the myriad problems related to arms control.

The Agency participated in international negotiations throughout the year. These took place principally at the United Nations Dis-

\(^1\) ENDC/165.
DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1965

armament Commission, which met in New York from April 21 to June 16; the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), in Geneva, Switzerland, from July 27 to September 16; and the Twentieth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, from September 21 to December 21.

In support of these negotiations and of overall U.S. arms control and disarmament objectives, ACDA administered a broad external research program (including transfer-of-funds arrangements with other government agencies) and an expanding "in-house" research effort.

The Agency employs slightly more than two hundred persons. In May, 1965, Congress extended the Agency's authority for three years and authorized to be appropriated $30 million over that period.

THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

In 1965, despite the trials of the war in Viet-Nam, the United States pushed determinedly ahead in its search for ways to turn down the arms race. A U.S. draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was presented for negotiation to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) at Geneva. An existing U.S. proposal to cut off all production of fissionable materials for weapons was expanded to include the actual destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons. The United States also restated its willingness to explore the possibilities of a freeze in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which would limit further production to present levels and prevent the development of new and even more destructive types of missiles and bombers. The latest improvements in the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions were brought to the attention of international disarmament negotiators. The United States expressed a readiness to take current scientific capabilities fully into account in discussing the number and kind of on-site inspections for verifying compliance with a total ban on testing.

These activities took place under the general guidance of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which bears principal responsibility for the preparation and management, under the direction of the Secretary of State, of international negotiations in disarmament.

1 The Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament will enter its fifth year on Mar. 14, 1966. The Committee, which meets at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, was established under a joint US-USSR agreement, and welcomed by the General Assembly. While it is not a United Nations body, it reports to the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission and is serviced by the UN Secretariat. Membership is made up of five NATO nations (United States, Canada, Italy, United Kingdom and France; the last has never taken her seat at the conference table), five from the Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, U.S.S.R.), and eight nonaligned nations (Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, U.A.R.). The U.S. draft treaty appears ante, pp. 347-349.
Throughout the year, in New York, Geneva, Washington, London, and Paris, U.S. negotiators pursued the urgent goal of an agreement to stop nuclear proliferation. In Vienna and Tokyo the United States joined with 93 countries of the International Atomic Energy Agency in its effort to bring worldwide power reactor development under improved international safeguards, and ACDA shared the scientific and diplomatic effort with U.S. agencies more directly responsible for this problem, so important to our non-proliferation objectives.

ACDA's Director, William C. Foster, who is principal adviser on arms control and disarmament to the President and the Secretary of State, spent over six months representing the United States at the international conference table.

On April 21, the long-dormant United Nations Disarmament Commission 1 was called into session at the request of the Soviet Union on the ground that the U.N. dues dispute had made it impossible for the General Assembly to hold its usual disarmament debate. The United States agreed, although it would have preferred early resumption of the ENDC talks in Geneva. The meeting lasted eight weeks and opened with a violent Soviet attack on U.S. policies in Viet Nam. The 117-Nation membership, however, was more interested in the problem of nuclear proliferation, and on June 16 wound up its deliberations with an overwhelming call for a return to Geneva "as soon as possible" in order to negotiate a non-proliferation treaty and the extension of the limited test ban treaty to cover underground testing.2

Under this mandate, the Geneva Conference convened the following month, on July 27. There, on August 17, the United States introduced its draft Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. This question held the center of the stage during the short, seven-week session.

On September 16, when the 18-Nation Committee came to its customary recess on the eve of the United Nations General Assembly, it was clear that any agreement on a non-proliferation treaty would come only after difficult negotiation. The Soviet Union had greeted the U.S. draft coldly, saying it offered "no basis" for negotiation, but had offered no alternate draft of its own.

Nevertheless, agreement of another kind had begun to emerge from the months of intense activity at the international conference table. There was an almost universal view that the further spread of nuclear weapon capabilities would constitute a grave and immediate threat to international peace. And while there was disagreement

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1 The Commission was created in 1952. It originally consisted of the eleven members of the Security Council plus Canada, and was enlarged in 1958 to include all U.N. members. It had not met since 1960.

2 Ante, pp. 260–262.
about how it was to be accomplished, the involvement of the Chinese Communists in disarmament discussions became an important objective of a growing number of countries.

When the United Nations 20th General Assembly met in New York (September 21–December 21), the Soviet Union introduced its own version of a draft non-proliferation treaty.¹

Disarmament questions dominated the agenda of the General Assembly's First Committee, and were debated for seven weeks.

The Assembly itself passed by overwhelming votes five disarmament resolutions, covering non-proliferation,² a comprehensive test ban,³ a world disarmament conference,⁴ the denuclearization of Africa,⁵ and general and complete disarmament.⁶ The United States voted for all five. The Soviet Union abstained on the comprehensive test ban resolution but voted for the others. France abstained on every vote.

After completion of the disarmament items, the Soviet and American Co-Chairmen of the 18-Nation Conference promptly agreed on reconvening at Geneva on January 27, 1966.

Nuclear proliferation dominated the debate and the character of the resolutions throughout the General Assembly session. By the end of 1965 the alarm had been raised on an international scale. In this fact lies the greatest element of hope for agreement.

Non-proliferation

The U.S. draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was presented at Geneva on August 17. It had been foreshadowed by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson earlier in the year. On April 26 at the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York, he had characterized the problem of proliferation as the most urgent facing the world, and had called for a "simple and effective" agreement, along the lines of the "Irish Resolution", unanimously approved by the U.N. General Assembly in 1961.⁷ Such an agreement, he said, should obligate the nuclear powers not to relinquish control of nuclear weapons or provide assistance necessary for their manufacture to nations not now possessing them. As a corollary, the non-nuclear states should agree not to manufacture, seek or receive such weapons or data necessary for their manufacture, or otherwise acquire control of nuclear weapons.

As the debate in the Disarmament Commission ran its eight-weeks' course, the sense of urgency expressed by Ambassador Steven-
son and Mr. Foster on this issue was echoed by many UN members and attention was directed towards the need for a non-proliferation treaty and for a total ban on testing; the latter was widely regarded as an essential element in preventing further spread of nuclear weapons. In June, the Commission by a vote of 83 to 1 (with 18 abstentions, including the Communist states), called for the resumption of the Geneva Conference "as early as possible" in order that priority attention be given to drafting a non-proliferation treaty and extending the partial test ban treaty to the underground environment.

The Commission's vote heralded a growing confidence in the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament as the best forum for the conduct of these complicated negotiations.

Some of the themes developed in New York were orchestrated at Geneva, as the 18-Nation Conference met July 27 for the first time since September, 1964. The Soviet Union continued in its long-held position that no agreement was possible on non-proliferation so long as the United States continued to hold open the possibility of such nuclear-sharing arrangements in NATO as the multilateral force or the allied nuclear force. These schemes, they contended, would constitute proliferation and place nuclear weapons within reach of additional countries, particularly Germany.

The consensus in New York that proliferation was a priority item had not extended to a formula for the best methods for preventing it. There was concern in some quarters that a single measure such as a treaty was not adequate and that a broad program was needed to accompany it. Certain of the non-nuclear states were worried about possible threats to their security should they forego nuclear weapons. Some advocated agreement to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons, or prohibition of their use against non-nuclear states. Concrete nuclear disarmament steps by the nuclear states were called for to match the self-denial by non-nuclear states in not acquiring or developing such weapons.

Throughout, the United States indicated its awareness of the responsibility of the nuclear powers to those states agreeing to refrain from the development of nuclear weapons. ACDA Director William C. Foster reminded delegates that the United States had offered a broad program of measures related to non-proliferation: a comprehensive test ban treaty, a cutoff in the production of fissionable materials, worldwide safeguards on reactors to prevent their diversion to military purposes, a freeze on the numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and support for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in certain areas of the world, such as Africa and Latin America.
To the Soviet claim that proposals for nuclear-sharing arrangements in NATO would constitute proliferation, the United States answered with its Draft Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. This document, worked out in consultation with the Western members of the Eighteen Nation Committee (Canada, the U.K. and Italy), set out specific terms for an agreement for the first time. It would prohibit nuclear powers from transferring nuclear weapons into the national control of any country not having nuclear weapons, either directly or indirectly through a military alliance, or assisting in the manufacture of such weapons. Non-nuclear states would have a corresponding obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons nor to manufacture them.

The draft treaty contains language which specifically prevents any increase in the present number of nuclear entities. Its provisions bind both nuclear and non-nuclear states “not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other Organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons.”

Mr. Foster emphasized that “the United States is opposed to any form of dissemination of nuclear weapons, direct or indirect. We seek no nuclear-sharing arrangement in NATO which could involve such dissemination. The treaty we have suggested would bar such dissemination since it would prevent the creation of any additional entity, whether a state or organization, having an independent power to use nuclear weapons.”

Under the U.S. proposal a new organization having independent power to use nuclear weapons can come into existence only if one of the present nuclear nations voluntarily turns over its entire stockpile of nuclear weapons to a collective entity, thereby giving up its own national capability.

The Soviet Union and its allies, while not rejecting the U.S. draft treaty outright, stated that a basis for negotiation had not been offered. They held to their position that the draft treaty permitted dissemination in that it did not rule out the possibility of “access” to nuclear weapons by the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Italian Foreign Minister, Mr. Fanfani, proposed to the Geneva Conference that the non-nuclear powers individually undertake a temporary moratorium—a unilateral declaration to refrain from developing nuclear weapons for a given period of time, or until the terms of a treaty could be worked out among the nuclear powers. By placing a time limit on such voluntary self-restraint, he suggested, pressure for agreement would be maintained. This idea has not yet been actively pursued, given the continuing hope for agreement on a treaty within a reasonable time period.

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1 *Ante*, p. 477.
The Eighteen Nation Committee recessed on September 16, 1965, in preparation for consideration of disarmament items at the Twentieth UN General Assembly. There, on September 24, the Soviet Union introduced its own version of a non-proliferation treaty. It was obvious that the treaty had been drafted in such a way as to preclude the type of nuclear-sharing arrangements which were currently under discussion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The eight nonaligned members of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference played an active role in the debate of the General Assembly’s 117-nation First Committee. Their initiatives contributed importantly to the compromise resolution on non-proliferation adopted by the General Assembly on November 19.

The Resolution calls on the ENDC to reconvene as early as possible to negotiate a treaty. It urges that “the treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.” The United States considered this language to be consistent with its position. In voting for the resolution, Mr. Foster said:

We agree that there should be no loop-holes, and the United States draft treaty permits none. (It) would not permit any non-nuclear country to acquire nuclear weapons, national control over nuclear weapons, the power itself to fire nuclear weapons, or access to information on manufacture of nuclear weapons. What could not be done directly would not be permitted indirectly, through a military alliance. 1

Soon after the completion of United Nations consideration of the five disarmament items, the Soviet and American Co-Chairmen of ENDC agreed to reconvene the Geneva conference on January 27, 1966. There the arduous negotiating task will continue as the Committee works to reconcile the differences in the two draft treaties.

**Comprehensive Test Ban**

The preamble to the limited test ban treaty of 1963 pledges its signatories to seek “the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time” and to continue negotiations to that end. It has not been possible, however, to conclude a comprehensive test ban agreement because of Soviet refusal to accept any on-site inspections. The USSR has maintained that national means of detection and identification can adequately verify observance of a ban on underground tests and that no on-site inspections are needed. The previous Soviet offer of two or three on-site inspections was withdrawn shortly after the limited treaty was signed. The United States and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, have pointed out that some seismic events remain unidentified and for this reason, on-site inspection is necessary.

1 *Ante*, pp. 519-520.
Intensive research in seismological detection techniques has been carried out in the United States and the United Kingdom. By 1965, significant technical advances had been made and led to the construction of the first Large Aperture Seismic Array (LASA) installation at Billings, Montana. This facility is a part of the VELA Project—a multimillion dollar research program to improve the detection and identification of seismic disturbances. Representatives from 21 nations attended the public ceremony opening the array, on October 12, and technical discussions were held afterwards with foreign scientists. On that occasion Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, pointed out that while LASA was a scientific tool whose potentialities were still not completely known, "it is clear that a world-wide system of such instruments will provide a major improvement to our capabilities for verifying a comprehensive test ban." President Johnson, in a special message marking the occasion, directed that "data from the new installation be made freely available to all countries of the world."¹

These encouraging developments are narrowing the gap between the U.S. and Soviet positions. But while Western seismologists have made progress in the techniques for distinguishing between earthquakes and manmade explosions underground, remote instrumentation alone still cannot provide the necessary assurance that cheating is not taking place. Repeated attempts over the years to get Soviet scientists to join with those from other parts of the world for an appraisal of the present technical situation have been fruitless.

The greatest technical difficulties lie in identifying small seismic events as earthquakes; the larger events can be sorted out with a greater degree of confidence. For this reason, the idea of including them in the limited treaty has been suggested, first by Brazil in 1963,² and later by other nonaligned members of the ENDC. In this approach, underground events over a "threshold" of 4.75 seismic magnitude would be banned in the belief that events of this size could be identified by seismic instrumentation alone, without on-site inspection.

At the 1965 session of the Geneva Conference, the United Arab Republic renewed its previous proposals for a 4.75 threshold, a moratorium on all other tests, and scientific and technical discussions on problems of detection and identification.³ The Soviet Union stated that it would accept the threshold, coupled with the moratorium, but it ignored the U.A.R. proposal for technical talks.⁴ The United States made it clear that it could not agree to an unverified moratorium.⁵

¹ Ante, pp. 465–466.
² Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 505–509.
³ Ante, pp. 344–345.
⁴ Ante, pp. 396–397.
Throughout 1965, the non-nuclear states continued to press for a comprehensive test ban. The debate in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee reflected their sense of inequity in the proposition that they should foreswear development of a nuclear capability while the nuclear giants continued to improve their weapons through underground testing. The nonaligned Eight presented a memorandum to the ENDC on September 15, calling for an immediate suspension of all nuclear weapons tests. This memorandum noted, however, that agreement on a comprehensive test ban could be facilitated by international cooperation in the work of seismic detection and in the exchange of scientific information—a suggestion that was strongly endorsed by the United States and a number of other countries.

A few weeks later, at the UN General Assembly, the Geneva Eight drafted a resolution urging that all nuclear weapon tests be suspended and calling on the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee to continue its efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty, “taking into account the improved possibilities for international cooperation in the field of seismic detection.” This resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 92 to 1 with Albania casting the dissenting vote. The Communist States abstained, apparently because the injunction to take “into account the improved possibilities for international cooperation in the field of seismic detection” implied a need for the scientific and technical discussions which the USSR opposed.

Denuclearized Zones

Continuing interest in the idea of nuclear-free zones in certain areas of the world was heightened in 1965, in part because of its obvious relationship to nuclear proliferation, and in part because of the progress being made by the Latin American nations in working out plans for the denuclearization of their area. Also, twenty-eight African nations sponsored a resolution, overwhelmingly adopted by the 20th General Assembly, calling upon all states to respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-free zone.

The United States has encouraged the creation of nuclear-free zones in areas of the world where such zones would not disturb existing security arrangements and where provisions are included for following up on alleged violations in order to give reasonable assurance of compliance. It is, of course, also important that the initiative for such zones originate in the geographical area concerned and that all states essential to the denuclearization of the area participate. The United States has opposed past Soviet proposals for the denuclearization of Central Europe and other areas, which clearly do not meet these criteria.

1 Ante, pp. 425-426.
The work carried on in 1965 by the Latin American Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America was characterized as "constructive statesmanship in the best tradition of the Hemisphere" by Secretary of State Dean Rusk at the November meeting of the Inter-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro.

"The United States has followed with keen and sympathetic interest," he said, "the efforts of Latin American countries to work out agreed arrangements for excluding the proliferation, the stationing, or storage of nuclear weapons within the territory of Latin American States. We have noted the encouraging progress toward this end which was made during the current year at discussions in Mexico City * * * We welcome the effort and would be glad to see it reach a successful conclusion." 1

The "Cutoff" and Weapons Destruction

In his opening address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg offered a new U.S. proposal to reduce the nuclear threat.

The proposal was a significant one. In connection with an existing U.S. proposal for a verified cutoff of fissionable materials, and a transfer of agreed quantities of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes, the new proposal provided for the destruction of several thousand nuclear weapons to obtain the materials for transfer.2 The United States had earlier suggested such a transfer in the ratio of 60,000 kilograms of weapons grade U-235 for the U.S. to 40,000 kilograms for the USSR.3 This amount of material, if completely fissioned, would be equivalent in electrical energy potential to roughly two-thirds of the total electric energy produced in the U.S. each year.

Ambassador Goldberg told the United Nations that the U.S. was also ready, if the Soviet Union would do likewise, to add to this transfer associated plutonium obtained from the destroyed weapons in an agreed quantity or ratios and to place these materials under IAEA or equivalent safeguards.

The Treaty Drafts for General and Complete Disarmament

Both the United States and the Soviet Union tabled draft treaty outlines for general and complete disarmament at the beginning of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in March, 1962.4 Later that year, a plan of work was agreed to for the conference's discussion of measures to take place in the first stage of the disarmament process.5

At the time of the September 17, 1964, adjournment, the Committee was working on the Stage I agenda item covering nuclear

1 Ante, pp. 535–536.
3 Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 332–333.
4 For the revised U.S. and Soviet proposals, see ante, pp. 111–140 and 77–102, respectively.
delivery vehicles. In addition to conventional arms, nuclear disarmament, and military bases (on which there has been some discussion), there still remain to be taken up Stage I agenda items on armed force levels, military expenditures, outer space measures, peacekeeping machinery, measures to reduce the risk of war, transition from First to Second Stages, and establishment of an International Disarmament Organization.

During the single, and relatively short session of the conference in 1965, discussions centered on non-proliferation and the suspension of all nuclear weapon tests and no progress was made in developing a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The Twentieth UN General Assembly, without a dissenting vote, called on the ENDC to continue its efforts "on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control as well as on collateral measures."1

World Disarmament Conference

The idea of a World Disarmament Conference, while not a new one, was revived in 1964 at the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Cairo.2 In the spring of 1965, a groundswell of sentiment favoring such a conference began to develop in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The Commission, in a resolution on which the United States abstained, asked the General Assembly to take up the question when it met in the fall.3 From the outset, the United States expressed reservations about the idea, on the grounds that such an unwieldy gathering would require the most careful preparation, and even then was unlikely to advance disarmament. However, when the question of preparing for a world conference eventually came to a vote in the General Assembly, the United States voted in favor since it was clear that governments could reserve their positions until satisfied that adequate preparations had been made. The resolution called for preparatory work to be done towards the convening of the Conference no later than 1967. It was then approved by the General Assembly by a vote of 112–0, with France abstaining.

In voting for the resolution, Ambassador Goldberg made clear that the United States continued to maintain its initial reservations, but was willing to go along with the decision "in principle" to convene such a conference. He went on to note that the United States had been struck by "the elementary common sense" in the approach taken by the delegate from Saudi Arabia (who had suggested that the United States, the United Kingdom, USSR, France and Communist China might want to explore whether there was in fact a con-

1 Ante, pp. 622–623.
2 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 445.
structive basis for convening a world conference). He indicated a U.S. willingness to participate in a small “exploratory” group as a step preliminary to the preparatory work itself. As for the composition of such a group, Ambassador Goldberg suggested that a few other countries be added since Communist China “has stated it would not be prepared to meet with that particular group.” The addition might include states with major peaceful nuclear programs and those who had played leading roles in developing the idea for a world disarmament conference.

It was unmistakably clear—and frankly stated by most delegates—that the motivating force behind the movement for a world disarmament conference was the strong feeling that some way had to be found to draw the Chinese Communists into deliberations on disarmament, and that it would have to be done in a forum not associated with the United Nations.

The Chinese Communists have held to the “absolutely unalterable” position that they will “have nothing to do with the United Nations as long as the latter fails to restore to the representative of the People’s Republic of China the legitimate rights as the representative of the sole legal government of the Chinese people and as long as the illegal status of the representative of the Chiang Kai-shek clique is not nullified.” As for the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, “it will not have the pleasure of our company.”

On November 29, the Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, placed his stamp of approval on the idea of a world conference outside the aegis of the UN. “The nations of the world now have an opportunity to bring into being a disarmament conference that will include all countries,” he told the General Assembly, “and that can give a new impetus towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament on a universal basis.”

The Research Program

In establishing the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1961, Congress assigned it the responsibility for the “acquisition of a fund of theoretical and practical knowledge concerning disarmament.” By that time, it was clear that if United States policy to bring the arms race under control were to be implemented, a coordinated and orderly attack on the problem had to be launched.

War is one of history’s most intractable problems. And war has been so refined in this era of unprecedented scientific activity that it has confronted us with the ultimate question of survival. The

1 _Ante_, pp. 536–538.
3 A/PV.1384, p. 61.
discipline of modern scientific thought and the tools of its technology are our weapons against extermination.

In 1961, the need was plain for an understanding of contemporary weapons technology and of how it was influencing traditional approaches to war as an instrument of national policy. The galloping pace of development in scientific warfare and the nightmare problems created by this process was further complicated by the post-war political upheavals taking place on a worldwide scale and centering on the two nuclear giants, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The research program of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is designed to find ways to introduce an element of control into this situation through the development of realistic arms control measures. It is taking the "scientific approach," not only to find the answers to our negotiating needs at the international conference table, but also to develop resources of thought and skill which are oriented to the control of arms. ACDA's developing research program, now entering its fifth year, will hopefully build a reservoir of knowledge—in the universities and factories and city halls, as well as within the government itself. There is, after all, no reason why the men who manufacture our machines of war should not also be expert in the problems of their control.

Over the past few years, ACDA has been building towards an integrated research program that will serve, within the limitations of its size, both immediate and long-range needs. It is intended to support the general objective of U.S. policy to 1) prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, delivery vehicles, and conventional weapons; 2) limit and reduce armed forces, armaments, and military expenditures; 3) prevent the outbreak of hostilities—and to reduce their destructiveness, contain and terminate them, should they occur; 4) plan for the economic consequences of reduced defense spending resulting from arms control and disarmament measures, and for the constructive use of the resources thus released; and 5) to search for means for maintaining a stable international environment conducive to arms control and disarmament.

Research in ACDA is planned and directed (and often carried out) by scientists and soldiers, diplomats, economists and lawyers through its statutory Bureaus—Weapons Evaluation and Control, Economics, Science and Technology, and International Relations. In the Agency's Research Council they preside over the effort to acquire a "fund of theoretical and practical knowledge." The description which follows of some of the research conducted in 1965 gives an indication of its scope.

Non-proliferation

The problem of proliferation received top priority in ACDA during 1965 when a draft treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons was
prepared and presented to the Geneva Conference. The implementa-
tion of U.S. policy on this question is intricately linked to our foreign
policy objectives; thus initiatives must be developed and coordinated
on an interdepartmental basis. Because of the international political
and military sensitivities inherent in the problem, the burden of
research must be carried on within the Agency, rather than as a part
of the external contract program.

In addition to the draft treaty, the U.S. campaign to stop further
nuclear spread includes the continued pursuit of several related
measures which would be reinforcing to the treaty itself. Foremost
of these is an extension of the partial test ban treaty to underground
tests.

Recent progress in seismology, together with work done in coordina-
tion with the Department of Defense on inspection techniques, may
introduce a new flexibility into the presently stalemated negotiations
on a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The most promising development has been the construction of a
Large Aperture Seismic Array (LASA) installation in Billings, Monta-
nana. It is believed that construction of about a dozen such installa-
tions throughout the world in a network of stations would significantly
improve present detection and identification capabilities. The LASA
program is the prime responsibility of the Department of Defense,
but ACDA staff have worked closely in its development.

Under ACDA's sponsorship, a panel of non-government seismo-
logical experts was convened during the past year. This group,
together with government consultants, ACDA and Department of
Defense scientists, surveyed the current situation with respect to
detection and identification of underground events, and outlined fu-
ture needs for improvement of seismological capability.

Another vital point of control in the containment of nuclear spread
is the plutonium-producing power reactor. While designed to serve
peaceful purposes, these reactors unfortunately also constitute a
passport to nuclear weapons capability. The United States has
taken the leadership in an effort to bring the rapidly proliferating
nuclear activities of all nations under international controls.

An intensive study of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards system was carried out in ACDA during 1965.
This system is designed to prevent the misuse of nuclear material and
equipment earmarked for civil research and power programs. It was
formally adopted by the IAEA in 1961. In September of 1965, an
expanded and improved system was unanimously approved by the 93
member nations at the IAEA General Conference in Tokyo. Thus,
important progress has been made towards obtaining wide acceptance
by other countries on at least some of their civil nuclear energy

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1 Ante, pp. 446-460.
projects. Much remains to be done towards broadening acceptance of the system, and extending its application to indigenous facilities as well as to those developed through outside assistance.

The draft U.S. treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons contains a provision calling on all signatories to cooperate in the application of IAEA or equivalent safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities. Meanwhile, a close watch is maintained over international traffic in raw materials and atomic equipment—particularly by nations who do not adhere to IAEA safeguards. Efforts are being made to seek ways of bringing diplomatic influence to bear on such transfer actions. ACDA personnel work closely in this area with other agencies of the U.S. Government.

Delivery Vehicles

The acquisition of nuclear weapons is, of course, intimately related to the means of delivering them to their targets—whether by plane or missile. Nuclear weapons, either as threat or deterrent, lack credibility without the support of a modern delivery system. In the space age development of missile and rocket technology can be carried forward in any modern country prior to—or even innocently independent of—a nuclear weapons program. Had Communist China possessed an advanced, modern delivery system at the time she carried out her first nuclear explosion, the effect on the military and political situation would have been more immediate.

Because of the serious implications of missile and rocket proliferation, the ACDA staff embarked on a study aimed at finding the facts in the present situation, the probabilities of missile development in non-nuclear countries, and the possibilities of controls by agreement. The basic study examined factors which might influence non-nuclear countries to obtain missiles and space rockets. It also looked at the role played by the larger nations in providing assistance, from the commercial, military and scientific aspects. Then a survey was made of present and potential capabilities in specific countries which might elect to develop a missile delivery system, with particular emphasis on the alternative ways by which missiles might proliferate—indigenous production, conversion of space rockets, and purchase from outside sources.

Much work on the detection of clandestine missile production has been done by the Agency in connection with the U.S. proposals for a production freeze on strategic delivery vehicles. As a result of this year's look at the problem of missile proliferation, additional questions were folded into a larger study on inspection techniques for missile systems. A contractor was asked to study the "visibility" of missile proliferation; i.e., what are the physical indications of the development process that can be detected by various technical devices. Their use in detecting specific activities—such as flight
testing, missile launcher construction, etc.—is analyzed in relation to individual countries, taking into consideration such factors as the location of the country, the sophistication of its industrial and scientific base, whether it was engaged in space activities, and so on.

A supporting task is being performed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, by arrangement with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The purpose of this research is to determine whether it is possible to impose some sort of inhibition on the development of military missile systems while not adversely restricting peaceful space activities.

**Regional Arms Races**

The transfer of certain types of hardware and equipment—bombers, for example—may contribute to the proliferation of nuclear delivery capabilities. Increasing international trade in conventional armaments may, if not subject to adequate control, constitute a direct threat to world peace and security. Uncontrolled arms trade can result in the initiation or acceleration of regional arms races.

New or improved measures for the national or international control of arms transfers are being explored through the Agency's research program. Through liaison with other agencies, ACDA keeps abreast of U.S. activities in arms transfers, participating in policy decisions where basic arms control considerations are involved. For example, ACDA participated in the formulation of the new Munitions Control and Export Control regulations, which help implement the nuclear test ban treaty and related national policies.

Research in this area provides information on the nature, size, and effects of present arms traffic, both government and private. ACDA must be familiar with existing control mechanisms, such as export restrictions and licensing requirements, and be in a position to measure the political, military, economic, and legal effects of arms transfer controls.

During the past year, an ACDA Arms Transfer Group, under the chairmanship of the Deputy General Counsel, was established. All bureaus and offices are represented in order to insure that this problem is covered from the political, technical and legal angles and that research activity is closely coordinated internally.

The Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau has underway a study of possible end-use restrictions on armaments transferred to other countries. Export by the United States of certain types of weapons is carried on in relation to its global defense arrangements and in an attempt to keep regional military balances stable. This purpose is obviously defeated if weapons are used for purposes which complicate U.S. foreign policy. In addition to examining existing end-use control procedures employed by the United States, this project will evaluate the feasibility of other control systems.
Verification

In 1964 the United States proposed exploration of a freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. The proposal was designed to stop the buildup of these vehicles, hold their number to present levels, and open the way to reductions in all types of forces.

The form of a verification scheme is often dictated by the relative complexity of the proposal itself. ACDA's research in this field covers exploration of all practical methods and combinations. The major share of the effort is focused on the scientific and technical aspects of the verification problem.

In addition to verification research on such measures as the freeze and a comprehensive test ban, theoretical research was done on inspection systems for agreements which would limit levels of tactical ground and air forces. This work is being extended to sampling methods in the inspection process and to the detailed requirements for the command and control structure for the verification of retained levels of tactical forces.

One of the most interesting and rewarding areas of exploration is in the use of modern and sophisticated "sensors" as instruments of detection. The term sensor is used rather broadly to denote objects or devices that sense and respond to their physical environment.

A contract now in progress is concerned with the use of sensors and multi-sensor systems in arms control inspection, and includes a comprehensive survey of the "state of the art" of advanced sensor technology.

One of the principal electronics companies has delved into the complexities of the anti-ballistic missile and its associated electronic hardware with the objective of developing techniques for inspecting for the existence of ABM systems, including testing. This question has a highly significant relationship to the proposal advanced by the United States to explore a verified freeze on offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which includes anti-ballistic missile systems.

The use of economic and fiscal information as a verification tool has long been of interest to ACDA. The Agency has a continuing reimbursement arrangement with the Bureau of the Census for a comprehensive descriptive manual of the operation and organization of the Soviet fiscal system, its administrative structure and reporting and accounting mechanisms. Columbia University is conducting a comparable research study of the financial systems of several East European countries.

In addition, a two-phase study, using different contractors, is looking into the use of economic data as a part of the verification

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1 Documents on Disarmament, 1964, p. 8.
process. Such data, while it may not be sufficient by itself, can furnish valuable clues to inspection systems based on other techniques. The inspection design resulting from the contracts will include an intermeshing grid of economic statistics which would make burdensome or risky the national concealment of significant quantities of armaments production.

**Field Testing**

During the past year, Project CLOUD GAP—the joint ACDA/Defense Department field testing program—completed two more tests. The first was a field test of inspection of missile production facilities. The purpose of the test was to evaluate means of verifying an agreement limiting the production of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Three missile and missile-component manufacturers: Martin-Marietta, producers of the TITAN missiles; and Aerojet-General Corporations and the Hercules Powder Company, producers of advanced missile booster engines, participated in and provided the facilities for this test. The test investigated several different means of inspection and determined the degree of access and the frequency of inspection which would be required for effective monitoring of plant production. The extent to which these inspections would require access to sensitive areas and information was also determined.

The second field test was conducted at five U.S. Air Force bases in southeastern United States. The purpose of this test was to collect factual information on the degree of intrusion which would be necessary in order to verify an agreement limiting numbers and location of aircraft. A wide variety of inspection teams and techniques was used, including resident and intermittent ground teams, aerial visual and photographic surveillance, and unattended instruments. The CLOUD GAP teams conducted inspections to find out just how much access to the field was required, including the flight line, hangars, operations control area, etc., in order to ascertain the number of aircraft present, under conditions where evasive tactics might be used.

**Economic Impact of Reduced Defense Spending**

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is enjoined by its statute to assess the effect of arms control and disarmament measures on the American economy. As patterns of defense spending have fluctuated over the past few years, public concern has begun to focus on the ability of the economy to adjust to the resulting changes. This concern, which the Congress foresaw in drafting the 1961 legislation establishing ACDA, has found a response in the federal and local agencies most directly concerned in the problem.

In July of 1965, after more than a year of study, the President's Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament concluded that "even general and complete disarmament would pose no insuperable problems; indeed, it would mainly afford op-
opportunities for a better life for our citizens.”¹ The Committee cited much of the research work being carried on by ACDA in the economic impact field and indicated the broad areas in which further research would be desirable.

There is a close similarity between ACDA’s approach to evaluating the economic impact problem and the research needs mentioned by the Committee. Like the Committee, ACDA is interested in finding out how shifts in military spending can be carried out with minimum difficulty for the people whose jobs depend directly or indirectly upon such spending. This means, among other things, studies on the mobility of defense workers, on problems of adjustment for defense-dependent communities, and on possibilities for converting defense production to production for civilian needs.

Most important is the people themselves: what happens to discharged defense workers?

An important recommendation of the Committee was for more “data on the numbers, location, skills, duration of joblessness, and other characteristics of unemployed defense workers, as well as information on the types of jobs that they ultimately obtain and the adjustments that occur in pay scales, fringe benefits, and other aspects of employment.”

Such data is being gathered by ACDA, where during the past year results have been coming in from three studies of large defense layoffs. Together, these three projects have addressed themselves to the reemployment experience of almost 20,000 defense workers.

The Dyna-Soar manned spacecraft project was cancelled by the Department of Defense in December 1963, and more than five thousand employees of the prime contractor, Boeing Company in Seattle, lost their jobs. Under joint ACDA/DOD contract, the Washington State Employment Security Department undertook a study of these employees, their post-layoff experience, their approach to seeking reemployment, and the assistance they received in their search.²

Thousands of workers at the Martin plant in Denver were laid off as a result of changes in missile procurement. ACDA contracted with the Martin-Marietta Corporation to trace the experience of these workers in seeking new jobs. The Colorado State Employment Service assisted in gathering the data.

On Long Island, between November, 1963 and December, 1964, ten thousand aircraft workers lost their jobs as a result of reduced aircraft orders at the Republic Aviation plant. The Department of Defense and ACDA asked the New York State Labor Department’s Division of Employment to find out what happened to the people who were thus released into the labor market.

² The Dyna-Soar Contract Cancellation (ACDA pub. 29; 1965).
A central element of the problem is the transference of skills from defense-related to non-defense jobs. This aspect was subject to special analysis in connection with the Long Island study, which the New York State Department of Labor has characterized as "the clearest picture yet of how defense workers fare after layoff from their jobs." The contractor undertook to examine the relationship between the skill content of jobs at the Republic plant with those in non-defense industries. It was found that for more than five out of every six jobs at Republic, the skills involved could be transferred to identifiable jobs in non-defense industries with relative ease. The special analysis was used as a practical tool for assisting Republic workers to find new jobs.

All three studies tend to show that there is no major barrier to transfer of skills from defense to non-defense jobs. A preliminary conclusion, however, is that the difficulties in obtaining new employment vary considerably in the three regions. It will now be necessary to analyze the causes for this. Although detailed results are now available in preliminary or final form on the individual studies, ACDA plans to integrate the data and findings of all three in an attempt to determine the best approach to improving assistance to displaced defense workers.

Other research needs cited by the President's Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament include information on the effects of defense cutbacks on specific regions. In line with this recommendation, the Agency has sponsored a study by the University of Kansas of the effects on a particular community (such as Salina, Kansas; Bangor, Maine; and Moses Lake, Washington) of the closing of military bases.

The National Planning Association has completed a study for the Agency of the policy tools available for dealing with regional economic adjustment problems. Its analysis is based in large part on the kind of adjustment problems facing the Baltimore, Seattle-Tacoma, and New London-Norwich-Groton (Conn.) metropolitan areas. The study revealed the need for a selective mix of policies and programs for each area. The Association is undertaking a further study for ACDA designed to assist individual areas in using available economic data effectively for selecting the proper policy mix.

Further information on the application of defense/space technology to other parts of the economy is needed. The Agency's research in this matter thus far has been primarily from what might be viewed as the "supply" side—that is, how defense-oriented industries or firms might best adapt their resources for defense research or production to non-defense purposes. Attention will now be turned to the "demand" side, particularly the problems of and possibilities for developing public sector demand for systems analysis and engineering.
A report entitled "The Implications of Reduced Defense Demand for the Electronics Industry" has been completed for the Agency. The report provides an excellent picture of the organization of the industry by major market segments. It stresses the difficult problems of how research and engineering personnel can be absorbed into the civilian economy without special programs, and recommends a corrective action program by government, industry and labor to mitigate the adjustment problems of the industry.

A study now in progress is analyzing the defense portion of the shipbuilding industry in order to develop production opportunities in non-defense, non-shipbuilding markets.

A joint ACDA/DOD project, administered by the Small Business Administration, has produced highly rewarding results although the expenditure of funds was relatively small. The contractor, Northeastern University, worked with a management-consulting firm to develop original case studies for instructional purposes based on defense conversion problems and directed toward the needs of small businesses. A series of weekly workshops, attended by company officials under a tuition arrangement, was held. The pilot seminar was conducted in Boston as a part of the contract. The university plans to hold additional workshops in cities throughout the United States on a self-sustaining basis.

The Denver Research Institute has completed a report which has potential use as a management tool. The project developed case studies of defense industry diversification experience and provided guidelines for industrial conversion.

The International Political "Climate"

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency must, in the words of its statute "assess the effect" of its recommendations "upon our foreign policies * * *." Some Agency research is directed at that part of the past which may be prologue, and at identifying those historical elements which illuminate possibilities for agreements.

Research also aims at an evaluation of present situations and their potential impact on arms control. Studies of Chinese Communist nuclear ambitions and of the Sino-Soviet conflict have thus provided valuable insights to those who must develop policy responsive to these events.

On October 16, 1964, Communist China exploded its first nuclear device at Lop Nor. A few months earlier, ACDA had brought together top scholars and specialists in Chinese affairs and arms control for a ten-day conference at Airlie House in Warrenton, Virginia.

The contract was undertaken jointly by the East Asian Research Center and the Center for International Affairs at Harvard. The

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1 ACDA pub. 28.
2 Industrial Conversion Case Studies (ACDA pub. 30, 1965).
participants—twenty in all—were university professors of political science and economics, including three from England and Japan; representatives of the RAND Corporation; and officials of the Department of State and ACDA. The years of specialization and experience brought to Airlie House by this group provided the Agency with a penetrating view of Communist China and its potential for the future.

A report was published for ACDA in 1965. Working from unclassified statistical, economic and sociological data, the experts attempted to estimate how soon after its first nuclear detonation the Chinese Communist economy and technology would allow it to develop a significant nuclear and missile capacity, and what the international political impact of that accomplishment was likely to be.

In a detailed examination of the costs involved in the development of a nuclear weapons capability, beginning with a single bomb, the report compares U.S., Soviet and French experience to the Chinese Communist GNP, projects its growth rate, and outlines the probable effect on agriculture and economic goals.

Research must be responsive to current needs. A contractor is sometimes asked to recast his approach or to concentrate immediate attention on a particular aspect of his study. Because of the need for an assessment of how the development of a Chinese Communist nuclear capability would affect prospects for arms control in other parts of the world, the Hoover Institution of War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University was instructed to give priority attention to this aspect of a regional study then underway. The separated study will attempt to evaluate the long- and short-range uses to which this new capability will be put in the international sphere, both on the periphery of Communist China and in other major geographic areas of the world. It will estimate the role she envisions for herself in international considerations of arms control and disarmament.

The broad range of Communist China’s foreign policy activity in Asia and the Southwest Pacific will be given special attention, along with her involvement in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. Records of participation in international negotiations and conferences will also be reviewed. In addition, of course, attention will go to the Sino-Soviet dispute, and its relationship to prospects for reduction of international tension and the control of arms. The continuing differences between Communist China and the United States, such as recognition, UN membership, Taiwan, the Indo-Chinese successor states, and the effects of these issues on arms control are being analyzed.

The Agency’s 1965 summer study turned again to Communist China, this time from the point of view of her relations with the

Soviet Union. As in the previous summer, the project was under the
direction of Harvard's East Asian Research Center. The Far East
scholars, joined by Soviet experts, considered the restraints imposed on
arms control possibilities by the Sino-Soviet dispute. A report is
being prepared and will be published in 1966.

Factors affecting successful negotiations with the Soviet Union
remain an active area of study. ACDA transferred funds to the
Department of State for a study to identify and analyze factors that
have induced the Soviet Union in specific instances since World War
II to reach a negotiated agreement or bilateral understanding with
the United States.

Arms Control and Limited War

Limited wars outside the European Continent have dominated the
international scene since World War II. The escalation of such con-
flicts through the involvement of outside powers represents a con-
tinuing threat to United States national security and to world peace.
So far, no notable systematic examination of the possible relationships
between arms control measures and the phenomenon of limited war
has taken place. As the basis for such an analysis, intended to suggest
feasible and potentially effective measures for reducing the risk, limit-
ing the intensity, and facilitating the termination of limited wars, an
initial design study has been undertaken by an ACDA contractor.
The study is intended to identify the critical issues, data requirements,
and appropriate possible arms control measures to be considered in
more detail in future research efforts.

Planning and Coordination

ACDA's research program consumes roughly two-thirds of its
annual budget. As of the end of 1965, the Agency had let 97 con-
tracts and grants to universities and other scholarly research organi-
zations, and to industrial firms, most of which have a background of
experience with the Department of Defense in the development or
manufacture of military hardware.1

In addition, ACDA has entered into twenty reimbursement agree-
ments with other government agencies. Of this overall total, repre-
senting the external research program since the establishment of the
Agency in 1961, 79 studies were in progress during the calendar year
1965.

"In-house" research, performed by ACDA staff members, is an
essential corollary to the external research program.

Basic planning is initiated two years in advance. Once the outline
of the research program has been established within the Agency and
submitted to the review and authorization process, invitations for

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1 For a list of contractors and grantees, see Appendix VI, infra.
proposals are sent out. The Agency maintains a bidders list, made up of potential contractors who are believed to be qualified to conduct research in arms control and who have indicated interest. Announcements are carried in the Department of Commerce Business Daily. Contracts are awarded by selection board. Experience has indicated sole-source selection of the contractor in those instances where the qualifications of a particular firm or academic institution are considered unique. Unsolicited proposals from industry, the academic community, or from individuals interested in research in arms control and related topics, are welcomed.

The public law which established the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency stipulates that available government facilities be utilized to the maximum extent feasible. In conformance with this principle, ACDA has turned to other government agencies for research in their particular area of specialization. Among such transfer-of-funds arrangements are a number with the Department of Defense, a study of the fiscal system of the Soviet Union by the Bureau of the Census, one on the defense conversion problems of small research and development firms by the Small Business Administration, and the arms control literature abstracting service provided by the Library of Congress. Other agencies include the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Office of Naval Research; and the National Bureau of Standards.

The intersection of interests revealed by this sharing of research tasks among government agencies points to one of the more vexing problems in the conduct of government study programs. How is duplication or overlap to be avoided?

At the time ACDA was established, responsibility for one or another aspect of arms control research was lodged in several different Federal agencies. Some aspects of the problem were either being studied in several places at once, or not being examined at all. The Congress, in an effort to eliminate this problem, charged the new Agency with the responsibility “to coordinate the research, development, and other studies conducted in the field of arms control and disarmament by or for other Government agencies.” ACDA has continued in its efforts to improve the level of coordination. Since 1962 a continuing inventory of research underway or completed by the various participating agencies has been kept. This inventory, in accordance with a Presidential directive, has been reported to the Bureau of the Budget on a semi-annual basis. The fifth and sixth reports in this series were submitted during 1965.

These reports have been useful as a cross-check for all interested agencies of what research is going on. One difficulty however, was that information was not available sufficiently early—while research is still in the planning stage—to eliminate the possibility of duplication
or overlap. In order to correct this situation, the Agency this year initiated a procedure whereby other agencies are asked to submit a projection of planned research, along with an evaluation of past activity. Draft terms of reference for projects related to arms control have also been requested. In this way, an agency sponsoring research can be sure of having available to it the comments and suggestions of all groups in government knowledgeable on the proposed subject matter prior to the soliciting of proposals. Modifications in the terms of reference can then be made.

The most fruitful means of interagency coordination remains that conducted on a day-to-day basis by ACDA staff personnel and their working-level counterparts in agencies—such as the Departments of Defense and State, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Labor—with which ACDA shares mutual interests and problems.

In August, President Johnson introduced an innovation in budget planning for the executive branch. Major agencies were directed to delineate their goals and objectives in this Planning-Programming-Budgeting System, and to examine alternative methods to assure the most effective performance at the least cost.

ACDA has taken steps to comply with this directive by the establishment of an Agency Program Planning Staff. A senior officer has been designated as Chairman, who also serves as non-voting Chairman of the Agency's Research Council. At the end of the year, ACDA was well ahead of the timetable laid down by the Bureau of the Budget for implementation of this system.

Agency Operations

The Committee of Principals

The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is principal adviser to the President and Secretary of State on arms control and disarmament, and as such he has a primary responsibility for policy recommendations in these matters. In fulfilling this responsibility, the Agency works in close coordination with other Government agencies.

Policy recommendations are made to the President by the Agency's Director through the "Committee of Principals" whose members in addition to the Director of ACDA are the highest ranking officials of each interested government agency—the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency, and the Director of the U.S.
Information Agency. As a committee, these officials review and coordinate arms control recommendations for the President. It is the President who must then give final approval for any measures to be set forth in negotiations. In 1965 this approval resulted in the tabling of the U.S. draft treaty To Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons on August 17.

The Committee of Principals met eight times during 1965.

The General Advisory Committee

This advisory group is made up of prominent citizens appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. They come from private life, from the business, labor, academic, military, and scientific fields. It met for a two-day session in March and July and for a single day on November 1, 1965. The timing of these meetings coincided in each instance with preparations for negotiations in an international forum. The first meeting of the year (the twelfth since the Committee was established), came less than a month before the United States was to participate in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The second meeting took place just prior to the reconvening of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, and the third as the disarmament items came up on the agenda of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

As always, the General Advisory Committee was thoroughly briefed on the latest U.S. positions and plans, and on anticipated problems in negotiations. Officials of the Departments of State and Defense joined in these high-level meetings. The sessions are characterized by a free and lively exchange of comment and opinion. The advice and counsel of this influential group—representing as it does an informed non-governmental view—is an invaluable contribution to the formulation of policy in arms control and disarmament.

The Social Science Advisory Board

The ACDA Social Science Advisory Board was established in March, 1964, by the Director under his statutory authority, to advise on the social science aspects of the Agency's programs. In 1965 it held two meetings, on March 11 and September 9. During these sessions, the members of the Board—distinguished representatives of their respective fields—were briefed on current arms control and disarmament programs and on the status of the Agency's social science research program.

In September, the Board discussed among other things ways in which it might be most useful to the Agency. It was clear that its members represented an important channel of communication between the Agency and the academic community. Through them universities and individual scholars can be acquainted with ACDA's plans for new research and with the results of completed studies. By virtue
of its intimate knowledge of research being pursued in colleges and universities, as well as of the work being done by individual scholars, the Board will be of invaluable assistance in the selection of contractors and grantees. In response to the Agency's September briefing on future research plans, the names of a number of possible grantees and contractors were suggested.

The Board also pointed out that it could perform another important function by providing a bridge to the results of research being conducted abroad, which is not always available through official channels.

Public Information

Under its enabling Act, the Agency is given the responsibility for the "dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament." Interest in arms control matters has increased greatly in the past few years, and the Agency's work is becoming more generally known to the public.

The Agency has given assistance throughout the year to educational, civic, and religious organizations interested in learning about arms control and disarmament. Officers of the Agency have responded to invitations to address meetings and have, in conjunction with military and diplomatic officers from other agencies, provided general briefings on American security policy and foreign relations. ACDA officials accepted a total of 176 such invitations, traveling to 24 of the 50 states. In accordance with the wishes of the House Appropriations Subcommittee, the cost of travel was, for the most part, defrayed by the host organizations.

Ambassador Clare H. Timberlake, the Deputy U.S. Representative to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, has been engaged in a series of lectures in Europe on U.S. policy as it relates to arms control and disarmament. The Ambassador has spoken to governmental and civic groups in Bern, Belgrade, Copenhagen, Oslo, Stockholm, The Hague, and a number of cities in Germany. In addition to the lectures, he consulted on an informal basis with opinion leaders of the countries visited, both government and non-government. His tour has served to familiarize European nations with our objectives.

Briefings and consultations have been arranged for visiting groups to Washington, including students, civic leaders, editors and publishers, and businessmen. These briefings and consultations have provided an opportunity for intensive discussion of topics of immediate interest, such as non-proliferation and the economic impact of reduced defense demand. They have been valuable not only in providing educational opportunities for the public, but also in making new ideas and viewpoints available to Agency staff.

A major occasion for the development of new ideas and diverse viewpoints was the White House Conference on the International
Cooperation Year. A panel of outstanding non-government experts worked for a period of six months on the preparation of a report on arms control, which was presented and discussed during the Conference. The report is receiving careful study both inside and outside the government. The International Cooperation Year stimulated the presentation of numerous papers and recommendations from non-government organizations, and these, too, are being studied.

Literature on United States arms control policy has been prepared and provided to interested citizens. Students have made heavy use of this material. A recent Agency publication covers the U.S. Draft Treaty To Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.

Unclassified reports resulting from ACDA's external research program have been made available. These reports may be obtained for a small cost from the Department of Commerce Clearing House for Scientific and Technical Information, Springfield, Virginia. In some instances, they may be ordered from the Government Printing Office. Direct requests to the Agency will be filled where limited stocks permit. In addition, all the unclassified research reports are maintained in the 20 Depository Libraries listed in Appendix VII.

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APPENDIXES

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APPENDIX IV

THE GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Chairman:

John J. McCloy of New York, former adviser on disarmament to President Kennedy, is the Chairman of the Committee. Mr. McCloy is a member of the law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy; member of the board, Chase Manhattan Bank; and former High Commissioner for Germany.

Members:

Roger M. Blough of Hawley, Pa., Chairman of the Board of Directors of the U.S. Steel Company.

Rev. Edward A. Conway of Omaha, Nebr., professor of political science at Creighton University.¹

John Cowles of Minneapolis, Minn., Newspaper Publisher, Editor, and President of The Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company.

¹ Deceased, May 1965.
George Bogdan Kistiakowsky of Cambridge, Mass., Professor of Chemistry at Harvard University and former Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

Dean Anderson McGee of Oklahoma City, Okla., President of Kerr-McGee Oil Industries.

Ralph E. McGill of Atlanta, Ga., Editor of The Atlanta Constitution and recipient of the Pulitzer Prize for editorial writing.

George Meaney of Bethesda, Md., President of the AFL-CIO.

James A. Perkins of Ithaca, N.Y., President of Cornell University.

Herman Phleger of Redwood City, Calif., a partner in the San Francisco law firm of Brobeck, Phleger and Harrison, and former Legal Adviser to the State Department.

Isidor Isaac Rabi of New York, N.Y., Professor of Physics at Columbia University; recipient of the Nobel Prize for Physics; former Chairman of the Scientific Advisory Committee, Office of Defense Mobilization; and former Chairman of the President's Science Advisory Committee.

Gen. Thomas Dresser White of Washington, D.C., former Air Force Chief of Staff, until his retirement.1

Herbert Frank York of San Diego, Calif., Professor of Physics at the University of California; former Chief Scientist of the Advanced Research Project Agency, Department of Defense; former member of the President's Science Advisory Committee; and Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

APPENDIX V

The Social Science Advisory Board

Chairman

Erwin N. Griswold, Dean of the Law School of Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

Members

Urie Bronfenbrenner, Professor of Psychology at Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.

Gordon Craig, Professor of History at Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.

W. Phillips Davison, Specialist in Public Opinion and International Communication, Senior Research Fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, N.Y.

Alexander Heard, Chancellor of Vanderbilt University and Professor of Political Science, Nashville, Tenn.

Alice Hsieh, Specialist on China, Social Science Department, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.

APPENDIX VI

CONTRACTORS AND GRANTEES

Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo, Calif.
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Boston, Mass.
Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, Aspen, Colo.
Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio
The Bendix Corporation, Ann Arbor, Mich.
Mr. Harold Joseph Berman, New Centre, Mass.
Bissett-Berman Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.
Braddock, Dunn & McDonald, Incorporated, El Paso, Tex.
The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
The Burroughs Corporation, Radnor, Pa.
Colorado Seminary, University of Denver, Denver, Colo.
Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
Control Data Corporation, Rockville, Md.
Mr. Richard A. Falk, Princeton, N.J.
Mr. Kazimierz Grzybowski, New Haven, Conn.
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
The Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C.
Dr. Franklyn D. Holzman, Medford, Mass.
Hudson Institute, Harmon-on-Hudson, N.Y.
Hughes Aircraft Company, Fullerton, Calif.
Institute for Strategic Studies, London, England
The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kans.
Los Angeles State College, Los Angeles, Calif.
Martin-Marietta Company, Denver, Colo.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.
Mathematica, Princeton, N.J.
Melpar, Incorporated, Falls Church, Va.
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
Midwest Research Institute, Kansas City, Mo.
National Planning Association, Washington, D.C.
The State of New York, Department of Labor, Division of Employment, Albany, N.Y.
North American Aviation, Downey, Calif.
Mr. William L. Ostrowski, Accokeek, Md.
Peace Research Institute, Washington, D.C.
Mr. Richard H. Pfaff, Boulder, Colo.
Raytheon Company, Bedford, Mass.
Research Analysis Corporation, McLean, Va.
Rutgers University, Eagleton Institute of Politics, New Brunswick, N.J.
Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Tex.
Sperry Gyroscope Company, Great Neck, N.Y.
Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, Calif.
Stanford University, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, Calif.
Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., Mountain View, Calif.
Texas Instruments, Incorporated, Dallas, Tex.
George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
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APPENDIX VII

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20451

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APPENDIX VIII

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Assistant Director, Science and Technology Bureau: HERBERT SCOVILLE, Jr.
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Chief, Reference Research Staff: ROBERT W. LAMBERT (Acting)
Special Assistant to the Director and Executive Secretary: CLEMENT E. CONGER
Disarmament Adviser: ROBERT E. MATTESON
Special Assistant to the Deputy Director: LAWRENCE D. WEILER
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¹ Also printed ante, pp. 636–670.
² Also printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1964,* pp. 534–562.
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¹ Also printed ante, p. 206.
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**General**


**Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space**

Verbatim records of meetings are available in mimeographed form.

**Disarmament Commission**


**Economic and Social Council**


**Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament**

Verbatim records of meetings of the plenary committee, the Committee of the Whole, and the Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests exist in mimeographed form. The Eighteen Nation Committee's sixth interim progress report, issued in 1965, was published in the Disarmament Commission *Official Records: Supplement for January to December 1965* (DC/227). Except for the documentary annexes, the report is also printed ante, pp. 427–430.

¹ Printed ante, pp. 11–18.
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Secretary-General

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Security Council

LIST OF PERSONS

ACKLEY, GARDNER. Chairman, U.S. President's Council of Economic Advisers, 1964-; Chairman, Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament, 1963-.

ADAIR, E. ROSS. Member of the House of Representatives (Rep., Ind.), 1950-; member of House Foreign Affairs Committee.

ADEBO, Chief S. O. Nigerian permanent representative to the United Nations, 1962-.

AIKEN, FRANK. Irish Minister for External Affairs, 1951-1954, 1957-.


ALI, S. AMJAD. Pakistani permanent representative to the United Nations, 1964-.

ANDERSON, CLINTON P. U.S. Senator (Dem., N. Mex.), 1948-; member, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

ANDERSSON, SVEN. Swedish Minister of Defense, 1951-1957; Minister for Communications, 1951-1957; consultant to the Cabinet, 1948-1951.

ASHA, M. RAFIK. Syrian permanent representative to the United Nations, 1964-.

BABCOCK, TIM M. Governor of the State of Montana, 1962-.

BARBER, ARTHUR W. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Government consultant to the Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament of the National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation, 1965.

BARRATT, LAWRENCE. Reporter, New York Herald Tribune.

BARZEL, RAINIER. F.R.G. Minister for All-German Affairs, 1962-1963; CDU-CSU floor leader in the Bundestag, 1964-.

BAUDET, PHILIPPE M. French Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., 1964-.


BEELEY, HAROLD. U.K. Ambassador, deputy leader of the delegation to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, 1964-.

BELSLEY, G. LYLE. Director, Economic Affairs Office, Office of Emergency Planning; member, Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament, 1963-.


BERRY, E. Y. Member of House of Representatives (Rep., S. Dak.), 1950-; member of House Foreign Affairs Committee.

BLOOMFIELD, LINCOLN P. U.S. Department of State, 1946-1957; member, senior staff, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1957-; Director, Arms Control Project, 1961-.
BLOUGH, ROGER M. Chairman of the Board of Directors of the U.S. Steel Company; member of General Advisory Committee, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1962—.

BOLTON, FRANCES P. Member of the House of Representatives (Rep., Ohio), 1940—; member of Committee on Foreign Affairs.

BOUATTOURA, TEWFIK. Algerian permanent representative to the United Nations, 1964—.

BRENNER, ANDREW F. Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of Commerce; member, Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament, 1963—.

BRENNAN, DONALD S. Consultant to the Executive Office of the President on arms control problems, 1961; participant in the Pugwash Conference, 1960; president, Hudson Institute, 1961—; member, Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament of the National Citizens’ Commission on International Cooperation, 1965.

BRONFENBRENNER, URIE. Professor of Psychology, Cornell University; member of ACDA Social Science Advisory Board, 1964—.

BROOMFIELD, WILLIAM S. Member of House of Representatives (Rep., Mich.), 1956—; member of House Foreign Affairs Committee.

BROSIO, MANLIO. Secretary-General of NATO, 1964—.

BUNN, GEORGE. Attorney Advisor, U.S. Disarmament Administration, 1961; Counsel to the President’s Adviser on Disarmament, 1961; General Counsel, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1961—.

BURNS, Lt. Gen. EEDSON L. M. Canadian Ambassador on the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee and leader of the delegation, 1962—.

CALIFANO, JOSEPH A., Jr. Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense; member, Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament, 1963—.

CAPRON, WILLIAM M. Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget; member, Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament, 1963—.

CAVAGGELLI DI OLIVETO SAVINO, MARQUIS FRANCESCO. Italian Ambassador on the ENDC and deputy leader of the delegation, 1962–1963; Ambassador and leader of the delegation, 1963—.

ČERNÝ, ZDENĚK. Leader of the Czechoslovak delegation to the ENDC, 1966—; deputy leader of delegation to the ENDC, 1965.

CHAKRAVARTY, BIRENDRA NARAYAN. Indian permanent representative to the United Nations, 1962—.

CHALFONT, LORD. British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 1965—; leader of the delegation to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, 1965—.

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CHIANG KAI-SHEK. President of the Republic of China, 1943–1949, 1950—.

CLARKE, JOSEPH S. U.S. Senator (Dem., Pa.), 1956—; member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

CLEMENTS, WALTER C., JR. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1963–1966; Executive Officer of the Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament of the National Citizens’ Commission on International Cooperation, 1965.

CONGER, CLEMENT E. Special Assistant to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1962–1963; Special Assistant to the Director and Executive Secretary, 1963—.

CONLEY, PATRICK. Office of Science and Technology; member, Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament, 1963—.


Cummings, H. Don. Member of the Executive Committee of the Washington Chapter of the American Veterans Committee, 1949-1955.


Derwiniski, Edward J. Member of House of Representatives (Rep., Ill.), 1958-1963; member of House Foreign Affairs Committee.


Eaton, Frederick M. Chairman, U.S. delegation to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, 1960; member, Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament of the National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation, 1965.


Etzioni, Ami. Professor, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University.


Fisher, Adrian S. Acting Deputy Director, U.S. Disarmament Administration, 1961; Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1961–.

Foster, William C. Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1961–.

Fowler, Henry Howill. Undersecretary of the U.S. Treasury Department, 1961–1964; U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, 1965–.

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Fulton, James G. Member of House of Representatives (Rep., Pa.), 1945–; member of House Science and Astronautics Committee; member of House Foreign Affairs Committee.

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Hays, Wayne L. Member of House of Representatives (Dem., Ohio), 1948--; member of House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Heard, Alexander. Chancellor of Vanderbilt University and Professor of Political Science; member of Social Science Advisory Board, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1964--.


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Humphrey, Hubert H. U.S. Senator (Dem., Minn.), 1949--1965; Senate Majority Whip, 1961--1965; Chairman of the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1955--1964; Vice-President, 1965--.


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Johnson, Lyndon B. Vice President of the United States, 1961--1963; President, 1963--.

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Sohier, Walter. General Counsel, National Aeronautics and Space Administration; member, Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament, 1963–.


Sparkman, John. Member of House of Representatives (Dem., Ala.), 1936–1946; U.S. Senator, 1946–; member of Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Spillane, Richard, S. J. Director, Center for Peace Research, The, Creighton University; member, Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament of the National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation, 1965.


Stone, Jeremy J. Research Associate, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.

Than, U. Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1961–.

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Truman, Harry S. President of the United States, 1945–1953.


Wiesner, Jerome. Former Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; Dean, School of Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Chairman, Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament of the National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation, 1965.

Wilson, Harold. British Prime Minister, 1964–.


Zablocki, Clement J. Member of the House of Representatives (Dem., Wis.), 1948–; member of House Foreign Affairs Committee.

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